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This study provides a new understanding of the nature of Eastman Kodak Research. 
The thesis considers the European context between 1891 and 1912, before the 
creation of the first Kodak Research Laboratory in 1912 at Rochester, New York, and 
between 1928 and 1950 with the opening of two additional Research Laboratories in 
the United Kingdom and in France. It sheds light on the technological and 
organisational relationship between the main Kodak Research Laboratory in Rochester 
and the later, related, Kodak Research Laboratories in Europe.  
 
Analysis of publications from numerous independent photochemists demonstrates 
that industrial secrecy during the interwar years limited the sharing of scientific 
knowledge and delayed developments in photographic science. The first Kodak 
Research Laboratory was created in Rochester in 1912 to address this issue internally. 
Its first director, Kenneth Mees, developed an innovative organisational model which 
combined fundamental and applied research in order to protect scientific facts about 
the photographic process that were discovered in-house and to create the appropriate 
preconditions for the development of new and marketable products. 
 
Qualitative analysis of unpublished research reports stresses the multi-faceted nature 
of the photographic research undertaken at the Harrow Research Laboratory from 
1929 onwards. It shows that the British Laboratory was open to external sources of 
scientific knowledge and innovative technologies. Photographic knowledge was shared 
significantly during the 1930s between the American, British and French Research 
Laboratories and Production Departments, as also evidenced by the previously 
undiscovered personal notebooks of a number of photochemists. Analysis of the 
British and more recently uncovered French Kodak archives also reveals that long-term 
Kodak research about colour photography was interrelated with the European Kodak 
Research Laboratories during the interwar period. Original analyses of unpublished 




during the Second World War was at the core of the scientific collaboration between 
Kodak Limited and independent inventors. 
 
This thesis concludes that the work of the European Kodak research laboratories was 
fundamental to Eastman Kodak in the twentieth century. Despite cultural disparities, 
the three laboratories followed an organisational model that promoted scientific 
collaboration. Furthermore, the modest size of Kodak Research in Europe during the 
early years forced the company to partially adopt an “Open Innovation” model, 
combining external sources of technology with in-house research. This is the first study 
to address the question of the European nature of Kodak Research using unpublished 
laboratory archives. It unveils the complete organisation of Kodak research, including 
knowledge transfer and scientific collaborations, as well as the actors in Kodak 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. General Introduction 
1.1.1 Preliminary discussion 
Right from the birth of photography in 1839 the nature of the light-sensitive material 
and the operating principles of the photographic process have always been an 
important field of study. During the first years of the medium, photographic processes 
were short-lived and developed with rather simple photochemical technology. The 
making of the sensitive image layer was shared and discussed by amateurs, early 
photographers and photochemists in treatises or through the first photographic 
journals. The sensitive material was either on metal, paper, glass or celluloid and it was 
quite easy to acquaint the fundamental recipes of a process and even to improve some 
of its characteristics through basic experimental work. This situation of sharing 
photographic knowledge within the small but growing community of photographers 
changed progressively towards the end of the nineteenth century. The industrialisation 
applied progressively to photography led to new behaviours towards the science of 
making sensitive materials, whose production increased substantially. From the year 
1871 and the development of gelatine silver-bromide plates by Richard Leach Maddox, 
photography became more and more a matter of investment, entrepreneurship and 
innovation as well. To ensure the continued existence of this new industry it was 
necessary to protect its assets in several ways. The time to diffuse and discuss 
photographic knowledge without restrictions was over. The know-how developed and 
improved within the photographic plants was progressively hidden by means of 
managerial procedures organizing industrial secrecy or by way of patenting the 
innovative technology. The central figure of innovation in the film and plate factories 
became the photochemist, frequently the manager and owner or a “master emulsion 




“model of innovation”1 was hazardous for the company’s owner as it depended on the 
skills and loyalty of one individual employee or paid consultant. 
This thesis deals directly with these processes and discusses the circumstances that led 
Eastman Kodak to a deep reorganisation of its “model of innovation”. It clarifies, using 
unpublished archival material, the nature of industrial research undertaken by the 
photochemists, managers and researchers before and after 1912. To move away from 
the old “model of innovation” for which scientific knowledge produced by employees 
was not sufficiently protected, the Eastman Kodak Company was one of the first 
industrial organisations in the photographic field to promote innovation in-house 
through the creation of a Research Laboratory. Taking other industries as a “model of 
innovation” through this new structure of research, George Eastman decided to hire a 
well-known director who would be in charge of managing and structuring the technical 
and scientific areas to study. From now on innovation became controlled and 
performed by a substantial and increasing staff of researchers sorted into several 
scientific departments according to their technical and academic backgrounds. Up to 
2009 and the transfer of the Kodak Limited archive to the British Library, it was 
impossible to undertake historical research into such a community of scientists from a 
corporate archive. Access to such artifacts, comprising primary sources such as 
correspondence, research reports or individual notebooks, was impossible until now 
due to their confidential nature. One could only speculate about the daily work of the 
researchers, the organisation of their research, the sharing of scientific knowledge or 
the transfer of a theoretical invention to the experimental work and manufacturing 
routine.  
                                                     
1 The concept of innovation relates to the set of activities taken by the firm to eventually release a new 
product for which a market could be found. In the 1950s and 1960s technological innovation was seen 
as a model of “linear innovation” in several phases from invention to innovation to diffusion. See Benoît 
Godin, "The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework," 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 31, no. 6 (2006): 639-667. For the evolution of “innovation 





Nevertheless, the time has now come to open the "Black Box" of research activities 
undertaken by the major film manufacturers of the twentieth century. When the 
corporate and scientific archive of Kodak Limited was donated to the British Library, it 
was clear that research could be planned to progressively unveil the silver curtain2 that 
was still masking the activities of this industry a few years ago. The discovery of a 
second corpus of data from Pathé and Kodak-Pathé in France modified the scope of 
the research questions and generated more findings and analysis than initially 
expected. In particular, the study of a specific archival source, namely the research 
reports produced by the staff of the two research laboratories from 1929, provided 
key information about the production of scientific knowledge but also its transfer and 
the collaborative work organized among the American, English and French Kodak 
Research Laboratories and third parties. It transpired from the research that it was a 
community of heterogeneous specialists who undertook the development and making 
of photography during the twentieth century. Researchers, scholars, independent 
photochemists and executives shaped the physical nature of photography by 
developing “innovative” photographic processes. This global teamwork was a radical 
shift compared with the situation in the nineteenth century and the monopoly of the 
almost independent entrepreneur and inventor working with his emulsion maker. 
Finally, the study of the organisation of industrial research and the management of 
innovation at Eastman Kodak during the twentieth century is crucial because it 
complements our understanding of the photographic medium as a whole.3 The visual 
universe of photography during the last century was directly connected with the 
photosensitive emulsions that the film manufacturers could provide. The artistic, 
                                                     
2 This expression was used during the twentieth century by technical and scientific staff of Eastman 
Kodak Company at Rochester to define the procedures as a whole to set up industrial secrecy during the 
manufacturing process. It concerned in particular the confidentiality of formulas, ingredients’ nature 
and production departments’ know-how. See Robert L. Shanebrook, Making KODAK Film. The Illustrated 
Story of State-of-the-Art Photographic Film Manufacturing (Rochester, NY: Robert Shanebrook 
Photography, 2010).  
3 Similar researches about innovation and development of processes already exist for the primitive 
period of the medium 1839-1860 because the scientific knowledge involved was not yet protected 




vernacular and professional use of photography was therefore related to a set of 
technological constraints with which the cine and photographic film manufacturers 
had to deal. These constraints represent a direct correlation between industrial actors 
who were inventing and making photography and individuals who were using 
photography as a finished product. 
 
1.1.2. Research design and research questions 
The aim of my research is to qualify and quantify the contribution of the European 
Kodak Research Laboratories to scientific and industrial Research at Eastman Kodak, 
leading to theoretical discoveries in the photographic process and to the diffusion of 
new innovative products. In other words, the aim is to ascertain the production and 
transfer of technological and scientific knowledge between the three Kodak Research 
Laboratories in Rochester, Harrow and Vincennes from 1928 to 1950. The final aim of 
the research is to define the “models of innovation” used by Eastman Kodak in Europe 
and its evolution for the longer period 1891-1950, before and after the creation of the 
Kodak Research Laboratories. 
For this purpose and in order to ascertain the production and transfer of scientific 
knowledge between the Kodak Research Laboratories, we need to clarify the historical 
context of photographic research in Europe before the creation of the first Kodak 
Research Laboratory at Rochester, New York, in 1912. It is also necessary to identify 
the nature of industrial research at Eastman Kodak before and after 1912. Concerning 
the European side of Kodak Research, we need to study the Eastman Kodak strategy 
that led to the opening of two additional Research Laboratories in Europe at the end of 
1928. The next stage of the research is to draw from the analysis of the French and 
British research reports some findings about the daily work of the researchers, the 
nature of the technological and scientific fields of study, the organisation and methods 
of industrial research and of international scientific collaboration. Furthermore, it is 
important to demonstrate that the analysis of some researchers’ notebooks confirms 




context of knowledge transfer, we need to clarify from the analysis of some corporate 
documents in the British Kodak archive terms of scientific collaboration between 
independent inventors and Eastman Kodak. To this end, several case studies raise the 
question of the patent system in the innovation process at Eastman Kodak. These 
studies clarify that it was used as a gatekeeper for scientific knowledge and acted as 
the guarantor of the company’s intellectual property. Some unpublished 
correspondence in the British Kodak archive about the drafting of patent literature 
provides new findings concerning the production of scientific knowledge and the 
organisation of scientific collaboration. Finally, considering the complete set of data 
gathered from the archives about the industrial research activities at Eastman Kodak, it 
is possible to qualify in the conclusion the “models of innovation” used by the 
company from 1928 to 1950. 
In brief, the three main chapters of the thesis contain the following topics. 
In chapter 2, the study of the historical context of photographic research in Europe 
demonstrates that the practice of industrial secrecy in the process of film 
manufacturing restricted the sharing of photographic knowledge to a large extent in 
the first half of the twentieth century. In spite of these practices, the same chapter 
demonstrates that there is some evidence of basic and industrial research at Kodak 
Limited before 1912. The Works chemist at Harrow, Thomas Krohn did some research 
into the measurement of emulsion speed and collaborated with the British chemists 
John Sterry, Ferdinand Hurter and Vero Charles Driffield from 1894 to 1899, thereby 
benefiting from their research in this field. The situation is similar for the French 
competitor Pathé before 1912 and chapter 2 recounts the research work in France 
about a new nonflammable film base. This additional study makes sense in the 
framework of the research because most of the researchers at Pathé would eventually 
constitute the scientific team of the Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratory in Vincennes 
after the merge with Eastman Kodak in 1927. The next section of chapter 2 introduces 




also analyses the personality of the first director of research Kenneth Mees and the 
organisation of the Research Laboratory progressively set up under his management.  
Similarly, chapter 3 introduces the European Kodak Research Laboratories opened in 
Britain and in France at the turn of 1928. The first section analyses Mees’ decision to 
create an international network devoted to industrial research. It also points out 
differences between the British and French Laboratories. The first one started from 
scratch from an evolving industrial structure at Harrow focused on cine and 
photographic film production. The second one already had a long-term tradition of 
fundamental and applied research in the photographic field. Chapter 3 also shows how 
the European Kodak Laboratories partially adopted the organisation of the main Kodak 
Research Laboratory at Rochester through external publications dedicated to the 
scientific community and through the in-house production of research reports at 
Harrow and research notebooks at Vincennes, which where only available to a 
restricted audience. 
In the next section of chapter 3, an exhaustive study of the production of knowledge at 
the Harrow Research Laboratory is conducted through the analysis of the British 
research reports. The sampling consists of the full sets of reports for the six first years 
1929-1935. Two qualitative analyses are performed on these reports numbered from 
H.2c to H.350. The first one is a statistical analysis made with the complete reports’ 
titles using a Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). It 
provides an overall view of the most important topics studied by the Harrow Research 
Laboratory for the period 1929-1935. The second analysis is more refined and 
addresses the reports’ content as well. It relies on the concept of interactional 
expertise developed by Collins and Evans in 2002 to justify the selection of several case 
studies from the many reports. 
Following these important narratives of the British Laboratory’s activities, the situation 
of the Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratory is then studied. This study uncovers for the 
first time the qualitative and quantitative nature of the scientific collaboration and 




analyses the exchange of research reports made by the director of the French 
Laboratory Marcel Abribat from Vincennes to Harrow during the period 1928-1935. 
The second part of the study details a similar exchange with Harrow for 1935 only, but 
this time it concerns the full staff of the Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratory. The analysis 
shows who the British addressees were as well as identifying their position within the 
company. The third part of the study clarifies the evolution of knowledge transfer in 
the year 1950. It shows the bilateral exchange of scientific literature between 
Rochester, Harrow and Vincennes. 
The final section of chapter 3 provides an additional insight into the production of 
scientific knowledge in the photographic industry through the analyses of some 
personal notebooks. Photochemists, researchers and production managers used these 
key tools to keep formulas of experimental emulsions or recipes. The study of these 
personal notebooks reveals that they were as important as the research reports for 
the production and exchange of technical and scientific knowledge. 
While chapter 3 deals with the nature and methodology of Kodak Research at the two 
European Research Laboratories, chapter 4 is devoted to the long-term research for 
colour photographic processes undertaken by the three Kodak Research Laboratories 
from 1914 to 1950. The narrative of Kodak research in colour photography is split into 
several case studies to ascertain the multifaceted aspect of industrial research and the 
nature of innovation used. These histories involved heterogeneous historical sources 
such as secondary sources, archival sources and patent literature. They are all 
connected together to clarify the evolution of Kodak Research’s strategy as it hesitated 
between additive and subtractive colour processes. 
Thus, the first section of chapter 4 introduces the research work of the photochemist 
John Capstaff at the Kodak Research Laboratory in Rochester from 1914 to 1918. He 
developed a two-colour subtractive process on glass plates, which was named 
Kodachrome. The process was only used on an experimental basis and never took off 
due to technical issues and the outbreak of the First World War. This first Kodachrome 




green filters. After the bleaching and dying of each plate, the coloured image could be 
viewed by superimposing the plates. Technically, two major characteristics announced 
the second Kodachrome process launched in 1935: the use of filters and the 
superimposition of two photographic layers. 
Moving away from this first attempt at a colour subtractive process, the second 
section describes the pioneering research work of the optical engineer Rodolphe 
Berton at Pathé from 1913 to 1914. The French scientist developed the basis of an 
additive lenticular process able to reproduce three colours. The discovery of Berthon’s 
research notebooks in the French Kodak-Pathé archive is exceptional because his 
colour technology, after being improved during his association with the industrial 
Keller-Dorian, was eventually purchased by Eastman Kodak and launched as the first 
Kodacolor process in 1928. 
However, the lenticular colour process could not compare with cinematographic 
colour processes developed by the Technicolor Motion Picture Corporation. This is why 
George Eastman and his director of research Kenneth Mees were investigating other 
technologies at the same time. Thus, the next section of chapter 4 introduces the long-
term research work of the two independent photochemists Leopold Mannes and 
Leopold Godowsky into an innovative subtractive tripack process. This section shows 
how the scientific collaboration with Eastman Kodak led to the incorporation of the 
two scientists into the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester. It also sheds light on 
the existing secondary sources concerning the three-colour Kodachrome process with 
unpublished archival sources such as the exclusive licence agreements between the 
photochemists and the firm. Finally the end of the section points out that methods and 
strategies of patenting scientific facts and innovation represented a major and growing 
constraint for photographic research in the 1930s. Concerning Mannes, Godowsky and 
Eastman Kodak, the major threat to the three-colour Kodachrome process was the 
patent work and applications of Leonard T. Troland, director of research at 




well-known patent reissue 18680 which forced Eastman Kodak to purchase a license 
and to modify its agreement with the inventors Mannes and Godowsky. 
The second part of chapter 4 confirms the predominance of the patent system in 
photographic industrial research. It also brings to an end the long narrative about the 
three-colour Kodachrome and clarifies that the positive process in colour was far from 
perfect when it was launched in 1935. Unpublished documents show how the British 
scientist Franck B. Phillips from the Kodak Research Laboratory at Harrow was 
cooperating closely with Mannes and Godowsky to perfect the Kodachrome 
developing process at Rochester in May 1935. These documents also reveal that 
Phillips discussed how to simplify the Kodachrome processing with the American 
researcher Lot Wilder in February 1938. Through Wilder’s further research work into 
the innovative technologies used in subtractive tripack processes, the end of the 
section demonstrates that Kodak research in colour photography grew significantly 
after 1935 as new scientific ways of mastering visible light through the three-layer 
monopack film were explored. 
The next section of chapter 4 deals with one of these technologies through the analysis 
of files related to the drafting of patent literature between the independent inventor 
Michele Martinez and the staff of Kodak Limited’s Patents and Trademarks 
Department. This innovation secured through the scientific collaboration with 
Martinez was fundamental to the future of colour photography because it was a new 
solution to prevent the couplers from wandering into the adjacent layers of monopack 
films. The technology of couplers incorporated in resin or protected couplers was used 
in particular in new Kodacolor negative films from 1942. The narrative of the patent 
application’s drafting becomes intermingled with the history of the United Kingdom 
because in 1941, at the time of the collaboration with Kodak Limited concerning the 
application 9657/40, Martinez was interned on the Isle of Man as an Italian alien and 
potential enemy. Despite this major constraint caused by the Second World War, the 




the incorporation of colour couplers in the emulsion, was finally obtained in March 
1942. 
Similarly, the last section of chapter 4 expands the notion of the patent system as an 
essential tool in the industrial research undertaken by the photographic industry. It 
deals with the scientific collaboration of the American and British Kodak Research 
Laboratories and the prolific inventor Karl Schinzel from 1936 to his death in 1951. 
Scientific collaboration between Schinzel and Eastman Kodak represents a synthesis 
between the similar collaborations with Martinez, Mannes and Godowsky. Indeed 
Schinzel was first employed by Eastman Kodak at Rochester, but was later 
commissioned as an expert consultant to open a new Research Laboratory in 
Switzerland that would be financed by the American firm. The project for this 
experimental Research Laboratory is first studied through the analysis of legal 
documents identifying the terms of collaboration between Schinzel and Eastman 
Kodak. Despite the failure to open the laboratory, these archival sources have a 
fundamental role in clarifying the methods and the rationale used by an industrial firm 
to develop its own research activities within the framework of modern innovation. 
As to Schinzel’s patent literature, its significance in colour photography technologies 
and their intellectual properties was even more important for Eastman Kodak than 
Martinez’s patent work. For the first time this mutual work between Schinzel and the 
researchers and managers at Eastman Kodak to secure and patent theoretical 
inventions in colour photography is established, including the background behind the 
drafting of some applications. This section also points out that despite constraints 
similar to those faced by Martinez during the Second World War, Schinzel’s various 
experiences during the War did not prevent the Kodak managers and researchers from 





1.2. Literature review 
1.2.1. Previous studies about Kodak history and Kodak research 
In the literature about industrial science, there are no comparable studies of 
photographic companies. This industry is dominated by small and medium-sized 
enterprises and corporate archives are often neglected and not preserved. Big firms 
such as Eastman Kodak are rare. For instance, as the British and French Kodak archives 
only recently become available to researchers, no study has used these corpora of 
marketing, scientific or legal artifacts as yet. Concerning my study about the nature of 
Kodak research, the existing literature about Kodak history and technology is 
consequently restricted and rather heterogeneous. Some information about 
technology and industrial research can be found in two biographies of George 
Eastman, the founder of Eastman Kodak.4 In particular Elizabeth Brayer constructed 
her narrative of Eastman’s life through the analysis of his extensive correspondence. 
This way it not only provided information about the founder and his decisions but also 
crucial data about some of the company’s key managers and scientists. The content of 
chapter 13, about the research for a viable colour photographic process clarifies this 
long-term period of technological uncertainty which was dominated by many 
theoretical and experimental processes.5 In a very different style, the vast study of 
Kodak history published by Collins provided valuable information about three-colour 
Kodachrome in particular.6 Collins gathered documentation about the science of 
photography and the Kodak Research Laboratories from the research archivist Murray 
Pierson, who worked for the Eastman Kodak Company before her retirement and from 
the coordinator of Research Communications in the same company, Timothy Hughes 
at the end of the 1980s. Despite some invaluable information and important details, 
the goal of Collins’ publication was to offer an overall view of the Eastman Kodak 
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Company’s history. Consequently, this publication lacks an academic structure with no 
detailed footnotes and an incomplete bibliography.7 
Fifteen years before, Jenkins’ Images and Enterprise was the first academic research 
study to ascertain the development of the photographic industry in America from 1839 
to 1925 at the end of George Eastman’s management period.8 It deals particularly with 
the growth of the Eastman Kodak Company and a chapter was devoted to the founding 
of the Research Laboratory at Rochester in 1912. Jenkins introduced the notion of 
master emulsion maker and explained how these trained chemists took part in the 
transfer of photographic emulsion knowledge by moving frequently from one company 
to another.9 Like Brayer, Jenkins analysed the correspondence of George Eastman 
along with some public documents and records such as the very long court transcript 
of Goodwin Film & Camera Company v. Eastman Kodak Company dated from 1914.10 
The influence of Jenkins remains important in recent studies about Kodak history and 
innovation in the photographic industry. Some scholars mentioned his original 
academic work and his pioneer methodology of collecting and analysing George 
Eastman’s correspondence.11  In his biography Brayer recognized that “of all secondary 
sources, only Jenkins, Butterfield and Ackerman are based on the rich primary source 
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important information gathered. He only included some partial text credits p. 386 but no bibliography. 
The author only gave in his acknowledgements pp. 12-13 the name of some Kodak employees at 
Rochester having provided some information or the access to some specific archives. 
8 Reese Jenkins, Images and Enterprise: Technology and the American Photographic Industry, 1839 to 
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of Eastman’s extensive correspondence”.12 However the studies of Jenkins, Brayer and 
Collins do not provide clear and complete indications of the methods used by the 
researchers or the chemists and individual inventors working and developing new 
ideas, processes and products before them. The Eastman Kodak scientific archive was 
simply not available during the writing of these studies.   
Publications directly connected with the history and activities of the Kodak Research 
Laboratories are scarce. Some descriptive papers written by Eastman Kodak executives 
were published from the start of the Research Laboratory at Rochester up to the 
Seventies13 and equivalent papers appeared from time to time from external writers14. 
These papers usually introduced specific fields of photographic research and pointed 
out technical and scientific milestones with some biographical indications about the 
researchers involved. In 1962 Roy Davies, the second director of the Research 
Laboratory of Kodak Limited, gave a lecture on research in photography at the Royal 
Photographic Society.15 But his talk gave no additional indications about the 
methodology used by the English researchers. Instead, he discussed the legitimacy of a 
research laboratory in the industrial sector, stressing that such a structure was vital, 
providing solid resources and a continuous flow of innovation. 
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At Eastman Kodak, two publications prepared the ground for an official history of the 
industrial research undertaken into photography within the Research Laboratories of 
the company. The first was Mees’s last book, printed after he died in 1961. From Dry 
Plates to Ektachrome Film is a reference book frequently cited by later authors when 
Kodak research in the photographic science is studied.16 Mees consulted the historian 
Beaumont Newhall and many scientific experts of the Rochester Research Laboratory 
for the writing of some chapters.17 It was also the first publication to introduce the 
French and English Research Laboratories, with some indication about staff and 
organisation.18 
A celebratory book was published by Eastman Kodak in 1989 on the occasion of the 
75th anniversary of the American Research Laboratory.19 During the research work for 
the book, Jeffrey Sturchio and Arnold Thackray, at that time independent scholars of 
the Center for the History of Chemistry at the University of Pennysylvania, undertook a 
series of interviews of Kodak researchers and managers. Although providing often 
relevant data about scientific research as well as reproductions of exceptional material 
and artifacts, Journey: 75 years of Kodak Research did not avoid the pitfall of the long 
technological narrative to depict what was perceived as a history in progress. Indeed, 
Kodak research was feeling the beginnings of its slow decline after having been at its 
peak. The change between 1985 and 1986 in its organisation confused the existing 
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teams of researchers accustomed to the centralized system of management from the 
Mees era. It seemed therefore like an appropriate moment to remember and to count 
the scientific milestones provided by successive generations of Kodak researchers. In 
parallel to this publication, Sturchio gave a talk at the Hagley R&D Pioneers Conference 
at the Hagley Museum and Library in 1985.20 His speech very likely presented a unique 
in-depth study of the evolution of Kodak research before and after 1912. Sturchio 
provided the context for the industrial research in the early years of the twentieth 
century. He also introduced Mees’s vision of the organisation of research, and studied 
the structure and methods of the Rochester Research Laboratory such as the 
conference system. His findings provide the necessary backdrops for a study of the 
European Research Laboratories, and for a discussion of the international structure 
and organisation of Kodak Research. Nonetheless he did not introduce the European 
part of Kodak Research and did not anticipate the collaborative work and exchange of 
knowledge between the three Laboratories. 
In 1920, Mees published his first Organization of Industrial Research which contained 
his philosophy of the organisation of a research laboratory.21 Initially focused on the 
photographic industry, Mees wanted his theory to be applied to other industries.22 The 
book was reworked with the researcher Leermakers who would later become a 
director of the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester and a second edition was 
published in 1950 together.23 Recent scholars have studied the role of Mees in 
Eastman Kodak’s strategy of research and innovation. Buckland studied how Mees 
used his academic and professional network to attract some skilled scientists to the 
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Research Laboratories through the example of the physicist and photochemist 
Emanuel Goldberg. As soon as he was appointed by Eastman as the director of the new 
laboratory, Mees unsuccessfully attempted to hire his friend Goldberg, with whom he 
stayed in touch through the years.24 Shapin discussed at length Mees’s ideas from the 
analysis of the two editions of the Organization of Industrial Research.25 The author 
particularly stressed the uncertain characteristic of industrial research. For Mees and 
his contemporaries, uncertainty governed fundamental or pure research while applied 
research could be predictable in producing regular outcomes. Shapin pointed out that 
Mees’s view about research work’s uncertainty remained the same during his whole 
professional life. Research work could not be scheduled and its outcomes were 
unpredictable.26 For Mees, the difficulty of planning industrial research was also due to 
the frequent technological advance of inventions worked out within the laboratory but 
not yet ready for the market. In chapter 3, analysis of the British research reports 
precisely ascertains the amount of fundamental research work related to uncertainty 
and whose outcomes could not be determined. Shapin also introduced many other 
faces of Mees’s view such as his faith in research disorganisation. For Mees, this way of 
reducing industrial research’s planning was a strategy to increase the continuity of the 
scientific work undertaken by the researchers.27 Finally, Fisk stressed the strategic 
importance of secretive practices at Eastman Kodak.28 Mees, who was a photochemist, 
encouraged his researchers to publish their findings about pure scientific advances. 
However, he considered that companies should not publish results related to the 
improvement of manufacturing technology. For Mees, technology was different from 
pure science but in direct relationship with the methods used for production. This 
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explains why it is impossible to find literature from Kodak researchers that details 
scientific topics and technologies studied by the Research Laboratories.29  
Moving away from the historical context of the Kodak Research Laboratories, a series 
of papers published at the end of the twentieth century took into account the 
structural changes in the organisation of research. Uthman discussed the new 
laboratory information management system (LIMS).30 The goal of this system was to 
improve the sharing of data among Eastman Kodak’s many laboratories and it was 
progressively implemented at several Kodak sites from 1990 to 1993, among them the 
Research Laboratories at Harrow and Chalon-sur-Saône (France). It echoes the system 
of in-house knowledge transfer from 1929 to 1950 that is studied in chapter 3. Gove et 
al. mentioned an example of scientific collaboration between the Kodak Research 
Laboratory and a public institution.31 They clarified how a collaborative research 
program was undertaken with the members of the Nuclear Structure Research 
Laboratory of the University of Rochester and some researchers at Kodak Park 
concerning silver halide imaging research. As for Strong, he introduced the recent 
marketing turn of the company at the end of the 1980s.32 He pointed out in particular 
that “the outdated functional organisation was replaced by a series of business units 
focused on specific customers and markets”.33 He also insisted that the new 
organisation wanted to increase communication between research, manufacturing and 
marketing. This new organisation compares with the centralized organisation of 
Mees’s era that is studied in chapter 2. The structural change also had consequences 
on the methodologies used to innovate, as ascertained by Kanter et al. or Utterback, 
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and the notion of competency within the context of rapid technological change.34 This 
same context was reconsidered by Munir and Phillips through the example of the 
photographic industry to illustrate how firms facing a radical discontinuity could suffer 
from uncertainty if they did not anticipate this technological turn.35 Actually, the 
outcomes of industrial research are supposed to reduce the uncertainty created by the 
adoption of new technologies and chapter 4 demonstrates how this process was 
successful regarding colour photography. The release of lenticular Kodacolor in 1928 
was the opportunity to test the market and to ascertain that Eastman Kodak had to 
improve the process and resume the research. 
Finally, the most recent papers about Eastman Kodak provided analyses of the fall of 
one of the biggest photographic companies. Facing the digital revolution, the 
managers fell behind by suggesting hybrid solutions of “film-based digital imaging” 
such as the Photo CD.36 The Christensen theory of “disruptive innovation”37 has been 
advanced or extended by several scholars.38 However Munir and Phillips balanced the 
notion of disruptive technologies, arguing that the marketing discourse of institutional 
entrepreneurs to construct the social context of a technology was at least as important 
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as the nature of the technology itself.39 The authors drew their conclusions from 
original research implying critical discourse analysis of Kodak marketing and the study 
of the introduction of the roll-film camera by Kodak in 1882. Despite their interest in 
understanding the recent economic situation of Eastman Kodak, these papers only 
addressed the final stage of the innovative process, which is the release and diffusion 
of new technologies. They did not tackle the concrete nature of Kodak Research and its 
organisation, which are the subjects of this thesis. 
 
1.2.2. Studies about the photographic industry at large 
The literature about Eastman Kodak found up to now partially enlightened my 
research questions. However, the challenge was also to find if publications dealing 
with other manufacturers in the photographic industry could provide further elements 
of knowledge and methodology. Aside from the Kodak managers already cited above, 
few documents were found about other film manufacturers in Europe. Didiée provided 
a thorough description of the Pathé-Cinéma works at Vincennes just before the 
acquisition by Eastman Kodak.40 In Italy, Cassinis, the technical director of the film and 
plates manufacturer FILM at Ferrania during the Interwar, published some articles 
about the photographic industry in Italy and its evolution.41 In particular, the author 
pointed out that a research laboratory was created in 1935 at Ferrania along the lines 
of the Kodak and Agfa Research Laboratories. However very little was known about 
this Italian Research Laboratory. In 1953 the director of Research G. B. Harrison at 
Ilford Limited published a descriptive paper about the Ilford laboratories from his 
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lecture delivered to the Royal Society on May 1952.42 Although his paper provided a 
relevant history of the laboratories over more than 50 years, Harrison listed only the 
most significant of the company’s milestones and the principal scientific fields studied. 
One year later, the Chartered Patent agent of Ilford Limited, Victor Gallafent gave a 
more pertinent lecture when he discussed the organisation of photographic research 
at Kodak Limited and Ilford Limited.43 In particular, he stressed the importance of the 
patent system as an aid to research and the significant role of independent inventors. 
In 1960, Sipley of the American Museum of Photography decided to publish the 
autobiography of an intriguing photochemist, Wentzel.44 German born, Wentzel 
painted in his own memoirs a portrait of the European photographic industry up to and 
including his period at the American Ansco company. He reported some of the 
methods and secretive practices employed by the many photographic plants he 
worked with. Both Wentzel’s recollections and Gallafent’s views are used in chapter 2 
to contextualize the photographic industry in the first half of the twentieth century 
and its management of scientific knowledge. More recently, Sauteron published his 
recollections of his period at Kodak-Pathé and some historical insights from his 
personal research using unidentified archives of the company.45 
In terms of academic studies, very few contemporary scholars have studied the 
photographic industry. Löhnert and Gill recently discussed the development of 
scientific and industrial research at Agfa and the contribution of the director of the 
Agfa Research Laboratories at Wolfen in Germany, John Eggert.46 Nevertheless the 
                                                     
42 G. B. Harrison, "The Laboratories of Ilford Limited," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series 
A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences 220, no. 1143 (December 22, 1953): 9-20. 
43 Victor Gallafent, "The Direction of Photographic Research," The Photographic Journal 94 (April, 1954): 
104-118. 
44 Fritz Wentzel, Memoirs of a Photochemist (Philadelphia: American Museum of Photography, 1960). 
45  Franco̧is Sauteron, Une Si Jolie Usine : Kodak-Pathe ́Vincennes (Paris: Harmattan, 2008); François 
Sauteron, La Chute De L'Empire Kodak (Paris: Harmattan, 2009). It is not possible to use Sauteron’s 
findings in the framework of my research as the telling is novelistic and made of a succession of 
anecdotes without references.  
46 Peter Löhnert and Manfred Gill, "The Relationship of I.G. Farben's Agfa Filmfabrik Wolfen to its Jewish 
Scientists and Scientists Married to Jews, 1933-1939," in The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth 




principal research question studied by the authors was the social and political situation 
of the Jewish employees at Agfa and in the Filmfabrik Wolfen during the National 
Socialist period in Germany. Moving away from a historical perspective, Kadiyali 
studied the U.S. photographic film industry in the context of industrial organisation 
economics.47 The author used the methodology of the new empirical industrial 
organisation for the period 1970-1990 to ascertain how at the turn of 1980, Fuji had 
entered the market dominated thus far by Eastman Kodak. Concerning the history of 
the twenty century British photographic industry, the only study of the subject was 
apparently published by Edgerton.48 Like Gallafent, he compared the research at Kodak 
Limited and Ilford Limited, but with additional data, describing the financial means and 
the staff of scientists and photochemists who were progressively hired during the 
interwar years. The author argued that the lack of knowledge in dyestuffs chemistry 
within Ilford drastically limited the expertise of the English firm in colour processes. He 
defined Eastman Kodak’s research as more separate from production than Ilford’s. 
Edgerton also noticed that at the time of writing studies about industrial research 
within British firms were rare. Edgerton and especially Horrocks progressively revived 
this subject. In 1994 as co-authors they tried to estimate the R&D investment in the 
British industry before 1945 from analysis of corporate archives. 49 From their findings, 
they argued that the amount of R&D undertaken by British companies was higher than 
estimated in previous studies and rejected in particular the conclusions of Mowerey 
and Chandler about the matter.50 Later, Horrocks continued to investigate the British 
industry through the archives of industrial and scientific organisations and individual 
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firms.51 She also discussed the alliances between academic researchers and industrial 
organisations52 and the internationalization of R&D activities, citing the example of 
Kodak for which “the greatest degree of internationalization of research activity was 
found”.53 The pioneering work of Edgerton and Horrocks about the British industry is 
partially used in chapter 3 for the description of Kodak Research at Harrow and for the 
question of knowledge transfer. It is also worth noting that the scarcity of British 
industry studies increases the relevance of my research into the European Kodak 
Research Laboratories, which will complement this recent field of study. 
 
1.2.3. The question of industrial research and large-scale 
organisations 
Horrocks’ literature about the British industry contextualized photographic research at 
Kodak Limited on the economic level, but it did not indicate how the involvement of 
scientists in the process of innovation should be assessed within the same 
organisation. In the 1960s, Hamberg stated that to a large extent industrial 
laboratories were principally major sources of “improvement” inventions and minor 
sources of major inventions.54 This abrupt conclusion was far from satisfying. By 
analysing patent data to find out how many patents resulted in marketed products, 
Hamberg denied the importance of fundamental research and considered only the 
profitability of industrial laboratories. Ten years later, Sanderson published an essay 
about research within the firm compared with research in universities or research 
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organisations in the interwar years.55 Stating that the importance of industrial research 
had been underestimated by historians, the author took the example of rubber tyres 
and the photographic industries in a short paragraph. These industries experienced 
similar shifts concerning the evolution of research when the core of the research 
activity, initially managed by a research organisation, was re-located within the firm.56 
The role of the industrial research laboratory was also highlighted in the well-known 
Visible Hand of Chandler. In chapter 13 the author introduced four case studies of 
large industrial enterprises (Standard Oil, General Electric, United States Rubber and 
Du Pont).57 Chandler illustrated how the research organisation was only one part of 
the structural machinery of the complete enterprise and interrelated with the other 
components of the so-called managerial firm. The Research Laboratory was only 
touched upon as the author remained focused on the role of the top managers and on 
the consequences of mergers and shifts.58 In fact a body of literature about the history 
of corporate laboratories started to grow in the 1980s. The historians of science and 
technology Reich and Wise studied the development of the General Electric and AT&T 
Research Laboratories and the life of the first director of Research at GE, Willis 
Whitney.59 The “organizational focus” commended by Chandler was used by Reich and 
Wise in their histories and criticized by Dennis,60 who stressed the importance of links 
between the history of university science and the corporate laboratories.61 In the first 
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part of his paper Dennis discussed the rare studies about a few big American firms 
such as General Electric, At&T, Eastman Kodak and Du Pont and discussed the origin of 
the idea of investing in research.62 Shortly after, Jones published a paper about the 
investment of foreign multinationals in the British industry in the interwar period. He 
pointed out the “superior research and development methods” of the American 
companies.63 Despite this statement, the thesis demonstrates in chapters 3 and 4 that, 
at Eastman Kodak, the European Research Laboratories strongly influenced the 
organisation and conduct of industrial research in the company. For instance, the 
sharing of scientific and technological knowledge was really two-sided between 
Rochester and Harrow. 
Recent studies about industrial research do not go far enough in ascertaining the many 
activities of scientists within industrial research organisations. For instance, Varma 
published a study about the evolution of the role of industrial research, identifying a 
shift toward the implicit mission of centralised corporate laboratories from the end of 
the 1980s.64 Fundamental research was no longer carried out first and then applied to 
the production. From that time onwards, research became “mission-oriented toward 
development”.65 However the author only studied the structure and development of 
the corporate laboratories. Some laboratory studies have attempted to define the role 
and the evolution of research and development within an industrial group. In 2007 Van 
Rooij published a case study of the Dutch chemical company DSM that opened a 
Research Laboratory in 1938.66 The author argued that DSM was not the typical 
company chosen for R&D case studies and that this academic field principally focused 
on large German or American companies for the pioneering period 1870-1920. 
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Following a chronological structure, Van Rooij’s study was the opportunity to clarify 
how the evolution of innovation at DSM led to three major transformations, from coal 
and coke to high value-added products. For his study the author analysed corporate 
archives, company newsletters and unpublished reports about DSM’s history. He also 
conducted interviews with existing researchers at DSM principally to discuss his draft 
manuscript.67 Within the same context of industrial research in the Netherlands, a 
paper discussed the development of the Research Laboratory of Philips, the “Nat.Lab.” 
opened in 1914 in Eindhoven.68 The authors concluded that industrial research at 
Philips followed a similar evolution to that defined by Varma, “from a scientific-
investigation attitude to product-driven orientation”.69 But they also stated that 
research at Philips often evolved differently to that of USA laboratories. Boersma & 
Vries analysed various archival data collections relating to Philips research and 
conducted interviews with former researchers at the Nat.Lab. to better ascertain the 
role of the research structure in Philips’ innovation process. But Vries also used earlier 
investigation work he had been allowed by the company to gather some corporate 
archives directly from the Philips laboratory during the 1990s.70 
The growing body of literature about large-scale organisations was approached in my 
literature review as an extension of the field of industrial research studies.71 It refers to 
historical studies of large-scale scientific research that is usually nationally funded. The 
field provided for instance studies about high-energy accelerators, the large-scale 
collider, big national laboratories or the early development of the cloud chambers. 
From the initial definition, the research organisation had to receive a large amount of 
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funding, be structured with a big staff of scientists, be equipped with massive material 
and be incorporated in big laboratories.  
Du Pont de Nemours, an important American company, interfered progressively in the 
area of large-scale organisations studies. This was logical because Du Pont was 
incorporated into the Manhattan Project during the Second World War to produce 
plutonium in large quantities. The private company was therefore temporarily linked 
to the military-industrial complex (MIC),72 as was Eastman Kodak during the same 
period. In 1985 Smith and Hounshell introduced in Science the pioneering work of 
Wallace Carothers who directed the new fundamental research program at Du Pont 
from 1928 on.73 The authors analysed how Carothers and his teams of scientists were 
able to discover neoprene and nylon materials and to contribute to polymer science. 
To this end, they collected data notably from the Du Pont archives in the Hagley 
Museum and Library, Wilmington. In 1988 Smith and Hounshell attracted a lot of 
attention when they published an in-depth study of R&D at Du Pont covering the 
period 1902-1980.74 However, the most significant study of Du Pont’s large-scale R&D 
was published by Hounshell in the well-known book Big Science. The growth of large-
scale research edited by Galison and Hevly in 1992.75 Hounshell’s study was accepted 
notably because the author wanted to ascertain “the important similarities and 
differences between big science within industry and the government-funded big 
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science projects that dominate the existing historical scholarship (…)”.76 A significant 
part of the paper was devoted to Du Pont’s involvement in the Manhattan Project. The 
author indicated how Du Pont’s successful nylon model was applied in designing a 
plutonium separation plant and in which context the collaboration between the 
Metallurgical Laboratory physicists at Chicago and the industrial researchers took 
place. This was the confrontation between two universes that could be summed up as 
“science” versus “engineering”, and the scientific collaboration was only partial. For 
N’Diaye, the example of Du Pont was inconvenient because the firm ceased its 
collaboration with the federal state in 1945.77 He suggested a further study with 
General Electric for instance, as this firm was committed to nuclear physics and more 
engaged with federal projects. The author also stressed that a study of fundamental 
research at Du Pont was not the best methodology to demonstrate that “Big Science” 
is not only concerned with high-energy physics, because fundamental research is 
neither big nor light.78 However, Hounshell had briefly shown how a scientific 
collaboration could be analysed and studied. Recently, Cerveaux, while researching his 
PhD dissertation about colloidal chemistry, dyes and fundamental research at Du Pont, 
discovered the existence of the Du Pont archive at the Hagley Museum and Library and 
collected additional data from this corpus. 79 According to the French author, colloidal 
chemistry had been underestimated in preceding studies about Du Pont. He also 
stressed the importance of the interwar period in the development of fundamental 
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research.80 This is a further argument that large-scale organisations also grew during 
the interwar years and did not suddenly emerge during the Second World War. It is 
worth noting that academic studies about industrial research and about companies 
incorporating large-scale organisations make good indicators in the context of this 
thesis. They show how to handle corporate archives to draw a company’s social 
narrative and answer research questions. The relationship between Eastman Kodak 
and these academic fields is therefore significant. 
Can Kodak Research be defined as a large-scale organisation for some periods of its 
history? It was certainly true during the Second World War from 1943 to 1945. During 
this two year period several hundred of scientists from Eastman Kodak and Tennessee 
Eastman Company took care of the electromagnetic separation of plutonium stage in 
the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Hanson, Leermakers, Ballard and Webb among 
others had to adapt the theory developed by the physicists from the University of 
California, Berkeley, to high-end chemical processes to separate uranium-235 from 
uranium-238.81 This episode is however not sufficiently documented either in existing 
publications or in the many documents of the Kodak Collection archive in London.82 
For this reason, further consideration is merited, although it will not be treated in this 
thesis. It is a particularly relevant case study in the context of large-scale organisations 
that remains to be written using other Eastman Kodak archives, if any exist. In this 
thesis, it is more difficult to describe the fundamental and applied research work that 
occurred at Kodak Limited, Pathé and Kodak-Pathé as large-scale research projects. 
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Budgets and staff numbers are not of the same. But the analysis of the body of large-
scale organisations studies was particularly important in decrypting the methods used 
by Eastman Kodak to undertake fundamental and industrial research and to start 
thinking about a social study of this multifaceted community of researchers. 
Apart from the Du Pont case and its legitimacy for integrating the field of large-scale 
organisations, other scholars of the discipline have focused their research on the many 
activities of the scientists facing a major project with multiple constraints. The 
prominent academic figure to have taken on the subject remains Galison, with his 
thorough studies of communities of scientists and his concept of the trading zone. In 
1997 Galison wrote: “I find it helpful to begin thinking through the relation of physics 
and technology by focusing on specific sites - laboratories - in which instruments and 
experimental practice come face to face with technological structures”.83 The author 
was deeply concerned with experimentation and instrumentation and both aspects 
were treated in a publication at the end of the twentieth century. In 1987 Galison 
addressed the neglected subjects of laboratory practice and experimentation in his 
doctoral dissertation.84 He used three case studies (the measurement of the 
gyromagnetic ratio of electron, the discovery of the muon and of weak neutral 
currents) to discuss the nature of experiments in the history and philosophy of science. 
In his preface, Galison also explained the methodology he used to write such case 
studies and what kind of documents he analysed. The growth of collaborative 
experiments provided new archive material for the historian such as progress reports, 
conference proceedings, proposals and photocopied minutes along with standard 
artifacts such as notebooks or letters. In Image and logic, Galison focused on 
instrumentation, considered as a subculture of microphysics.85 Breaking with the 
dominant theorists of the historiography of microphysics at the time, the author 
stressed the materiality of the scientist’s activity. In his review of Image and Logic, 
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Ziman noted that “scientific facts are not just made by attentive, imaginative 
observers: they are made by material devices and cultural institutions”.86 Galison 
thoroughly reviewed several fundamental scientific instruments of the twentieth 
century such as cloud and bubble chambers or Geiger counters. The author also used 
the concept of the trading zone taken from the anthropology literature to define the 
nature of the interface between different categories of scientific communities. How 
could physicists, engineers or computer scientists collaborate despite their distinct 
languages and paradigms? It is in the trading zone that distinct languages merge and 
that creoles progressively materialize during the scientific collaboration. For Galison, 
the trading zone and its “creolization” constitutes “the social, material, and intellectual 
mortar binding together the disunified traditions of experimenting, theorizing, and 
instrument building”.87 After the publication of the book, the metaphor of the trading 
zone was frequently discussed or criticized.88 With regard to this thesis, Galison’s 
thinking elucidates many organisational aspects of Kodak Research. For instance, it 
explains why a scientific fact discovered during fundamental research in a specific 
laboratory, was successfully used by different actors throughout an innovation’s 
process and converted from theory to practice, up to and including the manufacturing 
of new Kodak products. Therefore, the existence of this beneficial “mortar” which links 
Kodak heterogeneous scientists, managers and engineers stresses the many 
similarities between industrial research at Eastman Kodak and large-scale research 
projects management. It definitely connects the American manufacturer with the field 
of large-scale organisations through its research structure. 
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Since the 2010s, the same field was used to study present large-scale projects in high-
energy physics. Giudice clarified why the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), a particle 
accelerator operating at the European laboratory CERN near Geneva, should be 
considered a “Big Science” project.89 The author provided a comparison of costs 
between the LHC project and famous large-scale projects such as the Manhattan 
Project, the Apollo Program or the International Space Station. In 2012 McDonald and 
Widlake published a report about the Gambit and Hexagon satellite reconnaissance 
programs a few months after the declassification of confidential records from the 
National Reconnaissance Office of the United States of America.90 For this long-term 
reconnaissance program, developed during the Cold War, collaborations were set up 
with several industrials, Perkin-Elmer and Eastman Kodak in particular. The 
photochemists of Rochester developed improved high-definition and fine-grain films, 
as well as mono-dispersed films. Even more recently ten scholars published a book 
about the development of the European Spallation Source (ESS), a new large-scale 
research project at Lund University, Sweden.91 The authors stressed the complex 
nature of this large-scale organisation and studied its cultural, social and political 
aspects from various scholarly disciplines. These recent studies, as well as Galison’s 
publications, are an appropriate introduction into the methodology and routine work 
of scientists undertaking fundamental and applied research. However, another recent 
academic discipline goes further into the analysis of the researcher’s role, activities 
and tools, to discover scientific facts. 
 
                                                     
89 Gian Francesco Giudice, "Big Science and the Large Hadron Collider," Physics in Perspective 14, no. 1 
(2012): 95-112. 
90 Robert A. McDonald and Patrick Widlake, "Looking Closer and Looking Broader: Gambit and Hexagon - 
the Peak of Film - Return Space Reconnaissance After Corona," National Reconnaissance (2012). 
91 Thomas Kaiserfeld and Tom O'Dell, Legitimizing ESS: Big Science as a Collaboration Across Boundaries 




1.2.4. The contribution of Science and Technology Studies 
The Science and Technology Studies (STS) approach, an interdisciplinary scholarly field 
that has challenged the history of science during the last decades, provides some 
indications for understanding how social historians conducted their historical studies 
on scientific institutions or on industrial research activities. However, the task of 
deciphering the several waves of social history of science was not easy. 92 This new 
generation of historians wanted to increase the knowledge about the quotidian 
activities of scientists in the laboratory. In short, they wanted to refresh the social 
study of scientific practice.  
The discipline of STS has produced flagship publications investigating this practice as 
well as the scientific knowledge produced. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
directly influenced the cohort of STS scholars during the second half of the twentieth 
century.93 Kuhn stressed in particular the importance of scientists and their role into 
the research organisation. 94 As Dear pointed out in 2012, the investigation into 
scientific communities and their own paradigm has not been followed by many studies 
from historians of science.95 As to the SSK, this new field grew in the 1970s both in the 
University of Edinburgh with Barry Barnes and David Bloor and in the University of 
Bath with Harry Collins. This “strong program” of science studies developed partially in 
opposition to some Kuhnian theories. Science is seen as a social activity: sociologists of 
scientific knowledge take into account the various social factors of scientific practice 
such as history, economy or culture, in the construction of knowledge. 
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In 1971, Ravetz discussed the nature of scientific fact and its social construction, and 
by extension the importance of the scientist’s research work.96 In particular the author 
studied the social processes involved in the conversion of an individual research report 
into scientific knowledge. Scientific reasoning was also defined as craft reasoning, the 
craft researcher demonstrating some tenuous links with the reasoning of an artist. 
Ravetz was somewhat ignored by the new generation of historians of science in the 
1980s. One of the rare scholars to study Ravetz’s thought was the philosopher 
Ackermann in a chapter devoted to scientific facts and scientific theories.97 The 
scientists themselves became a privileged case study as they greatly influenced the 
results of scientific research.98 
In 1979 Latour and Woolgar moved into the research laboratory transforming it with 
an original ethnographic methodology to better analyse scientists’ research work. For 
two years they studied the activities of a community of researchers in the context of 
biomedical research at the Salk Institute and established how the scientific fact (the 
discovery of the structure of a peptide) was constructed in the laboratory.99 They 
made great use of the process and meaning of writing scientific papers in a research 
structure. For them, the researchers’ descriptions created evidence of their work, 
making it possible for the non-specialist observer to better ascertain the organisation 
of the laboratory and the collaboration between researchers and the production of 
knowledge in the end. The scientific literature produced became this knowledge and 
material evidence of the scientific fact that had just been discovered. But Latour and 
Woolgar investigated the products of scientific research, not the scientific reasoning 
and the mechanisms of research directly. It is these lacunae this thesis fills, in the 
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framework of Eastman Kodak Research.100 On the heels of Latour, Knorr-Cetina 
showed in greater detail how a scientific paper is conceived from the grounding of a 
research effort in the laboratory, the writing of the many versions of the paper 
including the rationale and the Methods and Results sections. The scientist is seen as a 
Literary Reasoner from which the scientific product of the laboratory is transformed 
into the written product of a scientific paper.101 Knorr-Cetina’s methodology is partially 
used in chapter 3 to analyse the Harrow research reports from Kodak Limited.102  
In 1987, Latour clarified his newly developed concept of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), 
in which both human and nonhuman entities can interact, through the publication of 
Science in Action.103 How can the living activity of a scientific community be gauged? 
For Latour, the challenge was to “penetrate science from the outside” but without 
becoming a scientist or an engineer once got into science. Scientists, or insiders, 
generated the products of science. But “how they did it, we don’t know”. While 
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regretting that few people had studied “from the inside” the mechanisms of science 
and technology, the author noticed that “there exist, fortunately, a few people, either 
trained as scientists or not, who open the black boxes so that outsiders may have a 
glimpse to it.”104 Except for the historical context, my own research about the 
community of Kodak researchers sound like a response to Latour’s call. And while 
sticking to Kodak, it is striking to read how Latour applied his metaphor of the black 
box to the famous slogan “Push the button, we’ll do the rest”. The “rest” is this black 
box that the customer did not see but that was necessary. It was made of a large 
commercial network as well as an industry involving know-how and high-end 
technologies. “When you push the button you do not see the salesmen and the 
machines that make the long strips of celluloid films and the trouble-shooters that 
make the coating stick properly at last; you do not see them, but they have to be there 
none the less”.105 By opening the black box of Kodak Research to analyse the scientists 
and engineers’ many activities, this thesis responds to Latour’s wish in Science in 
Action. 
As summed up by the sociologist and historian of science Pickering, the ethnographic 
approach of Laboratory life (Latour & Woolgar 1979) and the Manufacture of 
knowledge (Knorr-Cetina 1981) as well as the ethnomethodology developed by Lynch, 
Livingston and Garfinkel106 in 1983, challenged the foundations of sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK).107 For Pickering this discipline also faced a problem: 
scientific practice had been neglected by SSK scholars, who concentrated on the 
products of science and on knowledge in particular.108 For the author, the activities of 
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the scientists were as important as the knowledge produced by them. But, how does 
one undertake such a science study? According to the social epistemology claimed by 
Fuller in the same publication, “science must be studied in its own terms, not in terms 
that are alien to the scientific enterprise.”109 For the author, this view of science 
studies opposes the view of classical epistemology. The problem is that science could 
only become understandable by “insiders”, in the framework of Polanyi’s “tacit 
knowledge”. That is to say, scientific knowledge that is transferred from expert to 
novice in the laboratory. Finally, for Fuller, the epistemologist is an interpreter of the 
scientists’ activities and he has to use the “context” or “background knowledge” to 
provide the sense of scientific practice. With his “scientific turn”, what Fuller claimed 
could be defined as an expert epistemology of science studies. And the expert nature 
of the epistemologist makes sense when it comes to analysing the scientific practices 
of Kodak researchers in the twentieth century. 
In 2002, Collins and Evans questioned the nature of the legitimacy of a sociologist or an 
historian in technical and scientific decision-making.110 By extension, it could also be 
applied to the legitimacy of doing social historical studies about scientific knowledge. 
Like Fuller, the authors made proposals concerning the level of expertise necessary for 
the researcher. They proposed a third Wave of Science Studies, the Studies of 
Expertise and Experience. Collins and Evans identified three levels of expertise: no 
expertise at all, interactional, and contributory expertise. The second one “means 
enough expertise to interact interestingly with participants and carry out a sociological 
analysis” and the last one “means enough expertise to contribute to the science of the 
field being analysed”.111 With regard to my own place in this classification, within the 
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context of my historical research, I can define my profile as a “social epistemologist” 
with an interactional expertise, due to my educational background and my scientific 
knowledge of the photographic industry.112 This characteristic is particularly significant 
for studying the Harrow research reports in chapter 3 and for deciphering the many 
patents related to color photography in chapter 4. 
Finally, the present thesis also adopts the rationale of studies of functioning 
laboratories, or ‘lab studies’ as they are called by Doing, Sismondo and other 
scholars113, as discussed above. Alongside notebook studies, lab studies are frequently 
described as an academic field that arose in the 1980s but that lost momentum in the 
twenty-first century.114 In his excellent historiography of the discipline, Doing made a 
critical study of the real contribution of lab studies to the epistemology of scientific 
practice and the nature of the scientific fact. Revisiting Lynch,115 Knorr-Cetina (1981), 
Latour & Woolgar (1979), Collins116 and Pinch,117 the author noticed that laboratory 
studies did not address the way scientific activities produce an enduring fact.118 
Indeed, this weakness may represent a limitation of the anthropological approach to 
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laboratory studies. As the paradigm of the sociologist or the ethnographer is so far 
from the paradigm of the scientist, when the first is studying the scientific practices of 
the second, both researchers do not see the same thing.119 Within the context of this 
thesis and in my capacity as “expert epistemologist”, I use my background knowledge 
as an asset to study the Kodak research organisation, while remaining outside the 
Kodak laboratories, which no longer exists. The notebook studies approach used in 
chapter 3 for the study of the Harrow research reports and the personal notebooks 
enhances our understanding of the multifaceted activities of the Kodak researchers 
and their methods of innovation.120 
 
1.2.5. The management of scientific knowledge 
While reviewing the field of STS, I soon noticed that this discipline could not provide 
answers to some scientific and organisational practices within a research laboratory. 
STS and lab studies may clarify the context of the creation of a scientific fact but they 
cannot truly ascertain the nature of the scientific knowledge produced. Furthermore, 
the following questions could not be solved: How do scientists process new knowledge 
produced in the laboratory? What do they do with it? How is the collaborative work 
planned to increase the production of knowledge? Referring to industrial laboratories 
and not only to fundamental research done in national laboratories, do researchers 
follow a model to innovate and direct their work towards specific knowledge? 
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1.2.5.1. Industrial secrecy or knowledge transfer 
These questions stress the importance of the nature and management of knowledge. 
In industrial research, and in the field of photographic research in particular, two 
opposite fundamental practices control the management of knowledge: secrecy and 
transfer of knowledge. This thesis examines the use of these two notions within the 
photographic industry. As early as 1952, Mees made use in a short paper of the 
outdated view of science versus technology to justify the use of industrial secrecy. 
Scientific advances had to be published “because science advances as a whole”, but 
knowledge related to manufacturing technology was not supposed to be published.121 
However, as it is difficult to keep industrial secrets in the factory, Mees mentioned that 
the use of the patent was a solution for firms to protect themselves from competitors. 
Consequently, this practice also partially contributed to the diffusion of technical and 
scientific knowledge. Apart from Mees and other people involved directly with 
industry in general, the notion of secrecy has received scant attention from scholars. In 
1998, a workshop was held at Ithaca, New York about secrecy and knowledge 
production. Scholars studied “the relationship of secrecy to the production of scientific 
and technical knowledge” within the context of national security and industry.122 In 
particular, Dennis stressed Merton’s view about the relationship between science and 
secrecy, and Shuldiner provided a history of secrecy at Corning, and some historical 
facts about the collaboration between this well-known glass manufacturer and the 
military during the two World Wars.123 More recently, Balmer argued that secrecy 
could not always be criticized but could instead be used as an “active spatial-epistemic 
tool” to help governments to define reality.124 Discussing the potential threat of the 
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diffusion of a patent about VX nerve gas in 1975, the author discussed the concepts of 
dangerous, secret or public knowledge. 
Nevertheless, beyond the dangerous or innocuous nature of knowledge, the constant 
dilemma for scientists and inventors is to balance its sharing with its non-disclosure. A 
newly developed technology can be replicated if its inventor shared too much critical 
information about it or by reverse engineering.125 By contrast, the scientist needs to 
disclose his findings when seeking the recognition of his scientific community. Evans 
introduced both behaviours towards scientific knowledge, by comparing the use of 
secrecy by academic scientists and industrial researchers.126 In his study, the author 
explored how academics shared their knowledge during collaboration with industrial 
researchers. He concluded that “academics were seen, by the companies that 
partnered with them, as inconsistently professional and often unreliable in protecting 
research ideas and resources”.127 To share or to withhold knowledge? This teamwork 
with industrial researchers forced academic scientists to reduce their use of the 
principle of knowledge sharing. 
In modern industries, the concept of sharing knowledge is discussed more and more 
through the term of technology transfer. Some authors such as Headrick have 
provided historical studies.128 He demonstrated how large transfers of technologies 
such as railways and plantation agriculture from the Commonwealth to its African and 
Asian colonies succeeded in various ways and were progressively influenced by 
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research work in the colonies.129 Other studies are more professionally oriented, such 
as that of Speser or Sullivan who provided a complete method for scientists to manage 
their intellectual property, including the writing of a technology transfer agreement or 
the creation of a company to secure a possibly patented technology.130 Recently, 
Ganguli et al. mixed the historical and practical with their publication about technology 
transfer in biotechnology.131 The authors stressed how this practice of transfer was 
shaped regionally and how in this industry the intellectual property was firmly 
controlled by the patent system. Beyond the nature of technology transfers, the 
direction of the knowledge flow can also be a source of information. The 
Lichtenthalers studied the two ways technology can be transferred within the context 
of “Open Innovation” that I discuss at the end of this section.132 To measure the 
performance of outward technology transfer between companies, they used the 
concept of desorptive capacity as opposed to absorptive capacity.133 
1.2.5.2. Patent strategies 
This heterogeneous body of literature about “knowledge management” does not deal 
with the control of scientific knowledge companywide. Industrial research laboratories 
need and do protect their scientific assets through a policy of intellectual property of 
which the patent system is one of its tools. During data collection from the Kodak 
Collection archive, more and more artifacts surfaced, related to patents and business 
relationships with independent inventors. It appeared possible to estimate the 
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contribution of independent inventors to Eastman Kodak’s research and innovation. In 
order to do that, however, it is necessary to ascertain the part this external scientific 
knowledge played in the results of industrial research performed within the 
laboratory’s departments. The appearance of independent inventors in the archive 
provided an opportunity to study some scientific collaborations with the exterior. As to 
the status of such inventors and the resulting patent system, Hintz recently clarified to 
what extent American independent inventors cooperated with corporate research and 
development laboratories.134 The status of “independent inventor”135 did not quickly 
disappear with the rise of industrial research in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Models given by Hintz to describe the innovation strategies of independent inventors 
and firms can clarify the scientific collaboration between the – initially - independent 
chemists Mannes, Godoswky, Martinez or Schinzel and the Eastman Kodak Company. 
For instance, the “ally” model for which inventors enter into contracts with firms and 
license their patent on a royalty basis is particularly relevant (see Figure 1).136 After all, 
as pointed out by Nicholas, independent inventors retained a major role in U.S. 
technological development in the interwar years as they still represented 53% of the 
U.S. granted patents in 1930.137 The same author used a similar methodology to 
conclude that this figure was approximately the same in 1930 for Britain and Japan.138 
But he also stressed that British inventors were disadvantaged compared with their 
American counterparts because patent fees were far more expensive and patent life 
shorter, even if the 1883 Patents Act reduced patent filing fees drastically in Britain.139 
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Figure 1. Innovation strategies between independent inventors and firm.140 
 
In the same field of literature, some authors clarified the contribution of the patent 
and its nature to scientific knowledge. In her original study about patents, knowledge 
and technology transfer, De Laet used the patent document as a carrier of knowledge 
and an active mediator. Basing her study on transfer of technology between 
pharmaceutical industries and African countries, the author opposed the protective 
aspect of the patent to its sharing nature, a vehicle for knowledge. The patent is finally 
granted a role in the transfer of technology and knowledge. One might indeed wonder 
to what extent scientific knowledge produced is hidden within the many claims of the 
patent literature. After all, this knowledge and the resulting invention that is claimed 
within the patent is a fragile artefact. As Myers pointed out, “an invention is 
established in the world only when there is someone to make it, to sell it and, if 
necessary, to defend its status in the courts”.141 Sometimes, the final owner of the 
manufactured invention as well as its intellectual locus are even subject to debate. 
Latour took as a model the eventful development of the Diesel engine at the end of 
the nineteenth century. The initial patent of Diesel of 1887 never worked and the 
technology was finally developed by the engineers of the MAN company. Latour lastly 
wondered if the working engine had to be called a Carnot, Diesel or a MAN engine.142 
By extension, with regards to a major technological innovation, scientific knowledge is 
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frequently scattered through a “wave” of successive patents and not totally contained 
in a founding patent. This multi-level rise of knowledge allows the team of researchers 
to refine the technology in question.143 
However, the patent does not always result in a manufactured invention. Firms 
frequently used this protective aspect of patenting a scientific invention in the last 
century and still do today. Thus, this strategy of countering the competitors in a 
specific technological direction acts as an innovation shield.144 On the contrary, the 
patent can also become an offensive weapon, used to sue competitors and 
counterfeiters before a court. This rather negative side of the patent should not be 
neglected. Mangolte used the case study of the motion pictures “patents war” from 
1897 to 1908 to show how the offensive aspect of the patenting strategy between the 
Edison company, the American Mutoscope & Biograph Company and other actors of 
the movie industry was a dead end for the business of the whole sector.145 Belligerent 
parties finally had to come to an arrangement and created the Motion Picture Patents 
Company in 1909 to gather a pool of patents and to organize a licensing system. From 
a bureaucratic perspective, Fisk illustrated how the universe of inventors and research 
organisations was more and more surrounded by a set of legal constraints such as 
contracts or noncompeting agreements, progressively established by patent and 
Copyright laws.146 Finally, to the detriment of the patent system, Moser recently found 
through historical analyses that the existence of patent laws in one country did not 
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increase the number of innovations produced when compared with a country without 
patent laws.147 Even more surprising, according to Moser the part of innovations 
developed outside of the patent system prevailed in countries with patent laws.148 This 
means that the patent could also act as the enemy of innovation processes despite its 
possible capability to transfer knowledge. 
1.2.5.3 “Innovation models”  
Scientific knowledge, patents and innovation are all interrelated. My literature review 
ends with the concept of innovation, because during the data collection in the Kodak 
archives, I encountered several methods used to conduct scientific research, perform 
in-house experiments, and collaborate with other firms or independent inventors. In 
short, the methods used by the Kodak Research Laboratories to innovate were 
amazingly varied and far from the image of the industrial research laboratory in which 
“Closed Innovation” is performed. One of the first economists to seriously tackle the 
concept of “technological innovation” was the Austrian Schumpeter. It is striking to 
note that his first important study about entrepreneurship, economic development 
and innovation was published in German in 1911, just when Mees and Eastman were 
organizing the new Research Laboratory at Rochester.149 In the first English version of 
The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter provided a definition of the 
innovation concept.150 For the author, it represented the introduction of a new 
product or a new method of production, the access to a new market or a new supply 
of raw materials, or a new industrial organisation.151 Consequently the innovation 
process operates after the process of invention. It neither integrates discoveries of 
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scientific facts nor inventions. As clarified by Gaudin, invention is an act of intellectual 
creativity, while innovation consists in an economic decision to adopt an invention.152 
For the same author, Schumpeter did not clarify how the process of innovation itself 
works, as did the economic historian Maclaurin from the MIT. This scholar studied the 
mechanisms of technological change and clarified how a new scientific discovery could 
lead from the theoretical stage to a commercial success. Maclaurin developed, after 
the Second World War, the theory of a “linear model of innovation”, different from 
Schumpeter’s views. Technological innovation was seen as a sequential process made 
of four distinctive stages: pure research, applied research, engineering development 
and production. He later refined his theory with five stages, namely pure science, 
invention, innovation, finance and acceptance or diffusion.153 
As regards the measurement of innovation within firms, Arundel et al. clarified the 
many tools available to estimate knowledge creation such as patents, bibliometrics, 
numbers of research staff, research and development budgets or journal articles.154 
They also provided the knowledge flows between firms and thus introduced the 
mechanisms of patent innovation, protection of knowledge through secrecy, licensing 
agreements or reverse engineering. My present research ascertains if all or any of 
these mechanisms were used at Eastman Kodak. In recent years, the concept of 
“innovation model” has often been linked to the organisation of research and 
development (R&D).155 New theories have emerged to increase the efficiency of R&D 
within the framework of a worldwide competitive economy. Cooke introduced the 
notion of “regional innovation systems”. He showed that this “systemic innovation at 
the regional level” was recent in Europe but less efficient than in the United States 
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because it was mostly driven by the public system.156 Successful or not, this modern 
organisation of innovation in which a cluster of regional firms gather their R&D and 
collaborate remains worthy of interest. With this cooperative aspect in mind, 
Chesbrough claimed a paradigm shift from “Closed Innovation” (the classic in-house 
R&D) to “Open Innovation”.157 The last model tends to treat R&D as an open system by 
favouring external sources of technology in the innovation process. Consequently, this 
process is no longer confined to the industrial Research Laboratory. Thus “great 
inventions can come from both inside and outside the company”.158 “Open 
Innovation” was not supposed to remain confined to academia. It was seen as a new 
method of innovation by its inventor and is still used within the present industry.159 
However, Chesbrough’s model also attracted criticism. Trott and Hartmann pointed 
out that many previous researchers found concepts similar to those used by “Open 
Innovation”. While the authors recognized that Chesbrough’s model popularized the 
need to share and exchange knowledge, they also questioned, “if Open Innovation is in 
essence nothing new, why then has this concept been so readily embraced by firms 
and the R&D community?”.160 As a new “model of innovation” can have some 
historical background, the academic debate above illustrates the difficulty of defining a 
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clear boundary between the history of industrial research or business history, and 
business and economic studies, as these fields are interrelated. 
Using this literature, it is possible to ascertain if a specific “model of innovation” was 
used at Eastman Kodak principally during the interwar years. The extensive body of the 
archive allows an in-depth study of the transfer of scientific knowledge, the patent 
strategy and the “models of innovation” used by the three Research Laboratories. 
 
1.2.6. Approaches used and historiographies to which this study 
contributes 
The science and technology studies approach is used in this thesis to avoid the pitfall of 
telling a linear history of technological and scientific milestones. More than that, STS 
researchers conduct social analyses of under-studied communities and professional 
networks and thereby bring a complete understanding of the ins and outs of the 
progress of large-scale research projects or the narrative of “science in the making”. 
Such an approach has been fundamental in focusing my research on the specific 
network of this community of photoresearchers, either insiders or outsiders to 
Eastman Kodak, and its heterogeneous activities. The STS approach underpins the 
major argument of this thesis that science and technology do not exist per se but only 
derive from the desire and the research work of the scientists, engineers and 
technicians, and in the case of Kodak research specifically, following managerial 
decisions. A scientific or technological fact does not wait for a brilliant scientist to 
suddenly discover its existence one day and claim it as an invention. By contrast the 
“fact” is progressively identified and characterised by the thought and the rationale of 
scientists through experimentation and observation. In this way, the social study of 
these particular actors, their organisation, their networks and their management of 
scientific knowledge in the framework of the thesis provides a holistic understanding 
of what industrial research at Kodak in Europe really was in the first half of the 




few STS scholars have focused on the photochemical industry although it provides a 
rich source for studies of this sort. 
But this thesis also relies on other fields of study. An interdisciplinary approach is made 
necessary by the complexity of Kodak industrial research, as well as the heterogeneity 
of the primary and secondary sources used during the research work. The STS 
methodology could not address what the thesis proposes to do, namely to prosecute 
social historical research of a community of researchers so far ignored by history, 
although the tracks of its activities are still recent and vivid. Considering the nature of 
the primary sources used in this thesis, the contribution of bureaucracy studies was 
important as well.161 In addition to the group of secondary sources about Eastman 
Kodak and the photographic industry, which provided various information for this 
research, the qualitative analysis of a full set of bureaucratic artefacts provided the 
core of the research findings: research reports, legal agreements, unpublished internal 
reports, patent folders, personal notebooks and typescripts about project supervision. 
The wealth of information gathered from this heterogeneous corpus of corporate 
documentation proves that the use of bureaucratic archives, although rather technical 
sometimes, is a successful strategy for the conduct of historical research. Such an 
archive should not be neglected by historians of the photographic industry and the 
same strategy could be applied to the study of Kodak research at Rochester, Ilford or 
Agfa research. 
The bureaucratic studies approach can also contribute to other historiographies, such 
as business history, to which this thesis is oriented.162 The production and sale of 
                                                     
161 On bureaucracy studies, see, for example, Peter Becker and William Clark, Little tools of knowledge: 
historical essays on academic and bureaucratic practices (Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press, 
2001); Frank Fischer and Carmen Sirianni, Critical studies in organization and bureaucracy (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1984); Yehouda A. Shenhav, Manufacturing rationality: the engineering 
foundations of the managerial revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Alexander Styhre, 
The innovative bureaucracy: bureaucracy in an age of fluidity (London: Routledge, 2007). 
162 A good introduction to the discipline is given by Alfred D. Chandler, The visible hand: the managerial 
revolution in American business (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1977). For a recent analysis related to 
visual technology and culture, see Sean F. Johnston, Holographic visions: a history of new science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Johnston recently clarified that this publication “provided an in-




analogue photographic and cinematographic films were a successful business for a 
very long period from the early years of cinematography to the end of the twentieth 
century. Total margins generated from the photographic industry, and Eastman Kodak 
in particular, remained exceptionally high for decades and directly financed the 
conduct of industrial research. A history of Kodak research made from the analysis of 
Kodak bureaucratic practices contributes to a better understanding of the corporate 
mechanisms leading to scientific milestones and market success. Technology and 
innovation brought by the Kodak research laboratories were used by the firm to 
further develop a popular culture of products, allowing market expansion and the 
achievement of new business targets. Pertaining to the methods of innovation used by 
large business organisations, this thesis shows that Kodak research was governed by 
the concepts of risk, uncertainty, technological and even historical constraints. 
I mentioned at the beginning of the introduction that the study of Kodak research was 
crucial because it complements our understanding of the photographic medium as a 
whole. It is worth pointing out here that this thesis also contributes to the history of 
photography, in particular to the notions of the lengthy invention of photography and 
the processes of innovation used by the photographic industry.163 It complements 
existing studies about the nature of the photographic industry, the development of 
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colour in photography and the research work of the ‘primitive’ inventors of 
photography in the nineteenth century. Using unpublished archival material, my 
research shows for the first time how an entire industry was set up during a period of 
the twentieth century, and who the human sources engaged in the research and 
development of new photographic processes really were. With this new knowledge in 
mind, we can better comprehend the nature of our own visual culture in the twentieth 
century, intrinsically linked to the existence of imperfect and ever improved 
photographic materials with unique characteristics. We can now acknowledge that 
photography taken as a whole was created by its first inventors of the nineteenth 
century, by the masters of the medium and many amateur photographers since 1839, 
but also by the cohorts of inventors and photochemists of the twentieth century inside 
and outside the Kodak universe. 
The present thesis also sheds new light on some aspects of the history of technology. It 
questions the management of intellectual property regarding the continuous flows of 
scientific and technological knowledge produced by Eastman Kodak or by third parties. 
Complementing existing studies about government secrecy, my research contributes 
to the under-studied field of industrial secrecy, one aspect of intellectual property. It 
provides the practical terms of industrial secrecy within the research laboratories and 
the production departments, and its consequence for public photographic research.164 
But the thesis also refreshes studies about the history of the patent system, by firstly 
ascertaining that this bureaucratic system represented a major constraint for the 
photographic research. Secondly, the description of scientific collaboration between 
Kodak Limited and independent inventors clarified how scientific knowledge was 
progressively optimised literally from the lab bench to the issuance of a patent. This 
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new outlook on the photographic patent complements existing attempts to inventory 
photographic knowledge from the international corpus of related patents.165  
Finally, the thesis makes a significant contribution to industrial research studies, in 
particular with the delicate task of deciphering the nature of industrial secrecy at 
Eastman Kodak from the analysis of disparate corporate archives. This study shows 
that industrial research is not only a matter of statistical figures about budgets and 
staff, the critical question of return on investment and the possible milestones 
produced, but also that this discipline has everything to gain from taking into account 
the human factor and the career paths of researchers, the evolving organisation of the 
research structure and the circulation of scientific knowledge inside. Historians of 
industrial research should not overlook the study of daily work done in the 
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1.3. Methodology of the research 
 
The temporal context of the research is particular because Eastman Kodak was a very 
important company which was still active in 2016, although the number of employees 
was drastically reduced and its structure recently modified. Conducting qualitative 
research on the British and French communities of Kodak researchers would have 
been the ideal pretext to engage in an ethnographic study with them, in the style of 
Latour and Woolgar in 1979. Unfortunately, it is impossible because the time of 
scientific research at Eastman Kodak has passed. In Chalon-sur-Saône, France, the 
building of the Centre de Recherches de Kodak Industries is still in place but without 
any researchers in its deserted laboratories. In Cambridge, the Kodak European 
Research Labs was an ephemeral research structure that opened in 2006 and closed in 
2009. But what Kodak Limited bequeathed to scholars was a huge heterogeneous 
archive at the British Library. The former employees of Kodak-Pathé managed to 
rescue similar corporate archives and artifacts in Chalon-sur-Saône. In this context, I 
decided to adopt a social historical research to study the activities of the Kodak 
European scientific community and to compare my research questions to the collected 
data and evidence from the archives. Digging into such documents from the past and 
progressively constructing some narratives about researchers active in the first half of 
the twentieth century has not to be seen as establishing a “congealed” history of 
Kodak research. After all, “such a narrative account, at its best, is flowing, revealing, 
vibrant, alive.”167 
1.3.1. Timeline of the research 
This thesis is the result of thorough archival research during the three years of my PhD 
scholarship. It is worth clarifying the general timeline of the research to better point 
out the development of my ideas and the progressive drafting of the chapters. I 
started the bibliographical research and the reading of the secondary sources for the 
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literature review at the end of 2011. At the same period, I was introduced to the Kodak 
Collection in the Special Collections at the Kimberlin Library, De Montfort University. I 
collected some data in this Collection during the year 2012 but I rapidly noted that the 
Kodak Collection’s content was not exactly relevant to my research, although 
invaluable reports or monographs could be found there.168 This archive was lacking 
some primary sources so I decided to focus on the Kodak Collection Archive at the 
British Library. I first visited this very important archive in terms of volume in January 
2012 with Dr. Michael Pritchard, currently Director-General of The Royal Photographic 
Society, who was the first scholar to dig into the many boxes and who did the first 
inventory. At the time this inventory was at the stage of drafting but it helped me 
enough to identify documents and boxes directly connected with Kodak fundamental 
and industrial research. However, the archive’s huge size did not assist the 
identification of the relevant primary sources to consult. The access to the Kodak 
Collection Archive in the reading rooms at the British Library was not possible before 
June 2012. So I started my first data collection in this exceptional industrial archive the 
same month with the help of John Falconer, Lead Curator Visual Arts at the British 
Library. From June 2012 to June 2014, I organized and realized 11 archival researches 
at the British Library.169 The methodology I used to collect data in the Kodak Collection 
Archive is described in section 1.3.2. 
In September 2012, I created ethics forms to be able to conduct some interviews of 
former Kodak researchers and managers.170 However, at the same time, the situation 
changed due to new evidence in France proving that a scientific archive might exist at 
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the former Kodak-Pathé industrial site. In April 2012, I first approached the Fondation 
Jérôme Seydoux-Pathé in Paris to consult the index notebook of Marcel Mayer, the 
works manager at Pathé in Joinville-le-Pont during the 1920s. During my visit, 
Stéphanie Salmon, director of historical collections, informed me about the recent 
creation of the association CECIL near Chalon-sur-Saône and the possible existence of 
unidentified Kodak-Pathé archives. During 2012, I established first contact with Jean-
Pierre Martel, President of CECIL, and I planned my first visit to the Kodak-Pathé 
archive in March 2013. 
This visit in the French archive modified the framework of my research. I found the 
almost complete set of research notebooks made by the Pathé photochemists from 
1906 to 1927 and by the Kodak-Pathé researchers from 1928 to the 1960s. From this 
time onward I was able to consider a comparison between the English and French 
research reports made from 1929 on, but also to study the transfer of scientific 
knowledge between the three main Kodak Research Laboratories in Harrow, 
Vincennes and Rochester. I made a second visit to CECIL in November 2013 and for 
both visits, I was able to make the full reproduction of the documents consulted. In 
this way, only two visits were made in the Kodak-Pathé archive. As a consequence, I 
decided not to conduct some interviews and to spend more time on the analysis of the 
French archive, to complement and to improve chapters 2 and 3. Due to the additional 
archive material to collect and analyze, but also due to my supervisors’ request to 
increase the scope of the literature review, my application to transfer from MPhil to 
Doctor of Philosophy was slightly delayed and finally obtained in February 2014. In 
parallel, I started the writing of the general draft of my thesis in January 2014, and I 
finished this first version of the dissertation in May 2015. 
1.3.2. Methodology in practice 
According to Danto, up to five categories of historical evidence can be collected to 
conduct historical research: primary sources, secondary sources, running records such 




author also mentioned possible artifacts such as maps, objects or artwork.171 I had at 
my disposal the British and French Kodak archives which constitute the primary 
sources available. These corporate and scientific archives are made up of 
correspondence, research reports, notebooks, legal documents and patent folders 
among other things. I also consulted a wide range of secondary sources directly or 
indirectly linked with the history of Eastman Kodak. I found some oral histories of 
former Kodak researchers that had already been transcribed at the end of the 
twentieth century, and several biographies and obituaries of Kodak research leaders. 
With this in mind, I decided to avoid a chronological narrative of a general history of 
Kodak Research but rather to favour a thematic scheme with chronological sections 
and case studies to answer the research questions. The data analysis was therefore 
concentrated on the information collected from the scientific Kodak archives and was 
compared with the data enclosed in several secondary sources on a regular basis. The 
data collected and analysed from the archives were a decisive asset in ascertaining 
how topics of research were selected, how inventions and scientific knowledge were 
progressively produced and how teamwork was planned amongst the laboratories of 
Rochester, Harrow and Vincennes. 
At the start of my research, the possibility of conducting some interviews with former 
Kodak researchers in Britain and in France arose. With this prospect I constructed a 
consent form for interviewees addressing the necessary ethical issues related to this 
type of data collection. In parallel, I started to find some earlier interviews conducted 
in the 1970s and 1980s which gathered recollections from scientists who had partially 
worked at Eastman Kodak in the United States. Transcripts, abstracts and the 
interviews were found in the Chemical Heritage Foundation and on the Niels Bohr 
Library and Archives websites.172 These findings included the transcript of an undated 
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interview with Walter Clark, first director of the Harrow Research Laboratory, about 
infrared aerial photography and another undated interview with Wesley T. Hanson, 
the director of Kodak Research at Rochester from 1972 to 1977, at the Clarence E. 
Larson Collection from the Engineering and Technology History Wiki.173 I conducted a 
concise analysis of the interviews’ content and this first glance demonstrated that 
while the active living period of the interviewees was relevant for my research, the 
information delivered was not of prime importance. Some recollection could only be 
sporadically connected to the research questions. As an example I enclose an extract 
of the interview made in 1983 of the astrophysicist Dr. Walter Roberts, who first 
worked at Eastman Kodak in the development department. 
Roberts: 
I was in the development department under a man named Fred M. Bishop. The 
development department was one of two parts of the research lab under Kenneth 
Mees. There was the pure research, and there was the development side. But I 
did, interestingly enough, have a lot of contact with Mees, who knew of my 
astronomical interests and so on, and a lot of close personal contact with Fred 
Bishop, who was a marvelous man. I was in a group that was really incredibly close 
and friendly. We were developing new products. We had to do two things. 
We had to develop new products for the company, and test them out, and we had 
to test the competition, so that Kodak knew what the other companies were 
doing. Occasionally we had to do very unusual things; for example, my boss in my 
first year at Kodak, had to re-design the optical system of the Bell and Howell 
projector, because it wouldn't project Kodachrome very well. It was such an 
inefficient optical system that the Kodachrome didn't show up well on the screen 
and Kodak was losing money, because people who had Bell and Howell projectors 
didn't like their pictures. So we redesigned the optical system, and gave the new 
design to Bell and Howell, and they went ahead and marketed it, and they still use 
that same condenser system that Kodak designed back then. 
DeVorkin: 
Was the sprocketing different? 
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No, the sprocketing was the same. I think the light taken through the gate, from 
the bulb to the gate, was inefficiently used, and they were getting only about 40% 
as much light as they could from the bulb through the film. It was just a matter of 
poor optical design, and Kodak had superb optical experts. So we redesigned the 
optical system for Bell and Howell, in order to sell more Kodachrome. At least that 
is how I remember it. Then a crazy guy came around with a camera that you could 
take pictures and develop them immediately, and we tested that camera and 
decided it was impractical. His name was Edwin Land!174 
 
As this extract indicates, interviews can provide valuable information.175 But the 
interviewee cannot immerse himself in his own past again in the same way he 
experienced it. His memories depend on the interviewer’s questions and on the 
capacity of his mind to remember. Through the interviewee, some specific facts will 
emerge from the past while others will not be mentioned without a particular prompt. 
Instead, the archival artifact is better dealing with the time of “science in the making”. 
Ideas and thoughts are still clear in the scientists or managers’ mind when they put 
them in a letter, be it in a research report or through a technical notice in a personal 
handbook. Having observed this, I decided not to conduct any additional interviews to 
complement my data collection. The fact that the possible interviewees would only 
have been able to provide about the period 1960-2000 was another reason. It would 
have been problematic to ensure continuity between the time period of the historical 
archive, principally the interwar years, and this period, 1960-2000, for the data 
analysis. Lastly, the discovery of the French Kodak-Pathé archive in 2013 and the 
subsequent data collection and analysis this represented provided another strong 
argument against the conducting of interviews. 
With regard to the nature of the European Kodak archives, the heterogeneity of the 
materials was evident from the start of the qualitative data collection. The two Kodak 
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archives could not be considered as a complete and exhaustive corpus. First of all, 
preservation conditions of the archives on both industrial sites before the donation of 
Kodak to the British Library and the CECIL association are not clear, and there are some 
indications that neither archive is entirely complete. Secondly, when a corporate 
division is either closed, dismantled or transferred, the fate of surviving corporate 
archives is a secondary concern. Furthermore, a proportion of these archives will be 
physically destroyed depending on their level of confidentiality and on the directives 
followed by the archivist, if any. At the British Library the Kodak Collection Archive was 
unclassified and frequently chronologically mixed. It was therefore impossible to 
consult the entire corpus of the archive about a specific topic, or to claim to do so. 
In this context, it was not convenient to adopt a methodological approach based on a 
chronological and descriptive history of the research conducted in the Kodak 
laboratories over several decades. It was clear that the adoption of a linear model of 
the research process (involving a strong separation of the sampling, the data collection 
and the data analysis) was impossible. The nature of the Kodak archives has led me to 
favour the collection of topical data from which process and draw case studies, all 
related to the research questions. For that purpose, I have taken into account the 
Grounded Theory method used in the social sciences, which involves the finding of 
theory through the progressive analysis of data.176 As I had no a priori assumptions on 
what exactly would be found in the collection of data, I concentrated my initial 
sampling on the framework of the research questions. Thus, several periods were 
studied: before the creation of the first Kodak Research Laboratory in 1912, during the 
1930s principally with the Harrow research reports, and during the Second World War 
when research on colour photographic processes was predominant. I selected the 
scientists and managers to study according to their relevance to my research topics.177 
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Following an initial analysis of the findings, I had to refine my sampling of the archive 
for the next process of data collection, before returning to each Kodak archive. For 
instance, the research notebooks of the French Kodak archive were only inventoried in 
October 2013, and it was difficult to speculate about what would be found in them 
before this necessary archive work was completed. At the British Library, as it was 
impossible to finance the large-scale reproduction of several years of Harrow research 
reports, I carried out the data analysis on the fly, speeding up the data collection 
process of Grounded Theory. This methodology helped me to broaden the scope of my 
research and not to focus on the English research reports only. I was able to consider 
Kodak Research as a whole, including the period of pre-industrial research in Harrow 
and in Vincennes with the competitor Pathé, and not only from 1912 and the creation 
of the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester. The case studies collected in relation 
to scientific collaboration provided some innovative conclusions about Kodak research, 
in particular the mixed use of “Closed and Open Innovation” by Kodak during the 
interwar years. 
The use of Grounded Theory did not simplify in the research process, but one of the 
advantages of this approach is that the collection and the interpretation of the data 
are frequently close, and that the initial qualitative analysis is partially completed 
during the collecting process. The research process that I used can therefore be 
identified with a circular model, for which the starting point is the definition of 
preliminary assumptions, followed by the collection of a first data sampling, their 
interpretation and comparison, and as many other collections of data as necessary. 
That is to say, it is from this global corpus of data that the theory is expected to 
emerge and be formulated. As Flick mentioned, Grounded Theory research “allows the 
researcher not only to ask the following question repeatedly but also to answer it: How 
far do the methods, categories, and theories that are used do justice to the subject 
and the data ?”178
                                                     




Chapter 2: Evolution of Research and Development at 
Eastman Kodak Company 
 
2.1. Knowledge and secrecy about emulsion-making during 
the Interwar period 
2.1.1. The secretive practices of film manufacturers 
When studying research and development within the photographic industry, the work 
carried out on emulsion-making would appear to be a relevant indicator in the 
evolution of manufacturing innovations and related scientific discoveries about the 
behaviour of the photographic emulsion. However, inadequate secondary sources or 
detailed publications supplied by film manufacturers make this problematic. Very little 
has been written about the process, since photographic research was mostly confined 
to laboratories belonging to private industries and the necessity to keep key processes 
secret considerably restricted the exchange of knowledge in the public domain. The 
more the method behind film-making was dominated by the principle of secrecy, the 
less researchers studied the matter in the twentieth century, breaking with the 
tradition of the previous century. 
Despite its limited quantity, however, literature about emulsion and film-making is 
generally identified and promoted by specialists, most of them involved in the 
photographic industry.1 As no substantial external literature was produced concerning 
the daily activities of the Kodak Research Laboratories or those of competitors in the 
photographic industry, it is relevant to consult the rare literature devoted to the 
production of emulsion and film within the industry. Indeed, the use of trade secrets 
can indirectly provide some information on how the research was handled to produce 
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knowledge and technical tools related to emulsion-making. Moreover, the study of the 
collaboration between national research laboratories and the research structures of 
film manufacturers provides complementary information regarding emulsion research. 
 
During the Interwar period, one unique publication written by Edward John Wall in 
1929 described some steps of the production of photographic emulsions. After The 
Dictionary of Photography (1889), The History of Three-Color Photography (1925) and 
Photographic Facts and Formulas (1924), Wall published in 1929 his Photographic 
Emulsions.2 Although Wall started his career as a chemist in the plate manufacturing 
company B.J. Edwards & Co. in London, he was not directly connected with a film 
manufacturer during the Interwar period and thus Photographic Emulsions can be 
considered as an independent work about the science of making black and white film. 
In his preface, the author points out the rarity of literature in the field, recognising that 
there had been no work available about emulsion-making since William de W. Abney’s 
Photography with Emulsions (1885) and Joseph M. Eder’s Photographie mit 
Bromsilber-Gelatine und Chlorsilber-Gelatine (1903).3 The main purpose of the book, as 
indicated by the author, was to provide enough technical information to enable the 
amateur to undertake research work on emulsion-making. According to Wall, the 
reason for the lack of data about the subject is simple. 
Practically all the knowledge is secreted in the great factories. The worker at this 
point stands practically in the position of the man who first discovered emulsion 
photography, and he must battle his way through and pull himself up until he has 
acquired a knowledge equal to what is known at the present day.4 
Wall also clarifies that in his publication, “no trade secrets have been disclosed nor any 
confidences violated, even if such be in the writer's possession.”5 In a chapter about 
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the mixing of emulsions, while discussing the greater sensitivity of iodide of silver to 
red and orange than of bromide of silver, describing this property as a “trade secret 
never disclosed”, Wall goes back to the problem of the exchange of knowledge since 
the rise of the photographic industry.6 
 This trade or professional etiquette, which prevents the manufacturer from giving 
information as to his emulsions, is a serious stumbling block in the advance of our 
knowledge of the real whys and wherefores of emulsion making. In the early days, 
and it must not be overlooked that the gelatino-bromide emulsion was discovered 
by an amateur, the technical journals were filled with accounts of experiments in 
emulsion making; but since the commercial manufacture of plates an 
impenetrable wall of silence has shut down, that one might as well try to pierce as 
get through a modern safe with a knitting needle. This is, of course, explicable and 
understandable to some extent in view of commercial rivalry, but there can be no 
doubt that much valuable information might be given without violating 
professional secrecy.7 
In the end, Wall dedicated almost four years to this research work and produced “over 
three thousand very carefully arranged and recorded emulsions […] and approximately 
five miles of paper”, working day and night to this end.8 The book looks more like a 
treatise of the nineteenth century, supplying techniques and formulas for many kinds 
of emulsions, describing the many steps of emulsion-making : the mixing, shredding 
and washing of the emulsion, the filtering and coating for glass plates, film or paper, 
and the drying. For the equipment used, although some semi-industrial machines are 
described such as the coating plates machine of J.H. Smith (see Illustration 1), most of 
the accessories are generally suited to the amateur photographer. 
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Illustration 1. The J. H. Smith’s coating machine, to coat glass plates with 
photographic emulsion.9 
 
At some point, Wall gives indications about his research work procedures. For 
example, in the paragraph about chloro-bromide and bromo-chloride film emulsions, 
the author describes some laboratory experiments he conducted to prove that the 
length of exposure with a constant developer bears no correlation with the colour of 
the image. 
[…] a series of emulsions was made, starting with a pure chloride of silver and then 
with increasing percentages of bromide from five, ten, twenty, etc., to a pure 
bromide emulsion. The plates were exposed under a test plate of varying densities 
from 1 to 3.01, that gave exposures from 1 to 1024. The exposures were made to 
magnesium ribbon, a Nernst lamp and incandescent gas, and a constant developer 
metol-hydrochinon, was used.10 
This empirical method of laboratory work, frequently used in photographic science, 
was also used at the same period in the Kodak Research Laboratories as it will be 
studied in section 3.2. However, the method used by one individual cannot be adapted 
to the work of a set of Research departments. In the same paragraph, Wall gives two 
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formulas for Wellington & Ward Limited and Wratten and Wainwright emulsions. The 
author indicates that formulas are supplied because “they have been proved 
commercially to be reliable”, but it is not known if this indication was, at the time of 
writing, the delivery of a trade secret or if both manufacturers had already 
communicated the formulas.  
 
Wall’s vast and independent research work must be understood as one of the last 
attempts to publish with objectivity some technical data about the science of 
emulsion-making. In Photography (1937), the Eastman Kodak director of research, 
Kenneth Mees adopts on the contrary a corporate discourse, a specific language which 
allows the author to convey enough descriptive information without any specific 
essential details or key technology from the company, a language referring to “the 
impenetrable wall of silence” as criticized by Wall. The purpose of Photography is 
intended to “provide a general review of the whole subject of photography written in a 
simple and popular style”11, and although the author devotes the second chapter to 
the manufacture of photographic materials, the description of processes can be 
likened to scientific popularization.12 Five illustrations of equipment used for the 
making of the film base, the emulsion or the photographic paper were included. These 
installations were probably those of Kodak Park at Rochester although it was not 
specified (see Illustration 2). 
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Illustration 2. The process of coating the emulsion on the film base, most probably 
at Eastman Kodak in Rochester.13 
Some figures cited at the end of the chapter go some way to explaining why the 
disclosure of data about film making might act as a threat to the employment in the 
photographic industry. Mees indicated that 30,000 people were employed in the 
manufacture of photographic materials in various parts of the world in 1937. Too much 
competition could therefore have weakened this specialized industry. Other figures 
were supplied, such as the 500 tons of pure silver required per year, the 6000 tons of 
cotton needed to make the film base or the 3000 tons of prepared gelatin14. Mees was 
aware of the economic issues surrounding the photographic industry and related 
financial investments. It was therefore impossible to disclose sensitive data about 
emulsion-making to avoid industrial piracy and forgery. 
 
Breaking with Mees’ controlled discourse, the recollections of the photochemist Dr. 
Fritz Wentzel, published in 1960 by the American Museum of Photography with a 
foreword by its founder Louis Walton Sipley,15 are more informative about the 
technical activities of the photographic sector. Wentzel, a chemist born in Berlin in 
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1877, spent most of his professional career as a consultant for several photographic 
firms, and obtained a doctorate from the Technische Hochschule Charlottenburg in 
1908, with a thesis about the Contributions to the optical sensitization of silver chloride 
gelatin.16 He started working for the dry plate factory of Unger & Hoffmann in 
Dresden, “supervising the mixing of developers for sale, working on toning processes, 
etc.”17, then for the larger Neue Photographische Gesellschaft near Berlin where the 
chemist Rudolf Fischer, inventor of the colour developing process in 1914, was 
working. For Wentzel, since knowledge of the emulsion-making was key to the 
industry, the policy of secrecy complicated the production of film. 
There was a certain type of man working in the production of photographic 
materials, the so-called emulsioneer, with often a doubtful background, but 
possessing some formulae which he had acquired and applied in his employment 
with more or less success. Secrecy was in full bloom, every new production 
manager, chemist or emulsioneer, had to start work all over again, because his 
predecessor had left nothing behind except some basic formulae without any 
records.18 
Wentzel contrasts these basic methods of producing film in small plants with the 
methods of larger companies, who invested in research on emulsions “in well 
established laboratories”, highlighting the disappearance of these small photographic 
factories or their absorption by larger entities during the interwar period. 
During this period, Wentzel also became acquainted with gelatin manufacturers in 
Germany, and occasionally obtained information about their manufacturing processes. 
He provided some details about the making of this critical component of photographic 
emulsion, however this is a general technical narrative not related to a particular 
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manufacturer.19 More interestingly, the author indicates that suspicion also existed 
between the customer and the manufacturer, requiring time-consuming trials of 
batches of gelatin. 
This always has been, and still is, done by sending samples to the customer who 
makes trials with his emulsion formulae with no knowledge of the past history of 
the gelatin. On the other hand, the gelatin producer is kept in ignorance, except in 
very vague and general terms, of the emulsion for which his gelatins will be used. 
This secrecy on both sides has been a serious handicap in the development of the 
manufacture of photographic gelatins from the practical point of view because 
there is still much to be learned […].20 
Regarding gelatin, some of the mistakes and failures noted by Wentzel are also studied 
in the reports of the Kodak researchers at Harrow, such as the appearance of spots on 
the emulsion, or the non-uniformity of the production generating variation in the 
photographic sensitivity. Referring to the making of photographic emulsion itself, 
Wentzel is quite prolix, also supplying some references in footnote such as the 
Photographic Emulsions of Wall. The necessary equipment, a list of principal chemicals, 
conditions of operation and the process is detailed from the first mixing of the 
components to the coating and drying of the emulsion on film or paper.21 The author 
does not indicate from which manufacturing companies he draws his technical 
information but one can speculate that most of the processes described were inspired 
from ANSCO or AGFA technology, as Wentzel’s last position was at the Ansco paper 
plant from 1933 to his retirement in 1945, the American Ansco company having 
merged with Agfa in 1929. 
Wentzel, a good friend of the photochemist and photo historian Erich Stenger, was 
interested in the history of photography too and established his own photographic 
library. Footnotes of his Memoirs are full of references to scientific journals and 
publications in the field of photography and, as Sipley supposed in his preface, 
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Wentzel’s book has certainly been “of invaluable service” to students in 
photochemistry in the second half of the twentieth century. 
This rare photochemist’s account of the craft of emulsion-making echoes another 
publication written during the same period, about the making of nuclear emulsions, 
that is emulsions able to capture particles in the corresponding spectrum. The 
Canadian author of Ionographie22, Pierre Demers, was studying chemistry and nuclear 
physics at the nuclear synthesis laboratory in Ivry, France, where he specialized in 
particle physics for which special nuclear emulsions were requested, in keeping with 
the recommendation of the scientists Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Hans von Halban. 
Demers initially tried to establish an industrial collaboration with a film manufacturer 
but, due to the lack of positive feedback, developed his own nuclear emulsions and 
soon became an independent emulsion expert23. Demers’ research work was a long-
term project, which probably started just after the Second World War.24 Complete 
descriptions of the technology and procedures he developed for the making of these 
emulsions are included in his publication Ionographie, including the improvement of 
the “emulsion Eastman α” and the selection of a compatible gelatin.25 For example, 
products from Difco Bacto and General Foods gave good results, but gelatins “Eastman 
Pigskin Purified”, “Eastman Calfskin Purified” or a selection of Keystone gelatins from 
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composition of these emulsions and to provide other workable formulas of nuclear emulsions. See 
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American Agricultural Chemical Company created an abnormal fog on the film.26 In a 
chapter devoted to Kodak, Ilford, and the Photographic Panel, Galison discusses in 
1997 the contribution of Demers to the science of emulsion making27. He quotes a 
translated thought of Demers about the making of negative emulsions. 
“The fabrication of the fastest negative emulsions is surrounded by the greatest 
secrecy, a fact which is explained simultaneously by industrial necessity and by the 
nature itself of the techniques employed […]. These procedures are empirical, they 
hide tricks of the trade and craft recipes (des tours de main et des recettes de 
métier).” One can also add the end of the paragraph : “For these reasons, [these 
procedures] are difficult to protect with a patent ; it is easier not to make them 
known. Moreover, the analysis of the finished product shows little about the 
processes used.”28 
According to Demers, reverse engineering is useless in understanding the methodology 
used to produce photographic emulsions, and this “impenetrable wall of silence” 
provided the opportunity for an impressive research work into emulsion-making. 
Rather than keeping the precious resulting technology and know-how to himself, 
Demers decided to diffuse it through an exhaustive publication. In Ionographie, the 
author provides 21 complete formulas of nuclear emulsions according to three kinds of 
process: double spray processes with two burettes (p.105), double spray processes 
with two syringes (p.114) and processes using pumps (p.123). Demers does not 
hesitate to formulate advice to the photographic industry when he feels it necessary, 
such as the proposal to use continuous manufacturing processes for the numerous 
stages of emulsion-making instead of producing in batches. The mixing, the making of 
long noodles, the washing, the shredding or the maturation of the emulsion could be 
processed within this framework.29 For Galison, Demers “was […] unique in both 
successfully making new, highly sensitive emulsions and applying them productively to 
physics problems.”30 However, his work remained a unique experience in independent 
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emulsion-making and ultimately, the outstanding emulsions made by Demers were not 
used by emulsion physicists, who preferred the larger grain of Kodak and Ilford 
products.31 When interviewed in 1985 by Galison, Charles Waller, an emulsion expert 
from Ilford, continued to express reservations about discussing in detail the 
photographic processes used at Ilford after World War II.32 Although the convention of 
the silver curtain was a Kodak tradition, it was also used by other film manufacturers. 
Collected at the end of the 1980s in the company’s only publication about its research 
activities, the accounts of researchers and managers at Eastman Kodak about 
emulsion-making do not depart from the rule of industrial secrecy.33 Discussions of the 
milestones and technical achievements in the science of emulsion-making do not 
extend to the methodology used by the various teams of Kodak organic chemists and 
researchers. Although the practice of the silver curtain and its positive or negative 
influence is widely discussed. 
This corporate policy was developed in 1931 when Kenneth Mees received the 
approval of the Kodak President William G. Stuber to create a new Emulsion Research 
Department, the purpose of which was to regroup the skills and knowledge devoted to 
the photographic emulsion which were widely dispersed within the Eastman Kodak 
structure. Cyril J. Staud, a promising organic chemist in the company since 1924, was 
appointed head of the Department. As his team needed some emulsion production 
formulas in order to make progress, a secrecy protocol was set out to avoid any 
knowledge leakage, even to the other divisions of the Kodak Research Laboratory.  
The formulas were sent by the manager of the Film Emulsion Division to the 
director of the Emulsion Research Division on a “need-to-know” basis, and stored 
in a safe in the director’s office. When a researcher needed a formula, he would 
go to the office, be given the needed formula, and sit in that office while he 
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translated it from production jargon into emulsion research terminology and 
codes.34 
These languages and coding tools were frequently personalised in the following years 
to increase security about emulsion knowledge, and the nickname of silver curtain was 
invented for this trade secret practice. 
It is unclear whether the Film Emulsion Division managers hindered the transfer of 
emulsion technology to the new Research Department. It can however be noted that 
in its first years, it was frequently difficult for chemists to obtain the production 
emulsion formulas. During the necessary work for the completion of the Kodak 
publication, Jeffrey Sturchio and Arnold Thackray, two independent scholars from the 
Center for the History of Chemistry at the University of Pennysylvania, undertook a 
series of interviews with Kodak researchers and managers in the second part of the 
1980s. When asked about the silver curtain, the chemist Daan Zwick, who was hired in 
1944, recalled that the practice had negative consequences on the research work of 
chemists. Unaware of emulsions formulas, unexpected results often resulted in 
additional and time-consuming experiments. For Zwick, the director of the Film 
Emulsion Division at Kodak Park, Earl Arnold played a major role in knowledge 
retention practices. After Arnold’s retirement in the 1960s, secrecy rules were relaxed 
and new procedures simplified the transmission of emulsion information.35 
Sturchio and Thackray introduced the question of whether the silver curtain changed 
or influenced the Kodak research process. They gathered the opinions of several 
researchers, pointing out that they were quite divided depending on their access to 
the emulsion technology and formulas. However, the arguments in favour of a policy 
of secrecy were outweighed by the disadvantages noted by researchers. According to 
Elliot Stauffer, a former director of the Emulsion Research Division, the silver curtain 
was the vector for the introduction of scientific technologies into Kodak manufacture 
facilities, as some scientists of this division created a development group within the 
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Film Emulsion Division. One should point out that this technology transfer was 
unilateral, and that it did not involve in the research process. On the contrary, most 
“outsiders”36 to the silver curtain were discouraged when looking for sensitive 
knowledge about emulsion-making and gave up any research directly linked to these 
data. For Leo J. Thomas, director of the Kodak Research Laboratory from 1977 to 1985, 
the silver curtain “was a device that may have had some rational existence back in the 
1920s, but by the 1960s it was an absolutely inexcusable device, and it covered more 
ignorance than you could possibly believe”.37  
More recently, the technical information collected by Robert L. Shanebrook from 2007 
to 2010 about the production of film at Kodak Park demonstrates that even in the last 
decade the use of the silver curtain was still active, at least within the Film 
Manufacturing Division.38 The author was able to depict the various steps of the 
production of colour film in particular because he was a product-line manager at 
Eastman Kodak before he retired in 2003. He confirms that the silver curtain was still in 
use as there is no documentation of the complete photographic film-making process, 
and most of the procedures and chemicals remain codified. 
Coding of process and material names is practiced. Early in the exploration of a 
material or process it is referred to by its scientific or commercial name. If use of 
the material or process is promising, a code is assigned. When used in 
manufacturing, it is assigned an alpha-numeric code. The same material at 
different dilutions may have totally different codes. (5) 
Shanebrook stresses that the procedures used to mix the various chemical compounds 
of the photographic emulsion are also protected by the silver curtain. If some reverse 
engineering methods can determine which compounds were used for a specific film, it 
cannot reveal how these chemicals were mixed and in which order.  
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It appears from these readings that the trade secret of emulsion science and 
technology seems principally to take place downstream from the research work, and 
that it concerns mostly the production procedures or the application of new 
technologies to the manufacturing workflow. The fact that the activity of researchers 
was disrupted by a lack of cooperation from the engineers and chemists working in the 
manufacturing plants, does not really clarify how these researchers were supposed to 
conduct their work on experimental emulsions or new dye testing to improve current 
films. For Wall or Demers, the initial problem was even simpler; they had to start from 
scratch with no chance of cooperation and knowledge transfer. But independent 
photochemists were not the only scientists to suffer from the tradition of trade secrets 
in the photographic industry. In order to fully understand the problems faced by public 
sector researchers, it is necessary to clarify the lack of collaboration between public 
research laboratories or institutions and industrial laboratories in the private sector. 
 
2.1.2. National laboratories versus industrial research 
Government awareness of the lack of knowledge in scientific fields that were 
necessary to the development of industry at the beginning of the twentieth century 
led to the creation of several national laboratories. These institutions launched all-
around research in a wide spectrum of technological and scientific fields, but the 
connecting thread of the work was the establishment of a global standardization to 
help industries to improve their production. Following this aim, the National Physical 
Laboratory was created by the British government in 1900 and the National Bureau of 
Standards in 1901 by an Act of Congress of the United States. The French Bureau 
International des Poids et Mesures was created earlier in 1875, during the International 
Convention du Mètre in Paris. In Germany, the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt 




Halske “to promote the advancement of science and, thereby, also the technology 
closely bound to it.”39 
In photographic research, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) played a key role 
during the Interwar period and its scientists, among them Burt Haring Carroll and 
Donald Hubbard, known as Carroll and Hubbard, directly addressed the use of trade 
secrets within the photographic industry. Their research started in 1920 when the 
spectroscopy laboratory of the NBS requested infrared sensitive emulsions. 
Commercial film was not sensitive enough, the support in cellulose nitrate was 
dangerous and it shrunk too much.40 Initially, two NBS scientists, Raymond Davis and 
Francis Marion Walters conducted a general sensitometric survey of 90 photographic 
films and plates manufactured in the United States, with the aim of measuring “speed, 
development, colour sensitiveness, filter factors, and scale.”41 
As Davis and Walters had no data about the chemical compounds and the processes 
used for the production of American films and plates, they did this survey using the 
methods of a testing laboratory, describing in their report the process of doing the 
tests and the instrumentation used such as the sector disk type sensitometer, the 
Martens photometer used for measuring the density or the thermostat for developing 
test plates. Davis and Walters’ initial survey led to the general study of photographic 
emulsion, and the spectroscopist Dr. W. F. Meggers of the NBS managed to obtain 
some pilot plant machinery for making emulsions from Germany. When this 
equipment was installed in the basement of the Chemistry Building of the NBS and an 
Emulsion Laboratory created in 1922, Carroll and Walters were given the assignment 
to increase knowledge about photographic emulsion through the production of small-
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scale batches of film.42 They obtained significant results in 1926, when Carroll and 
Hubbard produced around 400 batches of emulsion and two years later, when they 
managed to control the photosensitivity of the emulsion and published their first 
paper.43 According to Cochrane, in 1933 and after the publication of seventeen 
reports, emulsions produced by the two chemists were superior in terms of sensitivity 
and graininess to the best commercially available films. But “disclosure by the Bureau 
of the method of their preparation threatened to make public vital trade secrets”, and 
the author pointed to the context of the great depression to explain why advisory 
committees surveying the research work of the NBS divisions decided to terminate the 
Emulsion Project, “in the interest of economy”.44 
Mees and his team of researchers from the Kodak Research Laboratory no doubt 
studied with care the various publications of the photographic division of the NBS. 
Although there is no evidence of any pressure or lobbying of American institutions or 
governments by Eastman Kodak at that time, the fact that the published work of 
Carroll and Hubbard posed a threat to Kodak products is clear. The film manufacturer 
further benefitted from Carroll’s skills when it managed to hire him in 1934, while 
Hubbard stayed at the NBS. In 1968, most of Carroll and Hubbard’s research papers 
were reprinted. In the publication’s introduction, the writer Dr. W. F. Berg, a former 
scientist of Kodak Limited’s Research Laboratories, who had succeeded Professor 
Eggert as the Director of the Photographic Institute of the Eidgenossische Technische 
Hochschule at Zurich at that time, stated that “the value of the series of papers 
produced during the years 1927 to 1934 is undisputed to this day, and they are widely 
quoted; indeed they should be regarded as classics.”45 
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In England, new co-operative research associations emerged from the First World War 
in 1918, to help the British industry increase its capacity for innovation and production 
in the face of international competition. A new Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research was created in the same year by governmental authorities, to assume 
responsibility for the National Physical Laboratory.46 For Varcoe, the war brought 
“home to many manufacturers the necessity of continuous research in order to bring 
about a systematic improvement in the methods of production and in the quality of 
goods produced.”47 Among them was the British Photographic Research Association 
(BPRA), one of the first to have been formed in 1918, along with the British Scientific 
Instrument Research Association and the British Wool Research Association. The aim 
of the BPRA was principally to carry out pure research in photography and 
photochemistry and, in a sense, it joined the mission of the Emulsion Laboratory of the 
National Bureau of Standards by starting research in various fields of photographic 
science such as colloidal chemistry or chemical properties of gelatin.  
The first laboratory of the BPRA was situated in the chemistry building of University 
College and Walter Clark, a young undergraduate, frequently met with its director Dr. 
R. E. Slade and his associates. He was so interested in the photographic process that 
soon after completing his studies, he took a position in the BPRA, the association 
having been transferred in the meantime to the Institute of Chemistry at Russell 
Square in London. Clark worked for the BPRA for five years, carrying out research with 
F. C. Toy and S. O. Rawling mostly on the theory of photographic development and the 
latent image. On the basis of his work at the BPRA he published two theses and 
obtained a Master of Science and his doctorate. In his recollections Clark mentioned a 
fruitful spirit of competition with various Kodak photochemists: “We had a splendid 
five years jousting with Svedberg of Sweden and with Sheppard, Trivelli, Silberstein, 
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Loveland and others of Rochester.”48 For financial reasons, he left the BPRA to take a 
position of deputy librarian at the Science Museum in London. However, he was still 
active in the photographic research field and the Seventh International Congress in 
Photography in London in 1928 provided him with the opportunity to meet Mees. The 
director of Eastman Kodak Research was perfectly aware of Clark’s photographic work 
through his publications as well as his correspondence with Sheppard and Trivelli.49 
Adopting the method that George Eastman used in 1912 for his own recruitment, a 
convinced Mees strove to hire the skilled Clark. 
So I went up to see Dr. Mees who said: “Clark, I have followed your work with 
interest. I want to start a research laboratory for Kodak in England. Would you like 
to run it for me?”. I said “Yes”. “Good”, Mees said, “You must come to Rochester 
and see how we do it there.50 
Therefore, the threat that the National Bureau of Standards, and the BPRA to a lesser 
extent, represented to the photographic industry was greatly reduced by the 
recruiter’s talents of Mees. Both the narratives of the photographic research at the 
NBS and that of the BPRA demonstrate the failure of constructive and scientific 
collaborations between public research institutions and private film manufacturers. 
Technological and scientific knowledge was produced unilaterally, and it appears that 
the photographic industry remained constantly suspicious towards the two national 
laboratories. During this period however, two factors can be defined as zones of 
knowledge exchange about photographic emulsion. Firstly, the intellectual and 
scientific rivalry between European and American photochemists, stirred up by the 
many publications on each side. Secondly, the organisation of several International 
Photography Congresses in Europe during the Interwar, where chemists and theorists 
from France, Germany, England and the United States in particular, met and 
exchanged their discoveries concerning photographic processes and improvements in 
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film production. The proceedings of these congresses were usually published thereby 
increasing knowledge about photographic science and growing into the research 
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2.2. Basic and Industrial Research at Kodak before 1912 
 
In the first section, an insight has been gained into the mechanisms of the research 
and production within the film industry, starting from the observation of a general use 
of secretive practices about manufacturing technologies and introducing the activities 
of national laboratories working without industrial support. In the present section I will 
indicate how technological research was performed at Eastman Kodak before the 
existence of the Research Laboratory in 1912. I will argue that unlike traditional views 
about the so-called breaking point caused by modern industrial research in the first 
half of the twentieth century, the scientific way of doing research at Eastman Kodak 
started well before the creation of the Research Laboratory. To this purpose, some 
secondary sources will be used. The British and French Kodak archives will also be used 
to introduce some unpublished data about the process of innovation in the company 
at the end of the nineteenth century. 
First of all, how do we qualify industrial research in the context of the research 
activity? Basic, fundamental, scientific or pure research seems to follow another goal. 
It represents research work produced when experimenting theory or attempting to 
discover new knowledge but without any commercial plan about its application. The 
strategy used in industrial research is slightly different: the goal is to make new 
products emerge from newly developed knowledge, invention or technological 
processes. In this way, the research process can be seen as biased or oriented from the 
beginning. At the turn of the twentieth century, the opinion of the scientific 
community about industrial research was commonly negative, compared with the pure 
objectivity of academic research. Therefore, the first years of the Kodak Research 
Laboratory in which fundamental research was emphasized can be seen as an attempt 





2.2.1 The development of scientific research at Eastman Kodak 
1891-1912 
Before 1912, the research activities of Eastman Kodak were especially oriented 
towards solving manufacturing issues and controlling the quality of raw materials. 
Existing laboratories were frequently located in production facilities. To qualify the 
nature of the research work at Eastman Kodak during this period, it is necessary to 
understand the notion of “master emulsion maker”52 with the evocation of a case of 
counterfeiting George Eastman had to solve in the 1890s. At that time, technological 
knowledge was not secured enough as a company asset, yet within the photographic 
industry skilled chemists were hired for their experience and knowledge. However, 
should they resign from a film and plate manufacturer, they left with their formulas 
and the company had to start from scratch again with another photochemist. With 
regard to Eastman Kodak, this section demonstrates that the shift from the model of 
the independent master emulsion maker to the model of the industrial research 
laboratory happened progressively from the 1890s to 1912, and did not suddenly 
emerge in 1912 with the creation of the research Laboratory at Rochester. 
Jenkins (1975), Brayer (1996) and more recently Catherine Fisk (2009) have all studied 
the case of the photochemist Henri Reichenbach, the perfect example of a master 
emulsion maker. Dr. Samuel A. Lattimore, the head of the chemistry department at the 
University of Rochester, recommended Reichenbach to George Eastman who hired the 
young expert in 1886 as a chemist, together with the analytical chemist S. Carl 
Passavant to assist him. At that time Eastman was still fully involved in the process of 
innovation and was aware of each stage of the production of his photosensitive 
products. Reichenbach’s mission was partly to release Eastman from laboratory work 
by undertaking experiments as necessary with a specific budget for research.53 The 
paper used for photographic support in the Eastman-Walker Roll Holder did not render 
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the picture sharp enough and the young Eastman knew in 1886 that a new base had to 
be invented with the same physico-chemical properties as celluloid. Working in close 
cooperation, both men managed to develop in 1889 a formula for a photographic 
transparent support similar to celluloid, a material whose manufacturing method was 
patent protected by the Celluloid Manufacturing Company. This transparent film was 
produced by dissolving nitrocellulose in wood alcohol, strengthened with camphor 
acting as a solvent and further optimized with fusel oil and amyl acetate to retain the 
camphor in solution when the film was drying.54 When launched in 1890 the new film 
was a commercial success, even if some technological issues in its manufacturing 
requested further optimization. At the end of 1891, as Eastman reported to Walker he 
was working as the director of an invisible experimental laboratory, trying to solve the 
problem of static discharges from the film in cold weather. 
One day, reflecting upon the theory that the discharge was caused by two 
surfaces, one of which was positive and the other negative, it occurred to me that 
if one of the surfaces was metallic there could be no generation. The idea of 
making one of the surfaces metallic naturally followed. […] I finally decided that 
every metallic particle in the emulsion must be insulated by the surrounding 
gelatine. […] I then naturally thought of the soluble salts and knowing that nitrates 
would not interfere with the emulsion, I decided to try them first. I directed 
Reichenbach to try the first experiment with Ammonium Nitrate, but he tried it 
with Potassium Nitrate, and found it worked perfectly.55 
This teamwork with his chief chemist ended when Eastman discovered in January 1892 
that Reichenbach had betrayed him in using the developed technology of transparent 
film to create a new film making company, along with the other chemist Passavant and 
the sales director Gustav Milburn, another of Eastman’s employee. The three 
“conspirators” were immediately dismissed and their loss led to a difficult situation for 
the young company. Eastman had neglected the protection of the intellectual property 
of his company in patenting the new transparent film under the name of Reichenbach 
in recognition of his decisive research work. The American patent n°417,202 for the 
“manufacture of flexible photographic films” was finally issued and granted to 
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Reichenbach on 10 December 1889, with Eastman as the first witness. At the same 
time, the Patent Office denied the application of Hannibal Goodwin for an equivalent 
technology of film-making arguing that the delivered information was not accurate 
enough.56  
At the end of November 1890, Reichenbach and Passavant improved the 
manufacturing process. In their application they claimed as their invention the 
“improvement in the art of forming flexible film-supports, which consists in adding a 
distillate obtained from zinc chloride and fusel-oil to a fluid solution of nitro-cellulose 
and camphor and subsequently depositing and spreading such solution upon a rigid 
supporting-surface and drying it.”57 
Fisk points out that the Reichenbach case is a good example of “the development of 
the law of corporate ownership of workplace knowledge”58. The case Eastman Co. v. 
Reichenbach was handled in 1892 and the New York Supreme Court judged that the 
owner of all the processes and formulae produced by Reichenbach and Passavant was 
the company of George Eastman because the two chemists had been hired to perform 
chemical research. It was clear in their contract and they knew the value of the 
technological knowledge produced for the company which they had kept secret up to 
this time.59 
This judicial story illustrates that intellectual property progressively shifted from the 
genius independent engineer, chemist or physicist to corporate ownership. But George 
Eastman needed to develop the method of securing technical knowledge as a company 
asset. He had several tools such as trade secrets, noncompetition clauses, or horizontal 
integration to reach this goal. I argue later in this chapter that producing innovation in 
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the framework of an official Research Laboratory was one of the strategies for the 
company to secure and obtain the ownership of all the inventions.  
In the British Kodak archive, some documents refer to Reichenbach and allow the 
description of pre-industrial research at the Kodak Harrow Works. They stress that 
some fundamental research work was also undertaken in Harrow well before the 
creation of the Research Laboratory at Rochester in 1912 and the Harrow Research 
Laboratory in 1928. Surprisingly, the study of these documents reveals that the 
fundamental research involved a scientific collaboration with independent chemists. F. 
W. Thomas Krohn, the Works chemist of Kodak Limited at Harrow from 1891 to 1901, 
was sent to Rochester from March to July 1891 to “get a good insight into the work 
over there”60. In other words, he had to learn basic principles of emulsion-making at 
Kodak Park. The Harrow Works were not finished at that time and George Eastman 
himself suggested this journey. In Rochester, Krohn worked under the supervision of 
Henri Reichenbach, who was now in charge of the whole manufacturing process and 
he was very impressed by the chemist’s skills. 
The second thing I learned, watching Reichenbach, was that genius is, as has been 
truly said, the infinite capacity for taking pains. Week in and week out, Sunday 
included, he was at that time, here, there and everywhere supervising and pushing 
along the work. He and others made a bad mistake afterwards, but one has to give 
him his due.61 
During these weeks of apprenticeship, Krohn took a lot of technical notes including the 
description of the manufacture of transparent film and formulas, all the more since he 
had no experience in the photographic industry, having previously worked as a chemist 
in the laboratory of the brewery Warwicks & Richardsons. The draft agreement 
between The Eastman Photographic Materials Co. Limited and Krohn for his 
engagement in connection with the Harrow factory stresses the great importance of 
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keeping the production in good working order rather than undertaking experiments to 
develop innovative products. 
Mr. Krohn’s duties will be to improve and perfect the present processes and 
apparatus of the Company, and to devise and perfect new and important systems 
of manufacture, and it is very important that he should be firmly bound to this 
Company in such a way that any discoveries that he may make in connection with 
photographic art shall be communicated by him to this Company and shall be our 
property, and that he shall take out no patents in his own name or in the name of 
the Company connected with photography without permission.62 
The possibility that Krohn might make some inventions during his routine work was 
therefore seen more as a threat than a benefit, “in virtue of his superior chemical 
knowledge”.63 But the new chemist, who came back to England and started to work at 
Harrow in August 1891, was in no way as ambitious and unscrupulous as the unruly 
Reichenbach. 
Krohn’s Early Kodak Days is important because it provides, on the one hand, 
information about applied research in the Harrow Works and on the other hand, the 
nature of the fundamental research made by the British photochemist at Kodak 
Limited. The analysis of the manuscript reveals evidence of scientific collaboration 
between Eastman Kodak, Kodak Limited, independent photochemists and 
instrumentation makers. Krohn illustrated in his diary the many difficulties of the 
production of base and emulsion at Harrow during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, and he also detailed his own attempts to use the preliminary research of 
Hurter and Driffield and the primitive densitometers available at that time, to measure 
the parameters of the emulsion and its speed (see Illustration 3). Krohn was aware of 
the photographic literature of his time and he discovered in 1894 the paper of Hurter 
and Driffield pointing out the mathematical relationship between the exposure and 
the density of the developed photographic material.64 They had produced the first 
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principles of densitometry and sensitometry. In his manuscript, Krohn discusses the 
benefits of the Hurter and Driffield work for the emulsion-maker. 
I became convinced in time that as a practical speed indication for ordinary camera 
use the H & D figures were not much more useful than the other speed indication 
methods then in vogue. […] I also became more and more convinced that the chief 
use of H & D work was to give the emulsion maker information about the 
characteristics of his emulsion and was only secondarily of use as a speed marking 
method. I felt too that the lighting and development conditions would have to be 
very fully studied and rigidly specified before we could begin to mark our materials 
with H & D numbers.65 
Krohn was in touch with the few actors of this young photographic science: the dry 
plate manufacturer and supplier of densitometry equipment Marion and Company’s, 
John Sterry66, an independent photographer trying to improve Hurter and Driffield’s 
methods, as well as the two English chemists. The first exposure apparatus of the 
Harrow Works was a densitometer made by Marion and Company’s, probably 
developed by the company’s technical manager Alexander Cowan, according to Krohn. 
The source of illumination, at first a standard candle, did not satisfactorily characterize 
the orthochromatic and the latter panchromatic emulsions.67 
                                                     
9, no. 5 (1890): 455-469. According to Mees, this paper was the basis of sensitometry. See C. E. Kenneth 
Mees, “L. A. Jones and his work on photographic sensitometry,” Image. Journal of Photography of the 
George Eastman House 3, no. 5 (1954): 35.  
65 Krohn, Early Kodak Days, 26. 
66 Concerning the link between Sterry, Hurter and Driffield and Marion and Company’s, see Ron 
Callender, “Hurter, Ferdinand (1844–1898) and Driffield, Vero Charles (1848–1915),” in Encyclopedia of 
Nineteenth-Century Photography 1, ed. John Hannavy (New York : Routledge, 2008), 733.  
67 “In the new laboratory I set up a 10 candle standard pentane lamp and a sector exposure apparatus 
which was made for us by Munroe and a more elaborate and better finished densitometer of the H&D 





Illustration 3. Primitive densitometer made by Hurter and Driffield at the end of the 
1880s.68 
 
When John Sterry published a paper about the organic and inorganic latent image and 
the mechanism of the development at the Royal Photographic Society in 1898, Krohn 
started a short correspondence with him. The Kodak Collection archive includes a few 
of Sterry’s letters to Krohn about the characterization of H & D speed for high speed 
plates when high densities are reached, the suggestion to conduct trials to test speed, 
or the problem of testing mixed emulsion.69 
Several letters dating from 1898 to 1899 between Krohn and Darragh De Lancey, 
Works manager of Kodak Park, reveal that Krohn collaborated with Rochester to 
convince them adopt some Hurter and Driffield equipment to improve emulsion 
formulas, at De Lancey’s request. The method of the two British chemists was 
objectively discussed and its potential underlined. 
At the same time I felt from the very first what you express in one of your letters 
that here was promise of a really scientific method for studying emulsions and that 
it only required patience & perseverance to understand how to apply the method 
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for the purpose of discovering the true laws which govern the speed of emulsions, 
the laws of exposure, the laws of development and many other questions.70 
In the same letter, Krohn reported to De Lancey that he had met Driffield to get 
additional information about his method, and that Driffield apologized for the delay in 
responding to De Lancey due to Hurter’s sudden death of in 1898. In his answer to 
Krohn, De Lancey emphasizes the benefit of what can be named as scientific 
collaboration. 
I hope to have Mr. Harris, our chemist, prepare a statement of what we have been 
able to accomplish so far and will send it to you shortly together with his reply to 
what you have been told us in your letter. I think that a full interchange of ideas 
and experiments on such matters will only result in great benefit to the Company, 
and you may be sure that we appreciate the care and the trouble to which you 
went in giving us such a full account of your own work.71 
Later in the same year, Krohn installed a photometer and an exposure machine at the 
Harrow Works and sent the same equipment to Kodak Park in Rochester, continuing to 
instruct De Lancey and his technical team about the best method for using this 
equipment and giving in particular the formula of the H & D standard pyro soda 
developer.72 
This first cooperation between independent researchers and several Kodak 
representatives from two continents represents an important turn in innovation. 
Krohn’s recollections, which Kodak staff themselves only discovered in 1955 through 
his manuscript, demonstrate that the new strategy of the Research Laboratory did not 
suddenly emerge in 1912. On the contrary, they reveal that the previous laboratory 
work at Kodak was not just about solving production issues. Fortunately, Krohn’s 
bureaucratic behaviour, that emerges from his writings, urged him to write down his 
ideas and concepts. His eye for detail, as anecdotal as scientific, helps us to 
comprehend his time at Kodak Limited. In 1901, he resigned from his position to join 
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two cousins in a family business, and took care of transferring most of his 
photochemical knowledge and know-how to his successor. 
I at once took steps to ensure, as far as I possibly could, that all the experience I 
had gained should be put on record, so that as far as I could foresee there should 
be no break in the continuity of manufacture. E. Robins and I spent many hours 
collecting and collating notes, I dictating and he taking down all notes, formulae 
and instructions I could think of which might be of use to my successor.73 
This conscientious behaviour was rewarded during the First World War as George 
Eastman agreed to supply Krohn with surfaced papers for the Seltona paper he was 
then manufacturing. Finally, Krohn was re-hired at Kodak Limited at an unknown date 
and retired in 1932. However, Krohn’s last notebook reveals that he was still working 
for the company after his retirement probably in his personal laboratory. He was for 
instance sending samples of Victoria blue dyes in 1935 to Harrow, revising the colour-
film costs in 1936 or suggesting a method to suppress the appearance of bubbles 
during the coating of acetone-acetate dopes. In a report entitled Colour Films, he 
provided the complete procedure of the film making, from the dope making to the 
coatings, with indication about the drying and temperature needed.74 
The section above introduced Reichenbach’s research works in the 1890s, Krohn’s 
training at Rochester in 1891 and the scientific collaboration he developed in-house 
and with independent photochemists at Harrow. Now we are going to identify similar 
evidence of applied and fundamental research at Eastman Kodak in the United States. 
At Kodak Park in Rochester, the leaning toward pre-industrial research was also 
growing in the first years of the twentieth century. In 1890 Eastman set up a new 
organisation called the Experimental and Testing Laboratory. Harriet Gallup, an MIT 
chemist and Franck Lovejoy, an MIT engineer, were hired in the mid-1890s and started 
to work in this Laboratory to make some routine quality control on raw materials.75 
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They also performed some concise studies on the production of chemicals used in the 
process of film making as well as on the nitrate film support and its possible 
substitutes. They managed to make the nitrate film stronger, more resilient and less 
liable to shrinkage by substituting a mixture of carbon-tetra-chloride and grain alcohol 
for fusel oil and camphor.76 In 1906, a pharmaceutical chemist David E. Reid was hired 
under the supervision of Lovejoy in the Experimental and Testing Laboratory with the 
initial mission of starting an experimental production of raw photographic paper with a 
staff of eight people. In the same year, George Eastman was informed by the General 
Paper Company, his Belgian supplier of raw paper material, that Pathé Frères among 
other companies in Europe had undertaken research on a new nonflammable cine film 
made of acetate cellulose. Work on the same topic was finally assigned to Reid as 
well.77 The standard celluloid cine film made of nitrocellulose was easy to produce at 
low cost for the Eastman Company, and the many stages of the production process 
had been long since mastered. But the necessity of developing a new film base was 
growing as celluloid film remained dangerous due to its flammability. After one year of 
research, Reid’s positive results allowed the start of production tests and a satisfying 
acetate support for film was developed in the spring 1908. The new safety film was 
launched on the market the same year, but due to its relative weakness compared 
with nitrate film, this innovation remained a commercial failure despite some technical 
improvements and two years of marketing. The nonflammable film was thinner and 
less tough than nitrocellulose film and it tore faster in the sprockets of the cine 
projectors. These negative feedbacks from the market proved that the new base was 
not matured enough and that it requested further research and development work. 
The method of research used by Reid for the development of the new base is not 
known, but one can speculate that experimentation played a large part in the process, 
through the analyses and the progressive improvements of experimental bases. The 
estimation of the Laboratory’s organisation is also challenging. It did not end with the 
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creation of the Research Laboratory in 1912 and Reid remained at its head for many 
more years. The staff grew to forty-five employees, and they were in charge of the 
routine production issues and of some product developments. However, the 
coordination between the laboratory and the production departments was not 
efficient and the research staff was not trained enough.78 The Kodak historian Wyatt 
Brummitt mentioned Reid’s assignment about the production of photographic paper 
and provided some indication about the research work inside the laboratory. 
Reid started from scratch, trying to determine which paper ingredients or pulps 
were most compatible with sensitized silver salts. His experiments led to the 
making of small batches of paper, according to new specifications, by the 
American Playing Card Company and, to investigations abroad. For the time-being, 
Kodak continued to obtain its raw stock from the Rives-Steinbach people and from 
the Schoeller mills in Germany.79 
It is not confirmed whether this empirical method of research was also used for the 
development of the new cellulose acetate nonflammable film or not. Jenkins provided 
some indirect information about the research for the new support: the solvents had to 
be carefully selected to produce an acetate film as transparent as requested and some 
modifications of the process were necessary to avoid the infringements of some 
American and European patents80. Above all, the supply of acetic anhydride, a key 
chemical compound for the new film given its use in the synthesis of cellulose acetate, 
was problematic. In 1908 no one was able to supply the requested quantities for Kodak 
Park. So George Eastman asked his scientific expert in Europe Joseph Thacher Clarke to 
look for a skilled chemist in England to run a plant to produce the acetic anhydride. But 
it was finally possible to draw up a contract at the end of 1908 with the Verein für 
Chemische Industrie, the Association for the Chemical Industry in Frankfurt for 1200 
tons of such a chemical in monthly shipments of 50 tons81. 
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2.2.2 Research work on film support at Pathé Frères 1909-1912  
In France, the wealth of research work and production know-how at Pathé benefited 
Eastman Kodak, when the American company bought its French competitor in 1927. 
From this time onwards, the innovation made within both companies was mutual. As 
the recently discovered French Kodak archive at Chalon-sur-Saône reveals the research 
work during the 1910s for an equivalent nonflammable film in the research notebooks 
of photochemists, working at that time in Vincennes, France, it is appropriate to 
mention now how such laboratory work was performed at one of the Kodak’s main 
competitors. 
At the end of 1909, Pathé tested the new nonflammable film Reid had developed at 
Eastman Kodak but reported that it was not satisfactory as it broke during the process 
of perforation.82 Some Pathé research notebooks reveal that in the autumn 1910 the 
experimentation on collodion and acetate raw material was assigned to the 
photochemist Clément Lair. He initially used Mr. Rivière’s formula and looked for a 
modification of the acetylation process.83 At the same time, he sought technical 
information in the patents of the American chemist George Miles in particular. Lair 
confessed that his methodology was in fact based on the absence of any scientific 
procedure. 
The tests we have undertaken this week have been done without method, it is 
more a sequence of experimentation, with the goal of producing a film base with 
the requested thickness.84 
This description might indicate that he was using a trial-and-error method for his 
laboratory work. Indeed, Lair experimented with the many processes at his disposal 
through the existing patents or through the technical knowledge gathered from 
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specific collaboration. Imitating the process of Mr. Rivière, Lair tried the process of 
Lederer as well (Rapport du 19 octobre 1910), but it was not satisfying as the acetate 
produced was not soluble in acetone and water, and the solubility of the acetate was a 
pre-requisite chemical behaviour. In fact, the dissolution of the acetate in the acetone 
together with additional chemicals produced the nitrocellulose collodion material. As 
this material was the main component for the making of traditional cine film base, its 
production had a great industrial and economic interest.85 Lair was producing more 
and more experimental acetates, going sometimes back to processes already tested 
but with a change in the formula. He was also comparing the mechanical and chemical 
behaviour of the acetate available from a few European suppliers in Europe, and his 
own acetates. In December, Lair had produced 107 experimental acetates of which 95 
were satisfactory for the research (Rapport du 28 décembre 1910). As Lair clarified in 
one report, the number of tests was due to the method of preparing a batch of acetate 
materials for which some components and quantities were constant and only one 
quantity of chemical varied (Rapport du 27 octobre 1910). In this way it was possible to 
estimate the influence of the unique variable of the experiment. In the same report 
the chemist indicated that the experimentation on acetates was over but it is unknown 
if the decision came from him or if he was told to stop. Anyway Lair’s remark confirms 
that he used a trial-and-error method for the development of these 107 cellulose 
acetate supports. 
The innovation of the nonflammable film at Pathé has to be understood as a long-term 
research work, which was extended up to the end of the 1920s. In addition to the 
fundamental research on the acetate base, Pathé management favoured the 
development of technical collaboration with raw material suppliers while dismissing a 
strategy of vertical integration for this innovative film base. During the same year 
1910, Lair was investigating the supply of raw material such as the acetic anhydride 
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and was testing new formulas to reduce the production costs. For instance, the 
synthesis of acetate with acetic acid, cellulose and sulfuric acid but without acetic 
anhydride gave no positive result as the acetate produced was inadequate (Rapport du 
23 novembre 1910, 12). In France, Lair contacted the suppliers Oudé, Ognat et Cie, 
Favel, Desfours or Latierce. The price from the supplier Desfours for 100 kgs of acetic 
anhydride for a minimum of quantity of 5 tons was 315 francs. At that time, these 
companies were mostly buying the acetic anhydride in Germany, so Lair went directly 
there, probably at the request of Charles Pathé. Like Thacher Clarke two years before, 
he met the directors of the Verein für Chemische Industrie in Frankfurt and obtained 
the price of 9 francs per kilogram for the supply of cellulose acetate. Near Dresden, he 
met the director Mr. Fuhrlainder of the Chemische Fabrik von Hayden, the Chemical 
Factory, to discuss the supply of sulfuryl chlorure and acetic anhydride. The price of 
the latter was cheaper than the price of the French suppliers: 215 francs for 100 kgs 
(Rapport sur notre voyage en Allemagne, du 13 au 21 décembre 1910). Concerning the 
buying of acetate as a finished product, Lair had already tested some samples: the 
supplier Favel sold him in November a batch of the acetate made by the Verein für 
Chemische Industrie but the product was not very satisfactory. He suggested then 
either to collaborate with the German to modify the production process of the acetate, 
or to buy the acetic anhydride from them and keep on experimenting with the 
production of acetate directly in Vincennes (Rapport du 1er Décembre 1910). During 
his experiments, he also tested the acetate from the Bayer industry and from the 
Guiterman company. The product made by Bayer was called Cellit and very likely in 
1908 Thacher Clarke reported to Eastman that the Bayer plant near Cologne had been 
extended to produce the new cellulose acetate, and that Pathé among others was 
interested in the Cellit.86 Lair’s last reports show that he went back to the Chemische 
Fabrik von Hayden in Dresden in February 1911 to try to improve the acetylation 
process with the German chemists.87 In the summer 1912, he reported his journey in 
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the United States and his meeting with a few suppliers of acetone and cellulose 
acetate. One of them, represented by Dr Little and the film manufacturer Fire Proof 
Co. at Rochester, produced a very good acetate but at an expensive price, as it was not 
producing the acetic anhydride itself. Lair tried to find a solution in a hypothetical 
collaboration. 
I think it is worth for us connecting Hayden, in Dresden, with this company, the 
first having the means of succeed and the second having a good process of 
production. They certainly could manage to produce at an affordable cost an 
interesting product.88 
When the first Kodak Research Laboratory was being constructed in the summer 1912, 
it is obvious that the capacity of producing cellulose acetate was still experimental at 
Pathé and that the laboratory work expressed in the form of chemical formulas could 
not yet be transferred to the production departments in the Vincennes Works. It is 
challenging to characterize the organisation of the emulsion laboratory of the French 
film manufacturer, and the research work of each chemist seemed to be quite 
independent following the assignment of a specific task. However, the all-around 
methods and the rigorous experimentation used reveal a high level of expertise in the 
context of the production of scientific knowledge. Consequently, Pathé was 
undoubtedly a major competitor and a threat for Eastman Kodak to the European 
market when it was decided to open the new Research Laboratory in Rochester. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the American, British and French situation of pre-
industrial research at Kodak and Pathé before 1912 shows an in-between phase of 
research, neither individual nor structured, in a research laboratory, as it was after 
1912. For Reid and Lair, this research was caused by the need for a new film base to 
replace the flammable nitrocellulose support. While maintaining sometimes technical 
and scientific collaboration with independent chemists or suppliers, Krohn, Reid and 
Lair were conducting relatively independent research in their own organisation. Thus 
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scientific knowledge was scattered among isolated chemists from photographic 
industries, patent literature and chemical manufacturing suppliers. A new solution had 





2.3. Creation of the Kodak Research Laboratory in 1912 
 
I have pointed out in the preceding section that the “innovation turn” at Eastman 
Kodak did not appear suddenly in 1912 but that the change from the model of the 
independent master emulsion maker to the more protective model of the industrial 
research laboratory happened progressively from the end of the nineteenth century to 
1912. Competition in the synthesis of a new nonflammable film by many European 
actors also threatened the market shares of Eastman Kodak. Pathé, among others, was 
investigating a great deal in laboratory activities hoping to innovate and produce the 
new acetate film which would satisfy the movie industry worldwide.   
In Germany, it is also worth noting that the Actien-Gesellschaft für Anilin-Fabrikation 
(AGFA)89 re-started the production of cine nitrate film in 1908 and also built a new film 
factory in April 1909 in Greppin near Bitterfeld, dedicated to the production of 
cellulose acetate.90 Thacher Clarke warned Eastman of the impressive plant91 and Erik 
Rassmussen, another Eastman's agent, tried to get into it in February 1909 but could 
only take some photographs of the building and send them to Rochester.92 As the 
Kodak acetate film invented by Reid was not entirely satisfactory, and provoked by the 
competition surrounding this product, Eastman needed to take action in terms of his 
“innovation strategy”. Furthermore, the making of a photographic colour process 
seemed to be out of reach, and the Lumière Autochrome process unsurpassable. In 
order to understand how Eastman made the transition I will first describe the creation 
of the Research Laboratory. 
As the findings of the preceding section revealed, this process did not suddenly start 
during a business trip in Europe made by Eastman in 1911. Indeed, some scholars point 
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to a fairly well-known anecdote of Eastman’s visit to the Bayer chemical plant in 
Elberfeld in Germany in the winter of 1911. Brummitt in his unpublished Story of 
Kodak depicted the scene. 
In Elberfeld, in Germany, Eastman and his party were entertained at a formal 
luncheon by Dr. Duisberg of the Bayer Co. […]. 
During the luncheon, Dr. Duisberg remarked, quite casually, that the Bayer 
organization found it necessary to have a research staff of several hundred 
chemists. “And how many do you have, Mr. Eastman ? 
Eastman’s answer was a little evasive. What could he say, without losing face 
completely ? But he was stirred to action. Legend has it that he exploded to Clarke, 
“I won’t be talked to that way !” At any rate, he formed an idea on which he 
proposed fast action.93 
Ackerman, Eastman’s first biographer, did not mention the dinner and is rather brief 
about the new Research Laboratory.94 In 1975 Jenkins cited Brummitt and discussed 
the source of the information, as Brummitt did not provide any references. Jenkins 
concluded that a stop in Elberfeld would have been feasible as Eastman undertook “an 
extensive continental tour” in January 1912 in Europe.95 However, he also mentioned 
that he found further corroboration of the story in the interview of Kenneth Mees by 
Johansson and Allardt on 24 April 1952. 10 years later, Sturchio confirmed in a 
footnote that the famous anecdote was taken from that Mees interview, kept in the 
archive of the first director of the Research Laboratory. 
[…] Duisberg turned to Eastman and said “We have 700 chemists in our 
organization. How many have you got ?” Kodak had closer to seven than 700, and 
Eastman did not answer Duisberg directly. Shortly after this encounter, Eastman 
told Joseph Thacher Clarke, his technical intelligencer in London, that he refused 
to “be talked to in that way. I’m going to have a research laboratory, too !” 
Eastman asked Clarke to recommend someone to organize and direct the 
projected laboratory, and Clarke suggested Kenneth Mees.96 
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For this reason, the same Mees would stress later, Eastman’s early motivation was to 
have a Research Laboratory “for the sake of prestige”. The fact that this would allow 
Kodak scientists to publish the results of their scientific work provides additional 
evidence of this hypothesis.97 
A meeting with Mees, at that time the young managing director of Wratten & 
Wainwright in Croydon, a modest firm manufacturing panchromatic plates, colour 
filters and safelights, was finally arranged with George Eastman in January 1912. 
Eastman visited the small factory quickly, being especially interested in the production 
of Wratten light filters. On the evening, he called Mees back and offered him the 
founding, organisation and direction of a new Research Laboratory in the heart of 
Kodak Park in Rochester, New York. It was not the first time that Eastman had met 
Mees; during a professional trip for the American Bank Note Company in the United 
States in 1909, the British specialist of photographic chemistry had showed the same 
approach towards George Eastman in writing directly to him, requesting a visit of 
Kodak Park. The two men met for the first time, and Mees visited the industrial plant 
of Kodak Park with its manager James H. Haste.98 He was certainly impressed by the 
size of the production facilities but it is not known if he tried to apply any of the 
production knowledge he acquired on his return at the factory of Wratten & 
Wainwright. 
In response to Eastman’s offer, Mees consulted his relatives and friends and finally 
accepted the new and promising position at Rochester, provided that Eastman took 
over Wratten & Wainwright and its production too.99 Mees even refused Eastman’s 
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first financial offer and requested double the amount, and this was finally accepted. 
Indeed, the deal was to hire the expert of photochemistry and colour photography as 
well as acquire a renowned factory of panchromatic plates and colour filters, and the 
additional opportunity to transfer technology was something that Eastman could not 
refuse. Finally, in April 1912, Mees went to Rochester to start the building of the 
laboratory. He also had his own doubts about his new position and duties, and the 
prospect of leaving London for Rochester was not a pleasant one. He asked himself if 
he was he the right man for the various responsibilities to come. As Mees wrote, “I 
told to Mr. Eastman, “I’m too young’, and he said: “That is a trouble that will get a little 
better every day.” 100 This anecdote shows that Eastman put forward Mees’ scientific 
background rather than his rather limited experience. 
At this stage, it is relevant to point out the scientific and corporate background of 
Mees at Wratten & Wainwright, because it clarifies Eastman’s decision to hire a young 
man with both managerial and scientific skills. Between 1904 and 1907, Mees and his 
classmate and friend Samuel Sheppard published eleven papers, which formed the 
basis for their doctorates and for the well-known book Investigations on the theory of 
the photographic process in 1907. The “revelation” of Sheppard and Mees's passion for 
photochemistry was the discovery before 1903 of the research work of Hurter and 
Driffield about the sensitiveness of photographic plates. It is not known if the two 
young chemists met either Driffield or Krohn from Kodak Limited as there is no 
evidence of a possible collaboration in the archives. But it is certified that Sheppard 
and Mees used the work of Hurter and Driffield as a basis for their own research, trying 
to improve on their experimental methods101. Thacher Clarke and Eastman knew the 
growing ability of Mees in photochemistry through his publications, and when the 
young chemist took the position of managing director at Wratten & Wainwright in 
1906, he soon started to improve the current production of plates and to develop new 
products. Mees had access to the sensitizing dyes produced by Hoechst Farbwerke in 
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Germany, such as the Orthochrome T or the Pinacyanol. He succeeded in developing 
an innovative process of making plates involving the new German dyes, by 
incorporating the dye in the emulsion before coating on the glass: the new plates were 
marketed as “Wratten Panchromatic Plates”.102 Mees also developed three well-
known light filters, the Wratten K filters, from a new German dye called “Filter yellow 
K”. He was collecting more and more dyes, and built a wedge spectrograph to be able 
to photograph the absorption spectra of all of them. When Eastman discovered the 
result of this work published in An Atlas of Absorption Spectra in 1909, he certainly 
understood that Mees was a seductive expert of coloured filters and thus of additive 
colour processes. The book was revised by Dr. E. Koenig of Hoechst and one notes that 
Mees mentions the “Research Laboratory of Wratten & Wainwright”.103 This 
laboratory was quite small with some measuring instruments at the factory in 
Croydon, as can be seen on Illustration 4. 
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Illustration 4. Kenneth Mees (left) in the laboratory of Wratten & Wainwright, 
Croydon, using a home-made diffraction spectroscope in 1908.104 
 
During the same period, Mees was also doing some consulting work and took some 
advice on methods of industrial research from two of his friends who were directing a 
research laboratory, William Rintoul at Nobel Explosives Limited and William Whitney 
at General Electric. In 1910, an important English dry plate factory suffering from the 
competition from Kodak Limited offered to purchase Wratten & Wainwright, 
interested by the technical knowledge of the production of panchromatic plates and 
proposing to Mees a position of technical director of the factory. The understanding 
with the director of the unidentified company was difficult and the offer was finally 
declined.105 It is not known if Eastman or Thacher Clarke heard about the possible 
agreement however one can speculate that Eastman was conscious that Mees’s 
scientific aura would attract some companies in the field. 
It should also be stressed that the small scale of Wratten provided the opportunity for 
Mees to experiment with various activities for the company, from research work to 
salesmanship, and to always keep in mind later at Kodak that scientific research needs 
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at least sometimes to deal with profitable results. And for Eastman, finding a skilled 
manager to establish a Research Laboratory also provided a new solution to control 
the production of knowledge with Mees directing a team of researchers, casting the 
individual’s role within the overall framework of the laboratory’s mission.106 Therefore 
tacit or explicit knowledge, as defined by Polanyi,107 remained embedded in the 
company’s assets, following a model of “Closed Innovation”. 
For Mees, research activities were also seen as an opportunity for publication despite 
the constraints of the industrial context. Thus, before accepting the new position he 
also negotiated with Eastman to secure his approval for the publication of “everything 
that we do that is scientific”.108 The generous Eastman also agreed to allow the new 
research structure enough time to start producing important and marketable 
inventions. The expected returns on investment from the Kodak Research Laboratory 
therefore followed a long-term strategy. As requested by Mees, the main goal of the 
laboratory was not to solve manufacturing issues but to study the unsolved aspects of 
the photographic process. 
It was understood that the laboratory was to be essentially devoted to basic 
research on photographic science but would not, at first, at any rate, deal with 
manufacturing processes or with new products, though obviously new discoveries 
in science might easily lead to new photographic products.109 
 
At this point, I am going to resume the study of the reasons of the creation of the 
Kodak Research Laboratory. The argument of the attack of Bayer’s executives as the 
release mechanism of a new strategy of research and innovation was almost always 
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used by historians inside and outside the Kodak Company. But the same scholars and 
others also stress the rise of industrial research, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In the United States, the biggest companies like Eastman Kodak, General 
Electric (GE), AT&T, General Motors and DuPont had enough capital resources to 
invest in applied research and managers to structure it, in parallel with the various 
problems of production facilities.110 But, if at least 39 American companies had their 
own industrial laboratory by 1900, they were usually devoted to the testing of new 
products, processes, and quality control of chemicals and raw material. On the 
contrary, the rationale of innovative research was the discovery of new scientific 
principles upon which to base industrial development.111 This new vision was initially 
developed in leading German chemical companies at the end of the nineteenth 
century, such as Bayer ; the purpose was to introduce “basic”, or “fundamental” 
research into the industrial laboratory. As John J. Beer concludes in 1958 in a paper 
about the Bayer company and the German dyestuffs industry, “it can be said […] that 
the industrial chemical research laboratories of Germany in the decade prior to the 
First World War were already highly institutionalized and closely resembled the 
commercial research laboratories of our own way.”112 For Eastman Kodak, introducing 
fundamental research into an industrial laboratory was just what was needed to solve 
the acetate film base problem in particular. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, other historians pointed out new 
interpretations of the development and use of industrial research. For Chandler and 
Galambos, research was an asset to corporate strategy, a resource amongst other 
resources, such as the will to increase the production capacity. For Jenkins and Reich, 
industrial research was used as a weapon to strengthen market position and to protect 
against competitors. And for Wise and Leslie, the success of the modern structure of 
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research depended to a great extent on the personality of the research directors113. 
The shift toward new research corporations producing knowledge and inventions 
weakened the traditional model of independent inventor in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, as stressed by the historian Thomas P. Hughes.114 
Sturchio pointed out another reason for the creation of the Kodak Research Laboratory 
in 1912. Reducing the argument of colour photography still being invented, he 
highlighted the “rise in antitrust sentiment on both the state and national levels.” This 
new way of promoting research within the industrial laboratory represented an 
opportunity for Eastman to comply with a good public policy should horizontal 
integrations no longer be allowed.115 On the contrary, Jenkins and later Brayer pointed 
out the various unsuccessful technical attempts of Eastman to develop a marketable 
colour photographic process. Analysis of Eastman’s correspondence showed that his 
concern about colour started no later than in 1904 when Thacher Clarke was asked to 
seek new processes in Europe. Some examples of scientific collaborations started with 
independent inventors: in 1904 John K. Powrie and Florence Warner worked for a few 
months in the chemical laboratory of Kodak Park, trying to improve their screen colour 
process but technical results remained unsatisfactory. In 1910, the chemist Carl Späth 
was working at Harrow with Thacher Clarke on his two-colour dichromated gelatin 
screen process, for which Eastman Kodak had optioned patents. Späth was later taken 
to Rochester to continue his experiments but, like many other experimental additive 
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colour processes of that time, the complexity of the manufacturing, development and 
projection was too high to reach a viable and marketable standard. So before Mees’s 
era, Eastman already favoured internal research in establishing a prototype colour 
laboratory under the supervision of the MIT graduate Emerson Packard. The mission of 
Packard was to develop a filter screen process from the research of Powrie and 
Warner, without infringing Lumière’s autochrome. It appears that the experimental 
laboratory did not produce any noticeable innovation and this structure did not survive 
the new Research laboratory in 1912.116 
 
                                                     




2.4. Basic and industrial Research under the management 
of Kenneth Mees 1912-1955 
This final section of chapter 2 deals with the development of the Research Laboratory 
in terms of figures and the strategy used by Mees to hire the most skilled scientists. It 
also identifies the nature of the research organisation he progressively set up during 
the first years. Fortunately for Eastman, the young Mees did not become a victim on 
the RMS Titanic, which sank the month of his round trips to Rochester in April 1912.117 
At Kodak Park, one challenge for Mees was his inexperience in working with engineers 
to build and design the new laboratory, requesting the demolition of the old emulsion 
building 3 at the centre of the industrial plant. However, this was also the chance for 
him to arrange the laboratory according to his vision of how photographic research 
ought to be conducted. The basement of the new laboratory was dedicated to the 
manufacturing of experimental emulsions and small-scale emulsions for coating films, 
plates or papers. Wratten panchromatic plates were also produced in this basement. 
Mees placed the research library dedicated to photography, chemistry, physics and 
engineering on the ground floor. The scientific departments were situated on the first 
and second floors, including offices and a conference room. Finally, the photographic 
studios and the projection room occupied the third floor. Mees, encouraged by the 
resources of the large company, created as many scientific departments as necessary, 
in particular to better understand how the photographic process works. 
In a new laboratory supported by the Kodak Company, I could organize an attack 
on all divisions of the problems presented by the science of photography, and by 
that time I knew enough about industrial research to believe that work on a large 
scale on the basic science of photography would justify itself commercially.118 
The staff of the Research Laboratory grew rapidly, as stated in Table 1. 
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Year Annual expenditure ($) Staff Floor area (sq. ft) 
1913119 53,787 20 - 
1915120 126,745 40 24,500 
Early 1920121 - 70122 - 
1920123 338,680 88 29,500 
1921124 - 105125 - 
1925126 397,449 92 39,600 
1930 618,503 159 48,700 
1935 952,397 210 140,100 
1940 1,923,223 392 205,600 
1945 2,457, 463 413 207,100 
1955127 - 1175128 318,700 
 
Table 1. The growth of the Research Laboratory in Rochester in terms of annual 
expenditure, staff and size.129 
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One of Mees’ major qualities was his managerial ability to set up an efficient team of 
researchers by hiring talented scientific profiles by using his networks and circles. 
Whilst still a student in London, he started networking at the Croydon Camera Club in 
1901 and at the Royal Photographic Society in 1904, establishing new contacts and 
being elected to the Council of the second institution in 1907.130 At Wratten and 
Wainwright, he was in contact with other business leaders and photochemists, as 
previously explained. A recent study of Emanuel Goldberg by Michael Buckland 
pointed out Mees’s way of sustaining friendships with a positive self-interest.131 
Goldberg, a Russian-born physicist and photochemist was the founder of Zeiss Ikon 
Company in Dresden. He met Sheppard and Mees in London in 1904 and Goldberg and 
Mees established a long-term friendship. He then went back to the Ostwald’s Institute 
in Leipzig, Germany to work with Robert Luther and Arthur Slator on his doctoral 
dissertation about the photochemical reaction. Having worked in the Technical 
University of Berlin with the photochemist Adolf Miethe, Goldberg took up in 1907 a 
teaching position in the department of Photography at the Leipzig academy. In 1911, 
Mees tried to increase the research capacities of Wratten and Wainwright by hiring 
Goldberg to work with him in London. The Leipzig academy was apparently informed 
about the British proposal and a counteroffer was made with a salary increase and a 
promotion to the rank of Professor in the same year. Goldberg finally declined Mees’ 
offer, but the wise British man replied in a way that kept an option open to the skilled 
Goldberg in the future. 
Should at any time in the future our financial position be such that we could afford 
to make an offer commensurate with the position which you will then have 
obtained, and should you at that time feel that the burden of official life was heavy 
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and that you would prefer a change, we may perhaps be able to re-open the 
subject.132 
In February 1912, Goldberg was informed in a letter from Mees about the new deal 
with Eastman Kodak. He was very surprised and congratulated his friend, joking about 
the possible reaction of André Callier, the Belgian physicist and a mutual friend of the 
two men.133 Goldberg was interested too: “if you ever need an assistant there, please 
think of me. Perhaps there will be a possibility later on to work together”.134 Mees 
took his chance and invited Goldberg to work with him at Rochester. However, the 
young Leipzig professor hesitated for a long time before finally declining the promising 
offer for family reasons and because he was enjoying his new life in Germany at that 
time. Following the outbreak of the First World War, Mees invited Goldberg once again 
to work in the Kodak research Laboratory, but Goldberg was not allowed to move to 
America as he was considered a Russian citizen.135 The same disappointment occurred 
when Mees tried to hire the dye chemist at Hoechst Dr. E. Koenig, as can be found in 
his notes.136 These two failures ascertain, in any case, that Mees used a wise hiring 
strategy, mixing appeals to his social and professional networks and rather 
opportunistic approaches built on favourable political contexts, to approach the 
relevant applicant at the right moment.  
In this way, Mees used his professional and social networks to build the most strategic 
team for the Research Laboratory. Some people were taken from the British staff of 
Wratten such as the emulsion-maker James K. Baker and John G. Capstaff, a young 
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man just hired in 1912 to make the Wratten filters. Unsurprisingly, Mees offered a 
position to his friend Samuel E. Sheppard who had planned to obtain a degree in 
biochemistry in the field of agriculture. Sheppard accepted the job, as did John I. 
Crabtree, another young Englishman and student in chemistry. In America, Mees drew 
from the scientific resources of the National Bureau of Standards and hired three 
promising scientists: Perley G. Nutting and L.A. Jones, who were working in optics and 
Alonzo S. McDaniel, who was an inorganic chemist.137  
 
Illustration 5. The physico-chemical laboratory in the Kodak Research Laboratory at 
Rochester in 1913.138 
 
Following Mees’s intuition in the development of the Research Laboratory but also 
responding to the growing needs of the researchers in their daily activities, the number 
of scientific departments grew in the first decade of the new research structure (see 
Illustration 5). The chemist Harry LeBreton Gray, former superintendant of the 
Emulsion Coating Department at Kodak Park, joined the Research Laboratory in 1914 
to create and head the organic chemistry department. He was soon seconded by Hans 
Thacher Clarke, the son of Joseph Thacher Clarke, the same year.  Later in 1917, it was 
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decided to create a department of microscopy and photomicroscopy and Adrian Peter 
Trivelli, a Dutch photochemist was hired to head the new department. This way of 
developing the Laboratory indicates that Mees’s inexperience was mitigated by his 
empirical sense of research. The inevitable hazards he encountered in his function 
made him progress and he took quick actions when necessary to improve the structure 
of the new Laboratory. 
Mees also developed a successful social network within the American industry. In 
December 1914, Mees, his friends Willis R. Whitney of General Electric Laboratories, 
Raymond F. Bacon of the Mellon Institute, Milton C. Whitaker of Columbia University 
and William H. Walker of MIT investigated the creation of a special subcommittee on 
industrial research during a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science. The new think-tank raised the matter of the organisation of industrial 
research and the necessity of promoting cooperation between industrial research 
laboratories and research institutes.139 The subcommittee may have influenced the 
creation of the National Research Council by the American Congress in 1916 as well as 
the need to develop new technologies for the purposes of the First World War. In 1918 
a campaign was launched to increase public understanding of industrial research and 
an advisory group was set up with some American business leaders among whom 
George Eastman, Edwin W. Rice of General Electric, Theodore N. Vail of A.T. & T. and 
Pierre S. du Pont. These presidents of large-scale companies stressed the importance 
of basic research compared to applied research. Science should be applied to every 
branch of industry.140  In a publication of the National Research Council, George 
Eastman provided his own views about the organisation of an industrial research 
laboratory, pointing out the significance of the creation and distribution of scientific, 
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technical and commercial knowledge in all departments. For Eastman, the benefits of 
such a structure could also “irradiate” up to final customers. 
By the very nature of its work an industrial research laboratory must become a 
focus and center of the technical knowledge of the industry. In our schemes for 
industrial development, therefore, we must direct our aim so that the laboratories 
established for research may create and systematize the technical knowledge 
relating to the industries with which they are associated, so that from the 
laboratories this knowledge may permeate all branches and sections of business 
life, […] insisting on products of higher quality and simultaneously educating 
customers to make the best use of the products which are supplied to them.141 
Eastman had been convinced by Mees and his management philosophy for the 
Research Laboratory. From 1913 onwards, Mees developed his vision of the young 
structure and took an enthusiastic interest in the organisation of the scientific 
research. He first published a paper in Science about the subject in 1916.142 Mees 
stated the limits of the self-made man period, Eastman’s era before 1900.143 He also 
defined the nature of this new type of laboratory. 
It means a large, elaborately equipped, and heavily staffed laboratory engaged 
largely on work which for many years will be unremunerative and which, for a 
considerable time after its foundation, will obtain no results at all which can be 
applied by the manufacturer.144 
Thus, while the research laboratory provided a structured organisation of in-house 
researchers, the notion of economic risk was still not excluded from the research 
process, due to the “unremunerative” nature of fundamental research. Mees also 
thought about the boundaries between the research laboratory and the manufacturing 
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divisions. Researchers could not handle all the technical issues of the manufacturing 
departments, thus a necessary separation was needed between them. 
In a second paper published in Science in 1917, Mees took on the organisation of 
research work, and developed his theory of the “convergent laboratory” and the 
“divergent laboratory,” the first being a structure for which “problems investigated are 
all connected with one common subject” and the second being a structure for which 
“the problems are of many kinds, having no connecting bond of interest.”145  The 
example used for the convergent laboratory was the Eastman Kodak Company. “The 
purpose of this laboratory is the investigation of the scientific foundations of 
photography and its applications, everything relating to photography in all its branches 
and applications being of interest.”146 Using graphics, Mees showed how the distinct 
sciences of photography (physics, chemistry, photography) are interrelated around a 
common “core” called photographic theory and practical photography (see Figure 2). 
As the scientific field of a photographic expert partially overlaps the other fields, Mees 
proved that in his organisation of a research laboratory scientific knowledge could be 
transferred between researchers working on different fields. It is precisely this use of 
knowledge transfer between the three Kodak Research Laboratories that is confirmed 
and highlighted in chapter 3 of this thesis with the study of the research reports’ 
exchange.  
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Figure 2. Sections of a research laboratory for the study of photographic problems 
as organized by Kenneth Mees.147 
 
Contents of both papers were used in 1920 by Mees to publish a monograph as the 
relation of science to industry was prominent after the end of the War.148 The book 
was intended to help people in industry when thinking about the creation of a 
research laboratory in terms of budget, recruitment and return on investment. Mees 
also studied the relationship between the research laboratory and the industrial 
organisation, the direction of the work and the design of the building for a specific 
industry. Sturchio pointed out that Mees emphasized cooperation and teamwork. As 
the time of photographic pioneers and individual geniuses was over, the research 
laboratory could now rely on well trained but standardised scientists, able to solve 
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research problems through interdisciplinary cooperation.149 In this way, Mees 
developed a process of invention by management, for which the origin of invention 
had shifted from individuals to the managed team.150 
In his quest for an ideal organisation of industrial research, Mees also used the 
experience of his friends W.R. Whitney at the General Electric Research Laboratory and 
W. Rintoul at the Nobel Explosives Research Laboratory. The former notably warning 
“against the things you shouldn’t do, particularly that you shouldn’t try and run the 
laboratory - that you should leave the men to run the laboratory and just see that 
nobody interfered with them.”151 Conversely, the organisation promoted by Rintoul 
was more traditional and structured and Mees, during his career at Eastman Kodak 
was always looking for a way between these two theories of managing a research 
laboratory, between the “over-organised” and the “under-organised” structure. In 
1935, he confessed during a talk, that in his opinion the choice between the two 
attitudes was not the most important. 
In some laboratories, the direction and the organization is extremely centralized, 
so that every problem is followed by a group of higher executives, and the most 
rigid analysis is kept of all expenditures. In other laboratories, the organization is 
so loose that it scarcely has any form at all; the individual worker has great 
latitude, and long distant planning is almost absent. As far as I can see, it doesn’t 
matter which method you use provided the men are equally competent. As you 
will see later, my own method is of the “formless” variety rather than a centralized 
plant.152 
It appears from the archives analysed for this thesis that the “formless” method 
referred to by Mees, was more a well-ordered freedom in conducting research. The 
choice of research topics was flexible and not restricted by the director Mees, but 
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routine activities were closely supervised. Furthermore, Mees remained a decision-
maker and gathered all the data produced by the Research Laboratories, which is the 
characteristic of a centralized organization. 
From Rintoul and Whitney, Mees also learned the best way to circulate technical and 
scientific knowledge among the researchers - he instigated the conference system. 
This “knowledge transfer” tool consisted in morning conferences held weekly in each 
problem area and involved researchers from several departments provided that they 
were working on the same specific subject. The growth of the Research Laboratory led 
to additional conferences being developed. “There were weekly meetings of 
laboratory departments heads, weekly division meetings (often involving as many as 
150-200 people), and periodic conferences of the research directors with senior 
research associates and laboratory heads.”153 
It is worth noting that, despite all this new strategy in the development of innovation 
in-house and the great hopes for scientific discoveries and inventions to result from 
the work at the Kodak research Laboratory, Mees never forgot to keep a vigilant eye 
on potential independent or internal inventors. This is confirmed by Maurice Holland, 
director of the division of Engineering and Industrial Research at the National Research 
Council, who interviewed Mees at the end of the 1920s for a publication and stressed 
the importance of the inventor’s place in Mees’ view. At the end of the chapter about 
Mees, Holland quoted the director of Kodak Research, who was regarded as an 
“industrial explorer” among other leaders. 
“I have not”, he explains, “the slightest trace of the inventor in my make-up. The 
inventor is a valuable man in any research organization. He may be hard to get 
along with. He may even be ignorant, because it is difficult for the inventive mind 
to absorb facts. But he’s essential. He finds a path around or across when the 
research man has been stopped. He may fool around for years without getting 
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anywhere. But he’s essential. When you get your hands on an inventor, freeze 
onto him !”154 
As this thesis clarifies in chapter 4, Mees’ clear vision of independent inventors’ 
potential would result in crucial scientific collaborations with the independent 
photochemists Mannes, Godoswky, Martinez and Schinzel.  
 
2.5. Conclusion of Chapter 2 
 
Placing fundamental and applied research in the photographic industry within the 
framework of intellectual property in chapter 2, I was able to argue for the central role 
of industrial secrecy in the production and manufacture of photographic and 
cinematographic film from the end of the nineteenth century. The industrial secrecy, 
nicknamed the “silver curtain” by the Kodak researchers, was a powerful constraint to 
innovation in the first half of the twentieth century. Emulsion research was principally 
impacted because industrial secrecy was usually deployed as a defensive weapon 
around the production departments. Indeed, the stages of photographic and cine film 
production and the application of new technologies to the manufacturing workflow 
were mostly affected by this constraint. Industrial secrecy therefore produced a lack of 
in-house cooperation between engineers and chemists working in the manufacturing 
plants, and scientists in the research laboratories. In these conditions, it was 
sometimes difficult to develop experimental emulsions or to test new dyes to improve 
current films. Outside the firm, industrial secrecy prevented scientific knowledge about 
emulsion making from being diffused within the international community of scientists 
in the field of photography. The independent photochemists Wall and Demers 
complained about this restriction of technical and scientific knowledge-sharing and 
had to start the development of emulsions from scratch with no chance of cooperation 
and transfer of knowledge. Demers developed a small-scaled industry on his own, 
                                                     




which was dedicated to the production of special emulsions used by nuclear physicists. 
Unlike the tradition of the photographic industry, he published all his findings, 
methodology and know-how in an exhaustive book.  
I also argued that the predominance of industrial secrecy progressively reduced public 
research activities in the science of photography. After the First World War, the 
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) in the United States of America and the British 
Photographic Research Association (BPRA) were forced to study film emulsions 
without clear information from their manufacturers about their nature. Both 
narratives of the photographic research at the NBS and at the BPRA also show the 
failure of constructive and scientific collaborations between public research 
institutions and private film manufacturers. Technological and scientific knowledge 
was shared unilaterally and the photographic industry remained suspicious towards 
the two national laboratories. During the same period however, two traditions 
stimulated zones of knowledge exchange about photographic emulsion and 
experimental colour processes. Firstly, the intellectual and scientific rivalry between 
European and American photochemists, provoked numerous publications from both 
sides. The second tradition, which is linked to the first one, was the organisation of 
several International Congresses of Photography in Europe during the Interwar period 
from which a photographic scientific community progressively emerged. Chemists and 
physicists from France, Germany, England and the United States in particular met and 
exchanged their discoveries concerning the photographic process and improvements 
in film making. The proceedings of these congresses were usually published thereby 
increasing knowledge about photographic science, and steadily growing into the 
specialised libraries found at many photographic research laboratories. 
In chapter 2, I also clarified the fact that contrary to traditional views about the so-
called breaking point between the old technical laboratory and the cutting-edge 
industrial research laboratory in the first half of the twentieth century, the method of 
doing scientific research at Eastman Kodak started well before the creation of the 




to the resolution of manufacturing issues and the quality control of raw materials. The 
reduced staff in the industrial laboratory was managed by the “master emulsion 
maker” who controlled the complete manufacturing processes of the company. At 
Rochester, this situation led to the betrayal of the photochemist Reichenbach. In 
England, his counterpart Krohn, hired in 1891, had nevertheless had time to benefit 
from Reichenbach’s extensive experience and the ensuing transfer of technological 
knowledge during a stay at Kodak Park. The agreement between Krohn and Kodak 
Limited was rigorous with respect to the intellectual property of any possible 
discoveries made in Harrow by the new photochemist. Krohn’s manuscript revealed 
that he undertook a long-term scientific collaboration with leading scholars in the 
science of photography. He developed the method of Hurter and Driffield to 
determine the speed of the emulsions and transferred it to Rochester at the request of 
the general manager De Lancey. This first cooperation between independent 
researchers and Kodak representatives from two continents represented an important 
innovation turn. During the same period, the Experimental and Testing Laboratory at 
Kodak Park in Rochester foreshadowed the upcoming Research Laboratory. Important 
studies were made there on colour photography, photographic paper manufacturing 
or nonflammable film base. I argue that all these small facts constituted the beginnings 
of the need for an industrial Research Laboratory in George Eastman’s mind, but also 
among the staff of Kodak managers and photochemists. The creation of the first Kodak 
Research Laboratory in 1912 represented, in part, the outcome of these common 
reflections.  
In parallel, Pathé, Eastman Kodak’s main competitor, instituted scientific procedures 
and modern experimental work in its industrial laboratory at Vincennes in France. 
Thorough scientific investigations were made into the production of a nonflammable 
support in cellulose acetate. Chemical raw materials were sourced directly from 
German and American suppliers to reduce manufacturing costs. The research methods 
used by the French photochemists revealed a high level of expertise in the production 
of scientific knowledge. Consequently, Pathé was undoubtedly a major though not 




twentieth century. In particular, competition over the synthesis of a new 
nonflammable film by several European actors threatened the market shares of 
Eastman Kodak. 
Another section of chapter 2 also pointed out that the creation of the Kodak Research 
Laboratory in 1912 took place for a variety of reasons. With respect to intellectual 
property management, it was necessary for Eastman Kodak to secure and obtain the 
ownership of all the inventions produced within the controlled in-house organisation 
which the Research Laboratory represented. In terms of historical context, George 
Eastman followed the trends in industrial research development from the end of the 
nineteenth century, inspired by the model of the German chemical industry. Pertaining 
to Kodak marketing strategy, the Research Laboratory was also used “for the sake of 
prestige” as confirmed by the liberty of researchers to publish their scientific results. 
With regard to photographic technology, the quest for a marketable colour 
photographic process was an important reason to increase the research capacities of 
the firm as well. The political context played an important part too. At a time during 
which antitrust policies were growing in the US, creating a research laboratory was a 
solution to innovate in-house and to avoid the use of horizontal integrations. In the 
same part of Chapter 2, it has also been stressed that the success of the new 
Laboratory highly depended on the managerial and organisational skills of its director. 
To that purpose, Mees’s recruitment was crucial, as he was an expert in colour 
photography and connected with European partners and suppliers. Eastman made an 
excellent choice in the personality of Mees, and the British scientist was partially 
responsible of the long-termed development and future commercial successes of the 
Research Laboratories.  
Mees’s inexperience in the organisation of a research laboratory was fruitful because 
he started from scratch without prior assumptions. He reasoned scientifically and even 
developed a methodology of the organisation of industrial research. He had to design 
everything from the laboratory’s building to the departments and their fields of study. 




by an expert in photographic science and that fundamental research in particular was 
oriented towards applied research. The laboratory’s staff grew progressively as Mees 
hired the best men for the job, selecting them amongst his former colleagues at 
Wratten & Wainwright, the National Bureau of Standards and his acquaintances 
(agreement with Sheppard, failure with Goldberg). Mees created an in-house scientific 
community devoted to the understanding of the photographic process. However, 
during the first years of the Research Laboratory at Rochester, Mees never considered 
the technological skills of Kodak Limited as an opportunity for Research and 
Development internationalisation. The first scientists scattered throughout the many 
scientific departments of the Research Laboratory at Kodak Park had to prove 
themselves first. As regards management, Mees was given favourable conditions by 
Eastman for the laboratory’s development: a satisfactory budget for the first years, the 
opportunity to publish scientific results and a greater focus on basic research during 
the laboratory’s first years. It is clear that Eastman took an important risk in financing 
Mees’s Research Laboratory, as the production of scientific knowledge promoted by 
the new director would not necessarily result in later marketable inventions. For 
Eastman, the long-term and uncertain development of Kodak Research represented a 







Chapter 3: Kodak Research in Europe: origins, organisation 
and methods 
 
Since 1912, the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester had been increasing its 
understanding of the photographic process, while continuing to solve the occasional 
production issues. In the middle of the 1920s, a business opportunity in Europe caused 
a definitive change of the Kodak Research organisation, through the purchase of the 
French competitor Pathé-Cinéma. This horizontal integration strengthened Eastman’s 
establishment in Europe and led to the opening of the British and French Kodak 
Research Laboratories. 
The first section of the chapter answers a question that could appear insignificant: why 
did Kodak decide to duplicate the Rochester Research Laboratory at the turn of 1928 
by forming two additional laboratories in relation with Kodak Limited and Kodak-
Pathé? Indeed, the Rochester Research Laboratory had substantial scientific results 
and the number of scientists it employed was growing year after year. In England, the 
Harrow Works were at that time an important film and paper manufacturing plant 
with a limited testing laboratory mostly used for the production processes. In France, 
the recent merger with the former customer and competitor Pathé-Cinéma was the 
opportunity to significantly increase film production capability without the need for 
building a new physical plant. However, recently discovered research reports of the 
Pathé Company show that the creation of a French Research Laboratory from the 
former Pathé structure was strategic due to the quality of the technical and scientific 
work of the French researchers. The new European laboratories were an attempt to 
“open” the “Closed Innovation” produced in the Rochester Research Laboratory to 
new scientific stimuli, new inventors or new competitive technologies. While 
performing their own research work inside the laboratory, these structures also acted 
as innovation clusters operating in several European countries and promoting 
networking and the exchange of knowledge. The technological context of research on 




collaborated for several years with the two chemists Mannes and Godowsky without 
clear and viable results, except the announcement of a two-colour subtractive process. 
The fact that Kenneth Mees decided to use the expertise in colour technology and 
chemistry of his colleagues at Harrow by opening an additional Research Laboratory is 
thus also quite strategic. 
To prove this, in the second part of the chapter I analyse one of the most important 
primary sources of the Kodak Collection archives in Europe: the research reports. They 
relate to the technical and scientific knowledge produced through the routine work of 
the researchers in the two laboratories. The research reports belong to the few 
primary sources available to answer my research question, in addition to the 
notebooks of the scientists, the varied correspondence, the patent work, some 
unpublished reports about Kodak Research and the oral histories of former 
researchers. This “older type of document” as Peter Galison names them, compared to 
late twentieth-century experiments of large-scale organisations give more direct 
access to the laboratory work.1 The research reports, which are a “public” source in-
house, are particularly pertinent because they provide the operating procedure and 
the results obtained from, for instance, a chemical experiment of which no traces now 
exist. The fact that each report follows a logical and scientific rationale helps in 
deciphering its meaning and import in the specific field studied. 
A research report is somewhat similar to a micro-thesis introducing a research 
problem. It includes a main body of experimental work and an analysis of the data 
collected in a conclusion and summary. The scientist’s reasoning is generally included 
within the text and the report is therefore more intelligible to non-expert researchers 
than, for example, a published scientific paper. To approach these sources, because 
the large quantity of research reports does not allow a complete study of the corpus in 
the framework of this thesis, I used a computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS) technique to process the list of collected report titles. Use of a 
                                                     




recent tool, the tag or word cloud, visually indicates whether or not some specific 
research topics might emerge for a specific period. Then the study goes through the 
content of a sampling of research reports and examines similitudes and differences 
between British and some French reports, including research about collaboration and 
communication between the three Research Laboratories. This section also clarifies 
the sociological aspect of the research reports, asking what their contribution to 
knowledge production might be and establishing “the social processes that convert the 
fallible individual research report (or rather, collections of such reports) into scientific 
knowledge”.2 The purpose of the research report is principally to increase the level of 
knowledge in a specific field as well as to serve as a decision-making tool to guide 
management towards the best innovation strategy. In a teamwork structure, the 
research report has to be read by as many scientists and collaborators as possible to 
gradually construct scientific facts and to promote the exchange and transfer of 
knowledge. To achieve this goal, it has to be widely spread into the various 
departments of the Research Laboratory. Its role is thus central to communication 
amongst the Kodak Laboratories.  
The third section of the chapter is the study of another important primary source to 
estimate the contribution of the European Research Laboratories to Kodak innovation. 
Indeed, the notebooks of some researchers can be considered as the first artifacts 
produced from their experimental work and reasoning in the laboratory. One might 
assume that these artifacts are private sources or objects unintended for 
communication to other scientists within the corporate network, however the 
convention of drawing up an index at the end of the notebook in the film 
manufacturing industry tends to demonstrate the opposite. The notebook in the first 
instance a research tool for its own writer, but it was probably intended for the closed 
research community as well. The fact that we still find such notebooks in the archives 
of Pathé or Kodak Limited acts as further evidence. Kodak management decided to 
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keep them and this decision shows their importance. A study of the consulted 
notebooks ascertains which data relate to the production of photographic products 
and which data concern more specifically the research process. The authors under 
study hold various professional positions and this characteristic emphasizes the 
disparate nature of industrial research, including both fundamental and applied 
research activities. Marcel Mayer, the first author, was the works manager at Pathé in 
Joinville-le-Pont, France. The second set of notebooks was filled in over a period of 
time by Charles T. Robinson, a production manager who worked at the same plant for 
Pathé and then for Kodak Limited. Using English as well as French in his notebooks, 
Robinson can be seen as a social link between the British and French photographic 
industry and provides an example of transfer of technical and scientific knowledge. The 
notebooks indicate the importance of teamwork and collaboration in the scientific 
structure. For instance, the notebooks of Franck B. Philips, a physicist, illustrate that 
the British researcher was frequently sent to Rochester to work with his American 
colleagues, among them Mannes and Godowsky, on the improvement or development 
of processes and manufacturing procedures. In the last section I consider a set of 
notebooks belonging to F.W. Thomas Krohn, the first photochemist at the Kodak 
Harrow factory whose work appeared in chapter 2. Krohn used his notebooks to keep 
formulas and recipes but also as a cognitive tool, to archive his thoughts about the 
development or improvement of photochemical processes. 
Together the setting up of British and French research laboratories, the official 
research reports sent between those research laboratories, and the individual research 
scientist’s research notebooks, combine to show the rise of Kodak Research in the 
1930s through the internationalization of its structure. Additionally, they provide an 
understanding of the methods of fundamental and applied research used and of both 
the standard and the occasional scientific topics investigated by British and French 
researchers. Finally, they show important findings and make clear the nature of the 





3.1. Creation of the Kodak Research Laboratories in 1928 
at Harrow and Vincennes 
 
The history of the European Kodak Research Laboratories remains largely untold 
despite its significance for the history of twentieth-century photography. For the 75th 
anniversary of Kodak Research, Eastman Kodak published a book to celebrate the 
many scientific and technological turning points produced by the researchers of the 
Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester. Surprisingly, only one page in 155 was used 
to introduce the other Kodak research Laboratories at the end of the volume, despite 
of the amount of scientific work and innovation produced at Harrow and Chalon-sur-
Saône.3 By 1988, the British laboratory in Harrow and the French laboratory in Chalon-
sur-Saône were listed, but also the German and Japanese laboratories located 
respectively in Stuttgart and Tokyo. Very little is known about these last two 
laboratories and it is not the purpose of my research to investigate them further here.4 
Kodak’s own extremely short introduction of the overseas laboratories not only 
demonstrates a broader problem of a lack of publications about them, but also that 
from inside of the company that Kodak Research history was biased towards the 
American side of the research work.  
This bias also occurred in 1961, when Mees published an abridged history of the work 
done so far in the Kodak Research Laboratories.5 Only the twenty-third (and last) 
chapter discussed all the Kodak Research Laboratories as they were in 1955, with the 
main part devoted to the Rochester laboratory.6 The British and the French Research 
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Laboratories received only a condensed paragraph. Consequently, to better ascertain 
the development of the European Kodak research structure at the end of the 1920s I 
draw information from several sources such as unpublished Kodak histories, reports 
and recollections of Kodak staff. With the help of this data I first discuss the creation of 
a Research Laboratory at Harrow in 1928. The purchase of Pathé-Cinéma and the 
organisation of the new Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratory will be analysed in a second 
stage. 
 
3.1.1. The origins of the Harrow Research Laboratory 
Kenneth Mees’ hiring of the British photochemist Walter Clark in 1928 to create and 
manage a new Research Laboratory at the Harrow plant has been studied in the 
previous chapter. What was the raison d’être of this new research structure? In 1977 
Dr. G.I.P. Levenson, head of the processing technology division, provided the following 
anecdote about Mees’ new initiative. 
I have heard it said – and the story is true in character if not in detail – that, on a 
visit to the Harrow factory, Dr. Mees asked were the reports from his Rochester 
Research Laboratory were filed. It was discovered that the reports were lodged, 
unseen, at the head office in Kingsway in central London. Dr. Mees thereupon 
decided to have a Research Laboratory at Harrow as, at the least, a fertile point of 
reception for Research reports from Rochester.7 
However, spreading the scientific knowledge contained in the Rochester research 
reports was not the only reason for the creation of the Research Laboratory at Harrow. 
It was a logical necessity to provide the output of scientific and technological research 
to the British photochemists and production managers of Kodak Limited, because one 
part of the Research work directly addressed the solution of production department 
issues. But during the 1920s, the Harrow Works faced a number of important 
production changes and modernizations, and the final creation of the Research 
Laboratory fitted within the framework of the new organisation. In 1919, it was 
                                                     




decided to permanently produce 35mm cine-positive film at Harrow, resulting in the 
formation of a Cine Film Department in 1921, as well as an Emulsion Department in 
1922 for which a new building was erected. A Film Coating Department was finally 
created after 1928. In 1924, a new Cine Kodak processing section was set up in the 
Harrow Building 10 of the Developing and Processing Department.8 This improved 
structure of the production might have been partially initiated by Kenneth Mees even 
if no clear evidence has been found in the Kodak archives. Indeed, George Eastman 
sent Mees in July 1923 to England to replace Francis C. Mattison, the Managing 
Director of Kodak Limited, who stepped down due to ill health. This meant that the 
Research Laboratory in Rochester was without his renowned director for almost a 
year, until September 1924, when Mees finally returned. Mees had by that time run 
the research work of the company for 10 years. In the words of Eastman, this British 
stay was an opportunity for an up to date view of the foreign needs of the business. At 
Rochester, Mees’ colleague Dr. Sheppard replaced him temporarily and reported to his 
friend frequently, in addition to his usual duties directing the Physical Chemistry 
Department.9  
During his work in Harrow, Mees was disappointed by the absence of a Research 
Laboratory despite the presence of the classic Works laboratory performing testing 
and analysis of raw materials. All finished products, the papers and the cine-positive 
film that were produced at Harrow were subject to testing. T. Wells, the “testing boy” 
who had been trained by the photochemist Krohn at the end of the nineteenth century 
was in charge of all the testing activities, which were conducted in several locations 
between the Harrow Works and the Kingsway head office.10 The potential benefits of 
internationalising photographic research, as has been recently stressed by Sally M. 
                                                     
8 Margaret D. Gauntlett, “A History of Kodak Limited” (unpublished report, Kodak Limited, Harrow, 
1978), 34-40. Available at De Montfort University, Kimberlin Library, KC 338.4777/GAU. 
9 Ibid., 32. See also James, A Biography-Autobiography of Charles Edward Kenneth Mees, 91-94. 




Horrocks, might have pushed Mees to open a research facility in England.11 To increase 
the sensitivity of black and white photographic emulsion, in particular to enlarge its 
sensitivity to the entire visible spectrum, the film manufacturers had used the chemical 
process of optical sensitising since the end of the nineteenth century. This 
phenomenon was discovered in 1873 by Dr. H.W. Vogel, who increased the sensitivity 
of a plate by the addition of dyes. Research in organic chemistry grew progressively in 
the quest for new dyes. For instance, erythrosine increased the sensitivity of the film 
for the green region and was used to produce orthochromatic emulsions, and 
isocyanine dyes were used to sensitise the yellow and orange spectrum. Mees studied 
and used two such dyes, Pinacyanol and Pinachrome, in 1906 to manufacture the 
Wratten and Wainwright panchromatic plates. It is worth pointing out here that Mees 
was one of the few photochemists at Eastman Kodak to understand the mechanisms of 
optical sensitising.12 In 1928, Dr. Frances Hamer and Olaf Bloch, two chemists of Ilford 
Limited, published a series of papers about improved synthesis of carbocyanines dyes 
and about 15 classes of modified cyanine dyes and their relative photographic 
sensitivities. It was soon evident to the Kodak researchers in Rochester that these new 
optical sensitisers were far better sensitising dyes than the chemical compounds 
Eastman Kodak has been using. On being confronted with this milestone in 
photochemistry, Mees reacted quickly and assigned Leslie G. Brooker, a young chemist 
at Rochester, the individual task of synthesising sensitising dyes starting from the work 
of Hamer and Bloch. The challenge was to produce new sensitising dyes to be able to 
increase the sensitivity of photographic emulsions. Brooker made important progress 
in the collect and synthesis of sensitising dyes, and the research work on the topic was 
increased tenfold when Walter Clark succeeded in recruiting Dr. Hamer in 1930 to the 
detriment of Ilford Limited.13 Thus the new British Research Laboratory presented the 
opportunity to gain oversight of technological advances in England and Europe in spite 
                                                     
11 See Horrocks, “The Internationalization of Science in a Commercial Context: Research and 
Development by Overseas Multinationals in Britain before the Mid-1970s,” 237. 
12 See for instance Kenneth Mees, “Sensitizing Dyes and their Use in Scientific Photography,” Nature 
137, no. 3470 (1936): 726-730.  




of the fact that this kind of research structure was still rare in the British industry, as 
pointed out in 1962 by the second director of the Harrow Research Laboratory E.R. 
Davies.14 
The opportunity for gaining a technological edge was not, however the only reason for 
the creation of the Harrow Research Laboratory. Economic and corporate factors also 
frame its creation. The European structure of Eastman Kodak would change 
significantly at the end of the 1920s. At Harrow, the photochemist Krohn returned to 
Kodak Limited in 1927 to take over the direction of the Collodion Department in the 
factory’s first pre-cast concrete building, in charge of the production of the new print-
out paper Kodatone. More important, George Eastman and Charles Pathé decided 
during the years 1926-1927 on a mutual merger to create the new Kodak-Pathé 
subsidiary (section 3.1.2). Eastman resigned in 1925 from the position of Joint 
Managing Director of Kodak Limited but was still active in important company 
decision-making. In 1927 Charles Z. Case, the successor of Mattison as Managing 
Director of Kodak Limited, was approached by Dr. Fritz Blüthgen of the Glanzstoff 
Fabriken A.G., a German textile manufacturer. Glanzstoff had created a photographic 
subsidiary named Glanzfilm to compete with A.G.F.A. and dealt with Pathé Frères 
concerning the building of a new film manufacturing plant at Cöpenick near Berlin.15 
Blüthgen suggested to Charles Case that Eastman Kodak purchase the entire Cöpenick 
plant as Glanzstoff and A.G.F.A. had resolved their differences meanwhile. Finally, 
Eastman decided to accept the proposal and the Cöpenick plant became a part of the 
reshaped German subsidiary Kodak A.G., then the responsibility of Kodak Limited.16 As 
the study of the Harrow Research reports in section 3.2.3 shows, an important part of 
the Cöpenick production was analysed by the staff of the Harrow Research Laboratory 
                                                     
14 “In 1928 industrial research laboratories were comparatively rare and our industry was among the 
few to carry out research on any scale.” Davies, “Reports of Meetings. Scientific and Technical Group's 
Second After-Dinner Lecture - 15 February 1962,” 255. 
15 The spelling “Cöpenick” was used by the British Kodak researchers in their reports (very rarely 
“Copenick”). This spelling is used in all this thesis. In German, the former spelling of the Berlin’s district 
“Cöpenick” was replaced with “Köpenick” after the Second World War. 




in its first years. All in all, the European structure of Eastman Kodak was greatly 
changed from 1928 on with increased capacity for film production, making the need 
for at least one research laboratory in Europe quite logical. As Mees was in London in 
1928 for the Seventh International Congress of Photography, he could take advantage 
of his journey to look for a talented British photochemist. 
The first years of the Harrow Research Laboratory were almost a duplication of the 
Rochester Laboratory, although on a smaller scale. The allocated budget was reduced, 
as seen in Table 2, and the initial staff of four graduate researchers was first installed in 
the “Goodwill to All”, an old public-house and the first location for the Research 
Laboratory. Mees informed Walter Clark about his research credo: “Your time will be 
divided between pure research, industrial research relative to factory problems, and 
research connected with development work.”17 Clark was initially supposed to provide 
the Harrow production personnel with the scientific work and innovation of the 
Rochester Research Laboratory as well as of the photographic community. But the 
British researchers soon started to work on their own investigations, producing the 
first research reports at the beginning of 1929. Clark, helped by the experienced 
assistant Works Manager E.A. Robins, selected a staff of researchers: a microscopist, a 
physicist, a physical chemist, some photochemists and their assistants. Clark also 
established a small research library in the same building, with scientific and 
photographic books and periodicals. 
  
                                                     




Year Annual expenditure (£) Qualified staff Floor area (sq. ft) 
1930 7,000 7 - 
1935 16,000 22 - 
1938 32,000 31 - 
1941 61,000 53 - 
1945 120,000 54 - 
 
Table 2. Kodak Limited R&D expenditure and staff.18 
 
In 1931, as Dr. Hamer was hired away from the Ilford Research Laboratories, a building 
was erected at Harrow to house the new Organic Research Department. In his 
recollections, Clark confessed than during his supervision at Harrow from 1929 to 
1931, about 180 reports were produced but nothing was done on photographic 
theory. One of the reasons advanced for this was the preponderance of some things, 
namely factory problems, the need of development studies and the practice of 
photography.19 Another reason is certainly that the scientists had at the outset no 
access to the secrets of emulsion making, which were kept by the production staff. 
When E.R. Davies took his position of second director of research in 1931, he found 
this situation deeply unproductive and managed to change the policy of secrecy, after 
which emulsion research was finally permitted in a special place within the 
laboratory.20 When studying the development of the British subsidiary of Eastman 
Kodak, it is therefore possible to see a pronounced rationale and continuity in Kodak 
policies about the innovation and the structure of research and development within 
the Anglo-Saxon framework. The chemist Krohn was hired by Eastman and sent to 
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20 Edgerton, “Industrial Research in the British Photographic Industry, 1879-1939,” 122. About the 
laboratory’s growth, Edgerton indicated page 121 that the staff in 1935 was 50 with 15 to 20 graduates 




Rochester in 1891 to “find out how things were done”, Mees was recruited by Eastman 
in 1912 and sent to Kodak Park under the same conditions, and finally Mees hired 
Clark in 1928 and replicated the same corporate ritual. The long residency at Rochester 
during which the novice watched how production managers and research scientists 
were performing their tasks represented an initiatory journey for which the origin of 
the technical and scientific knowledge was always the American core and know-how of 
Eastman Kodak. With the purchase of the French competitor and film manufacturer 
Pathé-Cinéma, this situation changed radically. This time, the French had their own 
source of technical knowledge and the challenge is now to clarify to what extent this 
knowledge was known by George Eastman and his British staff. 
 
3.1.2. The old tradition of photographic research at Pathé  
The capacity of scientific and industrial research in the 1910s at Pathé has been 
studied in the previous chapter in section 2.2.2, through the analysis of several French 
research reports about the synthesis of a new nonflammable film. However, before 
this research period Charles Pathé, the founder and owner of the French Company, 
had already decided to investigate the production of his own nitrocellulose cine film in 
Europe. In 1906 he purchased the declining cine film manufacturing facilities of the 
European Blair Camera Company in Foots Cray, brought the production fittings up to 
date and sent French technicians there to be trained.21 From a political point of view, 
Pathé was able to launch the production of film at Vincennes in 1909 thanks to the 
experimental work performed at Foots Cray. When Eastman was informed of this 
“conspiracy”, in February 1909 he decided to stop all shipping of Kodak cine film to 
one of his best customers. This situation was unsolved for several years. From a 
technological point of view, the British “experimental plant” at Foots Cray constitutes 
an important innovation stage for Pathé and a starting point for a rational organisation 
of industrial research. As the analysis of the Kodak-Pathé archive clarifies, during June 
                                                     




to December 1906, the technical manager Léopold Löbel and his assistant Mr. Loeuillet 
sent weekly reports to Charles Pathé about the modernisation of the Blair plant and 
the first experiments of film production. A technological collaboration was set up 
between the British and French teams, the transfer of knowledge being bilateral. The 
Blair emulsion coating machine was still in use but another machine was purchased 
from Scott and two Friedheim & Scott film cutting machines. In June 1906 Löbel was in 
Foots Cray with the French photochemist Georges Zelger to organise teamwork with 
the British photochemist Bonwitt.22 A laboratory was installed for the chemists to 
conduct “scientific testing” and “to control and improve our emulsions”.23 Bonwitt 
started with Dawson’s emulsion formula and soon improved it. In mid-September, the 
new installations were completed and the experimental work could start. The first 
“emulsion 501” was produced in October and controlled at Vincennes but it was 
fogged, not contrasty enough and too sensitive. At the end of the same month, the 
first emulsion to be equivalent in quality to the Eastman emulsion was the number 519 
and in the first week of December 1906 the perforating machine processed about 4 
percent of Blair emulsion along with 96 percent of the Eastman emulsion.24  
Therefore, the later research work undertaken by the French chemists from the Blair 
experience on the synthesis of photographic base and emulsion was logical. This initial 
work and the industrial research that followed were necessary to free themselves from 
the threat of Eastman Kodak, who was at the time the only reliable cine film supplier in 
the world. The French research reports kept by the association Cecil in Chalon-sur-
Saône in France clearly demonstrate that scientific research was performed on a 
                                                     
22 “Monsieur Bonwitt” was probably the emulsion maker for the Blair Company before the merger with 
Pathé. 
23 “Nous avons fait installer dans ces nouvelles pièces un bureau pour les chimistes ainsi qu’un petit 
laboratoire où ils pourront faire des essais scientifiques pour contrôler et perfectionner nos émulsions.” 
Mr. Löbel, “Commentaires faits à la suite d’un voyage à Foots Cray”, Vincennes, 26 Juin 1906, n.p., ref. 
33014, CECIL. 
24 The first week of December 1906 11569 meters of Blair emulsion and 274800 meters of Eastman 
emulsion were perforated. See Loeuillet, “Rapport du 8 décembre 1906”, ref. 33014, n.p., CECIL. The 
following reports of the same reference number also used to produce this summary are : “Rapport sur 
l’usine de « Foots-Cray », ” Joinville, 18 septembre 1906 ; “Essais des émulsions Blair envoyées la 




constant basis up to the end of the 1920s with all the attributes of a Research 
organisation: laboratories to perform the routine work, a team of skilled 
photochemists, the keeping of research reports classified by author, the most 
important of these being duplicated in a general “livre de fabrication”. The scientific 
know-how produced by the French photochemists was the result of this long-term 
industrial research and an attractive asset for a competitor in the same industry. 
The possibility that Charles Pathé wanted to sell his photographic business to George 
Eastman is one of the potential causes that led to the purchase of Pathé-Cinéma by 
Eastman Kodak in 1927. One argument to support this hypothesis is Pathé’s 1926 
publication about the making of cine film stock in the Vincennes Works and the 
development and printing division at Joinville-le-Pont.25 The book was written by Louis 
Didiée, a technical manager at Pathé-Cinéma, and contains detailed information about 
the many processes of support and emulsion making, the testing and analysis activities 
of the Works laboratory and some sensitometric data about Pathé emulsions. The 
book is also illustrated with many photographs of the production facilities as if a virtual 
visit of the Works was offered to the reader. A short comment is added about the 
“Scientific Research Laboratory”, depicted as the place were studies and experiments 
are performed to increase knowledge about colloid chemical properties in particular.26 
The impression of a technological showcase conveyed by the book indicates that the 
research activities of Pathé-Cinéma were clearly known by its competitors including 
Eastman Kodak. Shortly after the merger was finalised, Mees stressed the necessity of 
teamwork between the British and the French researchers. Clark wrote that “on June 
13 [1928], Dr. Mees told me in a letter from France that Marcel Abribat would be in 
charge of a « Photographic experimental laboratory at Vincennes and will thus be your 
collaborator in France. » ”27 This extract shows that Mees had travelled to France and 
had visited the Vincennes Works. He was then able to evaluate the level of research 
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work that had been done there and that could be done in the future, as well as the 
financial means used up to now. 
Dr. Marcel Abribat was indeed the man to take over the Kodak-Pathé research and to 
maintain the constant activity of the research work. But he did not belong to the old 
team of Pathé researchers. The new director of the Kodak-Pathé research laboratories 
had already worked for the French subsidiary of Eastman Kodak, the Société Anonyme 
Française Kodak (Kodak S.A.F.) established in Paris in 1897, as a “technical consultant” 
as Mees indicated in 1961.28 Abribat gained his PhD in chemistry in 192229 and was 
first employed by Kodak S.A.F. in the same year, but resigned one year later.30 When 
Mees finished his mission at the head of Kodak Limited in 1924, he met Abribat and 
hired him again on behalf of Kodak S.A.F. on 15 September before to return back to 
Rochester. Abribat is certainly the writer or at least the translator of the Bulletin 
radiographique, a technical brochure about Eastman Kodak X-Ray films which was first 
published in France in January 1927. The Bulletin was supposed to provide technical 
information on Kodak products to doctors using radiography and their staff. In the 
introduction of the first issue, the existence of the Kodak Research Laboratory is 
mentioned, as well as the possibility for customers to visit the “testing laboratory” of 
Kodak S.A.F. at Paris.31 In the fifth issue of the Bulletin in September 1927, the merger 
of Kodak S.A.F. with the film production activities of the company Pathé-Cinéma was 
announced. The marketing discourse of the short communication stressed that the 
                                                     
28 Mees, From dry plates to Ektachrome film, 300. 
29 Marcel Abribat, « Etudes électrochimiques sur la cyanamide et la dicyanodiamide » (PhD diss., 
Université de Toulouse, 1922). Accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.sudoc.fr/089219260. 
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31 Kodak S.A., Bulletin radiographique, no. 1 (Lausanne, January 1927), 3. No. 2, 3, 5 and 6 are published 
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availability of the existing products of Eastman products would be maintained and that 
the synergy of the merger would provide new technical milestones.32 
How Abribat was received at the head of the Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratories is 
unknown. He was certainly French, but came from the Charles Pathé’s biggest 
competitor. As most of the chemists and scientists received their directives from 
Charles Pathé and reported directly to him, the threat from the competitors might 
have been seen as a visceral struggle from their side as well. Until now, available 
sources have not clarified the first months of the Research Laboratories at Vincennes, 
either about the organisation of staff, or also about the change in the structure of 
several scientific departments.33 However, the discovery of the Kodak-Pathé 
hierarchical-type organisation charts for the years 1929, 1937 and 1951 in the French 
Kodak-Pathé archive clarified the progressive development of the French Research 
Laboratories around Abribat (see Figure 3).34 Such a chart shows the structure of a 
company’s organisation but also the relationship of one department to another. Unlike 
the situation of the Harrow Research Laboratory starting from nothing and requesting 
a new building and new scientists, the French researchers already had their facilities 
and working methods. Compared to the organisational structure of the Research 
Laboratory at Rochester, the French research and development activity took more 
time to structure itself hierarchically as it seems that there was no equivalent position 
of director of research at the time of Pathé. 
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accorder leur entière confiance. »  Kodak-Pathé S.A.F., Bulletin radiographique, no. 5 (Paris, September 
1927), 3. 
33 For instance, Horrocks only specified in her paper that a French counterpart opened at Vincennes in 
1928 with no additional information. See Horrocks, “The Internationalization of Science in a Commercial 
Context: Research and Development by Overseas Multinationals in Britain before the Mid-1970s,” 237. 
34 I am indebted to Jean-Pierre Martel, President of the CECIL association in Chalon-sur-Saône, for 





Figure 3. Extracts from the Kodak-Pathé organisation charts for the years 1929, 
1937 and 1951 (from left to right).35 
In 1929, Abribat was dealing with photographic research but his position was more 
isolated. Georges Zelger of the emulsion laboratory, H. Renard of the support 
laboratory or the consulting engineers Louis Clément and Louis Clerc reported directly 
to the general manager or assistant manager and not to Abribat. In 1937 the situation 
had changed. Abribat’s position became central in the column of the organisation 
chart related to industrial research. He was assisted by R. Pinoir and one chemical 
analyst reported to him. Abribat also had direct connections to Zelger, Renard and 
Clément, while all reported to the general manager Clément Lair or to his assistant 
                                                     
35 The complete Kodak-Pathé organisation charts for the years 1929, 1937 and 1951 can be found in the 
annexes at the end of the thesis. For a better reading, the chart’s widths for the year 1927 and 1951 
have been reduced in figure 10. A double stroke in diagonal means that the lines joining two names 




Alfred Landucci. After the Second World War and at least in 1951, the hierarchy was 
clarified. Abribat was the director of the Research Laboratories, managing several 
departments such as the physical chemistry, physics or emulsion research 
departments. 
Going back to the period shortly after the merger, what also appears is that a certain 
attitude of wait-and-see policy prevailed at Rochester but also at Harrow and London 
to clarify what role the highly skilled team of French researchers at Vincennes could 
play to benefit the Eastman Kodak Company. It is nevertheless possible to ascertain 
that it was initially requested that the Kodak-Pathé researchers follow the publication 
practices of the Rochester Research Laboratory. On July 1927 the first issue of the 
Bulletin bibliographique mensuel was published by Kodak-Pathé.36 This monthly 
publication was the French translation of the Monthly Abstract Bulletin edited by the 
American Kodak Laboratory. The first French issue corresponded to the American 
bulletin no. 6 volume 13 published in June 1927. The French copies contained a short 
summary below each reference and the bulletin was segmented into several chapters 
about photography, physics, chemistry and new patents in particular. As of issue no. 6 
a list of the authors was added at the end of the volume, making it easier to find out 
which researcher or inventor was working on what topic. This publication was the first 
attempt to make worldwide photographic knowledge circulate among the new 
tripartite entity of the Kodak Research Laboratories. 
The Bibliothèque nationale de France owns some issues of the Bulletin bibliographique 
mensuel up to March 1930, but it is unclear whether the small journal was published 
later than that date. Another French quarterly publication of the Kodak-Pathé 
laboratories could be the successor of the Bulletin: in January 1942 the first issue of 
the Résumés des travaux des laboratoires Kodak was published (see Illustration 6). 
However, this corporate publication only dealt with the scientific work of the 
American, British and French Kodak laboratories with no mention of the photographic 
                                                     




research and new patents outside the company. In the first issues the table of contents 
included nine chapters and four additional chapters from the second volume, 
respectively : physics, X-ray photography, colour photography, colour photography and 
film-making.37 This spreading of scientific knowledge outside the laboratory mirrored 
the activity in 1913, when Kenneth Mees decided with Eastman’s approval to publish 
the Abridged scientific publications from the research laboratory of the Eastman Kodak 
Company on an annual basis. The best papers of the Kodak researchers were selected 
to be part of the Kodak scientific journal.38 This policy was clarified in the introduction 
of the first issue in 1913. 
The more important scientific results of general interest that have been obtained 
have been published in various scientific journals. Some of these are not available 
to many who wish these results and hence an abstract journal is being published 
which shall contain all of the more important results of each paper.39 
 Therefore, in the first issue of the French Résumés, one could find a paper of Abribat 
alongside with papers of L.A. Jones and Neslon from Kodak Rochester, Webb and 
Selwyn from Kodak Harrow for instance. 
                                                     
37 The first nine topics are: sensitive layers, latent image, photographic techniques, scientific and 
technical applications, optics, physical chemistry, photochemistry, miscellaneous. The publication of the 
Résumés was reduced during the Second World War from December 1943 (no. 6) with no issue in 1944 
and only 2 issues in 1945 (no. 7 & 8). The quarterly publication restarted in January 1946 (no. 9) up to, at 
least, 1969 (vol. 4, no. 20). In France, some incomplete sets of the Résumés can be found at the Société 
Française de Photographie (1942, 1943, 1951, 1952 and 1968) and at the Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France (classification marks AD-307-4 and 8-JO-2799). 
38 For Mees’s opinion about the publication of research papers, see also Kenneth Mees, "The Publication 
of Papers from Research Institutions", Science 70, no. 1821 (1929): 502. 
39 Eastman Kodak Company, Research Laboratories, Abridged Scientific Publications from the Kodak 




   
Illustration 6. First issue (vol. 1, no. 1, 1942) and last issue found (vol. 4, no. 20, 
1969) of the French Résumés published by Kodak-Pathé. 
 
The quality of Kodak research after 1928 in the United States, in England and in France 
could thus be demonstrated with the help of such publications, a tool of external 
communication which had to be handled with care to avoid the unwanted sharing of 
proprietary know-how and scientific knowledge. However, a list of scientific papers 
that were approved by the Eastman Kodak managing staff for publication several 
months after the research period cannot reflect the reality of the routine work 
undertaken and the selected organisation in the three Kodak Research Laboratories. In 
general, the papers first needed approval for publication and then were published in 
specialized journals. In a second step, the most important papers were selected and 
published in the Résumés or in the Abridged scientific publications a year or more later. 
It is clear that the information contained in these papers was sufficiently disconnected 
from the more secretive research work undertaken in the Kodak Research 
Laboratories. The threat that the competition could use scientific data from these 
articles remained extremely small. A deeper study and analysis of the scientific 




relevant to ascertain how industrial research was conducted in the Kodak European 
laboratories. In the next section, I use new historical material to answer the research 
question of the nature of the research work undertaken in the Kodak Research 
Laboratories, and of the “innovation models” used to this end. Here I stop using Kodak 
histories and scientific publications from Kodak and start analysing some of the 
research reports produced in the Harrow Research Laboratory as of 1929, as this very 
important primary source survived the dismantling of the Kodak British research 
structure at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The fact that these reports were 
not supposed to be shared and read outside the Kodak internal network is the key 
element to understanding why they are of crucial importance in our study. Their 
structure, their raison d’être and their classification without any subsequent selection 
or censorship work provide critical information. In effect, unlike Kodak publications, 
the research reports and their content reveal more complete research activities of the 
Harrow Research Laboratory, and not a subjective selection of the best papers 
excluding most of the routine work that the company needed to hide. In this way, 
thanks to this corpus of complete research reports, the following study is able to give a 
sense of the heterogeneous nature of the everyday research work, and by doing so the 
full organisational methods used to innovate at Kodak Limited.   
 
3.2. Internal communication and Production of Knowledge 
 
3.2.1. The nature of the Harrow Research Reports and their 
qualitative analysis 
During the initial research within the draft inventory of the Kodak Collection archive 
held at the British Library in London, one of the most significant discoveries was the 
presence of the full set of Harrow Research Reports. Among many Kodak artifacts such 
as correspondence folders, sets of photographs or unpublished reports was this series 




research resources, it is necessary to extract some basic information from these 
documents.  
The reference A2897 of the Kodak Collection archive represents 99 bound volumes of 
research reports, all issued by the Harrow Research Laboratory from 1929 to 1964. The 
set of volumes is complete and also includes the period during the Second World War. 
The volumes are physically similar and homogeneous possibly because the assembling 
of existing reports was done long after their writing and during a global operation of 
archiving the scientific knowledge of Kodak Limited.40 The first volumes are not 
classified by year and the archivist seems to have gathered the reports on the basis of 
quantity. The first volume contains reports from H.1 to H.100P but the second volume 
is smaller, containing only reports H.101C to H.125P, due to the inclusion of 
sensitometric charts or technical drawings printed on relatively thick photographic 
paper. 
Each research report has some specific markings that follow a classification system. 
The existence of this system of archiving also indicates that it might be the work of a 
single archivist at one moment in time. By checking the first volume of the Harrow 
Research Reports, one can read that the archivist created an index including, for each 
report, a classification number “H.xxx”, the date of the report, the title of the report 
and the author or team of authors. The classification coding using H for Harrow 
correlates with similar coding of some French reports at Kodak-Pathé: some of them 
are stamped from 1928 on with the English mention “REPORT N°V.xxx”, V for the 
location Vincennes. For Harrow, the first 4 volumes use an additional code of one 
letter following the classification number and provide the general category of 
investigation.41 Each report includes a printed cover consisting of a form with the 
following data. 
                                                     
40 The reports themselves are originals and most of the time signed by their author(s). 
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The writer filled in the requested data usually by typing it on the printed form. On the back of 
this cover, there was the following printed form: 
 
Copies of this Report have been sent to 
 
Name   Address   Date 
MR. BENT       
DR. MEES       
MR. LAIR       
[…] 
 
For most of the reports only the first column “name” is filled. The “classification” at the 
top right relates to the additional coding letter and is rarely specified. The problem 
number is sometimes indicated but this is not a rule. The decision to organise the 
printed cover in this way gives us many indications about the function of the research 
report. Firstly, it is made to collect and to archive the technical and scientific 
knowledge produced within the Harrow Research Laboratory.42 Indeed the research 
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42 The question of bureaucratic practices and the significance for historians of science of archive 
materials such as reports was raised by Becker and Clark in 2001. In particular they pointed out how the 
modern plain style of scientific writing progressively created a new bureaucratic style adopted by the 




report ends up being converted into, and producing scientific knowledge, as already 
pointed out by Ravetz.43 Secondly, it is made to be kept by the scientist and also to be 
read by a restricted and defined number of managers who are therefore informed of 
the research undertaken. It is possible, therefore, to find out which individuals have 
been allowed to read the document. Consequently, the research report or scientific 
paper, with its logical structure as clarified by Knorr-Cetina,44 is a vector of transfer 
knowledge within the internal framework of the Kodak research organisation, and the 
sharing of this knowledge can be mapped. 
As many reports are sent to American and French managers and researchers, this 
bureaucratic tool allows scientific communication and cooperation between the three 
Kodak Research Laboratories. The structure of this research tool allowed those at 
Kodak Limited to provide the necessary data to understand the rationale of the 
experimentation and of the researcher, the method used, the data collected and the 
conclusion drawn. The report includes sometimes several scientific inscriptions such as 
numbers, diagrams, sensitometric curves or technical drawings. What the research 
report does not contain are the handwritten notes and drafts, if any, produced by the 
researcher while conducting his experiments in the laboratory. However, it does not 
mean that negative results are not included in the clean copy of the report. Negative 
results are kept together with conclusive results and the analysis of the whole allows 
the researcher to draw his own conclusion. 
The problem with this source is the vast scope of topics. A methodical and reasoned 
analysis of the corpus would not be possible in the confines of this thesis. To illustrate 
this problem one can consider the first research report ever produced by the Harrow 
Research Laboratory. It was made by Walter Clark and Edwin E. Jelley, dated 12 
January 1929 and entitled the Investigation of removal of dye from red-backed and 
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43 Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, 182-184. 
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green-backed Cine Kodak film.45 It concerns the opposition from the German 
competitor Agfa to a patent application of Kodak Limited in Germany. 
The Agfa company have opposed the application for a German patent for backed 
film on the grounds that the claims made in the application are too wide in their 
scope, in that they specify that the backing may be used on roll-film in general, 
and that the dyes are removed by any ordinary developing or fixing bath, but are 
not removed by water. Agfa submitted their opposition to the German patent 
office, who sent a copy, together with specimens of film prepared and treated by 
Agfa, to the patent department of Kodak Limited. 
In the conclusion, the authors discuss the admissibility of the Agfa’s opposition 
depending of the kind of film, safety film and dye-backed Ciné-Kodak film. They 
conclude that for both films the claim was justifiable and that the information 
provided in their patent application was insufficient. This research report relates 
therefore to the patent and trademark department of Kodak Limited but, as some 
experiments were necessary on some Agfa films, the opinion of the Harrow Research 
Laboratory was sought. Within the archiving structure set up for the notebooks, it is 
not impossible to link a sequence of research reports together as for instance the 
second one relates to the aluminium material used for the Kodak cameras and the 
third is about chemical experimentation with gelatine and baryta emulsion. 
To overcome this linear classification of the reports, I gathered all the research reports’ 
titles from the start of the laboratory to the end of the year 1935 to perform a 
statistical analysis of the principal words or tags used. The purpose is to use a 
Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) approach to obtain a 
preliminary glimpse into the many topics studied by the British Kodak researchers from 
the H.2C to the H.350 research report. The goal of this technique is also to ascertain 
whether or not it will generate some technical trends as the results of the software 
analysis cannot be anticipated. Many CAQDAS tools exist, within some of which there 
are several possibilities for processing data (Nvivo, QDA Miner, Atlas.Ti etc.). For this 
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initial analysis I decided to focus on the generation of tag cloud or word cloud. This 
technique provides a visual representation of the most prominent terms used within a 
text by producing a hierarchical order with font size or colour. I decided to use two 
different software programmes, the freeware application Wordle available online46 
(see Figure 4) and the tag cloud from a trial version of the commercial programme 
Nvivo 10 (see Figure 5). To clarify this initial analysis, I restricted the number of words 
to 25. Words are classified according to the font size; the more frequent the word, the 
bigger the font size. Therefore, each software provides an image of the most 
significant terms (within the 25 word restriction) used in black font, larger or smaller 
depending on their frequency within the list of titles. 
 
 
Figure 4. Tag cloud generated with Wordle from the list of Harrow research reports’ 
titles.47 
 
                                                     
46 This application can be reached at www.wordle.net and has been developed by Jonathan Feinberg. 
The applet uses some algorithms belonging to IBM and some source code source from an open-source 
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server online.  
47 The following settings were used in Wordle: maximum words: 25, common English words removed, 




Compared with Wordle, Nvivo10 can run a word frequency query which provides a 
summary tab of a specific source, including the length of each word, its count and a 
weighted percentage. Unlike Wordle, Nvivo10 can export this list into an Excel file, as 
shown in Table 3, allowing a further processing of the statistical figures if necessary. An 
option allows the user to process the list by grouping related words together.  The 
word cloud visualisation in the specific tab is relatively basic, as it is only possible to 
change the layout within 25 locked styles with a constant number of 100 words. But 
this quantity of words can be reduced at the start of the word frequency query. For my 
research I restricted the quantity to 25 words and I chose a black and white horizontal 
style to allow comparison with the visualisation generated from Wordle. 
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Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) Similar Words 
film 4 97 4,57 film, films 
tests 5 47 2,21 test, testing, tests 
cine 4 37 1,74 Cine 
examination 11 30 1,41 Examination 
paper 5 24 1,13 paper, papers 
positive 8 22 1,04 position, positive 
dyes 4 21 0,99 dye, dyes 
harrow 6 21 0,99 Harrow 
camera 6 19 0,89 camera, cameras 
kodak 5 19 0,89 Kodak 
roll 4 19 0,89 roll, rolls 
measurements 12 18 0,85 measured, measurement, measurements, measuring 
plates 6 17 0,80 plate, plates 
reflection 10 17 0,80 Reflection 
use 3 17 0,80 use, used 
emulsion 8 16 0,75 emulsion, emulsions 
process 7 15 0,71 process, processed, processes, processing 
spots 5 15 0,71 Spots 
screens 7 15 0,71 screen, screens 
photographic 12 14 0,66 photographic, photographs 
characteristics 15 13 0,61 characteristic, characteristics 
colour 6 13 0,61 colour, coloured, colouring, colours 
developed 9 13 0,61 developed, developer, developers, developing, development 
investigation 13 13 0,61 investigation, investigations 
prints 6 13 0,61 print, printing, prints 
 
Table 3. Summary tab with related words grouped together from Nvivo10.49 
 
A comparison between the generated tag clouds shows that the visual result is clearer 
using Wordle than using Nvivo10, as spaces between words are better processed and 
wider with Wordle. Such a visual cloud is easier to read compared to the united block 
of words provided by Nvivo10. However, concerning the qualitative content of each 
cloud, results from the two software programs are relatively similar. The possibility of 
grouping similar terms with Nvivo10 also gives a clearer result by automatically 
emphasizing their significance. For example, the software added up frequencies of the 
                                                     





terms “test”, “testing” and “tests” so that the global term “tests” reaches the second 
highest frequency with a count of 47. By contrast in Wordle, the term “tests” is 
rendered smaller than “examination” or “Harrow”. Both programs are therefore 
accurate but some subtle settings can slightly change the final results of each one.  
Using these clouds it is possible to better ascertain the principal missions of the 
Harrow Research Laboratory in its first years. The main priority is Kodak film, in this 
case the cine film rather than the photographic film. These roll films or these plates are 
tested, examined, investigated whilst the photographic process of the emulsion is 
characterized. At first sight, research work for colour photography does not seem to be 
a prioritised task of the Laboratory in light of the low frequency use of this term. Only 
one competitor, Agfa, appears in the list of the 25 most used words. “Rochester”, the 
main Kodak Research Laboratory also appears rarely as this term has a total count of 6 
only. From these data we can see that the Harrow Research Laboratory was created in 
the continuation of the former analysis and testing laboratory. A large amount of work 
was devoted to the quality control of the emulsion and base produced, but also to the 
testing of Kodak amongst competitive products as some research reports make this 
clear. 
It must be stressed that the crucial activity of controlling the quality of Kodak films and 
competitors’ films is also confirmed by the high frequency use of the terms such as 
test, testing, examination, measurement or investigation. But this activity is not 
production-oriented as a standard testing laboratory usually works, in direct 
relationship with the production department. The new Research Laboratory can be 
defined as externally-oriented considering the examination of competitive products, 
new chemical components that could be used in the manufacturing of Kodak films 
such as new sensitizing dyes. The goal of controlling film is also to regularly undertake 
a comparison of a Kodak film to existing European films as well as to Kodak film 
produced in Rochester. Qualities that might be controlled would be a film’s 




Despite all the information gathered from this initial qualitative analysis, it is still 
impossible to fully understand the missions of the Harrow Research Laboratory from 
raw statistics and word clouds. The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the 
discourse contained in the reports’ titles is unsatisfactory as there is a great risk of 
referring to a particular report to illustrate a particular tendency. The analysis might 
then become a sequence of some case studies randomly selected to attempt an 
objective description of the Research Laboratory work. This is why I decided to use a 
second method mixing the Grounded Theory methodology within the framework of 
the interactional expertise as described by Collins and Evans. In 2002, the authors 
discussed the nature of expertise in technical decision-making rights and proposed a 
third Wave of Science Studies, the Studies of Expertise and Experience.50 Collins and 
Evans identified three levels of expertise: no expertise at all, interactional and 
contributory expertise. The second one “means enough expertise to interact 
interestingly with participants and carry out a sociological analysis” and the last one 
“means enough expertise to contribute to the science of the field being analysed.”51 If I 
need to place myself within this classification for the purpose of a qualitative analysis 
of research reports, I can clarify my role of sociological analyst as an interactional 
expert, due to my educational background and my scientific knowledge of the 
photographic industry. I have the legitimacy to select the most relevant research 
reports from their scientific content. Rather than a “decision-making” right I can claim 
a “selection-making” right from which I can gather the most important reports from 
the full set of 350 items.52 
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Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
51 Collins and Evans, The third wave of science studies, 254. 
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theoretical sampling. I used the concept of interactional expertise to undertake this analytical process. 
See Corbin and Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 




To cope with the initial Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis from the reports’ 
titles, I decided to collect data from the same first eight volumes of the Harrow 
Research Laboratory, checking the reports from the first report H.2c to the H.350. The 
study covers a period of 6 years from 1929 to the end of 1935, the first years of the 
Laboratory. Using my expertise of the technical and scientific context of the film 
industry I gathered data from a theoretical sampling of 62 reports.53 I defined this 
sampling as sources of interest because it can clarify a wide scope of topics related to 
my research questions. For instance, whether or not the laboratory organised a 
technology watch on competitive products. Or whether or not the British 
photochemists undertook important studies of the photographic process to increase 
knowledge produced by the allied laboratory at Rochester. The other reports were not 
selected because their content was either redundant, or unable to better clarify the 
activities of a Research Laboratory. The content of the 62 reports was later processed 
to build a categorisation of the problems studied in the reports. Finally 16 sub-
categories were generated, and these sub-categories were classified within 3 general 
categories: fundamental research activities, industrial research and development 
activities and collaboration-oriented activities, as shown in Table 4 below.54 
 
  
                                                     
53 For each report I either summarized the content, or copied a part or the whole report in a file for each 
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54 The use of Grounded Theory was particularly relevant to the analysis of my data. As clarified by Corbin 
and Strauss, “in the initial sampling, the researcher is interested in generating as many categories as 
possible; hence, he or she gathers data in a wide range of pertinent areas. Once the analyst has some 
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Development of the 
instrumentation for the 
laboratory's activities (3) 
Complete memorandum about a 
specific topic (3) 
Investigation into a new technology 
developed by another company 
(10) 
Investigation into the behaviour of 
a photochemical compound (2) 
Development of new products (2) Meeting with the staff of the 
Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratory 
(2) 
Summary of testing procedures at 
the Laboratory (1) 
Investigation due to production 
issue (7) 
New material testing following a 
collaboration with a third party (3) 
Testing of new dyes (2) Investigation into a competitive 
product by reverse engineering (9) 
Visit abroad to meet partners and 
to look for new technologies (4) 
 Patent issue with competitors (3)  
 Testing and comparison between 
proprietary and competitive 
products (6) 
 
 Testing of film processing (4)  
 Testing of finished products (1)  
Total : 8 reports 
(13% of studied reports) 
Total : 35 reports (56%) Total : 19 reports (31%) 
 
Table 4. Classification of the 16 sub-categories generated from the 62 reports 
within three main categories, with some figures. 
At this stage of the analysis it is worth indicating the basic description of the research 
and development work in a Research Laboratory as defined by Kenneth Mees and John 
Leermakers of Eastman Kodak in 1950.55 This work was split into three main sections. 
The first one was the work on the fundamental science of photography and the theory 
of the photographic process on a 25 per cent basis. The second one was the work on 
practical photography and the development of new products and process on a 50 per 
cent basis. The third one, also on a 25 per cent basis, was the work in the field of 
chemistry and physics related to photographic problems.56 At the beginning of the 
second analysis no attempt was made to match these categories, instead the sorting 
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was performed independently without preconceived or historical schemes. It is 
important to remember that the partitioning of the Harrow Research Laboratory work 
is different and quite a long way from the partitioning derived from the controlled 
corporate discourse of the managing staff of the Rochester Research Laboratory. The 
analysis was done for the work of the British Kodak Research Laboratory and 
differences between these two structures should not be seen as unusual. The work of 
Kodak Limited seems to be more concrete with a taste of “science in progress” for the 
standard fundamental research activities and sometimes with activities that could 
have been made by other departments in the company such as the investigation due 
to production issue. However, the most remarkable finding is the third category that I 
called collaboration-oriented activities. It illustrates an unknown part of the research 
work of the laboratory that clarifies the methods used to perform innovation. This way 
of managing innovation is quite modern and can be compared with the current model 
of “Open Innovation” conceptualized by Chesbrough in 2003 and already mentioned in 
the literature review. This innovation by Kodak Limited is discussed in the section 
3.2.4. about the collaboration-oriented activities at Harrow. It is now relevant to 
illustrate the full spectrum of activities through a concise description of some research 
reports from the set of 62 reports. The case studies below cover the three identified 
types of activities found through three different sections. These case studies reveal a 
new vision of the Harrow Research Laboratory and provide a full understanding of a 
variety of research work undertaken in the 1930s by the British scientists. 
 
3.2.2. The fundamental research activities at the Harrow Research 
Laboratory 
As stated by Walter Clark, the first director of Kodak research in England, about 180 
reports were produced during the first three years of the laboratory but “we did 
nothing on photographic theory.”57 The work on fundamental research developed 
                                                     




later under the supervision of Roy Davies, who became director in 1931. During his 
first weeks he noticed that the “sensitometric practices both at Harrow and Rochester 
were archaic.”58 Consequently one of the fields of study of the researchers was the 
development or the optimisation of instrumentation, while the science of sensitometry 
was progressively developing. A better or self-modified densitometer, burner or 
photometer with convenient standard light sources was required to be able to 
characterise photographic materials in terms of granularity, sensitivity and sharpness 
but also to improve the replicability during the manufacturing process, a key point in 
the production of cine and photographic film. 
Before moving to Rochester, Walter Clark wrote the report H.148P outlining the 
sensitometric procedure for film and plates. This apparently trivial report is in fact an 
important memorandum for the smooth running of testing photographic materials of 
all kinds. Operations needed to be normalised to allow the comparison of 
sensitometric data between films and plates from Kodak Rochester, Harrow and 
Vincennes as well as competitors’ products. 
This report outlines the procedure adopted in the Research Laboratory for the 
routine Sensitometry of plates and films. In addition to the materials submitted to 
these regular tests, there is a considerable number of materials having special 
characteristics and which must be examined from the point of view of the special 
purpose for which they are to be used. The sensitometric procedure has been 
designed so as to bring it in line as closely as possible with the method employed 
in the Research Laboratory at Rochester.59 
Clark then described the procedure of exposing the photographic material in the 
Works Sensitometer supplied by the Rochester Laboratory, the light source being an 
Eastman Standard Acetylene Burner screened by a Wratten filter n°79. For density 
measurement the British Laboratory used the same Eastman Capstaff-Purdy 
Densitometer as Rochester. The interpretation of results such as the characteristic 
curve or the speed and inertia of the film was discussed. It is important to notice then 
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the close correlation between the British Laboratory and the Research Laboratory at 
Rochester concerning the definition and the modifications of bench procedures. In 
1932, E.W.H. Selwyn modified the Eastman Densitometer that had been conceived by 
J.G. Capstaff and R.A. Purdy around 1927 for motion-picture work60 to be able to 
measure reflection densities on photographic paper. At Kodak Park, the instrument 
had already been modified by J.W. McFarlane and L.A. Jones to read reflection density 
but the novelty of Selwyn’s modification was that the constant brightness field was 
retained during the measure.61 Following Selwyn’s work, Ralph E. Owen and Roy 
Davies reported, also in 1932, the manufacturing of a standard photometer for the 
measurement of photographic densities.62 This progressive standardisation of bench 
procedures necessary for the development of photographic science and for the 
homogeneity of the production was also important to enable cross-site comparative 
studies and to provide a mutual scientific vernacular easy-to-understand by each 
Research Laboratory. 
As to the classic activity of fundamental research, which is to increase the 
understanding of observed phenomena, the Harrow Research Laboratory did not 
undertake many studies during its first years. However, the chemist A. Batley worked 
during the summer 1930 on the effect of ammonium bromide on the pH of the gelatin 
and produced two research reports about the matter. The starting point of the 
research was an initial report by a French chemist at Kodak-Pathé, Georges Zelger, 
written in November 1929, allowing the joint work of Batley and Zelger to be defined 
as teamwork. It also shows that the British researchers retained contact with their 
French counterparts and were informed about their research. In his report Zelger 
concluded that “while [the] addition of ammonium bromide has no effect on the pH of 
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a gelatin sol[ution], yet gelatin containing ammonium bromide, if coated and dried on 
a glass plate, shows a lower pH than the gelatin coated and dried without addition of 
the bromide.”63 For Batley and the research staff at Harrow, “as the matter may be of 
considerable importance in emulsion making, further investigations have been carried 
out in this laboratory, with a view to determining the true cause and mechanism of the 
effect.”64 The British chemist demonstrated that the phenomena was independent of 
the origin of the gelatin and was due to the volatilisation of the ammonia from the 
hydrolysed ammonium salt. Batley observed also that the greater the fall in pH was, 
the higher the pH of the gelatin. While it might be frustrating for the interactional 
expert not to know whether these small discoveries in the chemical behaviour of 
photographic emulsion were later used to innovate and improve the Kodak products, 
the situation mirrors that of the author of the report and the Kodak employees who 
read it. New fundamental knowledge had been produced and, it was now known by a 
team of scientists and managers and would be used later should someone find an 
interest in implementing it in a process. With the same rationale, Selwyn undertook an 
investigation in 1931 when it was discovered by the Research Laboratory at Vincennes 
that gelatin exposed to radiation from a quartz mercury vapour lamp hardened. The 
British chemist studied this physical behaviour of gelatin through “pilot” experiments 
and started a preliminary discussion about the effect.65 
During the 1930s one of the major fields of photographic research was the 
investigation of the colour sensitivity of new chemical components to increase the 
photosensitivity of film beyond the visible spectrum and to select optimal molecules 
for future bi or tri-colour processes. For this purpose, testing of new dyes was 
necessary and one report in particular illustrates well this laboratory’s activity as it 
pertains to a discussion about instrumentation and procedure. The report was created 
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by E.P. Davey in August 1934 and covers the testing of dyes between March and July. 
These dyes had been selected and provided by Dr. Hamer and Davey’s task was to 
determine the sensitising or desensitising properties of all of them. In short, the dye 
was incorporated in an emulsion and the colour sensitivity was measured with a 
wedge spectrograph. Davey indicated that he followed the general procedure used in 
sensitising the emulsion as recommended by Kenneth Mees. However, an easy 
comparison between results from the Rochester wedge spectrograph and the one at 
Harrow was difficult due to some small technical differences. As the two laboratories 
used different amperage to supply the spectrograph, a measure for the same dye 
could differ between Harrow and Rochester. Again, as the emitting spectrum of the 
light sources used at Rochester and at Harrow was different, the American results 
showed a greater relative colour sensitivity compared to Harrow. The report also 
states that L.A. Jones sent a letter to the director Davies in March 1934 about the 
matter.66 This example shows that the American and British researchers were also 
actors in the young science of sensitometry, and that the physical nature of 
instrumentation and the related necessary procedures represented a challenge to and 
a major technological constraint in the conduct of fundamental research. 
Again, such research was not the main task of the Harrow Research Laboratory. But 
some pioneering studies about the development of instrumentation, the investigation 
into the behaviour of photochemical compounds or the testing of dyes show that the 
British Laboratory was able to produce photographic knowledge when necessary. The 
benefit of this kind of research with no immediate practical aim was expressed by Roy 
Davies in 1977. 
In the photographic industry, if we understand more fully the wide range of 
phenomena exhibited by photographic materials, in their manufacture and in their 
applications, we shall achieve a greater measure of control which will lead to 
improved performance of our generic materials.67 
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3.2.3. The industrial research and development activities at the 
Harrow Research Laboratory 
These core activities of the Laboratory may appear as routine and necessary work but 
they are vital for the company as they allow for comparisons with the competitors’ 
manufactured products. They also enable the conduct of technology watch and the 
solving of production issues, which can threaten the company’s survival. From the 62 
reports studied, these reports represent more than half, consisting of 8 sub-categories. 
The first of the sub-categories that was identified is the production of complete 
memorandums about some topics in relation to the photographic industry and 
industrial research by competitors. It does not relate to fundamental research as it 
concerns not only the study of new raw materials for instance, but also the 
investigation of new products, processes or leading chemistry already studied by 
independent photochemists or competitors. Thus in 1930 Franck B. Phillips provided a 
complete literature review about diazotype processes from ca. 1890 to the time of 
writing, including full references and the description of milestones of the research in 
the field in Europe.68 In the same way, Dr. Hamer wrote a 14 page report in 1932 about 
the many technological attempts to reduce the halation effect, providing references to 
patents or known solutions.69 
The investigations pertaining to production issue are recurring and it is interesting to 
note that the British Laboratory did not take into account the problems from only the 
Harrow Works but also from the French and German Kodak production at the 
Vincennes and Cöpenick factories. The reports also show other examples of 
international collaboration between the Kodak staff. As soon as the new laboratory 
was created, Walter Clark met the French team of Kodak-Pathé at Vincennes and 
discussed in particular the problem of white spots on Vincennes film. Marcel Abribat 
had investigated the origin of the issue and had shown that the white spots were 
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caused by ferric ions. Because these ions are associated with the dust in the air, the 
French Laboratory undertook several tests and showed them to Clark. The director of 
the British Laboratory asked his researchers to investigate the issue at Harrow by using 
the same procedures.70 In the next report, Clark reported that, while at Vincennes, he 
met Mr. Farrow of the Chemical Plant at Rochester, and discussed the corrosion of the 
steam coils used for heating the water baths in the silver nitrating rooms. Farrow 
advised Clark on the best steel to use for the steam coils, a sensitive material in the 
making of emulsion. He suggested Clark use Enduro steel to make the steam coils, as 
this metal was already in use for the Rochester steam coils. Hoods, basins and steam 
pipes were all made of Enduro and proved satisfactory. Through Farrow, Clark also 
heard that Mr. Tozier at the Kodak Toronto factory, was using Enduro hoods, and was 
satisfied with it.71 Therefore through informal meetings and discussions, the Kodak 
industrial knowledge or know-how was spreading and transferring among laboratory 
and production managers. 
As seen in section 3.1.1, the Cöpenick plant was a recent acquisition of Kodak A.G. in 
Germany. This factory had no research staff and the Harrow Research Laboratory 
sometimes dealt with the production issues of the German subsidiary. In 1930, Clark 
investigated a faulty Cöpenick nitrate support that showed some amber-coloured 
patches and holes.72 Two years later, Edwin Jelley faced a problem characterised by 
the appearance of white spots on the processed Cöpenick X-Ray film during the early 
summer. 
Microscopic examination has shown that many of these spots have a nucleus, and 
that the nuclei are of sand, gelatinous material or fibres. About two-thirds of the 
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nuclei are sand particles. An interesting feature is that practically all the particles 
are embedded in the emulsion.73 
 Jelley found the culprits. The Cöpenick factory was situated in a sandy country and 
during the hot season, the air became laden with sand and other particles. The water 
from the wells was full of dissolved iron, iron-bacteria and even sulphur bacteria. The 
water from the town was also laden with dissolved iron. Jelley worked jointly with 
technical staff and the manager of the plant, Franck Robinson, to solve the problem. 
He identified the chemical mechanism of the pollution and suggested two immediate 
actions, the treatment of the emulsion washing water with a solution of milk of lime 
and its filtering as well as a treatment by saturating the same solution with carbon 
dioxide.74 This kind of investigation was necessary as faulty Kodak films available on 
the market damaged competition in particular with AGFA films. The solving of 
production issues was not a technical and routine task only as it had been before the 
existence of the Kodak Research Laboratories, because the analysis produced by the 
researchers frequently provided a deeper understanding of unknown parasitic 
photochemical mechanisms.  
This scientific skill in biochemical analysis allowed the Laboratory to conduct many 
investigations into competitive products by reverse engineering. Before the advent of 
complex multilayered technologies of colour film on a single base, this corporate 
practice of technology watch was still possible with standard black and white or 
duplicating film, papers or negatives plates. The researchers could find out which 
chemical compound had been used in a specific process by a competitor. If its use was 
not patent protected, it was still possible to appropriate it for the products of the 
company. During the year 1930, Clark and his team observed that the Kodak films 
treated through the Henderson Laboratories in England were appreciably more 
resistant to abrasion and dirt. This company was created by William A. Henderson in 
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1918 and gained a solid reputation for the development of cine film.75 The researchers 
at Harrow organized some blind tests with Kodak film at the Henderson Laboratories 
and found that an additional treatment was used during the development process. The 
nature of the treatment was not entirely clear though. 
[It] appears to consist in the application, to the emulsion surface of the print, of a 
very thin layer of cellulose nitrate, containing a substance having a marked acid 
reaction. It is suspected that acetic acid is present in the mixture applied, to ensure 
the necessary adhesion between the gelatin and the nitrocellulose protective 
layer.76 
Such a modified film was good because its strength when used in a projector was not 
lowered, as shown by wear and tear tests by the Harrow laboratory’s staff. Sometimes 
the scientists were more successful for instance with the determination in 1930 of the 
nature of the dyestuff used in the backing of a Gevaert Anti-Halo plate. Through 
chemical and spectrographic examination Selwyn and Jelley found that the dye 
appeared “to be Aurin, partially neutralized (23.4%) with alkali.”77 Some studies were 
also more significant than others. In 1934 when E.P. Davey investigated the properties 
of Agfa Direkt Duplikat film, the report was sent to Mees in the United States, to Bent, 
Maitland and the “Management” in England, to Lair and Abribat in France and to 
Franck Robinson in Germany. In the introduction of the report Davey clarified the goal 
of the investigation. 
Agfa Direkt Duplikat Film is described by the makers as the first application of 
solarisation to commercial photography. This investigation represents an attempt 
to discover something of the nature and modus operandi of the film. The emulsion 
is already fogged when purchased, and exposure bleaches the latent image, so 
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that the process is the opposite of what occurs ordinarily – i.e. bleaching instead 
of formation of latent image.78 
 Davey studied the new process and succeeded in developing a similar emulsion 
prefogged and bathed in a pinakryptol green dye, giving a speed in the same order.79 
Davey was apparently later instructed to continue investigating a similar process as he 
produced a second report on the matter the next year. The rationale of this additional 
study was to get the confirmation of the initial conclusion, namely that in the German 
process the image was produced only by solarisation and with no other effect such as 
photo-reversal by dyes. “In a thorough investigation, the next step would be to 
attempt to reproduce the emulsion synthetically, and thus to confirm the original 
conclusion.”80 This time, Davey concentrated his search on the literature on 
solarisation and discovered new leads about the manufacturing of such an emulsion. 
According to Arens’ researches on solarisation, the emulsion could be prepared by 
peptising a silver-iodo-bromide precipitate. So Davey undertook some bench work and 
produced an iodo-bromide emulsion which solarised strongly, with similar 
photographic properties to those of Agfa Direkt Duplikat film. In this way, should the 
management decide later to launch a product similar to the German film, Kodak 
Limited had already developed a process to manufacture it.81 
Other activities that can also be classified with standard industrial research and 
development work consisted in discussions about patent issues with competitors, such 
as the very first Harrow Research report as it has already been studied, and testing of 
film properties or film processing. For instance, a critical aspect for cine film was its 
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mechanical resistance when used inside the projector as well as the consistency of the 
perforation pitch allowing the film to run and turn smoothly inside the projector. In 
1934, E.D. Eyles suggested a reorganisation of the wear and tear testing of 
manufactured film throughout the European factories with the assistance of Mr. 
Collison. He also collected the dimensions of sprockets and guides, the measurements 
of the tension on the film in its passage through the projector and undertook a 
comparative testing on Harrow, Vincennes and Cöpenick samples of safety film. For 
Kodak Limited, the result was good. 
 Analysis has shown that in general the Harrow pitch measurements are more 
consistent among themselves than those of either Copenick [sic]or Vincennes. This 
is surprising in view of the fact that at present no precautions are taken at Harrow 
to condition the film prior to measurement, or to make such measurements under 
controlled humidity conditions.82 
The same attention was directed when a comparison was requested between Kodak 
products and equivalent competitive products. Sensitometric testing on Kodak and 
competitive films and plates were regularly conducted. In the spring 1931 T.D. Sanders 
and W. Clark produced twelve reports about sensitometric testing on Harrow films and 
plates and products from competitors with Agfa, Lumière, Guilleminot, Wellington, 
Ilford and Capelli among them.83 The sensitometric characteristics of the photographic 
material such as its speed, gamma and the length of the straight-line portion to the 
characteristic curve allowed the researcher to determine which product was the best 
and the most appropriate for a specific use. To conclude this paragraph about the 
testing and comparison between proprietary and competitive products at Harrow it is 
worth citing two of Clark’s studies about the flammability tests on safety film made in 
1930 and 1931. It is important to keep in mind that as the film industry kept their 
formulae and manufacturing processes secret, the only way of controlling the quality 
of new safety film, that is to say nonflammable film made of cellulose acetate, was the 
conduct of burn tests to determine if the “safety” term could really apply. In his first 
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report, the result of burn test on cine Kodak film on Rochester and Pathé supports 
highlighted that the Pathé support was considerably safer. 
 Rochester base ignites fairly readily, and when alight, burns to completion. 
Further, when burning, the Rochester base is inclined to drop burning material 
which continues burning on the floor for some time. Pathé base does not do this.84 
 The Agfa 16mm safety film was even worse than the Kodak cine film. As methods of 
the burn test were not standardised yet, Clark also experimented with a German 
method of testing and compared it to the American procedure used by the Society of 
Motion Picture Engineers. He started a correspondence with Professor Lehmann who 
was responsible for this new method in Germany, discussing the weaknesses in the 
German proposals and sending more samples of Kodak film to test. In the end, the 
results appeared contradictory. 
There seems to be little or no parallelism between the results of tests by the 
German and American methods. In a number of cases, a film which appears more 
inflammable than another by the American method is given as less inflammable 
by the German method. Incidentally, by the German method Rochester 16mm. 
safety film burnt more readily than any other 16mm. film tested.85 
The discussion was not over, and Clark and Lehmann were able to talk again about 
burn tests face to face during the Eighth International Congress of Photography at 
Dresden on 3-8 August 1931 where the German scientist presented a paper about 
safety film. 
This selection of reports referring to industrial research and development activities 
points out the important benefits of such studies for the company. Solving production 
issues increased the understanding of photographic emulsions produced and enabled 
new physicochemical methods of reverse engineering. The conduct of complete 
reports about a specific process, patent studies and comparative studies with 
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competitive products also provided a better understanding of the global economic and 
technological environment to the company. 
 
3.2.4. The collaboration-oriented activities at the Harrow Research 
Laboratory 
As seen in Clark’s report, setting up testing procedures and controlling Kodak 
emulsions and supports as well as the products from the competitors was an efficient 
strategy to determine the key points and the weaknesses of its own products. But it 
does not have much to do with innovation, although it could provide some avenues to 
follow that other companies used for some products. When I began studying the first 
volumes of the Harrow Research Reports, I had some preconceived ideas about how 
the research work could be handled. One could consider the endless bench work 
undertaken by chemists and physicists to conceive an experimental emulsion or to 
better understand a cutting-edge chemical compound; highly-skilled, genuine but 
isolated researchers working in a vacuum in their own laboratory. One of the great 
surprises of the research was to find some reports introducing a new method of 
industrial research turned towards other sources of technology and innovation: 
research structures, companies of the photographic and movie industry or 
independent inventors. This time the Kodak researchers not only performed a 
technology watch on innovative products and processes but they also sought advice 
and technologies from individuals or companies by contacting them and sometimes by 
establishing a technological collaboration. The transfer of technology was frequently 
bilateral and as the goal of this kind of cooperation was to combine the research 
capacities of each party, I use the term collaboration-oriented activities, already 
introduced at the end of section 3.2.1., for this third main category. 
Evidence of such activities can be found in the confidential report of a visit made to 
Belgium and Germany by Clark in the Spring of 1929. According to him, the goal of the 




to re-establish personal contact with a number of photographic workers, and to 
discuss photographic work in Germany in a general way.”86 One of Clark’s first tasks 
was to visit Kodak A.G. in Berlin and the factory of Cöpenick. There, he discussed cine 
Kodak processing with Mr. Webb and Dr. Busch as some cine film was not properly 
processed. This was worrying because most of the German customers preferred Agfa’s 
16mm cine film to Kodak’s. Clark gave his technical expertise and suggested the use of 
sensitometric strips to better check the chemical baths used. He also met Emanuel 
Goldberg afterward in Dresden at the Zeiss-Ikon factory and the ICA laboratories and 
Goldberg showed him a comparison between the two cine films, with better results for 
Agfa film. Clark decided to repeat the same test at Cöpenick and Harrow to confirm 
Goldberg’s results. At this stage of the report it says that Clark also visited Professor 
Lehmann at the Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg-Berlin.87 The two scientists 
discussed the current research of the photographic department at the Technical 
University, such as the definition of a non-flammable film or investigations on new 
emulsions. Clark was aware of the interest of academic research for Eastman Kodak. 
 In view of the influential position of Lehmann in official and Kinematograph circles 
in Germany, and his thorough current knowledge of the trend of Kinematograph 
and photographic affairs, it would seem desirable to make the fullest possible use 
of services he may care to render. He could be of considerable value for the 
company.88 
In Belgium, Clark faced a tortuous case about a new colour process that an inventor 
and his agent wanted to sell. It illustrates the method used by the Kodak staff to 
evaluate the interest of a potential invention and to approach its author. The Belgian 
agent Mr. Van Sint Jan had already contacted George Eastman without success for a 
Mr. Proust, claiming a process of hypersensitising cine film and a process of colour 
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photography. But it appeared that both inventions came from the work of a Mr. Dony, 
the former associate of Mr. Proust. 
 Dony first worked privately, and all the main ideas in the methods of 
hypersensitising and colour photography, now exploited by Van Sint Jan for 
Proust, were due to Dony. Proust wanted Dony to sign a contract with him, but as 
he was to receive a sum he considered inadequate, he would not agree, and 
parted company with Proust. Dony is now employed in the repair shop of the 
Kodak Co. at Brussels.89 
It was essential for Clark to make everything clear about the chronology of the 
invention, and also about its real origin and property, should the Kodak company be 
interested in the new technology. He talked with Dony and got the confirmation that 
he had no agreement with any firm. Mr. Wildson, head of Kodak Co. in Belgium, came 
together with Dony to meet the agent Van Sint Jan and Proust for a demonstration of 
the colour process but as Proust recognized Dony, nothing was shown to the Kodak 
staff. 
It appears that Van Sint Jan and Proust are exploiting processes developed from 
Dony’s ideas, and that, knowing Dony is now with the Kodak Co., they do not wish 
us to know too much about it.90 
Finally, Clark managed to get some samples of Dony’s hypersensitising cine film and 
sent them to Harrow for testing. Nothing more can be found about the eventual 
relationship with the Dony colour process and the Harrow Research Laboratory. For 
Clark, the visit in Belgium was also the opportunity to find out about recent activity by 
the competition in the photographic industry. The young Nadox factory near Brussels 
had been taken over by the Union Chimique for the manufacture of sensitive goods. 
One emulsion technician from Bayer and another from Lumière had been hired by the 
Union Chimique and as this new factory could threaten the market for Kodak in 
Belgium, Mr. Wildson suggested Clark contact this company to organise a merger in a 
near future with Eastman Kodak. Clark finished his visit in Ghent where he met André 
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Callier, an expert in optics and lens design.91 Kodak Rochester was already equipped 
with one of his lens-testing devices, which was an improvement of a prototype 
developed by Goldberg in 1925. Clark recommended using Callier’s device to test the 
Kodak lenses at Harrow for curvature of field and chromatic aberration. He judged all 
his work of the highest order. 
It is recommended that the services of Callier be used as far as possible for 
designing and constructing optical apparatus cheaply but well. He would welcome 
an extension of the use of his lenses on Kodak cameras.92 
To Kodak, Callier was far more than a supplier, he was seen as a scientific consultant 
with whom a collaboration could lead to a general improvement of the optical 
characteristics of Kodak lenses. 
Other reports clarify the practical side of the collaboration between Kodak Limited and 
independent inventors. During the first half of the year 1930, Clark reported joint work 
with Mr. August, an individual developing a new photocomposing machine from an 
August-Hunter model.93 It is not known how Mr. August and Kodak Limited were 
introduced but the first report about the collaboration indicated that Mr. Barber, a 
technical manager of the Harrow Developing and Printing Department, had been 
assisting Mr. August in his developing work several months. The main points studied 
were the preparation of a satisfactory master positive film, the selection of a light 
source, a lens and a commutator for controlling exposures for the machine.94 The 
                                                     
91 Callier founded in Ghent the Société Belge d’Optique et d’Instruments de Précision in 1919. The factory 
produced photographic lenses, microscopes and other optical devices during the Interwar period.  
92 Clark, “Visit to Germany and Belgium,” 16. Callier was Goldberg’s friend and both scientists developed 
in 1913 an instrument that they called spectrodensograph. It was used to measure the intensity of light 
of different wavelengths. See Buckland, Emanuel Goldberg and his knowledge machine, 62. 
93 The principle of photocomposition is to photograph characters on film from which printing plates can 
be made. The initial model mentioned in the report was the photocomposing machine Thothmic 
developed and launched by Edgar Kenneth Hunter and his brother-in-law Johannes Robert Carl August 
in 1925. Hunter and August never managed to produce a marketable industrial model of 
photocomposing machine. See Alan Marshall, Du plomb à la lumière: la Lumitype-Photon et la naissance 
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practical terms of the collaboration were not well defined and it seems that the 
independent inventor suffered from the situation. 
Although I told Mr. August that I could not discuss any financial matters at all, he 
took every opportunity of impressing me with his need for freedom from financial 
worries to enable him to get ahead with his work. At one point he became slightly 
abusive of the Kodak Co., and their “desire to get something for nothing” and their 
inertia when he asked for money.95 
Kodak Limited finally funded Mr. August and as the progress was significant due to his 
joint work with Barber, Clark thought that a demonstration of the machine could be 
made soon at slow speed.96 Indeed Mr. August came to visit Harrow in May and 
managed to make his photo-composing machine work. The speed of the device was a 
key point and the speed of the prototype, although satisfying, was too weak to market 
the product with these characteristics. However Clark remained confident. 
This is the first demonstration that the writer has had that the mechanism of the 
photo-composing machine is capable of working at a speed higher than one 
change in 10 seconds. The results lead to the opinion that it is probable that the 
machine itself could be made to work at a rate suitable for practice.97 
Such a collaboration seemed to be a beneficial partnership and to make sense for both 
sides. 
Sometimes contact and information transfer were more challenging while the 
independent inventor was cautious and anxious that his new technology might be 
incorporated in some Kodak products without any compensation. This is for instance 
the situation encountered in 1930 with a mysterious Mr. Robins proposing a new 
“non-inflammable and non-explosive” film to Kodak Limited. The researchers looked 
for the corresponding patents and tested the film thoroughly to understand its nature. 
The cellulose nitrate or acetate could have been replaced with viscose. With regard to 
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colour photography, the technology was innovative. Indeed the film was made of three 
laminated layers, possibly intending to produce a panchromatic emulsion, each layer 
was sensitised for a portion of the visible spectrum. The Kodak scientists also found 
that the film was sensitised by bathing and therefore was not very sensitive. The 
shrinkage of the film was too high. Finally it was found that this sample of film was not 
entirely new. 
A film similar in type to the present was offered to the Company a year or two ago, 
examined by Mr. Blake, and rejected. It is obvious that the present film is the same 
as this previous one. No mention of this had been made by Mr. Miller. Towards 
the close of the negotiations, however, the writer tackled Mr. Miller about it, and 
obtained an admission that it was the product of the same inventor, but 
“considerably improved as the result of further research.” 98 
As a result, Clark informed the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester with a copy of 
the report and a sample of the film and decided to wait for their opinion before any 
further negotiations. 
On some occasion the collaboration-oriented activities of the Laboratory came from 
professional contacts or friendships with members from other research laboratories. In 
1929 Mr. Le Rossignol of the Research Laboratories of the General Electric Co., 
Wembley, suggested that Clark investigate the photographic action of thoriated 
tungsten lamp filaments. It could give a measure of the amount of thoria present in 
the tungsten and the Harrow researchers looked for the most appropriate emulsion.99 
During the same period, the Harrow Research Laboratory worked in conjunction with 
another scientist of the Research Laboratories of the General Electric Co., Mr. G.H. 
Wilson, to test some projector lamps probably because General Electric did not have 
the procedure and equipment yet to test light sources.100 
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Some investigations into a new technology developed by other companies were 
directly connected with potentially workable (at least according to the first tests) tri-
colour processes, such as the processes of Colour Snapshots Ltd. The English company 
was created in 1928 and its processes were based on a patent by William Tarbin with a 
new tripack arrangement to Ducos du Hauron’s initial multiple-layer package that had 
been patented in 1895.101 Two comprehensive reports illustrate the lengthy 
investigation undertaken by the Kodak research team to determine whether or not the 
colour film of this very young but well-funded company was worth purchasing. The 
colour film was made of a tri-pack with three emulsions but also with three supports, 
generating some optical problems and significant thickness in the film. According to 
Clark, the film itself and its base was made by Imperial and Selo Limited. Initially, Mr. 
Tritton of Colour Snapshots Ltd worked with with Clark and Crowther of Kodak Limited 
to discover the best Kodak camera to use with the experimental film so that the three 
layers were uniformly blocked with a workable pressure. Tritton gave some spools of 
film to Clark and Crowther to expose it at the Developing and Printing Department at 
Harrow.102 Tritton, Mr. Klein and two technicians of Colour Snapshots Ltd came to 
Harrow to discuss the results and to prepare prints from the negatives (see Illustration 
7). Clark justified the writing of the report in technical and economic terms. 
This report is intended to record our experiences of the handling of the process, 
with full manipulative details, general information gleaned in conversation with 
Messrs. Klein and Tritton, and general remarks on the process to serve as a guide 
to its possibility as a commercial proposition.103 
The structure of the tri-pack was carefully studied. The red-sensitive film was in the 
front, the green-sensitive film had its emulsion facing the emulsion of the front film, 
the back film being blue-sensitive. Oddly enough, the three films were not cemented 
together, because they had to be separated during the printing process of the tri-pack 
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made of a complicated superposition and register of three dye-transfer images by 
imbibition. The Kodak staff attempted to expose the experimental film with the best 
procedure and let Klein and Tritton prepare the colour prints through the imbibition 
technique. However the poor results and the procedures used by the staff of Colour 
Snapshots Ltd disconcerted Clark. 
No attempt is made to control the individual gradation of the separated negatives; 
all are developed together. The correct conditions for dyeing the positives were 
not known. […] The “experts” seemed to have no definite idea of the relative 
colour values required of the three images. […] Not one of the prints prepared 
could be regarded as satisfactory. All were diffuse, and most of the colours false.104 
 The commercial side of the new technology was also unclear. An agreement for the 
distribution of the product with Messrs. Houghton-Butcher had been voiced, but Klein 
finally invalidated this information. He nevertheless stressed the interest of Agfa in the 
new technology while confirming that “no agreement for manufacture, distribution or 
processing would be made until Messrs. Kodak Limited had signified whether they 
were interested or not.”105 Clark’s summary of the situation was a terrible indictment 
of the Colour Snapshots Ltd company. 
The process is theoretically not sound; the process is not capable of yielding 
satisfactory colour prints, even in the hands of experts […] ; the process itself is 
not really understood by the Colorsnap experts ; the method of processing is so 
uncertain and involved as to be of doubtful commercial value as a Developing and 
Printing proposition […].106 
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Illustration 7. Colorsnap representing some members of the Kodak Research 
Laboratory with friends on May 20, 1929.107 
 
Kodak researchers did not pursue further investigations on the Colorsnap tri-pack 
process, and the many faults of the young company finally resulted in its compulsory 
liquidation in December 1929.108 It is difficult to ascertain to what extent Kodak’s poor 
opinion about the new tri-pack process was one of the contributing factors reasons. 
But for Kodak, the success or the failure of a study in the framework of a research 
activity was not the most important indicator. This case illustrates well that hazard or 
opportunities can lead to marketable products or to dead ends, and that the time 
spent on a scientific investigation is not wasted time.  
Another important chapter about research in colour photography during the interwar 
period relates to Kodak’s first Kodacolor process. George Eastman unveiled it in June 
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1928 during a celebration at his home in Rochester. The technology of the first 
Kodacolor process had been first developed by Rodolphe Berton with his additive 
process.  The Société Keller-Dorian-Berthon was created when Berthon created a 
partnership with Albert Keller-Dorian, the director of a factory. In 1925, the French 
company offered the rights of its patents to Eastman Kodak and these rights were 
finally purchased in 1926. In the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester John Capstaff 
and his team improved the French process and it was finally marketed two years 
later.109 It is therefore peculiar to find in the Harrow research reports two reports of 
visits to the Keller-Dorian offices in France in January and August 1929. During the first 
visit Clark was with Abribat of the Kodak-Pathé Laboratory and they apparently studied 
the duplicating machine for Keller-Dorian film which was still in use outside the United 
States. But both reports are precise and detailed containing technical data and 
sketches including the embossing system of this lenticular film and its processing. As 
this three-colour additive process is important to Kodak’s long-term research in colour 
photography, I will study these reports in the next chapter about colour research, in 
section 4.1.3. 
To conclude with the collaboration-oriented activities of the Harrow Research 
Laboratory it is necessary to mention some evidence of team work between Kodak’s 
British and French Laboratories during their first years. Only two reports were found 
for the period 1929-1935 that show a straight scientific collaboration between the two 
laboratories but the topics discussed were significant. In November 1930 Clark made a 
second and extensive visit to Vincennes, met most of the members of the Research 
Laboratory such as Abribat, Lecté, Moreau, Calame and Lair and reviewed the work in 
progress in the research departments. The French were still investigating colloidal 
chemistry following a production issue with the appearance of white spots on some 
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Kodak-Pathé emulsion.110 This problem provided an opportunity for a research work to 
ascertain the role and the behaviour of gelatin with some specific chemicals. As the 
French had experienced the fading of the latent image with roll-film, Abribat 
investigated the oxidising properties of materials used in making film support. He and 
Lecté studied the effect of several materials and observed the change of sensitivity, 
latent image and fog for the emulsion. They also were investigating the chlorination of 
gelatin and the dehydration of gelatin with acetone. Later Clark balanced the pros and 
the cons of acetone’s use. 
Although this use of acetone might be of value for rapid drying of test pieces, it is 
not possible to say offhand whether it is of value on the manufacturing scale. It 
certainly could not be applied to emulsions containing materials soluble in 
acetone. Further, the cost of acetone would be considerable, and it would be 
necessary to install a recovery plant.111 
Another aspect of the French research was the study of the swelling of the gelatin and 
of cellulose esters in water over a long time. The benefit of this work was the 
understanding of the structure of the gelatin and to ascertain for instance if there was 
an intermicellar and intra-micellar swelling proceeding successively. Whatever the final 
industrial application of this fundamental research, both laboratories were sharing 
their knowledge and exchanging ideas. This exchange was bilateral and Clark also 
provided some of his findings. 
M. Lecté has started a series of experiments on the adsorption of Methylene Blue 
by silver halides. I have sent him a report of some measurements I made some 
years ago on this subject. I think they are well worth following up, as they may 
shed some light on the surface properties of silver bromide in an emulsion, and 
their variations with conditions of emulsion manufacture.112 
 Another reason for Clark’s visit was the improvement of sensitometric 
standardisation. How was Kodak to compare and discuss photographic density 
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111 W. Clark, “Visit to Vincennes, November, 1930,” research report H.155g, December 31, 1930, ref. 
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measurements if the same language was not used on both sides of the Channel ? In 
France, a Fabry and Buisson Microphotometer was used, giving parallel light densities 
with a range of density up to 4.5. Clark recommended the Eastman Capstaff-Purdy 
Densitometer that was in use at Rochester and Harrow. The initial French reaction was 
cautious. Lair asked to undertake preliminary tests first. Clark agreed but pointed out 
that the chemist Moreau had tested the Eastman Densitometer during a visit at 
Harrow and had given a positive opinion about the instrument. Other sensitometric 
procedures were compared such as the standard light source and developer 
employed.113 
Two years later, a conference on graininess in cine-film held at the Harrow Research 
Laboratory also presented an opportunity to share scientific knowledge on the topic 
and to discuss a possible standardisation for the measurement of graininess. Roy 
Davies, the new director of the British Laboratory was the keynote speaker while the 
former director Clark, working at Rochester since 1931, was the scientific 
representative of the American Laboratory. Abribat represented the Kodak-Pathé 
Laboratory. The starting point of the conference was the research work undertaken by 
Selwyn and Batley on measurement on graininess of Cine Kodak film.114 The discussion 
started on the theoretical aspects of the graininess, its variation with the density of the 
film, Selwyn introducing the notion of physical graininess : “it is the variation of the 
density of the material from point to point, as you measure the density over a very 
small area.”115 The British chemist had investigated the method of L.A. Jones and 
Hardy proposed in 1925 at Rochester and discussed the correspondence between the 
visual effect and the physical measurement of graininess. The talk focussed on a clear 
definition of the human eye’s behaviour, Abribat pointing out that the eye did not 
behave like a camera, but could see only by continuous scanning. The role of the retina 
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115 W. Clark, “Conference on graininess in cine-film at the Harrow Research Laboratory. May 13th, 




was studied, and Clark finally “objected that he could not see how a standard could be 
set.”116 Selwyn defended himself with a long intervention including mathematical 
formulas, but just after him the speakers started to think about “terms of practical 
experience”.117 So little had been done practically and this represented a problem. A 
controversy arose when Abribat introduced the relationship between graininess and 
the presence of silver. Davies and Selwyn contested his technical arguments. The 
discussion was definitely too theoretical. Phillips signalled to move forward. 
Mr. Phillips asked whether the discussion could shift on to the practical 
application. Had they to wait for the completion of this correlation before they 
could use a working method to measure the graininess of the Cine-Kodak films ? 
He felt that if they had to wait for that correlation they might have to wait for 
years.118 
Phillips had studied Rochester’s methods during several journeys to Kodak Park and 
knew that the Americans had no definite opinion about the objective and subjective 
side of the measurement of graininess. Davies was of the opinion that the researchers 
at Rochester should start to use Batley’s method, “while the theoretical aspects were 
still under examination.”119 Phillips agreed with him and also suggested to Clark that 
Rochester organise an investigation of the relationship between processing deviations 
and the granularity of the picture. It was better to do it in the United States as the 
British researchers could not undertake such a survey with sufficient scale. Finally, 
Clark reviewed the Rochester comments on Selwyn’s report H.233 and agreed to 
request general work on the graininess from the Rochester Research Laboratory.120 
These long minutes of proceedings were also sent to Mees and to Bent, the manager 
of the Harrow plant. It is not known how the quest for a convenient standard in 
graininess measurement came to an end and whether or not the American Kodak 
Laboratory organised a long-term study from Selwyn’s and Batley’s work. But at least 
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from this collaborative work of the laboratories emerged the idea that the three 
research structures of Eastman Kodak were sharing their newly developed knowledge 
when the finding or the innovation was of interest. Thus the behaviour of the Harrow 
Research Laboratory with the other Kodak Laboratories was not far from its work with 
third party companies and the investigation on their new technologies, in the 
framework of collaboration-oriented activities.  
In the section above, I have undertaken an exhaustive study of the production of 
knowledge at the Harrow Research Laboratory through the analysis of the research 
reports. From the data collection two strategies were taken to perform a qualitative 
analysis of 350 reports created from 1929 to 1935. The first method focused on the 
technical discourse embedded in the titles of the reports and necessitated the use of 
two Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software to generate statistical 
figures and visual tag clouds. The data produced through this method provided little 
information about the general work of the Harrow Research Laboratory. A second 
method based on Grounded Theory and the interactional expertise of Collins and 
Evans was therefore used to enable analysis of the content of the 350 reports from a 
photographic and scientific background. 62 reports have been kept for their content 
and classified within 16 sub-categories of 3 general categories: fundamental research 
activities, industrial research and development activities and collaboration-oriented 
activities. The last category exhibited a modern method of innovation for an industrial 
research structure of the interwar period. The selected case studies have shown the 
way the British Laboratory undertook some collaboration with companies and 
individuals. I have also introduced some of the teamwork with the French Kodak-Pathé 
Laboratory, as an archive of this structure has recently emerged in France. Thus the 
next section deals with the organisation of Kodak research in France compared with 
the British structure. It also enlightens the existence of scientific collaboration and 






3.2.5. Transfer of knowledge between Harrow, Rochester and 
Vincennes 
During 2013, the discovery of the new French Kodak-Pathé company archive at Chalon-
sur-Saône, France, provided a complementary and critical insight into the activities of 
Kodak research within the three main research laboratories. The initial study of the 
Harrow research reports clarified the role of the British Research Laboratory, its 
mission and exchanges with the main laboratory at Rochester. With the additional 
French archive, it was now possible to suggest an answer to the following questions: 
how was Kodak-Pathé research reorganized from the initial structure of the Pathé-
Cinéma research laboratory? How was the additional research organisation 
incorporated into innovation strategy at Eastman Kodak ? As the French archive was 
only in an intermediary state and not entirely inventoried in 2013, I again opted to use 
grounded theory to draw as much relevant data as possible from the unidentified 
corpus of qualitative data. My theoretical sampling in the archive started from a few 
“local concepts”, or categories, as stated by Glaser and Strauss in 1967.121 I initially 
knew that I could rely on a presumably complete set of research reports and on 
additional data with the other Research Laboratories. With a circular process of data 
collection including intermediary steps of data analysis I was able to refine the 
sampling of materials for my visits to the archive and to generate some theories about 
the French methodology of industrial research. During the collection process some 
outstanding material was found unexpectedly because it was not classified in the 
folder consulted. Due to this situation and to the important amount of work still 
necessary to inventory the archive, I did not consider performing a standard 
comparison between the French and the British research reports and instead choosing 
to focus on one important research question. Therefore this section is about how the 
French Laboratory collaborated with its American and British counterparts, and about 
how scientific knowledge circulated among the three laboratories. 
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The nature of the French reports and a method of classification that differed from the 
British system also made the research reports incomparable. At Kodak-Pathé, the 
research reports were classified by author in a research notebook presumably during a 
lengthy archiving process for an unknown period of time. If the scientist was a prolific 
researcher the unidentified archivist created several research notebooks in his or her 
name. One peculiarity of the archive clarifies the French context of photographic 
research: there is no partition between the period of Pathé up to 1927 and the period 
of Kodak-Pathé from 1927 onwards. For chemists already working for Pathé and later 
for the new Kodak-Pathé organisation their research reports were classified together, 
largely in chronological order. It seems that this way of archiving the research reports 
highlights the research work undertaken before 1927 by the scientific team of Pathé. 
Unlike the British Research Laboratory, its counterpart at Vincennes did not start from 
scratch but benefitted from a large body of technological knowledge that had been 
produced since the first years of the twentieth century. Moreover, this amount of 
knowledge clarifies and confirms the strategic interest of George Eastman in the 
French film manufacturer and the following merger in 1927. 
Some other notebooks did not relate to a specific researcher but to a specific activity, 
such as Activité Labo Recherches but they are in the minority. The nature of the 
research notebooks can vary. The research reports were generally typescripts with 
occasional curves, figures or photographs. One can also find some correspondence 
which is either original material or typed copies of original letters. Some rare research 
reports were handwritten directly by the researcher and incorporated into the 
research notebook this way, while a few handwritten drafts of report or letter have 
also been found somewhere in the corpus.122 On a cautionary note, it is important to 
say that it was impossible to study another important source of information, identified 
in French as the “livres de fabrication”. These chronological manufacturing notebooks 
are either lost or not kept in the Kodak-Pathé archive with the exception of the first 
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one. The keeping of manufacturing notebooks belonged to the Pathé period as the 
only manufacturing notebook kept in the archive is dated back to 1906.123 Due to the 
existence of notes and annotations about the manufacturing notebooks on some 
research reports, it is possible to better understand the rationale of the knowledge 
transfer. The research reports that were considered as essential for the technological 
or scientific knowledge produced were incorporated in the manufacturing notebook of 
that period. There is evidence of this methodology of incorporation at least up to the 
Second World War, therefore this practice continued well beyond 1927. In the 
manufacturing notebook, the best research reports were placed next to activity 
reports and minutes of general meetings. However, the loss of the subsequent 
volumes of the manufacturing notebooks was not detrimental to my research because 
all the research reports, classified by author, are preserved in the French archive as 
well as the reports that were not selected for incorporation in the manufacturing 
notebook. It is theoretically possible to ascertain the complete research work 
produced by a chemist or a physicist during his or her full career at Kodak-Pathé. 
With a better understanding of the nature of the Kodak-Pathé archive we can now 
return to the research questions above and ascertain the circulation of the scientific 
knowledge among the Kodak Research Laboratories from the study of some material 
found in the French archive. The first document is an inventory of the research reports 
produced by the director Marcel Abribat for the period 1928-1935 (see Table 5). This 
handwritten and typed document was found in a research notebook of another 
researcher with no direct connection with Abribat. It is made of several stapled sheets 
of paper, unlike the standard research reports that are bound into research notebooks. 
Thus this document was certainly never classified and its discovery was only made by 
chance. The major characteristic of the document is that each report also sent to 
Kodak Limited is identified with a specific mark “X” making it possible to identify what 
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kind of scientific knowledge was shared with the British researchers and in what 
proportion. 
 
Table 5. Extract of the inventory of the research reports produced by the director 
Marcel Abribat for the period 1928-1935.124 
                                                     





Year Date Research reports sent to Walter Bent125 
1928 
29/10/1928 
Rapport sur la granulation des images développées dans un bain à l’élon, hydroquinone, 
borax usage (Mr. Bent – 15.11.28) 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 6 
Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 14% 
   
1929 
16/01/1929 
MM. Abribat & Renard – Influence du laminage sur les propriétés plastiques des films (Mr. 
Bent 11.12.29) 
30/04/1929 
Étude de l’oxydation électrolytique de quelques révélateurs photographiques et de 
substances correspondantes (Mr. Bent – Avril 29) (V.402 – A study of the electrolytic 
oxydation of some photographic developer and corresponding derivative). 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 0 
Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 100% 
   
1930 
06/1930 
Rapport sur les développements à l’hydrosulfite de sodium des images inversées (Mr. Bent 
11 juin 1930). (V.443 – On the second development of reversal images by sodium 
hydrosulfite). 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 4 
Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 20% 
   
1931 
31/03/1931 
Dispositif micro densographique applicable notamment à l’étude des enregistrements 
photo-acoustique (Mr. Bent) 
Addition Mars 1931 Théorie mathématique du microdensitomètre enregistreur (Mr. Bent 7.4.31) 
21/10/1931 
Note sommaire sur les recherches concernant l’emploi des films d’acétate dans l’Industrie 
électrique (Mr. Bent 27.10.31) 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 6 
Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 33% 
   
1932 
11/01/1932 
Recherche concernant l’emploi de l’acétate de cellulose dans l’industrie électrique (Mr. 
Bent 8.2.32) 
5/02/1932 Conférence de Mr. Cahen sur la télévision (Mr. Bent 8.2.32) 
29/11/1932 
Report on researches actually carried on in the laboratory, on the effect of pyridine and 
quinoline on sensitivity and latent image (Mr. Bent 27.1.33). 
7ème pér. Preliminary note on the research work carried on at present (Mr. Bent). 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 3 
Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 57% 
   
1933 
- - 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 2 
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Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 0% 
   
1934 
- - 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 2 
Percentage of research reports sent to W. Bent for the year : 0% 
   
1935 
30/01/1935 
(Abribat-Pinoir) – Appareil pour la mesure de la conductivité électrique des films 
émulsionnés (Mr. Bent) 
Number of other research reports that were not sent to Kodak Ltd : 1 




Total number of research reports produced during the period : 36 
Total number of research reports sent to W. Bent during the period : 12 (33%) 
 
Table 6. List of research reports produced by Marcel Abribat and sent to Walter 
Bent for the period 1928-1935.126 
 
The summary included in Table 6 shows that about 1 in 3 reports was sent to Harrow 
and that there is no set topic. Abribat’s growing responsibilities from the start of the 
Research Laboratory at Vincennes, did not leave him much time to produce research 
reports and the amount of reports for the period is therefore rather small. However 
this list of reports has been compared with the tables of contents attached with 
Abribat’s research notebooks and it appears that it is the correct nature and quantity 
of reports. For some reports sent to the Works Manager Bent at Harrow one can find 
an English translation but translation was not systematic. This document ascertains 
that the recipient was only Bent but we do not know how Bent spread the following 
reports within the Harrow Research Laboratory. At least one can assume that some or 
all of the British researchers read the French reports that Abribat decided to share. The 
first conclusion of a brief analysis of the inventory is that in a mathematical sense one 
report out of three was sent to Harrow during that period of eight years (12 out of 36). 
But it is difficult to theorise this data, as for some years no report was sent to Harrow. 
The second conclusion is about the nature of the fields of study covered by the 
reports: topics are mostly heterogeneous. Some reports deal with the mechanical and 
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chemical properties of photographic films (graininess or physical resistance) or the 
optimisation of developers. Others deal with the development of new sensitometric 
instrumentation, the strategy of finding new markets for cellulose acetate or the 
technical watch on new technology like television. Concerning the Research Laboratory 
at Rochester, only one research report is labelled as “having been possibly sent to Dr. 
Mees by Mr. Abribat”. It is the report concerning the expert committee of the 
Nordmann process filed on 27 January 1931. This process was an innovative way of 
duplicating lenticular tricolour film better than any existing duplicating processes of 
the period, like the Keller-Dorian’s technology of collimation. Abribat was not a 
member of the expert committee but it seems logical that he reported to Mees on the 
results of the test of the Nordmann process, as Eastman Kodak could have been 
interested in this duplicating process for the Kodacolor lenticular process launched in 
1928. As the copy of the report in Abribat’s research notebooks indicates, Charles 
Nordmann had already patented his technology and the goal of his process was to 
establish an affordable industrial development without violating any existing patent. 
The mission of the expert committee was to appreciate the quality of a lenticular 
duplicated film compared to the original in terms of sharpness, colour rendition, colour 
cast and absence of moiré. The report concluded that the test was positive however it 
is not indicated anywhere that a copy was sent to Mees.127 Strangely the same report 
was not sent to Walter Bent at Harrow. One reason for the paucity of reports sent 
directly to Eastman Kodak might be that in the early years of the French Research 
Laboratory, it had been decided in-house that the French team would report to their 
British counterpart only. This situation changed progressively, especially from the end 
of the Second World War as I discuss in the last part of this section. 
Another inventory found in the French Kodak archive elucidates the transfer of 
knowledge between Vincennes and Harrow in a more general way. It concerns only the 
year 1935 but all researchers of the French Kodak Laboratory are cited. For each of 
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them the inventory lists their reports. Each document is codified with a reference from 
the type V. xxxx where “V” represents the French place of Vincennes (for instance V. 
1191). Should one report also be sent to Harrow, a letter close to its reference 
indicates the identity of the British addressee. For some researchers the inventory also 
includes a list of notes produced by him or her. These short reports relate to 
production matters or internal issues and none of them were sent to Harrow. Notes 
are not codified but are only classified with an indication of the date. Table 7 below 
represents the summary of the quantity of reports produced per researcher for the 
year 1935, the total number of reports that were sent to Harrow and the detail of 
these shared reports with the name of each addressee.128 For a better understanding 
of the knowledge transfer, the titles of the British recipients are provided in an 
additional line. For each box filed, the chronological number of the reports is given. 
This is not a qualitative indication about each report but it does show whether the 
same report has been sent to several addressees or on the contrary to a single person.  
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Abribat 1 1 (n°1)  1 (n°1) 1 (n°1)     1/1 
Bousquet 5 3 (2,3,5) 2 (1,5) 2 (3,5) 2 (1,5)     4/5 
Clément 10 10 (1 to 10)       1 (10) 10/10 
Mme. 
Cuissard 
29 3 (3,15,16?) 
4 (3,15,16, 
29) 
1 (16) 2 (15,27)     5/29 
Mr. 
Cuissard 
7         0/7 
Guillais 4 1 (4) 1 (2) 1 (4) 1 (3)     4/4 
Landucci 4 3 (1,3,4) 2 (2,3) 3 (1,2,4)      4/4 
Léauté 10    1 (9)     1/10 
Martin 1         0/1 






















2 (16,21) 2 (16,25)  30/52 
Sylvestre 10 3 (3,6,10)  3 (3,6,10)      3/10 
Zelger 17 2 (9,12)  2 (9,12) 2 (9,16)     3/17 
Total of different French reports sent to Harrow on 1935 65/159 
 
Table 7. Inventory of the French research reports produced and shared with the 
Harrow research team and other Kodak managers for the year 1935. 
                                                     
129 A.J. Sulzer was certainly the manager of the Emulsion Coating Department between 1926 and 1931 
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130 Ernest Edgar Blake started to work for Kodak Ltd. in 1903. He was appointed manager of the Cine 
Film Department in 1911 and Managing Director in 1930. In 1946, he became Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of Kodak Ltd. and General Manager of European companies. See Gauntlett, “A History of 
Kodak Limited,” 56, 85; Kodakery 5, no. 12, March 27, 1947: 1-5. 
131 Franck Robinson, the Works Manager of Kodak A.G. near Berlin has not to be mistaken for Charles 
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The example from 1935 stresses the importance of the Kodak-Pathé research team in 
which twelve researchers were qualified and requested to provide research reports 
throughout the year. Unlike the Kodak British tradition, co-authoring was rare and this 
may be inherited from the Pathé period. One piece of information is missing. The 
inventory does not ascertain the criteria by which context the reports to be shared had 
been selected. Abribat might have been the only decision-maker. Or each researcher 
could have been responsible for the research work he or she wanted to share. An 
expert committee that met periodically may have selected the most important reports. 
The amount of work produced per researcher is not even. The outstanding production 
of Mrs Cuissard (29 reports) and of Mr Renard (52 reports) has to be highlighted. It 
indicates that for the period some scientific fields were more crucial than others. 
Renard was in charge of everything relating to cine film. He worked on modern 
emulsions such as Kodak and Agfa safety films or Kodatrace and its competitor by 
Kalle. He studied the influence of film dimension, perforation and gauges on film 
mechanical resistance and improved wear and tear procedures. He also reported on 
several projectors and the film behaviour in such new equipment. He was in charge of 
the study of new Safety films made in Rochester and undertook another study with 
Matthieu of the quality of the Harrow perforation through microscopic examination. 
These multiple checking procedures between Rochester, Harrow, Vincennes but also 
Berlin (Cöpenick) were the opportunity of insuring a standardized production amongst 
the several production sites as well as a standard of quality at its highest level. As to 
Mrs Cuissard, she was a skilled chemist and made analytical studies of new materials 
such as collodion made by Nobel or synthetic resin made by Albanol I.G. She tested the 
mechanical properties of new experimental bases, undertook technology watch of 
radio films from Lumière and Agfa and of cine positive films. She studied new 
plasticisers, adhesives to repair Kodatrace and raw acetates from several suppliers. She 
was also in charge of research on safety films’ improvement. The ten other researchers 
studied various subjects, some of them relating to technological development of the 
film production process or related to the nature of the chemicals used for the making 




out of 159) represents 41% of the written production and is not so far from Abribat’s 
ratio (33% of reports sent to W. Bent). This new ratio is particularly high. It 
demonstrates that more than one report out of three was read by at least one British 
or American counterpart. The titles of the addressees are not equivalent compared 
with the title of the report’s producers. Unlike these general managers and production 
managers, the French team was composed from pure researchers plus the director of 
research Abribat. In the list of addressees the unique exception is the chemist E.D. 
Eyles but only Renard sent four reports to him. This difference in the responsibilities of 
Kodak employees may stem from some traditional management procedures stating 
that the knowledge had to be sent first to the general manager and then spread by 
him through the departments under his responsibility. Another noteworthy statement 
of fact is that the technological knowledge of the French was sent to all the three 
Kodak plants (Rochester, Harrow and Cöpenick) and not only to the teams of Kodak 
research laboratories. It shows that at least for the French producers of knowledge the 
information was important to share and useful for several strata of technological 
departments including pure research laboratories but also production departments 
whose work was crucial to enable the yield of products of consistent quality. 
A third inventory kept in the same folder of the newly discovered French archive 
illustrates now how scientific knowledge circulated back to France as well, from the 
research work of Harrow scientists to the French Kodak-Pathé researchers. This 
inventory provides a list of research reports received between 1929 and 1940 including 
the date of production, the title, the authors and the reference number of the report 
should the information was known (see Table 8). The inventory was no doubt 
interrupted in 1940 due to the Second World War. Having compared the selected 
British reports listed in this document with the list of the first 350 research reports 
produced at Harrow, I confirm that they correspond to the reports kept in the Kodak 
Collection archive with their correct reference number H.xxx, “H” being for the British 
place of Harrow, exact titles and authors. This way it is possible to ascertain what kind 
of scientific knowledge was shared between Harrow and Vincennes. Unlike the 




Presumably the reports were sent to Abribat first and then spread among the Kodak-
Pathé research laboratory. 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of Harrow research reports shared with Vincennes between 
1929 and 1936.133 
 
The inventory contains a very important piece of information. The list contains 
evidence of monthly reports about the activity of the Harrow research laboratory first 
written by Walter Clark and that had not been found in the Kodak British archive. 
These “Monthly reports of research laboratory” are clearly identified between 1929 
and 1931, the last reports for July to December 1930 being received in February 1930. 
Up to 1936 there is no reception of the monthly reports and it might be that they were 
not produced after 1931 on (see Figure 6). However, in March 1936 some “reports 
from the research laboratory Harrow for the months of January, February and March” 
can be found in the 1936 inventory and it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
production of these activity reports was continuous or interrupted between 1929 and 
                                                     
133 The source for the Harrow research reports for the year is the Kodak Collection archive, ref. A2897, 
British Library. The source for the research and monthly reports shared with Vincennes is the written 
inventory kept in the Kodak-Pathé archive, ref. 33498, CECIL. This archive provides the data up to 1940 
but I decided to conform to my initial study of the Harrow research reports from 1929 to 1935. I added 
the data for the year 1936 as I also inventoried the reports for that year and as it indicates the upward 
trend about the production and share of British reports that took place up to 1940. 
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1936. As these reports were shared with Vincennes, they were probably also sent to 
the main Research Laboratory at Rochester.134 The presence of similar reports of 
activity but in the French archive is now more understandable, as for instance the 
report of Abribat written in February 1951 about the “Main activities of the Kodak 
Pathé Laboratories”. These procedures can be understood as corporate practices in 
the management and transfer of scientific knowledge. It is worth noticing that studies 
of such bureaucratic practices have been underestimated by science and social 
historians, as stressed by Becker and Clark in 2001.135 At this stage of the thesis 
however, a simple statistical study of the bureaucratic production and of the exchange 
of reports provides crucial information about knowledge transfer. Therefore one can 
conclude that on average one out of three reports was sent to Vincennes by the British 
researchers. It is important to notice that this ratio is similar to the ratio found for the 
other exchange of reports from Vincennes to Harrow in the Abribat’s inventory and 
the second inventory of the French researchers.  
  
                                                     
134 Up to now, one of the rare evidence of the existence of monthly reports was the transcript of an 
interview of Davies, second director of the Harrow Research Laboratory. “Before I left [Rochester], Dr. 
Mees said that there was one thing he would insist on – that I write him a letter each month. It was this 
that gave rise to the Monthly, and later the Quarterly Reports that senior staff were asked to submit.” 
Roy Davies, in “The Harrow Research Laboratory. Origins and Growth 1928-1976. A retrospective 
album”, 20. 






Table 8. Inventory of Harrow research reports received at Vincennes on 1935.136 
 
The constant value of this ratio is significant because it points out the uncertain nature 
of industrial research. The outcomes of basic and applied research being 
unpredictable, some research and experiments were not worth sharing with the other 
Kodak Research Laboratories. As a secondary consequence, uncertainty also created 
the necessity of a hierarchy in the importance of each research report.137 This selection 
was made by an undefined group of scientific experts in Harrow as well as in 
Vincennes. 
The year 1931 is the exception for this ratio of one out of three. Only one report about 
the “permanence of colorimetric pH standards” was sent to France out of the 61 
research reports produced at Harrow. The possible reason for this break in the 
knowledge transfer could be the replacement of the director of the British laboratory 
as Roy Davies succeeded Walter Clark when he left for Rochester in May 1931. Finally, 
the topics covered by the reports shared are heterogeneous as the topics of the French 
                                                     
136 “Rapports Harrow reçus à Vincennes 1929-1940,” inventory, undated, ref. 33498, CECIL. 
137 Mees’ view about the notion of uncertainty in industrial research has already been studied in the 




reports sent to Harrow also were. Bilateral knowledge transfer138 covers several 
scientific fields and is not restricted to some routine topics such as sensitometric data 
about Kodak films. Therefore the data about photographic innovation and innovative 
experimental products was also shared both ways between Harrow and Vincennes. It 
is worth noting that the British reports shared concern the development of 
instrumentation for sensitometry or spectrophotometry, competitive or Kodak 
experimental processes, the testing of new material or new sensitising molecules. They 
are also about scientific aspects of non-flammable film, sensitometric procedures and 
regular testing of Kodak films and products from the competition. The variety of these 
topics stresses the vital importance of the Research Laboratory in the corporate 
structure of the company. It was used to develop photographic science, improve 
production processes and make innovation grow. 
The direct consequences of these research report exchanges are difficult to assess. It is 
problematic to estimate how the knowledge of a scientific fact can influence the 
activity of a researcher. Basically it can prevent him or her from working on an 
inappropriate track or it can persuade the researcher to maintain the development of 
a promising technology such as the use of a new sensitising dye to synthesise 
experimental emulsions. Beyond the scientific topics shared, the Kodak practices of 
knowledge transfer illustrate an innovative way of international communication during 
the Interwar period. The three Research Laboratories were producing a network of 
knowledge and the circulation of this knowledge has been confirmed by some 
evidence found in the British and French Kodak archives. It is necessary to stress that 
this network of knowledge also produced increasing teamwork between the 
laboratories. The Kodak-Pathé archive holds many examples of collaborations for 
which the production departments or the Research Laboratory at Vincennes worked 
together with their colleagues either at Harrow or Rochester. There is a report of a visit 
made by some researchers and managers from Harrow to the scientific staff at 
                                                     
138 This expression means here the exchange of research reports both ways and consequently the 




Vincennes. Abribat, the author, mentioned the technical subjects that were discussed 
with Messrs. Soper, Berg, Stevens and their other British colleagues. Designated with a 
handwritten note on the report as the “Harrow committee”, this collaborative 
structure may be an attempt to organise some regular meetings between the French 
and British Kodak research. During the visit the researchers discussed colloidal 
chemistry starting from some repellency issues during the coating of the emulsion on 
the film support. One of the challenges was to better understand how gelatin 
physically reacts with tensioactive agents such as wetting agent or emulsifier, to 
improve the coating process.139 During the same period, an important folder kept in 
the French archive demonstrates how the three laboratories worked jointly between 
1946 and 1948 on the development of a new cement from an initial study by the 
French researchers. The folder contains a typed summary of the correspondence 
between the American, British and French researchers as well as this original 
correspondence. Industrial research on new cements for cine film could appear trivial 
compared to other topics studied by the laboratories but splicing together several rolls 
of cine film tightly was absolutely necessary to deliver satisfying products to the movie 
industry. As film supports were evolving, the nature of the cement had also to be 
adapted to the nature of the new support. When new cellulose triacetate supports 
were first produced by Eastman Kodak for 16mm Kodachrome, Rochester tried to 
develop a universal cement for use in the European plants as well, but it was almost 
impossible to adapt it easily to the local productions of cine film. The French chemist 
Léauté spent a few months in 1946 at Rochester to work on the use of the dioxane film 
cement n°22.100 produced by the Americans. In parallel the researcher Collot at 
Vincennes studied a new cement formula for use with triacetate film for which a new 
component, trimethylene oxide, was necessary. This chemical was unavailable in 
France and the French Laboratory worked with Dr. Allen of the Rochester Research 
Laboratory to produce it there in small quantities. Both sides found that the new 
cement formula was very efficient but Dr. Steiner of the medical department at Kodak 
                                                     
139 Marcel Abribat, “Compte-rendu Abribat,” notebook “Activité labo recherches,” March 6, 1951, ref. 




Park studied the toxicity of trimethylene oxide and discovered that it was producing 
severe skin irritations in contrast to the alternative dioxane. The medical concern was 
so critical that the use of the innovative chemical component was eventually 
abandoned.140 The fact that these research studies about film cement came to a 
deadlock should not be seen as a failure. The results of fundamental or industrial 
research are governed by a game of chance to a great extent and the process of 
following a so-called ‘wrong’ track produces peripheral discoveries and scientific facts 
as well. Most important, this second example shows how more than a dozen people 
collaborated on a mutual research project, from the general managers to the pure 
researchers and the medical staff. Such collaborative arrangements could be further 
studied along with other examples of international collaboration between the three 
Research Laboratories present in the French archive, but such an in-depth study lies 
outside the framework of this research and I want to end this section of the chapter 
with a final document arguing again the strategy of knowledge transfer between 
Vincennes and the two other Kodak laboratories. 
Compared to the three inventories of shared reports already studied above, this report 
explaining the transfer of reports between the three Kodak research laboratories was 
written after the Second World War in 1951 and thus illustrates the evolution of 
knowledge transfer conventions at Kodak-Pathé. This basic report lists the transfer of 
reports from Eastman Kodak to Kodak-Pathé and from Kodak Limited to Kodak-Pathé 
for the year 1950. It also provides Kodak-Pathé’s policy for the process of transferring 
reports. In reports that were exchanged from Rochester to Vincennes, one can learn 
that 187 research reports were produced in 1950 at Kodak Park and 106 (56%) were 
received by the documentation centre at Vincennes. Vincennes had also received the 
Monthly reports of the Rochester Research Laboratory since August 1949, which 
reminds us of the fact that equivalent reports were found in the third inventory of the 
                                                     
140 “For example, if trimethylene oxide were used in a film cement, it is quite likely that skin irritation 
would result in an appreciable number of individuals using this cement even though little injury would 
be found in a similar use of a cement containing dioxane.” J.H. Steiner to J.H. Folwell, in “Documents 





Harrow research reports sent to Vincennes. The report also indicates that Mr. Lecte, a 
specialist of photographic technology at the Vincennes works also received some 
reports, in particular the Quarterly reports on emulsion making and the Monthly 
reports of the emulsion department of the Research Laboratory. In the way Harrow to 
Vincennes, 86 research reports out of 100 were received by the documentation centre, 
as well as the Monthly reports of the Research Laboratory since September 1949. Mr 
Lecte also received the Quarterly reports on emulsion making at Harrow, the Quarterly 
reports of the emulsion department of the Research Laboratory and the Quarterly 
reports of an experimental laboratory working on emulsion making. Finally, in the 
research reports exchanged from Vincennes to Rochester and Harrow, it was first 
stated that all the research reports sent to Rochester were also sent to Harrow. Of 
course, not all reports were shared and the document provides the process of 
selecting the most important reports.  
The selection of the reports is completed by a committee whose members perused 
from day to day all the reports. At the end of each month a list of reviews 
representing all the reports is provided to the members in order for them to 
remember their content and each member selects a list of reports that are 
interesting to share with Rochester and Harrow. This selection is made including 
as much reports as possible and only reports or notes whose results seem to be 
not enough clearly established, or with a purely local interest for Vincennes are 
dismissed from the selection.141 
The unidentified author includes statistical numbers for the year 1950. The Research 
Laboratory at Vincennes produced 114 research reports and 93 were sent to Harrow 
and Rochester (81%). The same year, it had been decided to make copies on microfilm 
of all notes, research reports and activity reports since 1940, and to send one set of 
microfilms to Rochester. First and foremost, this document proves that, at least for the 
year 1950, Vincennes and Harrow shared more than 80% of their research reports and 
Vincennes received around one report out of two from Rochester. It is far more than 
                                                     
141 “Échange de rapports entre Eastman Kodak & Kodak-Pathé d’une part et entre Kodak-Limited & 
Kodak-Pathé d’autre part,” February 13, 1951, ref. 33023, CECIL, 3. The author of the report signed it at 
the end but it has not been possible to identify him (the signature could signify “Bouchard”). This 




the average ratio I have found for the 1930s exchanges between Harrow and 
Vincennes (one report out of three) and it could be that this increase in the amount of 
scientific knowledge transferred at Eastman Kodak was a trend after the Second World 
War. The document also proves that the production of reports increased and that their 
nature diversified. The writing of Monthly and Quarterly reports developed gradually 
in addition to the research reports for which in-house publishing was not done at 
regular intervals.142 In this way the scientists of the research laboratories were 
informed of the work from their counterparts abroad, but also of the technical 
research from some production departments such as the emulsion, the film finishing 
or the developing and printing departments. It is as if the internal transfer of scientific 
knowledge at Eastman Kodak was progressively accelerated after the creation of the 
new structure in 1928-1929 with the three Research Laboratories probably in order to 
increase the spirit of competition but also to increase the chance of innovation and 
development of technologies that could be used in new marketable products. 
The section above provides the corporate regulations for the management of 
knowledge, but does not clarify the process of its production through individual 
research. In order to understand the nature of this particular research it is necessary to 
turn to a different kind of source – the research notebook. Kodak Limited decided to 
keep some of them in its corporate archives. They do not represent structured pieces 
of scientific knowledge such as those contained in the Harrow and Vincennes research 
reports, but only personal notebooks of researchers and production managers in which 
many kinds of technical and scientific data can be found. However the analysis of these 
personal notebooks may provide an estimate of the contribution of the European 
Research Laboratories to innovation at Eastman Kodak. Some studies of specific 
notebooks in the following section will provide some clearer answers. 
  
                                                     
142 In the second inventory of the Harrow research reports received at Vincennes, I also identified from 
1937 on the receiving of a “Monthly report on the sensitometric characteristics of certain Harrow, 
Vincennes and Copenick film products” written by the British researchers Hance, Jones and Sanders. 




3.3. A Research tool : the personal notebook of scientists 
and managers 
 
During my research through the primary sources of the Kodak Collection archive and 
also in the archive of Kodak-Pathé in France, one specific artefact created and used by 
the technical and scientific staff of Eastman Kodak caught my eye. There were an 
appreciable number of paper notebooks, each belonging to one employee, that can be 
qualified as personal notebooks.143 At least one individual was responsible for the 
making and preserving of the physical notebook, which frequently covered several 
years of data collection.144 This individual progressively filled out the personal 
notebook by hand. The large number of notebooks found in the Kodak archives, as 
well as in a corporate archive introduced in the section below, points out that this 
method of keeping and archiving technical or scientific knowledge in notebooks was an 
industrial research tool often used by photographic and cine film manufacturers. 
To clarify how the personal notebooks were used and the nature of their content, I 
selected the notebooks of four different scientific profiles, to point out the variety of 
industrial research in terms of practices and methodology. The first notebook was 
found in the corporate archive of the French company Pathé, one of Eastman’s biggest 
competitor in Europe up to 1927. The notebook belonged to Marcel Mayer, the works 
manager at Pathé in Joinville-le-Pont, France. The second set of notebooks belonged to 
Charles T. Robinson, a production manager who worked at the same plant in Joinville-
le-Pont and then for Kodak Limited. Robinson’s collection allows a deeper insight into 
production processes. The third set of notebooks belonged to Franck B. Phillips, a 
physicist of the Harrow Research Laboratory who additionally incorporated his 
                                                     
143 For instance, the box n°96 in the Kodak Collection archive at the British Library contains 20 personal 
notebooks belonging to 5 researchers. 
144 The personal notebooks are mostly handwritten by one author but have not to be mistaken for 
private notebooks, personal records or diaries. These handwritten objects are usually created due to the 
unique will of her or his author. Concerning the personal notebooks found in the Kodak and 
photographic archives, this is not the case and the creation and use of the notebooks may have been 




thoughts and his rationale in his writings, breaking with Mayer’s and Robinson’s 
protocols. The last set of notebooks was attributed to F.W. Thomas Krohn, the first 
photochemist at the Harrow Works already studied in chapter 2. Krohn combined both 
aspects of the use of the notebook with the addition of his thoughts and rationales 
alongside photochemical data and so conceived the notebook as a cognitive tool. 
 
3.3.1. The contribution of Marcel Mayer from Pathé at Joinville-le-
Pont 
Ironically, the first personal notebook that I identified and studied belongs to an 
archive of one the most important competitors of Eastman Kodak, the Pathé company. 
The Marcel Mayer index notebook is currently kept by the Foundation Jérôme Seydoux 
– Pathé in Paris and a digital annotated version of the notebook has been available 
online since 2013.145 The first inscriptions date back to 1923, the year in which Mayer 
was appointed as the general manager of the works of Pathé-Cinéma at Joinville-le-
Pont. That is why this document is not a laboratory notebook including a list of 
photochemical experiments and the analysis of results. Its author was not a scientist of 
the Pathé laboratories but a technical manager. Mayer’s indexed notebook was filled 
out up to the year 1930 and contains some operating instructions to produce specific 
substances, some technical explanations about manufacturing methods and some raw 
chemical formulas of confidential processes. These data represent Pathé trade secrets 
in the form of know-how, and were the technical as well as the scientific assets of the 
company. It was certainly not intended to be shared outside the company but 
presumably within a small network of managers working on film production. The use 
and importance of Mayer’s notebook are open to interpretation. Stéphanie Salmon, 
who is the responsible for historical files in the Foundation Jérôme Seydoux – Pathé, 
argued that the notebook appeared within the context of a new industrial 
management. Since the end of the First World War Charles Pathé had been thinking 
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about the application of Taylorisation principles to his factories and Mayer’s indexed 
notebook could be evidence of analysing and inventorying manufacturing techniques 
of the company according to this new principle of management.146 Mayer’s notebook 
might also be the only document where manufacturing methods and chemical 
formulas were noted down. In the photographic industry, like other industries dealing 
with chemical recipes, the transmission of technical knowledge was frequently verbal 
amongst the managers and technicians working in the manufacturing departments and 
the data kept in the notebook could therefore represent a break with tradition. They 
could be consulted or modified progressively should an improvement be made in a 
formula or a specific process. This argument that the notebook was used by several 
people is supported by the fact that it has an alphabetical index 12 pages long at the 
back.147 The indexed notebook was therefore paginated and intended to be consulted 
by its author and possibly by other knowledgeable readers in film manufacturing 
techniques. Therefore, Mayer’s notebook was an important tool for Pathé because it 
was used to record tacit knowledge produced by insiders, but also to possibly share 
and transfer this knowledge in-house. 
The notebook contains some formulas of Kodak substances or related to Kodak films 
such as an American cement, a developer for Kodak positive film or the chemicals used 
in the well-known Kodak D-76 developer in 1929.148 The most interesting information 
related to Eastman Kodak is a long description of the techniques used for the recovery 
of film on an industrial scale from 1909 onwards. At that time Pathé was able to 
manufacture an appreciable amount of cine film after the long-term research work at 
the Blair factory in Foots Cray but the engineers and chemists at Vincennes also found 
a way of reusing a positive film that had already developed by removing the gelatin 
layer, the metallic silver and the eventual impurities from it. To skin the film support 
from the gelatin layer it had to undergo a pancreatic digestion for which the pancreas 
                                                     
146 Stéphanie Salmon, “Tinting and toning at Pathé: The Jacques Mayer notebook,” Film History 21, no. 2 
(2009): 177-179. The correct first name is Marcel. 
147 “Le répertoire Mayer,” 213 (electronic pagination). 




and intestines of pigs were used.149 In this way the factory was able to coat another 
emulsion layer on the recovered film support. By generating new film from old, Charles 
Pathé was able to increase his independence from his main film supplier Eastman 
Kodak. 
 
3.3.2. The many lives of Charles T. Robinson in the photographic 
industry  
In the Kodak Collection archive at the British Library there are many personal 
notebooks of Kodak researchers and technical managers. Some of them possess a 
structure similar to Mayer’s notebook. The quantity of personal notebooks is 
significant, and it points to the fact that they are important sources.150 I decided to 
focus on a particular case study by investigating the personal notebooks of Charles 
Thomas Robinson, a British native who worked for several photographic 
manufacturers: the European Blair Camera Company, the Photofilm Company, Pathé 
and Kodak Limited. Although he can be described as a discreet manager and always 
remained in the background of film manufacturing departments, the name Robinson 
appeared frequently in the course of my research work through the Kodak Collection 
archive.  
Robinson’s biography is important. He was professionally connected with Pathé and its 
British subsidiaries, Eastman’s biggest competitor in Europe. He moved to France to 
work at Pathé in Joinville and finally returned to Kodak Limited in Harrow when Kodak-
Pathé was created in 1927. During his working life, he learned, developed and 
transferred technical knowledge within the framework of secretive practices used by 
                                                     
149 Ibid., 183-185 (electronic pagination). 
150 In addition to the box 96 in the Kodak Collection archive with its 20 personal notebooks, boxes 134 
and 135 contains 10 notebooks, boxes 157 and 158 3 notebooks, box 212 2 notebooks and box 329 one 




the photographic manufacturers he worked with.151 It is difficult to know if Robinson 
was already working for the European Blair Camera Company when it was bought by 
Pathé in 1906. In any case Robinson started to work for Pathé at this date and 
continued to do so up to June 1927. In 1909 he moved from Blair to the Photofilm 
Company at High Barnet and when Charles Pathé closed both the Blair and the 
Photofilm companies in 1910, he joined the French employees of Pathé at Joinville-le-
Pont.152 One of Robinson’s personal notebooks spans the years 1908 to 1911 and 
clarifies the work of the young photochemist during his first years at Joinville.153 It 
contains various technical data including several chemical formulas and operating 
instructions for the manufacturing of film or substances such as substratum. Robinson 
also provided a memorandum about organic toning processes. In September 1908, he 
wrote that the toning method he indicated in his research reports in April and May of 
the same year had been simplified by the French chemist Georges Zelger.154 Robinson 
then provided a full description in French of the toning processes. The clear and 
descriptive nature of his writing in almost perfect French stresses that the technical 
knowledge about toning was meant to be shared among the technical staff at Joinville. 
In his discourse Robinson also indicated some research work “at the laboratory” to 
improve or develop new formulas for toning cine positive film. For some things, 
Robinson was more concise and preferred the use of the English.155 
                                                     
151 As he wrote on 19 April 1912 in a small black notebook alongside with his boot size, Robinson was 
born in Foots Cray in England on 30 July 1882. Charles T. Robinson, “The property of C.T. Robinson,” 
personal notebook, ref. A1649, box 136, KCA-BL, n.p. 
152 Charles T. Robinson to Walter Bent, April 16, 1929, ref. A1648, box 136, KCA-BL, n.p. 
153 C.T. Robinson, “Monsieur Tom Robinson,” personal notebook, ref. A1274, box 96, KCA-BL, n.p. The 
notebook is neither indexed nor paginated. The handwritten notes alternate between English and 
French languages. 
154 One can assume that Robinson met Zelger when the French employee of Pathé was sent to the Blair 
factory in 1906 to do some research work about film manufacturing. See chapter 3, section 1.2. 
155 For instance, Robinson used the following description to provide the process of remelting the 
emulsion layer. “Refonte. The emulsion to be melted as quickly as possible (45 mins at Joinville). While it 
is being melted when the temperature is about 35° add the extra gelatine & the potasse, and when it 
reaches 70° add the rest of the chemicals as follows. Magnesie, Bromure, Saponine, Alun Alcool after 




The various technical data enclosed in Robinson’s personal notebook weakens 
Salmon’s argument that personal notebooks at Pathé existed as a consequence of the 
Taylorisation of film production.156 First the content of Robinson’s notebooks reveals 
that the knowledge of the processes and the chemical recipes described was more 
important than understanding the general organisation and management of the 
production departments. Secondly, Robinson’s notebook is similar in content to 
Mayer’s notebook but was created and used much earlier. Therefore, filling in such a 
notebook with photographic knowledge cannot be considered a novel practice in the 
1920s, when Mayer started his own notebook. Instead the early compilation of 
Robinson’s notebook could demonstrate that the existence of personal notebooks is a 
distinctive characteristic of the photographic industry, controlled by the constraints of 
the industrial secrecy. Chemical formulas and specific processes were the most 
precious asset for photographic film manufacturers and needed to be protected by 
secretive practices if a patent strategy was not used by the company.157 
Consequently, Robinson’s progressive notebook making can be qualified as an archival 
practice of technical and scientific knowledge. This activity continued during the whole 
of Robinson’s commitment with Pathé Frères. Another notebook filled between 1923 
and 1926 contains many formulas of varied emulsions and supports, such as a 
nonflammable base using the cellulose acetate from the French supplier Usines du 
Rhône, the Pathé Blue negative emulsion or the emulsion for the Velox paper.158 
Another list of formulas relating to remelting technology at the “Fabrication C”, a 
production building at the Joinville works, is signed by Robinson and indicates that he 
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Robinson,” n.p. 
156 Salmon, “Tinting and toning at Pathé: The Jacques Mayer notebook,” 179. 
157 See chapter 2, section 2.1.1. 
158 Charles T. Robinson, “FORMULAS. Substratum & Supports,” personal notebook, ref. A1747, box 154, 
KCA-BL, n.p. Although the notebook is not attributed to Robinson, I claim that it was the property of the 
British chemist as notes alternates between French and English and as the handwriting used is similar 




probably was a production manager for Pathé.159 Furthermore the technical data 
about the Velox paper consists of a letter from Mr. Bossard that was first signed, and 
later summarized and retyped by Robinson. It describes research work on the 
emulsion to improve photographic characteristics such as contrast and density in the 
shadows. Bossard160 was a researcher investigating emulsions and gelatine and his 
letter in the notebook might demonstrate collaborative work between him and 
Robinson in this particular field. Robinson was not a scientist with academic degrees 
but he was aware of the Pathé Frères laboratory’s research work and used the 
technical knowledge produced by this research structure. Of course, he was also 
dealing with the routine work of a production department. In the same notebook 
there is a list of raw materials with some suppliers’ names and the monthly quantity 
requested.161 Like the nature of industrial research advocated by Kenneth Mees, 
Robinson’s research work contained a significant proportion of work applied to the 
development of production. This research work in the production buildings can be 
seen in another of his notebooks dating back to 1919. He collaborated with several 
researchers from Vincennes to produce experimental emulsions, receiving new 
formulas and discussing the results first with pithy comments in the notebook and also 
certainly with the researcher himself face to face or over the phone. For instance 
Robinson produced 16 kilograms of experimental emulsion for Mr. Roussel on 26 April 
1919 and he qualified the result as “sensible but grainy”. On 21 May of the same year, 
4 kilograms of the emulsion made for Mr. [Paolontone] was further “coated at 
Laboratory” which may indicate that the best experimental emulsions were coated on 
a photographic support to test them in real conditions.162 
                                                     
159 A general map of the Pathé Frères works at Joinville-le-Pont can be found in the first pages of the 
Mayer’s notebook. See “Le répertoire Mayer,” 8 (electronic pagination).  
160 See Bossard, research notebook, ref. 33135, CECIL. 
161 At least for the period 1923-1926, 20 tons of nitrocellulose were bought per month at the Poudrerie 
du Moulin Blanc in France, 80 tons of acetone in England per month. In May 1926, 2020 kilograms of 
silver were bought at 493 francs per kilogram. See Charles T. Robinson, “FORMULAS. Substratum & 
Supports,” n.p. 




At the end of the 1920s, Robinson’s many activities become difficult to follow. Another 
of his personal notebooks proves that he was sent to Cöpenick near Berlin when 
Charles Pathé decided to collaborate with the Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken AG to 
build a new film manufacturing plant.163 Pathé Frères would provide the technical 
knowledge to help build the plant and train the technical staff. The German company 
took the name of Glanzfilm AG and was created in 1922, but the Cöpenick plant was 
not finished before 1926. It is difficult to ascertain when exactly Robinson worked in 
Germany. His notebook on Glanzfilm covers the period 1924 to 1927 and contains 
technical notes in French, English and a little German. He was probably consulted for 
the installation of the film manufacturing equipment.164 The notebook also provides 
some technical comparisons between the production of Vincennes and Cöpenick, as 
well as Harrow. These three film manufacturing plants would become the property of 
Kodak Limited from 1927 onwards and it is interesting to notice that Robinson 
transmitted technical knowledge from Pathé to Kodak Limited. He was finally hired by 
the British subsidiary of Eastman Kodak between 1927 and 1929 and the last evidence 
of his work at Kodak Limited is dated 1942.165 One last notebook belonging to 
Robinson clarifies the first months of the tripartite organisation of Eastman Kodak with 
the sites of Rochester, Harrow and Vincennes. Robinson was not the only author of 
this notebook as it is composed in his and other’s handwriting. It includes 
miscellaneous data principally about 16mm. cine film production issues. It includes 
memos about technical specifications, copies of letters about technical problems, and 
draft notes about everything. There is for instance a cable sent by Bent to the 
production manager Sulzer at Rochester requesting from the Americans the maximum 
and minimum limits of thickness of support for the Cine Kodak Reversing Film to Lair in 
                                                     
163 A German company, literally “the United Artificial Silk Works Corporation”. See Charles T. Robinson, 
“C.T. Robinson GLANZFILM,” personal notebook, ref. A1649, box 136, KCA-BL, n.p. 
164 For more information about the collaboration between Pathé-Cinéma and Glanzstoff, see Stéphanie 
Salmon, Pathé : A la conquête du cinema. 1896-1929 (Paris: Tallandier, 2014), 462-464. 
165 See the file ref. A1680, box 140, KCA-BL. It includes a proposal for using rolls of scrap film as 
incendiaries. Concerning the date of Robinson’s hiring at Kodak Limited, his letter to Bent on 16 April 
1929 does not clarify this point as it may represent a request of pay rise that needed to be approved by 




France. At the end of the notebook there are many 16mm film samples from 1938 and 
before: infrared, Type A. “S” Kodachrome, Kodachrome type 1936, Dufaycolor, 
Kodaline Fast, Cine Kodak Eight, Harrow S. Pan, Kodaline Slow etc. It indicates that the 
notebook was filled and carefully kept during these years and constitutes an archive of 
technical knowledge about the varied Kodak cine films and the science of film 
making.166  
Some evidence indicates that Robinson collaborated with his new British colleagues 
and researchers up to the Second World War. In 1935 the physicist E.D. Eyles sent him 
a copy of his research report about the routine physical testing of 16mm film at 
Harrow.167 In 1934 Robinson provided some procedures about slitting and perforating 
cine film to the researcher Franck Phillips, as it has been found in one of his personal 
notebooks.168  
 
3.3.3. Franck Phillips’s notebooks as tools to solve technological 
issues 
Robinson’s case begs the question, is the notebook of a researcher different or similar 
to the notebook of a production manager at Kodak Limited? A set of Phillips’ 
notebooks kept at the British Library allows a structural and content-based comparison 
with Robinson’s notebooks. Studying them highlights critical differences in the nature 
of the information in each one. Phillips’ notebooks are not only about recipes, 
formulas and descriptive technology but also about research and development of new 
processes or procedures and the related rationale for that procedure. Phillips, a 
physicist, also introduced teamwork, between the Kodak Research laboratories which 
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136, KCA-BL, np. 
167 E.D. Eyles, “Routine physical testing of 16 mm. film at Harrow”, research report H.334, May 15, 1935, 
ref. A2897, KCA-BL. 




was a more scientific collaboration than Robinson's collaborative work with the Pathé 
Works at Vincennes. 
Five of Phillips’ research notebooks have been identified and studied. Their structure is 
more homogeneous than Robinson’s notebooks as for each copy the pages are 
manually numbered and a basic index can be found at the end or at the beginning of 
the notebook. This structure is similar to the organisation of Mayer’s notebook and the 
Robinson notebooks that include an index. Phillips’s notebooks cover the period 1926 
to 1938. Their contents vary greatly, Phillips’s handwriting being concise and 
frequently instructive. Some notes may have been used by the author for writing 
technical reports, while other sections provide detailed visit reports including 
information about what had been said, suggested, accepted or questioned by the 
parties.  
In his first notebook dated 1926, Phillips reported some issues about the method used 
to duplicate the current 16mm cine Kodak film. While summarizing the instructions 
provided by the Rochester Research Laboratory he also discussed some stages of the 
duplicating process. 
In the Rochester instruction (2652/7) [or 2652/1] there is ambiguity about the 
state of the carbonate & sulphite. On p 11 we are told : “In the case of desiccated 
chemicals like sodium sulphite and sodium carbonate…” while on p12 “…dissolve 
all the carbonate possible ; decant the solution & dissolve the remaining crystals in 
warm water.”169 
Apparently unable to reproduce the process using Rochester’s instructions, Phillips 
stated further that they “are obviously misprinted on pp14&15” and decided to change 
the volume of one of the solutions. At the end of the notebook he reported what was 
possibly a discussion with Capstaff, the designer of the 16mm cine Kodak process that 
clarified the origin of the technical issue. 
Mr Capstaff considers that the emulsion supplied to us in the first place (R.L.G.) 
was not of the same quality as that used when the directions were written, 
consequently he agrees that our film wanted extra development & that the 
                                                     




addition of hypo to the two developers was correct. (…) The addition to the 2nd 
developer of hypo is an improvement in his judgment, & this will be incorporated 
in the new instructions. He denies that strengthening the clearer can have any 
effect, beneficial or deleterious & has tried its effect on the re reversal phenomena 
but has concluded that it is without effect.170 
This last excerpt demonstrates effective teamwork between the British scientist and 
his American counterparts to solve a photochemical issue and improve a recent 
process. Phillips did not write any final statement but decided to include the opinion of 
a well-known colleague. This information could be used later and discussed again 
should Phillips have trouble developing a satisfactory duplicating process for cine film 
at Harrow. Seven years later, the researcher visited Kodak Park at Rochester again and 
wrote his thoughts in another personal notebook, where it is evident that he 
continued to argue and postulate. He worked in collaboration with the Cine Kodak 
Processing Department and reported on the ripple effect that could be observed 
sometimes on cine film. 
The reason Rochester film does not show it so much is connected with the fact 
that Rochester Acetate base is not “curved” so much as Pathé base & therefore 
drying of the emulsion is balanced by drying of the base solvents on the [buch], – 
the latter effect – tending to balance the former. 
Note that the smaller [curve] of the Rochester base may account for its greater 
[shrinkage] compared with Pathé since in the former case prolonged drying cannot 
cause such evaporation of solvents as in Rochester base. Therefore Pathé [shrinks] 
in dimension less than Rochester. For sound film 16mm why not use either 
Rochester support or Pathé not “curved” so far ?171 
The standardisation of the production of Kodak films was a real headache even before 
the Kodak-Pathé period and the production at Vincennes. Depending on the Kodak 
manufacturing plant, the film base produced was more or less flawed and sometimes, 
as Phillips remarked, one specific flaw reduced another one. In this example, Pathé’s 
support was rippling more but was shrinking less than Rochester’s. Unlike Robinson’s 
written discourse, Phillips notebooks provide the rationale of the researcher alongside 
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formulas and operating instructions. It could be said that Phillips kept records of his 
mental reflections and of his technical discussions about his research work. What is 
unknown is how Phillips used his notebooks in his research work and how often he 
consulted them. 
 
3.3.4. The notebook of the photochemist Krohn as a cognitive tool  
To end this section, it is important to point out that the characteristic of providing the 
thoughts and the rationale of the researcher in a notebook was not specific to Phillips, 
but was also found in notebooks kept by others. It would not be relevant to study all 
the notebooks kept at the British Library in the framework of my research, however a 
last example of notebook written by a chemist we have already discussed shows the 
importance of the data enclosed in the notebooks for the intellectual process of doing 
fundamental or applied research. I mentioned the existence of a notebook attributed 
to Krohn, the photochemist, in the previous chapter. After his official retirement from 
Harrow Limited in 1932 Krohn was still active and undertook scientific studies about 
film technology in his personal laboratory. The personal notebook of the chemist 
encloses a letter about a method for removing bubbles during the coating of acetone-
acetate dopes that follows a typed report about the making of colour films. In this 
letter Krohn first explained the issue and indicated that he found an easy solution to 
avoid the appearance of bubbles by boiling up the dope for 5 minutes and by cooling it 
just before coating. Krohn not only provided the method in his letter but also the 
observations and the reasoning that led him to the solution. 
Some time ago I noticed when coating blue dopes for Series 3 that the bubbles 
would start as minute bubbles here and there along the surface and would then 
gradually grow in size. This gave me the idea that they were largely due to air, 
dissolved in the dope, gradually getting released round a nucleus once it was 
formed. It seemed probable that if this idea were correct we should be able to get 
rid of or materially reduce the bubble trouble by boiling off the dissolved air, then 
making up the weight of the dope against cooling it down to 20°C-22°C. (…) I had 
on several occasions [? strated] the dopes, just before coating, by boiling them 
and that these dopes coated very free from bubbles. At that time I put this 




S346 – PF/326 + S347 – PF327 I tested the idea and was more than pleased to find 
that my expectations were fulfilled. (…)172 
Although Krohn’s handwriting is sometimes difficult to decipher, the reader can follow 
the entire process of his thoughts about the bubble issue including the empirical and 
experimental work. It is difficult to identify the nature of the so called colour films 
studied by Krohn. The coating of a blue emulsion layer could indicate the 3-colour 
Kodachrome process, but according to Gauntlett, full-scale Kodachrome film 
manufacture did not start at Harrow before the end of the Second World War.173 Thus 
Krohn’s activities may represent experimental work about the production of 
Kodachrome film in England. Why did he provide so much information about his 
rationale ? This characteristic of his notes may surprise the reader. Did he know that 
the notebook would be read by other technical or scientific staff at Harrow? But even 
if his notebook was not supposed to be shared with others, the very descriptive 
literary style of Krohn's autobiography shown in section 2.2.1 stresses that the 
photochemist was used to adding in-depth descriptions as much as possible when 
writing. The presence of the corpus of personal notebooks in the British archive 
demonstrates that Kodak managers considered it important for the company to keep 
this specific kind of technical knowledge, as some in-house correspondence suggests in 
the Kodak Collection archive.174 Krohn may have thought that his observations about 
the boiling of the emulsion were available to use and improvement for a later coating 
technology at Harrow. It is unclear whether or not Krohn, Robinson and others were 
requested to fill in notebooks during their professional life at Kodak Limited. The 
keeping of a personal notebook seems to have been a regular practice in the 
photographic industry, sometimes in a form like a laboratory notebook, sometimes an 
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index notebook of confidential formulas, or a draft notebook as a place to note 
scientific rationales and even as a private notebook including children’s drawings and 
poems.175 The disparate nature of the notebooks studied demonstrates their 
exceptional value within the photographic archives and merits further academic 
study.176 
 
3.4. Conclusion of Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the European Kodak Research Laboratories opened in Britain and 
in France at the turn of 1928. In the first instance, Mees’s decision to open a Research 
Laboratory at Harrow was to identify competent interlocutors to receive the Rochester 
research reports, and to keep them informed about new procedures or improvements 
in the film production. The Harrow research structure was therefore supposed to focus 
on applied research and production improvements, while gathering scientific and 
technical knowledge produced at Rochester. These activities follow what is now called 
“Closed Innovation” excluding interactions with external actors or technologies. The 
nature of the innovation performed by the Harrow Research Laboratory diversified 
rapidly, though. This was particularly due to Eastman Kodak’s need to develop 
research in organic chemistry in Europe. In Britain, photographic research undertaken 
at Ilford Limited proved more successful in the 1920s than equivalent research 
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conducted at Kodak Limited. The discovery in 1928 of new optical sensitizers made of 
carbocyanines dyes by Ilford Limited’s Dr. Hamer forced Mees to initiate some 
research work on these innovative chemical compounds at Rochester. Soon, one part 
of Harrow’s Research Laboratory was a command centre where competitive 
intelligence was planned and scientific knowledge gathered from Ilford Limited and 
other competitors. More recently, the Harrow Research Laboratory was also used as a 
“regional innovation cluster”. In a structural sense, the British Laboratory represented 
a duplication of the first American Research Laboratory on a smaller scale. It followed a 
similar organisation with the accelerated hiring of qualified scientists, the use of 
several Research Departments and the existence of a library with a core of scientific 
literature. The British researchers started to produce their first research reports in 
1929, following the “model” of industrial research institutionalised by Mees. In terms 
of innovation management, the Harrow Research Laboratory can be said to have 
mixed “Closed and Open Innovation” models to optimise the development of scientific 
knowledge in photography and secure the innovative technologies necessary to the 
production of experimental emulsions and films. Considering this, I argue that the 
Harrow Research Laboratory represents a new “model of innovation” which I call 
“Hybrid Innovation” due to the mixed nature of the resulting industrial research, on 
the one hand focused on experimental research in-house and, on the other hand 
developing outward-looking skills to identify and possibly take over or collaborate with 
innovative firms, scientists or technologies.177 
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The origins of the French Kodak-Pathé Research Laboratory are not comparable. The 
French subsidiary of Eastman Kodak arose from the 1928 purchase of an independent 
film production and film manufacturing company. As early as 1906, Pathé launched 
experimental production of cine film in England, purchasing the declining cine film 
manufacturing plant of the European Blair Camera Company in Foots Cray. A 
cooperative team was implemented between British and French photochemists to 
work together for several months. From this technological collaboration, the 
researchers at Pathé archived their experimental work in research notebooks and a 
number of research reports. The most interesting reports were copied and classified in 
the annual manufacturing books. Thus the research organisation at Pathé can be said 
to have been a model of “Closed Innovation” with research objectives focused on the 
introduction of innovative technologies such as non-flammable supports or 
experimental colour processes, and on the improvement of existing products. The 
research and production structures worked in closed collaboration with some of their 
suppliers and partners but generally did not undertake organised technology watch or 
scientific collaborations as a company might do in “Open Innovation” model. The 
scientific knowledge developed by the French photochemists was a real asset to the 
company and carried influence in the purchase by George Eastman in 1927. In parallel, 
there is evidence that the French owner Charles Pathé was willing to sell his industrial 
works to his competitor Eastman Kodak. After the merger, the American manufacturer 
was able to use a scientific knowledge network with an enlarged international research 
organisation. 
The two European Research Laboratories were supposed to work in joint collaboration 
according to Mees’s request. Despite cultural disparities and an already existing 
structure, the French Research Laboratory partially adopted the organisation of its 
American and British counterparts. In particular, the French followed the policy of 
spreading knowledge outside the laboratory by publishing a French version of the 
American Kodak Monthly Abstract Bulletin as early as 1927 and an equivalent of the 
Abridged Scientific Publications from the Kodak Research Laboratories from 1942. The 




thus be demonstrated through such publications, although these external 
communication tools had to be handled with care to avoid the unwanted sharing of 
proprietary know-how and scientific knowledge. Usually published several months 
after the research period, a corpus of scientific papers that had been approved by the 
Eastman Kodak managing staff would not reveal the reality of the routine work 
undertaken and the organisation in practice at the three Kodak Research Laboratories. 
It was clear that the information contained in these papers was sufficiently 
disconnected from the research work undertaken in the Kodak Research Laboratories. 
By contrast, a study and analysis of the corpus of Kodak research reports was 
particularly appropriate to show how industrial research was conducted in the Kodak 
European laboratories. 
The exhaustive study of the production of knowledge at the Harrow Research 
Laboratory through the analysis of the British research reports led to my identification 
of a modern method of innovation in the traditional industrial research activities. The 
research reports have never been studied before and as they contain the complete 
corpus of fundamental and applied research performed from 1929 to 1964, it was the 
best source of information pertaining to the organisation of industrial research and the 
methods of innovation used by Kodak in Europe. The qualitative analysis covered data 
collected from 350 reports created from 1929 to 1935 and resulted in the 
identification of three main core activities. It appeared from the analysis that standard 
industrial research and development activities constituted 56% of the Harrow 
Research Laboratory work, examples of which include investigations on production 
issues or investigations into a competing product through reverse engineering. 
Standard fundamental research activities, such as the development of instrumentation 
or the testing of new dyes, represented only 13% of the research work. Surprisingly, 
the remaining 31% were made up of collaboration-oriented activities. Such activities 
constituted a modern method of innovation for an industrial research structure of the 
Interwar period, underpinned by the selected case studies which clarified how the 
Harrow Research Laboratory undertook collaboration with companies and individuals. 




and the establishment of a long-term industrial collaboration regarding both 
production issues and fundamental research. Thus the British Kodak Laboratory, which 
was initially working in the framework of “Closed Innovation”, was also open to the 
external resources of scientific knowledge and innovative processes. This method of 
gathering and producing technical and scientific knowledge is similar to what could be 
called a modern model of “Open Innovation”. It is worth noting that the findings above 
fit with my preceding argument for naming the Harrow Research Laboratory activities 
“Hybrid Innovation”.  
A study was conducted in the second section of Chapter 3 on the organisation of the 
Research Laboratory at Kodak-Pathé from 1927 as the scientific archive of the French 
subsidiary of Eastman Kodak had just emerged in Chalon-sur-Saône. The analysis of 
scientific and technical transfer of knowledge between the three Kodak Research 
Laboratories in Vincennes, Harrow and Rochester shows that a general procedure of 
bilateral knowledge sharing was set up during the period studied in the 1930s. This 
practice demonstrated that an individual research laboratory never worked 
independently of its counterparts. It was possible to identify for some periods in which 
a kind of scientific knowledge was shared, by whom and what amount of technological 
and scientific knowledge was transferred. The scientific facts and the innovation 
produced were shared frequently during the 1930s between the American, British and 
French Research Laboratories. There was also a general upswing in sharing knowledge 
in-house after the end of the Second World War. The development of international 
teamwork and the spirit of competition within the Eastman Kodak research structure 
was the result of this transfer of scientific knowledge. 
The study of personal notebooks enhances our understanding of the methods used by 
production managers and researchers to develop technical or scientific knowledge 
during their day-to-day work. Even if some questions remain unsolved about these 
archival documents such as their origin and the decision to produce and keep them, it 
is nonetheless clear that in the photographic industry it was important to keep know-




authorised people within the company. For the authors themselves, the note-taking 
and later consultation of their notebooks also represented a cognitive process 
clarifying the rationale behind specific research. 
Having established the processes of producing scientific knowledge in-house in an 
industrial organisation it is important to understand how that knowledge was made 
concrete, protected and legitimised through the patenting process. Using important 
folders in the Kodak Collection Archive pertaining to film colour technology, and the 
patenting process with independent inventors in other archive documents, I will 
analyse the relationship between the managers of the Patent and Trade Marks 
Department at Harrow and at Rochester with the initial inventors of scientific facts. 
This will allow me to establish how they tackled long procedures of patenting 
technologies and how intellectual property was finally incorporated in the company’s 
assets. The studies will ascertain the rationale of the scientific collaboration at 
Eastman Kodak by introducing one of Mees’ successes, the progressive incorporation 
of the two photochemists Mannes and Godowsky into the structure of the Research 








Chapter 4: Scientific collaboration and patent strategy: 
the case of colour photography 
 
This chapter demonstrates how the British researchers of Kodak Limited as well as the 
French photographic research of Pathé and Kodak-Pathé regularly interacted with 
long-term research projects on two and three-colour film processes during the 1920s. 
In addition to this competition and teamwork across the Atlantic, the first section of 
the chapter illustrates the context of the development of the two-colour Kodachrome 
and the lenticular Kodacolor processes. In a second stage I introduce the three-colour 
Kodachrome by ascertaining how the two independent photochemists Mannes and 
Godowsky undertook their first experiments before their collaboration with Kodak and 
what their initial patent work was for the quest for a viable colour process. I then 
provide the mechanisms of the social agreement between the two chemists and the 
Kodak scientists, pointing out Kenneth Mees’s strategy to recruit highly skilled people 
in the field. New materials in the Kodak Collection archive illustrate the conditions 
under which the collaboration was agreed, detailing patent issues before and from the 
recruitment of Mannes and Godowsky. Indirect information collected in other sources 
clarify how teamwork developed progressively in the field of colour photography. This 
teamwork foreshadowed the later creation of an experimental colour processing 
department to improve negative and positive processes at the time of the Second 
World War. The successful collaboration of Eastman Kodak with Mannes and 
Godowsky is an opportunity to explain the definition of an invention, elaborated 
through the routine work of the laboratory as well as within the body of the patent. 
Section 2 complements the study of the meaning of the patent strategy by stressing 
the contribution of Kodak Limited to the research on colour photography. I use two 
case studies related to the establishment of patent works to secure intellectual 
property of Eastman Kodak on colour film technologies. The first case study is the long-
term collaborative work of the Patents and Trade Marks Department of Kodak Limited 




patents for colour film technology. I analyse in particular the folder relating the 
difficulties of the wording of a patent application in order to patent it successfully in 
the United States under the number US2269158 (“Color Photography”). During the 
editing period of the patent in 1940 Martinez, an Italian citizen, was interned as an 
enemy alien at the n°2 Metropole Camp in Douglas, Isle of Man and was prevented 
from producing any laboratory work. The study of the complete set of correspondence 
between the researcher, the Kodak staff of the Patent Departments of Harrow and 
Rochester and the Examiner of the Patent Office allows a description of the 
methodology of knowledge production from the scientific, collaborative and 
administrative side. This case study is important because it illustrates how a scientific 
fact is constructed from laboratory work and previously patented work.  
The second case study also concerns an independent chemist who maintained a 
stormy collaboration with the Kodak Research Laboratories while producing cutting-
edge technologies in colour photography. Karl Schinzel’s initial work in 1905 on a 
subtractive integral tripack system influenced the research of Mannes and Godowsky 
and a correspondence folder in the Kodak Collection archive indicates that the three 
men worked together many years later for a few months at Kodak Park in 1938. Like 
the collaborative work between Kodak and Martinez, the material shows a long-term 
cooperation between Karl Schinzel and the Kodak Research Laboratories and new 
evidence about the planning of another Research Laboratory in Switzerland under the 
direction of Schinzel, financed by Eastman Kodak, which was never opened due to the 
outbreak of the Second World War. After the analysis of the scientific and corporate 
collaboration between Eastman Kodak and Schinzel, illustrating the duties of the 
chemist towards Eastman Kodak for the planned Research Laboratory, I study in 
particular the letters the chemist sent to the Patent Department of Kodak Limited from 
Switzerland during the winter 1939. These letters are about the editing of British and 
American applications for patents and the author discusses several claims and 
especially the scientific inquiries of the British Kodak staff. The analysis of Schinzel's 
correspondence regarding the development of patents is a new methodology to 




previously unpublished evidence of the collaboration between Schinzel and Kodak 
within the framework of the innovation process. 
This important chapter ascertains different kinds of scientific collaborations between 
the teams of the three Kodak Research Laboratories as well as between them and 
independent inventors. It stresses the contribution of Kodak Limited to scientific 
research in colour photography. Patent strategy undoubtedly influenced photographic 
research at Eastman Kodak and in the main Research Laboratories of the competition 
by concentrating teams of researchers on specific fields of study, while diverting them 
from other fields they could have explored. This chapter emphasizes the key part 





4.1. Collaborative Research for a subtractive tripack 
process 
 
The quest for a viable and marketable colour process dominated the first half of the 
twentieth century not only on the part of George Eastman and the Kodak researchers 
but also in the research laboratories of competitors and through academic networks. I 
have already mentioned the first attempts undertaken at Kodak Park in Rochester to 
study and develop new additive colour processes in section 2.3. In 1904 John H. Powrie 
and Florence Warner worked unsuccessfully on their screen colour process but 
technical results remained unsatisfactory and from October 1910 the MIT graduate 
Emerson Packard directed a prototype colour laboratory starting from Powrie and 
Warner’s work. This thesis is not the place for a technical and chronological narrative 
of the many additive and subtractive colour processes that punctuated the first 
decades of the twentieth century. That technical history has already been done in 
several publications and papers.1 To introduce the research work of Mannes and 
Godowsky that led to the three-colour Kodachrome in 1935, I narrow my study down 
to the preceding colour processes directly connected with Eastman Kodak. Their 
development and introduction to the market coincided partially with the long years of 
research provided by the two independent photochemists and it shows that industrial 
research about colour did not stop when a particular colour process was released. 
Even for the new Kodachrome in 1935, it was clear in Kodak scientists’ eyes that the 
innovative tripack film had to be improved and that other colour film technologies 
could overtake the difficult technology of controlled diffusion developed by Mannes 
and Godowsky. 
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4.1.1. The development of the two-colour Kodachrome at Rochester 
 
Soon after the creation of the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester in 1912, 
scientists started undertaking technology watch about any announced or existing 
colour processes and working in-house on additive or subtractive technology. At Kodak 
Park, a young researcher, John G. Capstaff, started experimental work in 1914 and 
developed the first Kodachrome film process that was introduced to the public in 
1915.2 This two-colour subtractive process had already been conceived by the fall of 
1914 and its introduction to the market was delayed due to the outbreak of the World 
War I in August 1914. American-made sensitising red dye was not satisfactory and the 
better red dye from Germany was no longer available following the start of hostilities.3 
The two-colour Kodachrome was patented in 19164 but never marketed despite the 
importance of two markets, the professional photographers and medical 
photography.5 The research work done by Capstaff and his team in 1914 is not well 
documented. Baum McCarthy pointed out that the initial observation made by 
Capstaff in 1910 while working at Wratten & Wainwright on the effect of tanning 
bleach was probably the starting point of the research work. When a negative image 
was bleached, washed and dyed a positive dye image could be seen on the 
photographic support. At Rochester, Capstaff worked on a method for colour 
cinematography but he decided to use glass plates instead of celluloid film for greater 
ease of handling. He then had the idea of testing the tanning bleach effect on two glass 
plate negatives made through red and green filters. The final stage to get a photograph 
in natural colours was to superimpose two dye-positives and to observe the assembled 
coloured bi-pack by transmitted light.6 World War I, however, was not the only cause 
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of failure for the first Kodachrome process. The colour rendering was particularly 
appropriate for European flesh tones as well as tones in orange, red, green and black. 
But the process was not good for reproducing blue, violet and magenta colours.7 It had 
in fact inherited the disadvantages of a two-colour process, for which the removal of 
the third colour was made to simplify the making of the colour film. From that point of 
view Capstaff may have been influenced by the Kinemacolor, a two-colour additive 
process of cinematography. As a two-colour subtractive process such as Capstaff’s 
process provided a slightly better colour rendering than a two-colour additive one, the 
Kodak researcher thought that his invention most closely corresponded to one solution 
of making photography in natural colours.8 Despite the commercial failure, Capstaff 
kept on working on his process during the First World War and filed a new application 
in 1918 for another procedure of the two-colour Kodachrome.9 For this modification 
Capstaff used a technique initially developed in the photomechanical printing trade. 
Positive images, printed from separation negatives, were developed, washed and 
bleached in a solution of ferric chloride and tartaric acid. This treatment hardened the 
gelatin depending on the amount of silver. The plates were then fixed, washed and 
dyed with the same Kodachrome dyes as the first version of the process.10 It is not 
known if the second procedure of the two-colour Kodachrome improved the colour 
rendering or the sharpness of the process. However, the photosensitivity was still 
weak and the process still required powerful artificial lighting to provide satisfactory 
portraits.  
 
                                                     
7 Ibidem, 3. 
8 Early two-colour photographic processes could only approach an accurate reproduction of colours and 
were inaccurate for the rendering of some colours. A photographic process said in natural colours would 
normally mean a structure made of three coloured separations through red, green and blue filters for an 
additive process or three coloured layers for a subtractive process, to provide an accurate colour 
rendering. 
9 John Capstaff, “Color photography,” US Patent 1,315,464, filed February 14, 1918, and issued 
September 9, 1919. 




4.1.2. The research work of Berthon on a lenticular process at Pathé 
 
While Capstaff’s unfinished process of was progressively abandoned in Rochester, 
research in colour photography was actively being carried out in France. I have already 
written that the Berthon additive process and his association with the industrialist 
Keller-Dorian led to the development of the first Eastman Kodak Kodacolor process, 
when the patent rights were purchased by the American company in 1926. The initial 
patent of Rodolphe Berthon is also frequently cited in the histories of colour 
photography. Filed in May 1908 in France and in May 1909 in England, the patent 
contained a new lenticular screen technology and a three-colour reproduction 
system.11 One side of the film base was embossed with a honeycomb structure and it 
represented an optical solution to the reproduction of colour. Each microscopic 
spherical embossing worked as a small lens to render the red, green or blue spectrum 
of the photographic subject. A standard camera could be used provided that the 
diaphragm of the lens was fitted with a three-colour screen. As early as 1944 Friedman 
pointed out that the first scientist to consider the possibility of a lenticular film 
material was Gabriel Lippmann early in 1908.12 During a sitting at the French Académie 
des sciences, he revealed the theory of a screen process that could possibly reproduce 
colours but also provide the three-dimensional image of the photographic scene. 
Before coating the emulsion on the film base, suppose this base has been 
squeezed under heat in a kind of embossing machine, so as to create on each of 
its faces many little projections in the shape of spherical rings. Each projection 
whose front face of the film base, the one which will remain bare, is covered is 
intended to act as a convergent lens.13 
                                                     
11 Rodolphe Berthon, “Perfectionnements aux procédés photographiques trichromes,” French Patent 
399,762, filed May 1, 1908, and issued July 7, 1909; Berthon, “Improvement in three-colour 
photographic processes,” English Patent 10,611, filed May 4, 1909, and issued May 4, 1910. 
12 Friedman, History of Color Photography, 222. 
13 Gabriel Lippmann, “Épreuves réversibles. Photographies intégrales,” Comptes rendus de l’Académie 
des sciences 146 (2 mars 1908), 446-51. “Avant de coucher l’émulsion sur la pellicule, supposons que 
celle-ci ait été pressée à chaud dans une sorte de machine à gaufrer, de manière à faire naître sur 




Kim Timby recently pointed out that despite the theoretical aspect of Lippmann’s 
description of the process, Berthon reacted and undertook some research work so fast 
that he submitted a patent application for his lenticular screen process just two 
months after Lipmann’s communication.14 
As very little is known about Berthon’s biography and early work, it is challenging to 
determine at first glance whether he behaved as an opportunist inventor benefitting 
from Lippmann’s theory or if he really contributed to the lenticular screen through 
optical research work. In the English patent 10,611 he was referenced as an engineer 
and, according to Friedman, he was an astronomical optician. In addition, a recent 
investigation points out that Berthon partnered with Joseph Gambs, an optician and 
dealer in Lyon, France. Berthon and Gambs were granted 7 patents from 1905 to 1908 
regarding projection techniques, in particular the adaptation of standard projectors to 
additive three-colour photography.15 Until now, there has been an historical gap 
between the patent filed in May 1908 by Berthon and the transfer of Keller-Dorian-
Berthon technology to Eastman Kodak in 1926. New archival material clarifies how the 
photographic research was conducted on the lenticular additive process during some 
of these years and under what conditions and whose supervision. According to records 
at the French Kodak-Pathé archive, Berthon worked for the French film manufacturer 
as a researcher in Vincennes for at least one year between 1913-1914. The research 
notebooks of Berthon contain 38 research reports relating to colour photography, 
lenticular screens, patents, film embossing technology or experimental emulsions. This 
research work deserves further scholarly studies due to its sheer volume but it is worth 
                                                     
des saillies dont est couverte la face antérieure de la pellicule, celle qui restera nue, est destinée à faire 
office de lentille convergente.” (p.447). 
14 Kim Timby, “Colour Photography and Stereoscopy: Parallel Histories,” History of Photography 29, no.2 
(2005): 183-196. The author also stressed that classic histories of photography and cinema, while 
placing Lippmann at the origin of lenticular film, neglected the scientist as the precursor of the recording 
of a three-dimensional image. 
15 Nicolas Le Guern, « Des Recherches de Rodolphe Berthon chez Pathé en 1913-1914 au Procédé 
Lenticulaire Kodacolor » (paper presented for the Conference « Les Cahiers de Recherche Pathé (1904-




providing some previously unpublished information that clarifies the relationship 
between the scientist and the firm Pathé.16 
Although his principal concern was the development of his additive lenticular process, 
surprisingly Berthon was still investigating the Powrie-Warner colour process in 1913. 
This process was a line screen three-color additive process for which the screen was 
made with bichromated colloid or fish-glue. The colour technology was similar to the 
additive principle of the autochrome process but with a regular linear screen instead of 
a random arrangement of colored grains. While recognizing that the Powrie-Warner 
process provided “the most remarkable transparency and brightness of the screen”, 
Berthon also pointed out that unfortunately the colour saturation was too weak due to 
the extreme thinness of the bichromated and tinted layers. It was possible to notice 
some colour differences between Powrie-Warner plates and the reproducibility of the 
process was not satisfactory. To increase the saturation of the dye, Berthon worked 
out an additional procedure by bathing the plate successively in a solution of tannin 
and basic fuchsine.17 His interest in the Powrie-Warner process can be clarified by 
accounting for the thorough research of John H. Powrie. After his failure to collaborate 
with Eastman Kodak in 1904, Powrie never stopped working on his process. At the end 
of 1908, Johnson noted that Powrie and Warner intended to manufacture two kinds of 
plates not yet on the market.18 Later in the 1920s, Powrie eventually developed a 
scientific cooperation with Warner Brothers. He was able to work at the Warner 
Research Laboratory in New York City to adapt the process to colour motion pictures 
                                                     
16 Elizabeth Brayer is a priori the unique scholar having reported that the Berthon process had been 
purchased by Pathé in 1914 and that the French competitor was working on this colour process the 
same year. She revealed in 1996 that George Eastman was aware of this research work and informed 
some of his associates in 1914 through correspondence. “Pathé (…) is about to bring out a color process 
which will revolutionalize the industry… Invented by a man named Berthon… The colors are in the film, 
reproduction simple […].” See Brayer, George Eastman: a Biography, 220-222.  
17 Rodolphe Berthon, "Couleurs naturelles,” research report, May 21, 1913; "Étude critique de la 
reproduction des couleurs en projection”, research report, May 25, 1913; "Sensibilité des chromates. 
Recherches sur le procédé Powrie-Warner,” research report, May 28, 1913, ref. 33125, CECIL. 
18 "In those employed for producing negatives in colour, the lines will run lengthways; in those from 
which colour positives are to be printed, the lines will run across the shorter side of the plate.” G. 
Lindsay Johnson, Photographic optics and colour photography, including the camera, kinematograph, 




and reported on his process to the members of the Society of motion picture 
engineers in 1928.19 
Berthon was certainly aware of the most promising innovations of his time related to 
colour photography. Through the autochrome and the Powrie-Warner process, he was 
investigating a method of producing colour granular screens with a symmetrical 
pattern. He concluded from his research that photographic and chemical methods of 
making the screen should be abandoned: only mechanical methods could produce 
correct colour homogeneity and screen regularity.20 From his study of the work of 
other photochemists he reported the patents granted in the period, discussing their 
interests to improve his own researches on colour technologies.21 Many of his reports 
were also dedicated to the development of his lenticular process, for which the 
greatest difficulty at this time was the production of the film’s embossed support. 
Berthon undertook some embossing experiments with Eastman celluloid film and 
Pathé acetate film, with different embossing material. He used for instance a knurled 
cylinder heated between 115°C and 135°C to shape the film support with lenticular 
pattern. Results were encouraging but not entirely satisfying.22 Other reports related 
to the development of optical systems principally used to project lenticular colour film 
with a significant reduction of light loss. Berthon’s last report in his research notebook 
provided an overview of the experimental work done so far on the lenticular colour 
process and some thoughts about what was still required to transfer the prototyped 
process to the production stage. He pointed out two major issues to improve: the 
                                                     
19 John Powrie, “A Line Screen Film Process for Motion Pictures in Color,” Transactions of the Society of 
Motion Picture Engineers (April 1928): 320-334. See also Roderick T. Ryan, A History of Motion Picture 
Color Technology (London: Focal Press, 1977), 36-37. Friedman noticed that Powrie was a prolific 
patentee in the field of dichromate photography for the formation of the screen. Friedman, History of 
Color Photography, 155. 
20 Rodolphe Berthon, “Réseaux polychromes granulaires symétriques,” research report, June 4, 1913, 
ref. 33125, CECIL; Berthon to Charles Pathé (most likely), June 6, 1913, ref. 33125, CECIL. 
21 Rodolphe Berthon, “Brevets divers,” research report, June 25, 1913; “Brevets communiqués,” 
research report, July 23, 1913, ref. 33125, CECIL. 
22 See for example Rodolphe Berthon, “Couleurs naturelles,” research report, July 10, 1913; “Couleurs 
naturelles – Projections en couleur,” research report, August 18, 1913; “Gaufrage de film à sec,” 




sharpness of the images and the colour brightness. Berthon finally concluded that “the 
fundamental experience of strains on the film can only, after all, give accurate 
information about the requested time to the industrial development of 
cinematography on embossed film.”23 At the outbreak of the World War I a few 
months later it appears that the collaboration of Berthon with Pathé ceased.  
The analysis of four research reports included in Berthon’s folder provides a partial 
answer for the sudden separation between Berthon and Pathé. I argue that the end of 
their collaboration is due to the lack of recognition of Berthon’s work with respect to 
the authorship of four patents. Indeed four of the research reports are similar to 
nearly complete patent drafts. For instance, the report written on July 24, 1913, 
referred to an optical system that made it possible to superimpose three juxtaposed 
prints on a single sensitive layer. The text accompanied a technical sketch most likely 
by Berthon.24 In the list of patents that were granted to Pathé for the years 1913-1914, 
there is a corresponding patent that was also accompanied by the same drawing 
among others (see Illustration 8). The fact that the name of the inventor was not 
included in the final patent is a practice that breaks with Anglo-Saxon patent 
procedures. At Eastman Kodak or Kodak Limited, the name of the researcher or the 
independent inventor collaborating with the firm was always mentioned in the patent. 
Berthon’s disappointment also indicates that in the mind of an inventor, the granting 
of a patent represents the recognition of scientific knowledge conceived by the 
inventor, on behalf of a community of researchers or competitors. 
                                                     
23 Rodolphe Berthon, “Cinématographie en couleurs naturelles,” research report, March 16, 1914 ; 
“Brevets communiqués,” research report, July 23, 1913, ref. 33125, CECIL. “L’expérience fondamentale 
sur les déformations du film peut seule, en définitive, donner une indication précise sur le temps 
nécessaire à la mise au point industrielle de la cinématographie par films gaufrés.” (p. 5). 






Illustration 8. Berthon’s technical drawing attached to his research report on July 
24, 1913 (left) compared with the first illustrations included in the French patent 
461,248 issued to the company Pathé on December 23, 1913 (right).25 
 
Yet another important piece of information is also available in Berthon’s folder. 
Beginning at least at the end of the year 1913 Berthon was in contact with the 
company Keller-Dorian. In November 1913, Berthon tested a sample of ferro-nickel 
metal received from Keller-Dorian for the making of embossing rollers.26 The 
information is important because it fills a gap between Berthon’s research work at 
Pathé and his later collaboration with Keller-Dorian, which is rather well 
                                                     
25 Ibidem, np; Compagnie Générale des Établissements Pathé Frères, “Système optique applicable aux 
appareils trichromes,” French Patent, filed August 9, 1913, and issued December 23, 1913. See also Le 
Guern, “Des Recherches de Rodolphe Berthon chez Pathé en 1913-1914 au Procédé Lenticulaire 
Kodacolor,” 9-10. 
26 Rodolphe Berthon, “Échantillon de Ferro Nickel (Keller Dorian),” research report, November 12, 1913, 




documented.27 We know now that the first relationship between Berthon and the 
Keller-Dorian company was the relationship between an industrial laboratory and one 
of its suppliers. This French company specialised in engraved rollers and was directed 
at that time by Albert Keller-Dorian, who diversified his activities by opening a 
developing and printing laboratory in Paris in 1913. Further to the success of the 
laboratory, a research department for colour cinematography was later created.28 It is 
not known to what extent Keller-Dorian was aware of Berthon’s research work but he 
filed an application at the end of 1914 to secure a method of making “lenticulated 
films for color photography, comprising in combination a transparent support having a 
large number of minute juxtaposed objectives upon one of its faces, and a sensitive 
layer upon its other surface.”29 This application was apparently done without the 
collaboration of the Pathé researcher, because Keller-Dorian may have been aware of 
the innovative nature of Berthon’s process.  
 
4.1.3. From the Keller-Dorian process to the Kodacolor additive 
process 
 
There are no sources that clarify the collaboration of Berthon with the Keller-Dorian 
company during the first years of the Interwar period. Numerous applications filed for 
improvement in the lenticular process in the 1920s provide some indication. It appears 
that only two patents were granted under the joint names of Keller-Dorian and 
Berthon. The application of the patents, filed in December 1922 and February 1923 in 
France, was made on behalf of the French company Keller-Dorian & Cie, and the 
                                                     
27 See section 4.1.3. 
28 Juan-Gabriel Tharrats, Eva Tharrats, and Henri Bousquet, Segundo de Chomón un Pionnier Mećonnu 
du Cineḿa Europeén : Espagne, France, Italie, 1902-1928 (Paris : L'Harmattan, 2009), 236. 
29 Albert Keller-Dorian, “Film for photographic projections in colors,” US Patent 1,214,552, filed 




Société du Film K.D.B., two corporate names that did not exist for very long.30 
According to Coote, it was in December 1922 that the K.D.B. lenticular process was 
first shown in Paris.31 The development of the process made by Berthon at the Keller-
Dorian company is not known. Ede recently indicated that a research team was set up 
by the company in 1925 including the optical engineer Henri Chrétien and the 
photochemist Léopold Löbel. Berthon was strangely not incorporated with the 
researchers but he was occasionally consulted about some development work.32 
Beyond the Keller-Dorian industrial research, the fact is that in 1925 rights were 
offered to the Eastman Kodak Company by the French company to further develop and 
adapt the K.D.B. photographic process to 16mm amateur cinematography.33 The 
researchers at Rochester had also studied lenticular technologies before 1925 but even 
with the French K.D.B. process in their hands, it took three additional years to fully 
                                                     
30 See English Patent 207,836, issued December 18, 1924, convention date December 2, 1922, and 
English Patent 211,486, issued February 19, 1925, convention date February 16, 1923. Albert Keller-
Dorian’s company frequently changed its corporate name. Keller-Dorian & Cie was assignee of Société 
Keller-Dorian Berthon et Cie, a company at the same address. In 1925, the company’s name changed for 
Société du Film en Couleurs Keller-Dorian, following the death of Albert Keller-Dorian in July 1924 and 
the restructuration of the company. From 1928 on the name changed again for Société Française de 
Cinématographie et de Photographie Film en Couleurs Keller-Dorian. As for Berthon, he created his own 
company in 1929 and his late patents made reference to the Société Française Cinéchromatique 
(Procédés R. Berthon). See for example the English Patent 294,493. 
31 Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 56; Louis-Philippe Clerc, « Cinématographie en 
couleurs par le film K.D.B., » Science, Technique et industries photographiques 3, no. 2 (February 1, 
1923): 12-13. 
32 François Ede, « Un Épisode de l’Histoire de la Couleur au Cinéma : le Procédé Keller-Dorian et les Films 
Lenticulaires, » 1895 Revue d’histoire du cinéma, no.71 (2013): 190-191. This recent paper is up to now 
the most documented work on the Keller-Dorian-Berthon lenticular process.  
33 Coote in his history mentionned an article of Glenn E. Matthews, a Kodak researcher, clarifying that 
the rights were acquired from the Société du Film en Couleurs Keller-Dorian in 1925. See Coote, The 
Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 54. However, this information was not retrieved in Glenn E. 
Matthews, “Photography in Naturals Colors,” Journal of the Society of Motion Pictures Engineers 16, 
no.1 (1931): 188-219. The correct year of purchase by Eastman Kodak of the patent rights seems to be 
1926. In any case, Ede clarified that in July 1926 some members of Keller-Dorian research team resigned 
following in-house dissension. The subsequent difficult situation might have forced the company to sell 
the rights of the K.D.B. process to Eastman Kodak. However, the financial agreement between the two 
companies is not known and it is difficult to conclude. Regarding Eastman Kodak and Keller-Dorian, Ede 
also noted without additional information that Raymond Edwin Crowther [of the Patents and Trade 
Mark Department of Kodak Ltd.] was sent to Keller-Dorian works to study the colour process but the 





develop a viable and marketable colour process, named Kodacolor. Mees clarified this 
research period in a paper. 
A great deal of study was involved. It was necessary to standardize the methods 
of making the lenses on the film ; to design and make a suitable emulsion strongly 
sensitive to green and red light and yet with sufficiently fine grain for the minute 
structure of the separate color elements to be resolved ; and, especially, to work 
out suitable methods by which the film could be developed and reversed while 
the rendering of color was retained.34 
In his “dream letter” written to Frank Lovejoy in 1926, George Eastman did not expect 
these technological complications. In April 1926, he was sailing near Port Sudan for a 
hunting trip in Africa lasting several months and was so anxious to release a successful 
three-colour process that he anticipated the commercial launch of the Kodacolor 
process.35 It is unclear whether Mees had been requested to analyse the process in the 
Keller-Dorian works or not. As James confirmed in 1990, Mees did agree the 
technological interest of the French process and recommended that Eastman Kodak 
purchase the patent rights. So it is possible that Mees went to Paris in the year 1926 to 
check the lenticular technology of Keller-Dorian for himself.36 
In the transfers of knowledge involved, it is striking to see how a theory initially 
designed by Lippmann was practically developed by a French optical engineer called 
Berthon, financed by Pathé for some years, further developed by collaboration with 
the industrialist Keller-Dorian and finally gathered and optimised by the research staff 
of Eastman Kodak. The research work undertaken after 1925 and summarised by Mees 
above was not known up to now. In some sources in the European Kodak archives, 
there are traces of this work. First of all the Abribat's research notebooks kept in the 
Kodak-Pathé archive contain some evidence of collaborative work with the Keller-
Dorian company. In 1928 he reported to his manager Lair the existence of a study in 
                                                     
34 Kenneth Mees, “Amateur Cinematography and the Kodacolor Process,” Journal of the Franklin 
Institute 207, no.1 (1929): 12. 
35 “Last night as I lay in my berth I dreamed a dream, I dreamed that Mees came to Paris and examined 
the Keller-Dorian process and found no fundamental defects in it – That it was ready to be put into 
production.” From James, A Biography-Autobiography of Charles Edward Kenneth Mees, 160. 




progress of the photographic and cinematographic Keller-Dorian processes.37 Abribat 
wanted to plan a series of tests with several film supports emulsified or not, before or 
after the embossing process. He also suggested that a study of the film support's 
plasticity should be undertaken to improve the development of Kodak’s own 
embossing technology. Two Harrow research reports complete the French archive and 
inform us about the rest of Abribat's investigation at the Keller-Dorian company. On 
January 1929 Walter Clark reported a visit made the same day with Abribat to Keller-
Dorian works in Paris and conducted by the chief engineer Vidal. Clark noted the 
complete working of the embossing machine and all the mechanical details about the 
embossing cylinder, its nature and manufacturing. The empirical method of controlling 
the embossing process was also discussed as well as the reproduction technique of 
35mm Keller-Dorian films. Clark completed his report with three pages of technical 
sketches about the equipment used for the embossing process.38 At the end of the 
same year, Clark stressed the importance of the reproduction of Kodacolor films in 
another report about a second visit to the same Keller-Dorian works. The visit was 
made with Ludwig Blattner, who had just purchased the rights to exploit the Keller-
Dorian process outside the United States of America.39 Clark first saw two projections 
of films recently exposed for Blattner. The second one was the “Collier de la Reine” 
and Clark judged that “the colours and gradations were excellent; the rendering of the 
green of the grass was perfect.”40 But the first director of the Harrow Research 
Laboratory was more intrigued by the reproduction process of the Keller-Dorian film. 
He detailed the copying machine made by the French manufacturer Debrie with its 
                                                     
37 “As a rule, I spend all my afternoons at the Keller-Dorian laboratories and workshops where I am 
initiated as much as possible into the manufacturing and researches undertaken by the company Keller-
Dorian.” From Marcel Abribat, “Travaux personnels en projet ou en cours,” research report, July 3, 1928, 
Vincennes, ref. 33073, CECIL, 2. 
38 Walter Clark, “Visit to Keller-Dorian Works, Paris,” research report H.79g, January 1, 1929, ref. A2897, 
KCA-BL. 
39 A short biography of Ludwig Blattner can be found in William D. Rubinstein, Michael A. Jolles, and 
Hilary L. Rubinstein, The Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 100. 
40 Walter Clark, “Report on second visit to Keller-Dorian, August 1929,” research report H.79g(ii), 




light source, optics and diaphragm. He selected a negative and a copy of the film was 
made in his presence. Copies of Keller-Dorian films were good, and Clark judged that it 
was almost impossible to distinguish between the original and the copy. For the Kodak 
representative, the technology used for the copying machine was interesting for the 
reproduction of Kodacolor film. However, as the film format was different, Clark 
suggested contacting the Debrie company directly to adapt the 35mm Keller-Dorian 
optical printer to the 16mm Kodacolor film. 
The second report also clarifies the destiny of the Keller-Dorian process, in parallel 
with the Kodacolor and other lenticular processes. In 1929, the French Keller-Dorian 
company granted to Moviecolor Limited, a British corporation, the exclusive right to 
exploit its process worldwide while Kodak was supposed to furnish film to the British 
company. Moviecolor Limited then worked with Blattner to supply him “with raw stock 
and apparatus produced under the process.”41 During his conversation with Clark, 
Blattner informed him that the Agfa company was interested in the Keller-Dorian 
process and wanted to run the laboratory but that he would do nothing “until the 
Kodak policy was definitely settled.” In his report Clark concluded that Blattner’s 
indication was used to force the Kodak company into a decision about its relationship 
with Moviecolor Limited.42 Details of the dispute between Eastman Kodak and 
Moviecolor are not entirely clear, but it appears that the American company as well as 
the Technicolor company conspired in the following years to progressively control the 
Keller-Dorian process and patents so that it would not be used anymore.43 Near the 
end of the report, Clark mentioned that before the visit, Abribat had experienced some 
                                                     
41 Moviecolor Limited. v. Eastman Kodak Company, Technicolor, Inc. and Technicolor Motion Picture 
Corporation, 288 F.2d 80, United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit, decided March 10, 1961. See 
paragraph 15. 
42 Clark, “Report on second visit to Keller-Dorian, August 1929,” 8. 
43 Moviecolor Limited. v. Eastman Kodak Company, Technicolor, Inc. and Technicolor Motion Picture 
Corporation, op. cit., paragraph 15. “Defendants, 'separately or in concert, conspired to and effected' 
the organization of a Delaware corporation, hereafter American Keller-Dorian, and induced French 
Keller-Dorian to assign to American Keller-Dorian all its patent rights and its rights under the contract 
with Kodak. This was done in order to deprive plaintiff of the benefits of plaintiff's contracts with French 




difficulty in getting into the Keller-Dorian works. According to Blattner, an Agfa 
representative was also in the works when Abribat came and Blattner did not want to 
talk about the duplicating machine in his presence.44 In any case, the Keller-Dorian 
process never took off and it can be considered as an industrial failure. American 
investors created the Kislyn Corporation in 1930 to develop Berthon’s later Société 
Française Cinéchromatique, and Berthon started a scientific collaboration with the 
American Technical Director Carl Gregory. However, the international venture never 
really took off as well and the German group Siemens-Halske eventually purchased the 
rights of patents at the end of 1930. After four years of industrial research in Germany 
at Spandau and collaboration with the film manufacturer Perutz, the lenticular 
Siemens-Opticolor process started an industrial stage in 1935.45 But it was discarded in 
1938, outpaced by the innovative subtractive three-colour Agfacolor Neu and new 
Kodachrome processes. 
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4.1.4. The long-term development of three-colour Kodachrome 
 
Kodacolor, despite its successful launch on the market, possessed the inconvenience of 
additive systems and some technical limitations due to its optical structure such as the 
necessity to use almost the maximum aperture of the lens, therefore reducing the 
depth of field.46 At the Rochester Research Laboratory, Capstaff continued improving 
the two-colour Kodachrome at the beginning of the 1920s but Eastman and Mees had 
agreed to consider another promising technology. With the long-term research 
undertaken by Leopold Mannes and Leopold Godoswky for a three-colour multi-layer 
process, a new form of innovation took place at Eastman Kodak. It was the alliance 
between amateur, or independent research and the industrial research organisation of 
one of the main film manufacturers of the period. Thus given the final result of the 
three-colour Kodachrome released in 1935, the scientific collaboration between the 
two independent researchers and the Kodak researchers can be judged as a positive, 
successful one. This full collaboration differs from the model of the Kodacolor’s 
development, for which patent rights were purchased from a third-party company 
without a sharing of knowledge. The research odyssey of Mannes and Godowsky 
between 1920 and 1935 is well documented and I will only point out some events and 
milestones of their research work, before introducing new sources clarifying the 
collaboration of the two young men with Eastman Kodak.47 
As Brayer points out, the modern legend indicating that Kodachrome was invented by 
two skilled musicians living far from science is wrong. Mannes and Godowsky had the 
standard profiles of talented inventors who used a scientific background to transform 
the theory into a true process through experimentation. Godowsky studied chemistry, 
physics and mathematics at the University of California and Columbia University and 
                                                     
46 For a summary of the reasons of lenticular system’s commercial failure, see Coote, The Illustrated 
History of Colour Photography, 56-57. 
47 Friedman, History of Color Photography, 108-124; Coe, Colour Photography: The First Hundred Years, 
120-128; Collins, The Story of Kodak, 205-215; Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 134-




Mannes received his Bachelor of Science degree in physics from Harvard in 1920.48 The 
two men had already met in school in 1916 and become friends with a mutual amateur 
interest in photography. The next year, Mannes and Godowsky saw in New York a film 
entitled Our Navy made with a four-colour additive process. The colour rendering was 
not good and they started to undertake some research work at their high school to 
develop a better additive process. They succeeded in improving a parallax issue 
encountered with multiple lens systems, before parting to attend Harvard and 
Berkeley respectively. However, they continued their research work during their 
holidays and managed to conceive a viable two-colour additive process. It consisted of 
side-by-side images on a single strip of film exposed in a double-lens prototype 
camera. An experimental film was made but upon failing to adapt the projection 
equipment to the two-colour film Mannes and Godowsky gave up their first colour 
process.49 When they had graduated from University, they started to work full time as 
professional musicians but were still experimenting during their spare time on colour 
processes. At the beginning of the 1920s, they progressively turned from the additive 
to the subtractive theory, considering rightfully that the multi-layer film could be a 
better solution. In their makeshift laboratory at home, they managed to coat double-
layered plates able to record part of the visible spectrum.50 But they also worked on 
the theory of three-colour photography and filed their first patent application on 4 
October 1921, to secure the making of a coloured positive from a set of separation 
negatives. According to Friedman, Mannes and Godowsky’s application did not consist 
of especially new concepts and would have been difficult to adapt in a practical 
manner.51 
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During this period, Mannes and Godowsky faced an important constraint. They had to 
seek funds to significantly improve their research work and results, as their families 
decided to stop their financing. In 1922 they were able to meet George Eastman 
directly to present their work on colour photography. Eastman was intrigued by their 
findings, but the meeting finally had no financial results.52 Then the two researchers 
tried another approach with Eastman Kodak. From his studies Mannes knew Robert W. 
Wood, head of the Experimental Physics Department of Johns Hopkins University. 
Wood was also a friend of Kenneth Mees and agreed to write a recommendation in 
favour of the two men. In a letter to Mees dated 6 February 1922, Mannes informed 
him of “a new and simple method of photography in color recently invented by Mr. L. 
Godowsky and myself”, and did not forget to add Wood’s note to his mail. During his 
next trip to New York, the intrigued Mees finally met Mannes and Godowsky at the 
Chemist’s Club and was impressed by the progress of their photographic work. From 
then on and during the following years Mees accepted to supply them with the 
materials they would need for their research, especially some film coated with several 
layers, provided that the two Leopolds would keep him informed of their further 
developments.53 The same year, Mannes had also approached Everett Somers, a 
secretary of the investment firm of Kuhn, Loeb and Company. It appeared that this 
company was interested in investing in colour research and soon Lewis Strauss, a 
young associate of Kuhn, Loeb and Company who was aware of the practice of 
photography visited Mannes and Godowsky in Mannes’ apartment. Following the 
demonstration of the experimental process, Strauss granted Mannes and Godowsky 
financial help for their research.54 
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The investment by Kuhn, Loeb and Company was a twenty thousand dollar loan. The 
money was invested in the research and around one year later, Mannes and Godowsky 
filed another application for a two-colour negative process.55 A red-sensitive emulsion 
was coated on a transparent support, and an orthochromatic emulsion blue and green-
sensitive was coated on the red-sensitive emulsion. After development and fixation 
the bipack was treated with ferricyanide to convert metallic silver into silver 
ferrocyanide. The new feature of the patent consisted in the method used for the 
development of the ferrocyanide images : the diffusion into the gelatin of the solution 
used could be controlled at will. Thus one could develop only one layer without 
polluting the other one. Mannes and Godowsky took care not to unveil any formula or 
detailed mechanisms of this controlled diffusion.56 Due to their professional situation, 
they remained rather isolated from academic and industrial research in photography 
but a fortunate event in 1925 allowed them to develop their knowledge of colour 
coupler technology. The well-known independent photochemist Edward J. Wall had 
just published his History of Three-Color Photography and Mannes and Godowsky 
knew that they were cited in the book for their 1924 patent.57 After the purchase of 
Wall’s book, they discovered the scientific narrative of the monopack film and the 
potential of colour development. 
Mannes and Godoswky were now working on a technology of integral tripack or 
monopack, whose structure was made of three layers each containing an emulsion 
sensitised for a single primary color. With Wall’s book they read that a young 
independent photochemist Karl Schinzel was the first to patent the use of a subtractive 
monopack for color reproduction in 1905. In his process called Katachromie Schinzel 
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suggested using a coated plate with several layers of silver bromide emulsion 
separated by plain gelatin films. Each sensitive layer was coloured complementary to 
its sensitivity. However, this innovative process was theoretical and the few dyes 
available were not sufficient to allow its practical use.58 Thus, it is evident that when 
Mannes and Godowsky started to explore the possibilities of the subtractive 
monopack, its theory had already been developed. However, the two photochemists 
experienced Eastman Kodak’s relative technological backwardness in organic 
chemistry as a significant constraint. From 1927 on, they conceived a different strategy 
for the colour development to get around the problem. Unlike other methods, they 
decided to include the colour couplers into the liquid developer instead of each 
emulsion layer. Thus the wandering coupler problem would be solved, but not the 
issue of the wandering sensitising dye.59 As it will be studied later in section 4.2.2., the 
photochemist Michele Martinez developed a different technology of protected 
couplers incorporated into the emulsion for Eastman Kodak in the 1940s. 
In 1928, the chemist of the Eastman Kodak synthetic chemistry division Leslie Brooker 
was able to synthesise new dyes which were excellent sensitisers from Frances 
Hamer’s research work. The problem of wandering sensitisers was almost solved. The 
pooling of Mannes, Godowsky and Brooker’s research works eventually constituted 
innovation because from that stage the monopack concept could move from theory to 
practice. For Mees, the time to increase the scientific collaboration with Mannes and 
Godowsky had come. 
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In 1930 I realized that the new dyes that we could now make would solve the 
problem of making Mannes’ and Godowsky’s proposed color process work. (…) So 
we asked Mannes and Godowsky to join us here, where they worked happily with 
us for ten years, and we all set to work and made the new color process work.60 
The agreement seemed an easy one. Mees’s offer was finally revealed much later by 
Eastman Kodak in 1989.61 The manufacturer offered to pay a lump sum of $30,000, 
whose $20,000 would be used to repay the Kuhn, Loeb and Company loan, and annual 
salaries of $7,500 each. The film manufacturer also accepted that Mannes and 
Godowsky would receive royalties on all patents filed before the collaboration with 
Kodak.62 The two independent researchers accepted the offer and became 
incorporated in the Kodak research organisation in November 1930. As the Kodak 
Collection archive at the British Library keeps a copy of the original agreements 
between Eastman Kodak and Mannes and Godowsky, I compared the above 
information with the formal data enclosed in this confidential document, not only to 
confirm the sums in play but especially to ascertain the terms of trade between the 
parties for this scientific collaboration. Thus, the analysis clarifies the nature of the 
research work that was requested from Mannes and Godowsky. It is also clear about 
the ramifications of ownership pertaining to potential scientific knowledge produced 
from the collaboration. 
The original exclusive patent license agreement and an option agreement, both dated 
1 November 1930, are the most critical documents for this argument. The exclusive 
patent license agreement is a contract in which the two inventors agreed to grant 
Eastman Kodak the right to produce, use and sell products and processes relating to 
their invention. To define this invention, the agreement provided a list of five 
previously granted patents of Mannes and Godowsky from 1925 to 1930 all related to 
colour processes. As their research work was experimental and not finalised, this set of 
patents was therefore used to ascertain the purpose of the agreement. Usually, the 
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exclusive patent license agreement is offered in return for royalties during the patent 
life only and unsurprisingly that was also the case for the present agreement. The 
contract clearly stated exactly what Eastman Kodak requested. To obtain “exclusive 
license, with the right to sublicense others, to make, use and sell products, apparatus 
and processes” Kodak agreed to pay 2,5% of the net selling price of "such motion 
picture film of all widths" involving the inventions and 3,5% of the net selling price of 
"all other such sensitized products", principally the colour photographic products.63 
These terms were very favourable to the inventors. In 1982 the royalty figures were 
not known but Milanowski has already pointed out that “both Mannes and Godowsky 
received extremely excessive royalty/contracts which paid over a million dollars per 
year to each man at different points in the time.”64 Beyond financial matters, the 
experimental technology of Mannes and Godowsky was far from the production stage, 
and a paragraph of the agreement mentions that a separate contract of employment 
had also been established for the same period. The two inventors were therefore hired 
by Eastman Kodak as well and incorporated to the Rochester Research Laboratory. This 
incorporation was realised in two phases. From 1 November 1930 to 1 June 1931, 
Mannes and Godowsky worked in New York "the equivalent of four and one-half full 
working days per week" to develop their inventions and each received a salary at the 
rate of $3,500 and a flat royalty at the rate of $2,500 per year. After 1 June 1931, they 
started working at Kodak Park and their salary rose to $5,000 per year including the 
same flat royalty. The exclusive patent license agreement does not include information 
about the lump sum of $30,000 offered by Eastman Kodak. But it does not mean that 
this transaction was not made between the film manufacturer and the young 
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photochemists. In fact, this lump sum was crucial for Mannes and Godowsky due to 
the necessity of paying back the Kuhn, Loeb loan. 
As for the option agreement signed the same day of 1930, its study clarifies the 
parallel activities of Mannes and Godowsky in 1928. The agreement is focused in 
particular on the technology of natural color photography involving a “layer process”, 
which was disclosed in two patents and in one application for letters patent of the two 
inventors.65 During the 1920s, the major competitor of Mannes’ and Godowsky’s work 
was the Technicolor Motion Pictures Corporation and the prolific activities of its 
director of research Leonard T. Troland. The option agreement reveals that Mannes 
and Godowsky had already entered into a legal agreement with Comstock and 
Wescott, Inc. and the Technicolor Motion Picture Corporation in February 1928. From 
this agreement they were able to acquire rights “under any patents resulting from 
certain applications of Leonard T. Troland, Serial Nos. 377,755, filed April 30, 1920 and 
499,425, filed September 9, 1921, relating to color photography”. Comstock and 
Wescott, Inc. relates to the industrial research and development company formed in 
1912 by the two MIT professors Herbert T. Kalmus, Daniel F. Comstock and the 
mechanical expert W. Burton Wescott. The three associates created the Technicolor 
Motion Picture Corporation in Boston two years later and the first two-colour motion 
picture process was released in 1916. The photochemist Edward J. Wall helped solve 
technical issues encountered with colour sensitising film.66 Troland was then 
approached in 1918 by Comstock and Wescott, Inc. and was associated with the 
scientific engineering firm as an expert consultant. At the same time he also become 
chief engineer and then director of research in 1925 of the Technicolor Motion Picture 
Corporation and worked on the improvement and development of two and three-
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colour processes.67 In this position he undertook an important patent work to secure 
his inventions in the field of both imbibition processes and monopack layered 
processes. In the unpublished paragraph above one understands that to further 
develop their own processes, Mannes and Godowsky could not avoid using some of 
Troland’s technology. Even if it concerns only two patent applications, it represented a 
potential threat to the further development of Mannes’ and Godowsky’s processes. 
The option agreement was thus made in order for the inventors to confirm that “they 
have right, title and power to convey the rights herein conveyed and intended to be 
conveyed.” But as the validation of an application to a granted patent was subject to 
the technical study of an independent examiner of a national patent office, Eastman 
Kodak viewed the three eventual options for the future : no patent would be finally 
issued from Troland applications, one patent would result from one application or two 
patents would be granted from both applications. According to the result, Eastman 
Kodak agreed to do the necessary actions to secure any application or patent of the 
two inventors through the payment of licenses or the payment of foreign patents 
provided that they took care of their patented inventions in the way a patentee should 
normally act. It means in particular that Mannes and Godowsky were supposed to 
inititate a possible prosecution following any interferences involving their precedent 
applications or patents.68 
In reality, the two Troland applications created a major problem to both Eastman 
Kodak and the young photochemists. The application No. 499,425 by the prolific 
Troland, that was in part a continuation of the prior application No. 377,755, was 
finally accepted ten years later and a patent granted in June 1931. Troland had 
incorporated the impressive number of 234 claims into his application. According to 
Friedman, Mannes and Godowsky had suggested one equivalent formation of the 
                                                     
67 Bryan Dye, Caryn Hannan, and Jennifer L. Herman, Connecticut Biographical Dictionary (Hamburg, MI.: 
State History Publications, 2008), 526; J.G. Beebe-Center, “Leonard Thompson Troland : 1889-1932,” 
The American Journal of Psychology 44 (1932): 817-820. 
68 To this end, the two photochemists had to provide all evidence, documents, drawings or applications 
necessary for the possible prosecution. They also were supposed to pay the renewal fees referring to 




monopack in their patent application work during the 1920s but due to the anteriority 
of Troland’s application, he was given priority to later work in the field.69 Of course, 
Troland had never stopped working during this decade and had made some additional 
findings.70 In September 1931 he sent an application for reissuing the same patent and 
increased the number of claims by five. On 5 April 1932, Troland signed the final patent 
document. On 27 May 1932, he died in a tragic accident while hiking but, as the 
application had been signed and processed, the Comstock and Wescott, Inc. was finally 
granted the well-known patent reissue 18,680 on 6 December 1932 (see Figure 7).71 
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Figure 7. Last page of Troland’s US Patent Reissue 18,680 mentioning the last 
claims from 230 to 239. 
 
Friedman pointed out that in only a few general claims could a connection between 
the structure of the Kodachrome and the structure of a Troland monopack be traced. 
According to Coote, the reissue 18,680 aimed more at “a single emulsion layer that 




than a material requiring the superimposition of two or more emulsion coatings.”72 
However, due to Troland’s monumental patent, Eastman Kodak had no alternative and 
was forced to purchase a license from Technicolor Motion Picture Corporation. This 
license also contained a specific condition : should Kodak market a motion picture film 
in colour in 35mm size or wider, Technicolor had a limited period during which it would 
become the exclusive processor of such film. The initial license opened a period of 
agreements between Technicolor and Kodak that only came to an end at the beginning 
of the 1950s.73 
Finally the third and last legal document in the Kodak Collection archive is a later 
supplemental agreement between Mannes, Godowsky and Eastman Kodak made in 
June 1934 and that took into account the existence of Troland’s patent reissue 18,680. 
It confirmed the terms of the option agreement of 1930 and links Troland’s former 
applications to the resulting reissued patent. It also clarified that if the license acquired 
by Kodak became non-exclusive, the company would agree to grant to “any designee 
of the Inventors” a non-exclusive license under the Troland reissue patent and any 
other patents “relating to color processes involving a single photographic element 
having upon the same side thereof two differentially color sensitive strata.”74 
Therefore this agreement clearly referred to a two-colour film and it tallies with the 
known narrative about the Kodachrome process.75 
Finally employed by Eastman Kodak, Mannes and Godowsky probably had to adapt 
their research methods to the collaborative work with the Kodak Research 
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Laboratory’s staff. However this period is not well documented and it is difficult to 
ascertain the research work done and the practical terms of the collaboration. It is also 
not clear whether or not the Harrow Research Laboratory and the Kodak-Pathé 
Laboratory to a lesser extent played a partial role in the initial development of the 
Kodachrome. In 1955 Mees remembered that “Mannes and Godowsky did a great deal 
of the work, but a great deal of it was done by our own people and particularly by the 
Emulsion Research Laboratory, which had all the responsibility for the sensitizing, 
coating, and so on.”76 From 1930 on, the two inventors focused on processes involving 
mono-layer and mixed grain coatings to avoid the use of a multi-layer coating and its 
potential problems.77 As Mannes and Godowsky had a three-year contract terminating 
at the end of 1933, and as the results of their research were not visible enough, Mees 
had to insist with some members of Kodak Management that they should be given 
another chance for one more year. They finally developed a concrete two-colour cine 
film in 1934, “working practically around the clock, day after day.”78 As the production 
of the new film was delayed due to some complications, Mannes and Godowsky were 
able to perform additional research and modified the two-colour into a three-colour 
process. Some evidence of this research period has been found in a correspondence 
folder between the Patents and Trade Marks Department at Kodak Limited and the 
engineer Busch of Kodak A.G. at Cöpenick. The subject was the processing of the 
application for the two-colour process of Mannes and Godowsky in Germany. It 
appeared that the process was never patented in the United States, however it was 
granted a British patent in April 1935.79 To take equivalent action in Germany, in 
February 1935 the officer of Kodak Limited requested a sample of the two-colour 
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process from his American counterpart at Rochester. The answer was partially 
negative.  
Mannes & Godowsky do not have any film made in the manner described for making 
the negative one frame having the blue records and the next frame with red and blue-
green records. As they are extremely busy now preparing the new Kodachrome method 
for the market (…), they would have to take time from their regular work (which is 
extremely pressing) to furnish such a sample and, in view of its present lack of 
commercial interest, we believe it is not worth the trouble.80 
The American office finally sent another sample of two-layer film but using a different 
method. The pressure put on Mannes and Godowsky bore fruit. Finally the new 
Kodachrome process in its 16mm version for colour movie was announced in April 
1935. The first technical description of the process was published in the Journal of the 
Society of Motion Picture Engineers in July 1935.81 As the film consisted of five layers of 
emulsion and gelatine it was nicknamed the “quintuplet” film by Science magazine.82 
Three layers were devoted to the recording of the blue, green and red spectrums. 
Between each sensitive layer a thin layer of clear gelatin was coated, used as a margin 
of safety during the development process and the use of the controlled diffusion 
bleach. It was thus possible to bleach two layers and not the bottom layer. But the first 
development process was very long and involved in all 28 steps.83 As it will be 
demonstrated in the next sections, the 1935 Kodachrome process was not fully 
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accomplished and the Research Laboratory and the production facilities of Kodak Park 
at Rochester managed its great complexity only with difficulty. 
We have seen so far how across-the-board and also opportunistic industrial research 
was conduct by Eastman Kodak in search of a viable colour process. What we do not 
know yet is how Eastman Kodak structured its research around colour photography 
following the introduction of three-colour Kodachrome in 1935 and how the scientific 
knowledge was practically built up through the patent system within the framework of 
collaborations with independent photochemists. In the next sections, I will first clarify 
the development of colour research from 1935 in the Kodak Research Laboratory at 
Rochester. I will then analyse the drafting process of patent applications between two 
European independent inventors and Kodak Limited to demonstrate to what extent 






4.2. Patent strategies for colour photography technologies 
4.2.1 In-house innovation to tackle colour problems 
When Mees pointed out in 1955 that an important part of the development work for 
the new Kodachrome process had been realised by the Eastman Kodak technicians and 
photochemists at Rochester, it was perfectly true.84 Kodak Park anticipated the 
production of Kodachrome film before the official release of the new product. The 
Engineering and Maintenance Department had to build new machines to produce and 
process the coming batches of Kodachrome film. A new building was erected especially 
for the production of large quantities of the necessary chemicals by the Synthetic 
Organic Chemicals Department.85 However, the correct development processing for 
the new Kodachrome film was not at all ready in April 1935. This situation was critical. 
It was possible to expose some 16mm Kodachrome reels but it was still impossible to 
get a neutral colorimetric rendering of the developed slides. Mees had to organize and 
supervise an exceptional program in extreme circumstances; the theoretical 
technology of Kodachrome had to confront the practical side of the laboratory. 
In one of his notebooks, the researcher Phillips detailed this critical period of intense 
research for a satisfactory development process.86 Phillips, a member of the Harrow 
Research Laboratory, was already visiting and working at Rochester in November 1934. 
He had probably been requisitioned to help the American scientists and assist Mannes 
and Godowsky. In April and May 1935, he was testifying to the intensive work 
undertaken in the Research Laboratories. The teams were working nearly all day long 
with infrequent breaks in a desperate quest for better Kodachrome processing. On 10 
May, Phillips noted that “a man (Pringle) was sent to the Medical Dept having been 
made sick with fumes from acetone-alcohol mixture while cleaning racks from the b-g 
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developer.”87 One day, Phillips reported that the general tendency of the experimental 
work was the development of Kodachrome with green neutrals. The photochemists 
tested several solutions to reduce the colour cast but, as the writer noted, the "results 
were very erratic."88 On 16 May the situation had evolved towards the blue colour, and 
the depletion of the chemical solutions was suspected. The team decided to use 
additional replenishers and to improve the forming of the yellow dye into the layer to 
counterbalance the blue colour cast. 
Godowsky showed that less carbonate in the yellow increased the [deposit] of 
yellow dye & this was agreed. The carbonate in the yellow was reduced by 50%.89 
Phillips added as well that on Mannes' initiative the stop bath after the magenta 
bleach was changed as it was polluted by this bleach with blue-green dye. However, 
despite many additions "made all night" with several developer and bleach solutions 
the results remained poor. There was always a blue-green colour cast in excess. Four 
days later, the situation was better and the developed Kodachrome films at last 
reached a correct neutrality in the grey. The magenta bleach had been acidified with 
hydrochloric acid to reduce the residual blue-green dye. This acidification was 
criticised by Godowsky but Phillips disagreed in his notebook. 
Godowsky pointed out that we must avoid heavily acidified film entering the 
carbonate stop bath on account of CO2 bubble formation. However this was never 
encountered.90 
For Phillips, the developing standards had been fixed for the high densities of the 
characteristic curve and the researchers could focus on other chemical issues. 
This evidence of research teamwork illustrates well the complexity of the new 
Kodachrome process. However this tendency toward technological complexity was 
from that time the rule and increased up to the Second World War and beyond. The 
                                                     
87 Franck B. Phillips, “1934/35”, personal notebook, ref. A1270, box 96, KCA-BL, 71. The b-g developer 
means the solution of blue-green (or cyan) colour developer. 
88 Ibid., Tuesday May 14, 1935, 75. 
89 Ibid., 77. 




era of the master emulsion makers was over and an independent photochemist or an 
industrial researcher was no longer able to conceive a complete colour process on his 
own from the theory to the adjustment of layers and the selection of sensitising dyes 
and chemicals. With multilayered emulsion of monopacks the competition was also 
tough. In 1936, the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. at Wolfen in Germany managed to 
develop a technology of anchoring colour couplers to individual emulsion layers. This 
way a process of selective colour development by controlled diffusion used by Mannes 
and Godowsky was no longer necessary. The colour couplers could be incorporated 
into the monopack film, and not during the developing process of the exposed film as 
suggested by Rudolf Fischer in 1912. The Agfa patent clarified that the diffusion of the 
dyestuff components could be stopped “by using as the component in the 
manufacture of the photographic silver halide emulsion a dyestuff compound which 
has in the molecule an aliphatic carbon chain of more than 5 carbon atoms.”91 As the 
molecule had a long-chain structure, its movement was almost entirely blocked. The 
Agfa Research Laboratories at Wolfen undertook a long-term project to synthesise 
possible dye-forming couplers and experimental colour emulsions. Besides the 
laboratory activity an extensive patent work was undertaken to secure every colour 
technology produced in the Research Laboratories.92 Finally, after a satisfying selection 
of couplers for each of the three layers, Agfa introduced in October 1936 the Agfacolor 
Neu film including a multi-layer reversal technology. 
For Eastman Kodak, the elegant solution of the Agfacolor Neu was a technological and 
economical threat even if the colour rendering of the Kodachrome film was slightly 
better. The technology used by Agfa was far simpler and rendered the 28 steps 
necessary to the processing of Kodachrome films obsolete. Another issue was the 
                                                     
91 Gustav Wilmanns et al., “Manufacture of photographic silver halide emulsions,” US Patent 
2,186,849(A), filed August 5, 1936 (United States of America), filed August 7, 1935 (Germany), and 
issued January 9, 1940. Mentionned by Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 152. The 
author did not provide the reference of the patent but a textual research in patent databases online 
provided the American patent reference.  
92 Coote indicated that in 1935 alone, Agfa filed 450 patents relating to colour photography. Coote, The 




relative instability of the chemical dyes used in the layers of Kodachrome.93 Kodak’s 
first action was to develop a simpler processing for the Kodachrome films. It was not 
before 1938 that they released this new processing. The controlled diffusion bleach 
was replaced with selective re-exposure for each colour-development step. In this way 
the total number of steps was reduced to 18.94 As new sensitisers were available that 
would not wander in adjacent layers, it was now possible to selectively re-expose the 
blue and red sensitive layers with blue and red light and to treat them by yellow and 
cyan color developer. As for the third and last green sensitive layer, it was treated with 
a fogging agent to make it developable again.95  
In James’ memoires, we learn that the enigmatic Lot Spaulding Wilder, a researcher of 
the Rochester Laboratory, was the inventor of the Kodachrome processing 
simplification.96 After the release of the Kodachrome monopack, Mees decided to 
create an experimental department for colour photography including Wilder, Ralph M. 
Evans and Wesley T. Hanson. Mannes and Godowsky also played an important role for 
scientific and patent work during the period up to the outbreak of the Second World 
War. James quoted one phrase of Mannes stressing Wilder’s research skills.  
Lot Wilder, Mannes said, “was one of the most gifted inventors I’ve ever known, and also 
one of the finest men.” He played a major role in simplifying Kodachrome processing, 
which was reduced from 28 to 18 steps.97 
Wilder’s research work is difficult to identify in the British archive. In 1936 he was 
apparently not working on Kodachrome processing yet the Communication n°605 of 
the Kodak Research Laboratories suggests he jointly worked with Capstaff and Miller 
                                                     
93 Brian Coe, Colour Photography: The First Hundred Years, 1840-1940, 128. 
94 Journey: 75 years of Kodak Research, 52.  
95 Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 145-147. See also Annette Roulier, “A Short 
History and Concepts of Color Photography,” Imaging and Media Lab, Swiss Virtual Campus, 2008, 
http://www.abmt.unibas.ch/SKRIPTEN/ScriptColor/color_photography_history.pdf , 23. 
96 Surprisingly Friedman remained entirely silent about Wilder’s research work in his History of Color 
Photography published in 1944. 




on the projection of lenticular colour films, such as the first Kodacolor process.98 
Fortunately, in his last notebook Phillips reported a meeting with Wilder in the 
laboratory on 4 February 1938. The discussion was naturally about the new 
Kodachrome processing, noted by Phillips as the selective reversal process. If the 
processing steps of February 1938 are compared with the later literature about the 
new 1938 Kodachrome processing, it is clear that Wilder was on the right track and 
that he had almost developed the final processing that would be used from the end of 
that same year. As Phillips summarized, the new process “depends on exposing each 
layer after negative development, to fogging light of the colour to which that layer was 
sensitized, & then developing the layer in a complementary colour coupling 
developer.”99 After the negative development and the removal of the backing, the film 
was exposed through the base with a red light and re-developed in a cyan developer. It 
was then exposed through the base with a white light and re-developed in a magenta 
developer to treat the green sensitive middle layer. The fourth step was an exposure 
through the top of the film with white or blue light and another development in a 
yellow developer. The silver present in all three layers was removed with a bleach 
treatment by a Farmer’s reducer and the film was fixed and washed. Phillips also drew 
the structure of the Kodachrome film in his notebook. He reported the details 
discussed with Wilder as the sequence was not entirely satisfactory. The application of 
an UV coat was not successful as it interfered with the gelatine. The nature of the 
yellow filter between the blue sensitive and green sensitive layer had to be adjusted to 
be fully removed during the fixing. A “dry over-coat” layer, present into the initial 
Kodachrome film between the green sensitive layer and the yellow filter layer had 
been eliminated. To sum up, Wilder and Phillips stated that the first exposure in red 
was correct but that their indecision about the spectral quality of the two last 
exposures generated some errors on the final colour rendering of the film. “Wilder 
                                                     
98 The communication was presented during a meeting at Rochester in the autumn 1936 and a copy sent 
to the Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers. See Capstaff, Miller and Wilder, “The 
Projection of Lenticular Color-Films,” Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers 28, no. 2 
(February 1937): 123-135. 




agrees [and] points out that in parts where the effect comes in only the red light is 
theoretically absorbed by the varying b-g dye & this does not put the green sensitive 
layer anyway.”100 It is important to note that Wilder’s processing was secured in an 
application filed jointly with Mannes and Godowsky on 19 January 1938 in the United 
States, and in Canada on 24 March of the same year. The equivalent patents are 
identical and involved two exposures of the monopack with white light after the initial 
exposure in red, such as in Phillips’ notebook.101 Wilder, hired by Eastman Kodak at an 
unknown date, possessed an academic background in mathematics. It is possible that 
his theoretical abilities necessary for the study of mathematical concepts was engaged 
in the development of the new Kodachrome processing. At this stage, the structure of 
the processing could be defined theoretically, such as the solving of a matrix made of 
three sensitive layers. The challenge was to simplify the initial matrix and to get a red 
dye in the film from a red photographed object and the like. Wilder was finally able to 
find the correct spectral nature of the two lights for green and blue sensitive layers. 
                                                     
100 Ibid., 3. “B-g” means blue-green or cyan. 
101 Leopold D. Mannes, Leopold Godowsky, Jr., and Lot S. Wilder, “Reversal process of color 
photography,” US Patent 2,252,718, filed January 19, 1938, and issued August 19, 1941. Same authors, 
“Colour photography,” Canadian patent 415,999, drawings certified March 24, 1938, and issued October 
26, 1943. It is difficult to clarify whether Mannes and Godowsky really took part in Wilder’s research 
work or if they were granted the co-authorship of the invention due to their long-term research about 





Figure 8. First Kodachrome processing (1935-1938) compared with new 
Kodachrome processing (from 1938).102 
 
The final process was described by Friedman in 1944. The photo-historian deduced the 
principle of the processing from the study of a published communication of the Kodak 
research Laboratories by Mees in 1942.103 The new processing was equivalent up to 
the exposition with red light and the development in cyan developer (see Figure 8). 
The next step was to expose from the top of the film the blue sensitive layer with a 
blue light, and to develop with a yellow-coupler developer. Then the middle layer 
                                                     
102 Arnold Weissberger, “A Chemist's View of Color Photography: How Does Color Photography Work? 
What is Required of the Light-Sensitive Material? What is the Origin of the Image Dyes?” American 
Scientist 58, no. 6 (1970): 651. Dr. Weissberger was an organic chemist at Eastman Kodak and was 
Associate Head of the Color Photography Division of the Kodak Research Laboratories at Rochester 
when he retired in 1964. Weissberger’s description of new Kodachrome processing corresponds to the 
description made by Friedman in 1944. See next footnotes below. 
103 Kenneth Mees, “Direct Processes for Making Photographic Prints in Color”, Journal of the Franklin 
Institute 233, no. 1 (January 1942): 41-50. This paper corresponds to the Communication no. 832 from 




magenta sensitive was exposed to white light or treated by a fogging agent such as 
methylene blue or thiourea. This layer was developed with a magenta-coupler 
developer and the rest of the processing was similar to Wilder’s solution of February 
1938.104 The move from theory to production was unsurprisingly tough, as confirmed 
by Mees. 
This process offered very considerable difficulties when it was first attempted but, 
in view of its advantages, they were overcome, and it is the method by which the 
Kodachrome film is now processed.105 
Wilder continued working on the improvement of layer technologies applied to 
Kodachrome at least up to 1945. In 1941, he filed another application with Mannes 
and Godowsky about a new technology of integral mask.106 Between the yellow filter 
thin layer and the green-sensitive layer, the researchers added a slow blue-sensitive 
layer that was converted during processing into a mask to obtain colour correction. 
This technology was released to compensate for the imperfect nature of chemical dyes 
used into the emulsions and to provide in particular a better colour neutrality for the 
reproduction of colour film.107 Furthermore, three patents have been identified with 
Wilder as the only inventor. In two of them, the author showed his profound 
knowledge of the multilayer technology used in monopack films. The US patent 
2,275,710 introduced a technology to combine sound and picture film, with the 
addition of an infra-red sensitive, yellow dyed layer between the blue and green 
                                                     
104 “The newer method was to utilize the residual color sensitivity of the layers after they had been 
exposed and developed, to effect a layerwise separation of the complemental images.” Friedman, 
History of Color Photography, 122. In her digital publication, Roulier reversed the position of the 
expositions and colour-coupler developments of the red and blue sensitive layers. See Roulier, “A Short 
History and Concepts of Color Photography,” 23. However, the correct processing seems to be the one 
as outlined by Mees, Friedman and Coote.  
105 Kenneth Mees, “Direct Processes for Making Photographic Prints in Color,” Journal of the Society of 
Motion Picture Engineers 42, no. 4 (April 1944): 234. 
106 Mannes ceased his collaboration with Eastman Kodak in 1939. The same year, Godowsky left the 
Kodak Research Laboratory but still worked on colour photography as a consultant in a small personal 
laboratory in Westport, Connecticut, nicknamed “Kodak Park Westport”. See Journey: 75 years of Kodak 
Research, 54.  
107 Leopold D. Mannes, Leopold Godowsky, Jr., and Lot S. Wilder, “Integral Mask for multicolor film,” US 




sensitive layers. As Wilder clarified in his specification, his solution was the 
improvement of the gold toning process suggested by Mannes and Godowsky in 1939, 
producing a film “not of highest quality” due to unwanted density in the sound track 
area.108 Later in 1943, Wilder filed an application for a complex monopack colour film 
involving five colour-sensitive emulsions, a yellow filter layer plus the film base. The 
two additional layers were a green-sensitive emulsion with magenta coupler and a red-
sensitive emulsion with cyan coupler. This feature of adding a non-diffusing coupler 
into an emulsion was very innovative for Eastman Kodak during this period, and only 
used by Agfa in the Agfacolor Neu film. The purpose of the invention was “to provide a 
multi-layer film containing couplers, which produces maximum dyes densities.” For 
this work Wilder used the previous American patent 2,306,410 by Karl Schinzel that I 
discuss later in this chapter in section 4.2.3.109 This very important shift towards the 
incorporation of colour couplers in the monopack film ought not to evade the 
collaborative work of Wilder with other researchers at Eastman Kodak. Apart from the 
joint work with Mannes and Godowsky, Wilder produced patents with Paul W. Vittum, 
Scheuring S. Fierke, Deane S. Thomas, Edwin E. Jelley, Arnold Weissberger and Kent C. 
Brannock.110 
 
                                                     
108 Lot S. Wilder, “Combined sound and picture film,” US Patent 2,275,710, filed November 9, 1940, and 
issued March 10, 1942. Does the origin of the invention reveal a spirit of competition between Wilder 
and Mannes and Godowsky? One can point out that it was a great chance for a young researcher such as 
Wilder to tackle the two famous inventors. 
109 Lot S. Wilder, “Color photography,” US Patent 2,376,217, filed April 6, 1943, and issued May 15, 
1945. 
110 It is not possible to study the complete set of patents within the framework of my research. See 
Wilder’s collaborative patent literature in US 2,266,456, US 2,292,306, GB 557,750, GB 557,802, US 
2,322,005, CA 418,533, CA 419,015, US 2,401,713, US 2,403,722, US 2,435,616 and US 2,507,183. See 
also Kelley Wilder, “Kodak and Photographic Research,” in American Photography: Local and Global 
Contexts, ed. Bettina Gockel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 264. Lot Wilder died in 1951 and his 
sudden death could explain why this skilled researcher remained in the shadows of the Kodak pantheon. 




4.2.2. “Win-win” scientific collaboration with the independent 
photochemist Martinez 
One understands from the study of this research period in colour photography that the 
most important challenge for the Kodak researchers was to invent a process to prevent 
the couplers from wandering into the adjacent layers of the monopack films. It was 
necessary that this innovation not interfere with the German technology of long-chain 
molecules, which was protected by dozens of patents. Although Wilder used an 
approximate solution as has been seen above, he is not the author of the solution 
secured by Kodak Limited and used later for the new Kodacolor negative film. As 
Friedman wrote, “Kodacolor evidently is based upon the disclosures of M. Martinez”. 
Martinez’s American patent 2,269,158 details a solution in which the coupler was 
dissolved in a resin, and the result was dispersed into the emulsion. Martinez also 
suggested dispersing the silver halide grain in the resin as well in a later American 
patent 2,284,877.111 This one brief sentence was all Friedman had to say about 
Martinez’s case, and the photochemist has been given the same treatment by other 
historians of colour photography, if he was treated at all.112 From Kodak’s point of 
view, this technology of “protected couplers” had been progressively developed by in-
house researchers such as Vittum, Weissberger or Evans. Martinez was not mentioned 
in 1989 except for the remark that from his initial research an early Kodacolor process 
was released in 1941 but with poor colour rendering and stability.113 Coote’s History 
gives more information about this independent chemist Dr. Michele Martinez, an 
Italian living in the United Kingdom during the Interwar period. First of all, two of 
Martinez’s patents lay behind the development of the Vivex process of colour printing. 
The company Colour Photographs Limited was formed in 1928 to purchase the British 
                                                     
111 Friedman, History of Color Photography, 123. Martinez is also briefly mentioned p. 392. 
112 See for instance Weissberger, “A Chemist's View of Color Photography: How Does Color Photography 
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coupler in a resin binder. However, a concise mention of the research work of the free-lance inventor 
Martinez was found in Gallafent, “The Direction of Photographic Research,” 118. 




and foreign rights in Martinez’s process as described in his patents.114 Coote also 
mentions that a decade later, in 1939, it was Vittum and Jelley who discovered a 
technique of mixing colour couplers with “oil formers” to fix them in the emulsion. But 
he also clarified that Martinez had already received a patent in 1937 for the 
incorporation of a colour coupler in a resinous binder. Coote also added an important 
piece of historical information. 
In 1940, while he was in an internment camp of the Isle of Man, Martinez was 
granted another patent for a mixed grain monolayer colour film, and Kodak must 
have considered that because the proposed procedures were sufficiently close to 
what they expected to do, they should obtains rights to the Martinez patents.115 
The Patents and Trade Marks Department of Kodak Limited together with the Harrow 
Research Laboratory carried out long-term collaborative work with Martinez to file 
several patent applications and to draw up some exclusive license agreements. This 
activity was necessary to be able to use an innovative technology developed by an 
independent researcher like Martinez in exchange for royalties and to add it to 
Eastman Kodak’s patent folders and scientific assets. The terms of scientific 
collaboration followed the “ally” model recently suggested by Hintz, as mentioned in 
section 1.2.5.2. This model stipulates that independent inventors develop and license 
their patent to firms on a royalty basis in maintaining a bilateral flow of scientific 
information between the two parties.116 As the Kodak Collection archive holds some 
important correspondence folders about Martinez, this is an unique opportunity to 
study the methodology used by the Kodak representatives from the initial contact with 
Martinez in the 1920s in England to the patent’s expiration after the Second World 
War. It shows how inventions or scientific facts produced in a personal laboratory were 
converted into the official jargon of patents by which they became real for the 
                                                     
114 Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 78. The author did not provide the references 
of the patents, but it appears that they are GB 280,053, “Improvements in colour photography,” 
complete accepted November 11, 1927, and GB 280,252, “Improvements in in the manufacture of 
photographic surfaces,” complete accepted November 17, 1927. In 1928, Martinez became a member of 
the Royal Photographic Society of Great Britain and used the first name Michael. 
115 Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography, 157. 




scientific community. I have already mentioned at the end of section 4.1.4. that the 
invention, characterised by a technical or scientific fact, was hidden in the patent’s 
jargon and in its claims. A large part of the patent can explain these facts and makes 
them travel outside the industrial research laboratory. It is worth adding that in Laet's 
view, as clarified in section 1.2.5.2, the patent is also a vehicle, a carrier of technical 
and scientific fact that can take an active part in the transfer of knowledge. This 
concept can be juxtaposed with Morgan's view about the notion of facts, their 
existence and circulation. I argue that the patent used by Martinez as a tool to identify 
and confirm the nature of scientific facts he found through experimentation can be 
compared with Morgan's "good companion" necessary for a scientific fact to travel 
well and with integrity.117 The patent is not a part of the scientific fact but this fact is 
embedded into the patent which acts as a protective "companion" and enables the 
scientific fact to travel through scientific communities and industrial competition.118 It 
is now possible with Martinez’s case study to clarify the real substance of an 
innovation connected to a scientific fact through the study of the drafting of a patent 
application, in the framework of a scientific collaboration with an independent 
photochemist. 
The first abundant folder of Martinez points out his inventive nature during the 1920s 
in England. It confirms that when Martinez released the technology of couplers 
incorporated in resin in 1937, he possessed the profile of a prolific independent 
inventor. The first document linking him to Kodak Limited is a non-disclosure 
agreement dated back to 1924, which entailed neither scientific collaboration nor 
bilateral exchange of knowledge. Martinez had filed an application in 1923 for a colour 
photographic process and Kodak requested “the sole right to purchase all or any of the 
rights under the patents enumerated in the Schedule”, which enumerated the 
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“[...] we can understand technologies as embedding facts, much as ancient pottery jars carry facts about 




applications filed by the inventor in England, the United States, Germany, France and 
Switzerland. He was also requested to provide any and all improvements in the 
process which he may have made up to the granting of the patent. The agreement was 
made in exchange for a lump sum of £250 and it was the opportunity for the 
manufacturer to avoid having Martinez disclose or sell his technology to a 
competitor.119 It was a real possibility that Martinez might to deal with other 
manufacturers of the photographic industry and this is what occurred several years 
later. A second agreement indicates that Eastman Kodak “did obtain from Martinez an 
option to acquire a full and complete assignment of certain inventions patents and 
applications” in 1930 in exchange of a certain sum.120 But some other agreements in 
the folder demonstrate that before being granted his well-known British patent 
505,834 in 1939 about couplers and resin, Martinez approached the company Elliott & 
Sons Limited and offered an option for six months from 20 December 1937 on 
processes that could be developed from the potential patent.121 The agreement also 
clarified that this option was given on the consideration of the payment of a lump sum 
of £300 and that Elliott & Sons122 agreed to pay Martinez “a royalty commission on 
sales of five per centum calculated on the retail selling prices of all articles concerned 
with a guaranteed minimum sum of £500 per annum.”123 After the complete 
specification was accepted and the British patent 505,834 granted, the situation with 
the British competitor was still tense as Elliott & Sons purported to have exercised its 
                                                     
119 Agreement between M. Martinez and Kodak Ltd., May 1, 1924, ref. A1737, box 153, KCA-BL, 1. The 
following patent was granted in England the same year: “Direct colour photography,” British patent 
222,523, filed April 5, 1923, and issued October 6, 1924. The patent involved a complicated printing 
process in colour from the theoretical side with 16 claims. 
120 Option Agreement between M. Martinez and Eastman Kodak Company, July 1, 1932, ref. A1737, box 
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121 Charge agreement between M. Martinez and C.C. Rawlinson and J.H. Bruce, March 11, 1938, ref. 
A1737, box 153, KCA-BL. Of course, as the patent was not granted on March 1938 yet, the agreement 
mentioned the corresponding provisional specification n°26966. But it also mentioned another 
specification n°24423 that apparently did not produce any patent. 
122 The company Elliott & Sons was established in Barnet near London. Initially a printing works, the 
factory started manufacturing photographic plates and paper from the end of the nineteenth century 
onwards. 




right to purchase Martinez’s technology. It is the reason for another agreement in 
which Martinez “contends that there is no binding agreement affective upon him in 
respect of such rights.” In return for a lump sum of £250 plus £370 if the option was 
fulfilled, Martinez granted to Kodak the option to acquire the “said patent and patent 
applications”.124 It is clear that the two competitors were struggling to secure 
Martinez’s technology and incorporate it in their respective assets. Finally, Kodak 
Limited managed to contain its competitor’s ambitions and an agreement was signed 
between the two companies through which Kodak granted an exclusive and royalty-
free license to Elliott & Sons in exchange of a specific remuneration.125 
The fact that Martinez generated competition between Kodak and Elliott & Sons for 
the purchase of his technology could have been a strategy of the inventor to secure a 
possible agreement with one of these companies and to ensure some source of 
income. In this strategic sense, the necessary procedures for the completion of a 
patent helped the inventor to attract the interest of potential investors. Time 
management was crucial for the procurement of the patent, not only with regards to 
the prior art and to the other possible applications already filed, but also concerning 
the custom of provisional specification. Martinez used this subterfuge for most of his 
patent applications and was therefore able to claim priority on an incomplete 
invention. He then had to provide a complete specification to the patent office within 
the time limit allowed.126 For example, Martinez sent the provisional specification 
related to his British patent 505,834 which did not contain any claims on 5 October 
1937, and the complete specification with 17 claims on 5 October 1938. The definition 
of his invention was now clear as the nature of the process in the first claim points 
                                                     
124 Agreement between M. Martinez and Eastman Kodak Company, November 21, 1939, ref. A1737, box 
153, KCA-BL. 
125 Agreement relating to British Patent No. 505,834 […] between Kodak Ltd. and Messrs. Elliott & Sons 
Ltd., March 4, 1941, ref. A1737, box 153, KCA-BL. 





out.127 Both documents were enclosed in the final patent that was granted some 
months later, on 18 May 1939.  
The incident may be why Kodak Limited seemed to have been wiser in securing 
Martinez’s second patent. However, the situation was also different and after the 
outbreak of the war, Martinez’s personal situation was complicated due to his Italian 
nationality. A set of letters from 1939 to 1941 stresses that Martinez was also 
collaborating closely with Kodak Limited. During the spring 1941 he requested and 
received from the manufacturer a lump sum of £2,000 in consideration of his British 
Patent application n°9657/39 and foreign rights. The sum was sent to his wife in 
London as the Italian inventor had already been detained in an internment camp. The 
first evidence of Martinez’s detention comes from a memorandum dated 27 January 
1941 written by L.E.T. Branch of the Patents and Trade Marks Department of Kodak 
Limited.128 Branch reported his discussion with Martinez when he met him at the 
internment camp of Oratory Schools in South Kensington. This camp appears to be a 
transitional location where civilian German, Austrian and Italian aliens were screened 
before either being released or sent to one of the internment camps on the Isle of 
Man. After the Italian declaration of war on the Allies on 10 June 1940, the British 
Italian community was treated as a potential enemy.129 Martinez who had emigrated 
to England at least fifteen years before suffered from this anti-alien policy and was 
arrested together with other Italian residents at an unknown date. In his memo, 
                                                     
127 “A process of colour photography employing colour formers for producing different colours in 
different parts of a photographic material, which includes localising the action of the colour formers by 
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intimate physical association with it.” Michele Martinez, “Improvements in or relating to colour 
photography,” British Patent 505,834, filed October 5, 1937, issued May 18, 1939, 3. The equivalent 
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128 Leslie Ernest Thomas Branch, Deputy Manager of the department. His immediate superior was 
Raymond Edwin Crowther, with the title of Manager of the department. This information was retrieved 
for the year 1940 from the statutory declarations of Branch and Crowther, 20 and 18 March 1940, ref. 
A1251, box 89, KCA-BL. It seems that Branch had a background in mechanical engineering as 
demonstrated by some of his early patents (see GB 38,335, GB 372,565 and GB 366,273 in 1932). 
129 Terri Colpi, “The impact of the Second World War on the British Italian Community,” in The 
Internment of Aliens in Twentieth-Century Britain, eds. David Cesarani and Tony Kushner (London: Frank 




Branch unveiled a vast project of ten provisional specifications filed by Martinez and 
sent in a letter to Mees on 4 June 1940. Branch discussed each case with Martinez, 
pointing out that some specifications were not interesting at all for Eastman Kodak. As 
a first reaction, Martinez declared that “whoever buys the applications must buy all 
ten or none”, but he finally reduced his request to four applications 9657/40, 9651/40, 
9653/40 and 9556/40.130 The reference of these four applications is important as only 
the application 9657/40 would lead to the second of Martinez’s British patents, 
number 543,606 about technologies of colour coupler incorporation into the emulsion. 
Martinez was conscious that Kodak Limited had already secured the principle of a 
method of colour film manufacturing with the couplers into the layers, and agreed to 
limit his claims accordingly.131 After all, Martinez was not in a dominant position and 
could not access his personal laboratory anymore for further experimentation. On the 
contrary, in Rochester some researchers had already checked the validity of Martinez’s 
specifications.132 
But Martinez did not lose courage while interned on the Isle of Man and continued to 
be a prolific inventor.133 In a communication sent to Crowther in April 1941 to be 
shared with Rochester, he provided six photographic relief processes involving the use 
of colloid-metal salts in combination with heat treatment. Such inventions could 
contribute to several technologies like sound records on cinematograph films or 
                                                     
130 L.E.T. Branch, Memorandum of discussion with Dr. Martinez at the Internment Camp, Oratory 
Schools, South Kensington, January 27, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
131 Branch to Martinez, January 28, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, Kodak Collection Archive, British Library. 
Indeed in their British patent 524,154, the Kodak researchers had found “that if a colour coupler is 
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binders.” Kodak Limited, “Improvements in colour photographic materials,” British Patent 524,154, filed 
January 23, 1939, and issued July 31, 1940, 1. Mannes and Godowsky used this technology and improve 
it in their American patent 2,304,939 issued in 1942. 
132 “9653/40: Dr. Staud points out that the compounds usually desensitise […].” Branch, Memorandum 
of discussion with Dr. Martinez at the Internment Camp, 1. 
133 About everyday life of Italian internees on the Isle of Man see Lucio Sponza, “The internment of 
Italians 1940-1945,” in "Totally un-English"?: Britain's internment of "enemy aliens" in two world wars, 




ribbon-like materials, typewriter equipment, Dictaphone or telegraphic machines. It 
indicates some evidence of scientific collaboration between Martinez and the Research 
Laboratory at Rochester.134 In the letter accompanying his communication Martinez 
reminded Crowther that his relief process had already been studied by the American 
Kodak researchers and that “it proved successful even to making the castings for the 
lenticular colour process.” He also emphasised the ability of the invention to 
contribute to the making of geographical maps in relief. His idea was to help to the war 
effort, as a large number of maps was required. For Martinez, it was also the 
opportunity to ask for help. 
If we put ourselves together and I am allowed to work with your people in your 
factory, in no time we could produce good samples for trials for the military and 
the Air Force, and in no time we could organize production in large scale.135 
The Italian inventor had probably overestimated Kodak’s power over military 
authorities, and his situation did not change.136 
For Eastman Kodak, more than innovative technologies of photographic relief, 
application 9657/40 remained high on the priority list. However, Martinez’s personal 
situation complicated the bureaucratic initiatives of the British Kodak staff.137 In fact 
Branch and Crowther were working in close collaboration with their American 
                                                     
134 “Colour reliefs. Dr. Alexander Murray, who worked [at] this relief of mine in Rochester, expressed the 
opinion, which Dr. Mees shared, that just relief still pictures, colourless or black and white, were not 
possibly a proposition of commercial importance, but that if colour could be added, then the 
proposition would become of real magnitude. I have evolved in full the process to obtain this, but 
although it is still incredibly simple in manufacture and in use […] I am unable to write it fully in 
conditions obtaining in camp, nor would I risk to put down in an abridged form or in haste the novel 
principle involved.” Michele Martinez, “A communication to Messrs Kodak Ltd and to the Eastman 
Kodak Company of U.S.A.”, April 24, 1941, ref. A1737, box 153, KCA-BL, 8-9. 
135 Martinez to Crowther, Metropole Internment Camp n°2 in Douglas, Isle of Man, April 24, 1941, ref. 
A1737, box 153, KCA-BL. 
136 The supply to the military during the Second World War would be an interesting line of arguments to 
follow. The Kodak Collection Archive may contain other evidence of such potential collaboration with 
the American military. However, this subject goes beyond the scope of my thesis and cannot be studied 
here. Concerning the supply to the American military during the First World War, we have more 
information available. See for example Mees, From Dry Plates to Ektachrome Film, 55-57. 
137 From 1940, the sudden interest and hostility of the British government toward Italian immigrants, 
whatever their particular background, caused many problems to the international exchange of 




counterparts at Rochester. In Rochester, Newton Perrins was the Head of the Patent 
Department of Eastman Kodak and the three men frequently corresponded.138 The 
flows of their exchange of knowledge can be summarised in Figure 9. At the end of 
March 1941, Perrins requested Martinez’s signature from Branch for the American and 
Canadian applications concerning the British application 9657/40. Crowther had to 
write directly to the Commandant of the Metropole Camp to get the papers signed and 
formalised.139 In June 1941, Branch started to prepare the complete specification from 
the provisional specification already provided by Martinez. He expressed some 
hesitation as to the correct method necessary to change the initial explanations of the 
inventor. “Shall we “clean-up” the pro[visional]. (…) Martinez might accuse us of 
something if we alter his wording at all.”140 Branch had also some difficulties 
understanding Martinez’s rationale through his provisional. He provided a draft of the 
complete to Crowther but with some reservations. “At the places marked in red I 
either cannot understand at all what he means or am doubtful whether my 
amendments are correct. Can you specially consider these.”141 Finally the application 
9657/40 was sent for approval by Kodak Limited to the British Patent Office but 
Martinez received a negative answer in July 1941. The examiner objected to the initial 
title of the application, requested a reference to the literature about some processes 
and chemical compounds and also refused the presence within the text of some 
                                                     
138 Newton M. Perrins was hired by Eastman Kodak as an assistant patent attorney in 1917. He directed 
the Patent Department of the Company from 1928 to 1949, when he relinquished the active 
management to Daniel I. Mayne. In 1947 he was named a member of the National Patents Council. He 
died in 1953 at the age of 69. See “Newton M. Perrins,” Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office 
Society 35, no. 12 (December 1953): 887; “Kodak man appointed to U.S. Patents Council,” Kodakery 5, 
no. 25 (26 June 1947): 2. 
139 “The papers for both the applications should be signed by Dr. Martinez before a Notary Public. As 
there is no United States Consulate in the Isle of Man, the papers will have to go to Liverpool for 
legalisation of the Notorial signature at the Consulate there.” Crowther to the Commandant of 2 
Metropole Camp, Douglas, Isle of Man, April 15, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. See also Perrins to 
Branch, March 28, 1941, ibidem. 
140 Branch to Crowther, “Martinez British 9657/40,” June 4, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. The pro 
means the provisional specification. 




registered trademarks such as Ozobrome, Agfacolour or Dufaycolour.142 In October 
1941 the application was changed and re-sent to the Patent Office but the examiner 
still refused it for similar reasons.143 
In the meantime, Martinez insisted during the summer 1941 that Eastman Kodak 
consider his other applications 9651/40, 9653/40 and 9656/40 again. For Martinez, the 
invention contained in the application 9651/40 would solve every drawback of the 
Chromatone process, a method of colour printing developed by the Defender Photo 
Supply Corporation.144 Martinez summarized the others applications under three 
inventions. The first was a colour process derived from the principles of the colour 
inherent to relief that the inventor wanted to apply to processes working with fast 
bromide emulsions. The second was a new photographic paper providing constant 
sepia colour after development independent of the exposure time and strength of the 
developer. The third invention involved an anticipatory technology of dry development 
of photographic materials. 
Absolutely dry, not semi-dry, and nothing to do with mercury vapours nor with 
ammonia fumes. A revolution, literally, […] of which I cannot sufficiently 
emphasize the repercussions specially on the cinematograph processing trade.145 
Martinez also clarified that these inventions were based on experiments made in the 
past several years and still fresh in his memory. To finish the research work he 
requested a collaboration with the Kodak researchers and a short stay at Rochester: 
“Oh, if only I could go to U.S.A. for a short time. It should be possible for Dr. Chapman 
                                                     
142 Patent Office to Martinez, July 20, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
143 Patent Office to Crowther, October 28, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. It is difficult to speculate 
on the potential politics played by the patent office and the examiner. Martinez was collaborating with a 
British subsidiary of an American company, but his Italian nationality may have worked against him. 
144 “The people in the E.K.Co. in Rochester must not have tried the true-colour processing contained in 
my 9651/40 and further detailed in the notes I attached to it […].” Martinez to Crowther, August 21, 
1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL, 2. 
145 Ibid., 4. It is unfortunately impossible to determine the innovative technology of dry development 




to obtain that, through the diplomatic representatives here, if he really desired it.”146 
Martinez also expressed a fear of watching his inventions pillaged by enemy countries 
during this period of war, and suggested postponing the disclosure of the patent 
relating to the application 9657/40. “Would it not be preferable to record matters at 
present, for you to keep in option but in abeyance until the world and patents are safe 
?”147 Crowther forwarded Martinez’s letter to Perrins and Chapman and the inventor’s 
proposal was followed, and the publication delayed. But it appears that Eastman 
Kodak did not try to arrange a visit to Rochester for Martinez in the following months. 
Despite Martinez’s supplication, he was forced to remain captive on the Isle of Man 
during much of the Second World War.148 
In any event, Crowther and Branch’s mission still remained to present an amended 
application 9657/40 to the British Patent Office. To this end Branch requested some 
additional explanations to Martinez in November 1941 as the examiner himself could 
not understand a specific point of the application. It concerned the example 2 for 
which three layers produced after the initial development a yellow plus silver image, a 
red plus silver image and a silver image. The film was then bleached and treated with a 
colour coupler developing solution. Branch thought that the result should be a yellow 
plus blue-green, a red plus blue-green and blue-green, thus giving an incorrect colour 
reproduction as described before in the application.149 Martinez replied to Branch by 
providing a clearer explanation of the theoretical mechanisms of the process. In fact, 
following the development of Martinez’s emulsion with a colour agent, the quantity of 
                                                     
146 Ibid., 5. During the war Dr. Albert Kinkade Chapman (1890-1984) was the vice-president and general 
manager of the Eastman Kodak Company.  In 1951 he became president and chairman of the board 
from 1962 to 1967. This time again, Martinez’s wish was not fulfilled. 
147 Ibid., 6. 
148 In the same letter, Martinez stressed the advantages of an improved scientific collaboration at 
Rochester: “Again I wonder, is it not possible for me just to have only a few months’ work in U.S.A., or 
simply personal communications with the E.K.Co., so that I may do, show and say all I have to do, show 
and say? Personal contact only, and discussion, can give the measure of innovations of real value. I have 
not the slightest doubt that it would be very relevant the advantage to the E.K.Co. I have no desire to 
force myself on the Company, only give them benefit of what I have of paramount importance.” Ibid., 6. 
149 “However, if you could send us an explanation which would satisfy the Examiner, we could reinsert 




silver formed in the location of the colour agent was entirely insignificant. Thus after 
the bleach the results in the layers would be “yellow with negligible traces of blue-
green, if any, […], red with again traces of blue-green, if any […]; blue-green.”150 As a 
result, example 2 was reinserted and later accepted by the Patent Office examiner. The 
last set of correspondence regarding the application 9657/40 was an increasingly 
fastidious discussion about specialised terminology in chemistry and physics. For 
instance one hesitation was about the terms hydrophilic and hydrophobic used in a 
claim, following a request from the examiner.151 Crowther suggested another terms 
such as water repellent or with a tendency to absorb water.152 In another discussion, 
Branch juggled with the subtle art of patent writing in which the inventor should not 
provide too much key data or, to achieve the same ends with a different method, 
should give a long list of chemicals that could potentially be used in a process. In this 
way the competitor would have to perform lengthy experimental work to be able to 
reproduce the equivalent process with the correct components.153 As a result of these 
revisions, the examiner154 was finally satisfied with the amended complete 
specification and the British Patent Office accepted it in February 1942.155 The 
document received the number 543,606 and it was legalised on 5 March.156 The 
narrative of this patent drafting process shows the connection of specific vocabulary 
                                                     
150 Martinez to Branch, November 27, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
151 “Dr. Davey gave us the opinion that ordinary collodion emulsions do absorb water to some extent, 
even if a very small extent. If this is correct it would perhaps seem that the words are not really suitable 
for the claims.” Branch to Crowther, December 19, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
152 Crowther to Branch, December 23, 1941, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
153 “In case “ammonium” is all that will work, I do not favour, substitute it by potassium, but say “alkali” 
which probably includes it.” Branch to Crowther, January 15, 1942, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
154 It is critical to understand the role of the examiner during the patent process because he is the third 
expert interlocutor as part of a scientific collaboration in the patent drafting process. Although I found 
sometimes the identity of these state employees through correspondence in the Kodak Collection 
Archive, further research would be necessary within the Patent Offices archives, if available, to increase 
our understanding of the examiner’s role. Such research goes beyond my own collection of data during 
my PhD. 
155 “We (…) have pleasure in informing you that the Examiner is now satisfied with the specification and 
it will be accepted finally today.” Branch to Martinez, February 3, 1942, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
156 Michele Martinez, “Improvements in colour photography,” British patent 543,606, filed June 3, 1940, 




formation to difficulties in clarifying the technical aspects of the patent and to the 
lengthy process of issuing patents. It also shows the difficulty for Martinez, source of 
the invention, to transfer his scientific knowledge to Branch and Crowther despite 
their knowledge of the photographic process. 
 
 
Figure 9. Scientific collaboration and exchange of knowledge during the drafting 
process of British patent 543,606 and its related American patent US 2,284,877. 
 
The final action in parallel with the British patent was to monitor the patent 
application in the United States of America, from the application signed by Martinez in 




long after obtaining the British patent it was also patented in 1942 by the United 
States Patent Office. When one compares the British and American patents, it is clear 
that the texts are slightly different. Although the examples and the photochemical 
description of the invention remain similar in substance, the total number of claims 
was reduced from 16 to 8 claims for the American patent. This change was made at 
the discretion of Perrins and his subalterns, who were responsible for the patent 
application in their country on behalf of Martinez. That difference proves that it was 
necessary to adapt the British patent literature to the American Patent Office and to its 
editorial practices. It also points out that the state of the art pertaining to Martinez’s 
technology likely differed between the two countries. For the inventor, his new 
invention embedded in the British patent 543,606 changed the previous technology of 
insulation of the sensitive grains, for which colour reactions occurred through localized 
particles as disclosed in the British patent 505,834. 
The object of my present invention is achieved by precipitating silver halide in the 
presence of a synthetic or natural resin, gum, or gum-resin, or similar substance, 
preferably of water-repellent properties, in such a way that the silver salt is 
formed within or in close physical association with the resin, which is the insulator 
of the grain so formed […].157 
  
Illustration 9. The resin acting as an insulator for the silver salt and the colour 
couplers in Martinez’ American patent 2,284,877.158 
 
This insulator as seen in Illustration 9 above, dispersed into the gelatin, then 
incorporated the colour couplers and the silver halide. 
                                                     
157 Michele Martinez, “Light sensitive color element,” American patent US 2,284,877, filed May 22, 1941, 
and issued June 2, 1942, 1. This description used the adjective water-repellent, a terminology also 
suggested later in the year 1941 by Crowther as seen above. 




In the Kodak Limited archive, there is a license between Martinez and the Eastman 
Kodak Company that was made and signed in April 1943. The inventor, namely the 
licensor, gave the licensee, that is Eastman Kodak, the sole and exclusive license 
related to the British patent 543,606 “in consideration of the sum of $2,000.”159 
However it is not clear whether Martinez had been released from the Isle of Man or 
not. In any case the British government did not detain him after 1944, as the 
Metropole Camp in Douglas was closed the first week of November 1944.160 After the 
war, Martinez reappeared, writing a letter to Branch from a hotel in New York. The 
deputy manager at Kodak had requested a simple authority with signature concerning 
Martinez’s patents. The Italian inventor had a new address in Los Angeles but was 
residing temporarily in New York for business. In his letter, Martinez expressed his 
sadness to Branch because he had been informed about Crowther’s death by Perrins 
some time ago.161 In January 1947, Martinez also sent to Branch a priority assignment 
signed and legalised by notary, for the Patents and Trade Marks Department to be 
allowed to fill a patent application in Czechoslovakia corresponding to the invention in 
patent GB505834.162 In the following years, all trace of Martinez’s was gradually lost. In 
1954, the time had come to think about the renewal of the Martinez patents. Branch 
wrote to Daniel Mayne, Perrins’ successor, with a short list of important British patents 
to consider. In the opinion of Branch, as Kodak Limited has “not made or imported into 
England any material made according to” the Martinez patent GB505834, it would be 
very difficult to convince the British Patent Office to extend the lifetime of the 
patent.163 Alongside this patent, Branch also considered the patent GB507841 of 
                                                     
159 License between Michele Martinez and the Eastman Kodak Company, April 1, 1943, ref. A1737, box 
153, KCA-BL. 
160 Connery Chappell, Island of Barbed Wire: Internment on the Isle of Man in World War Two (London: 
Robert Hale, 1984), 181. 
161 “What a loss! Crowther was the man I admired most. Not knowing it, I had in him the greatest friend 
I ever had. I cannot tell you adequately how I feel.” Martinez to Branch, Hotel New Yorker, August 5, 
1946, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 
162 Martinez to Branch, Beverly Hills, January 27, 1947, ref. A1728, box 152, KCA-BL. 





Mannes, Godowsky and Wilder for the original Kodachrome selective reversal 
process.164 In June 1954, the Patents and trade Marks Department of Kodak Limited 
sent two letters to Martinez regarding the decision not to renew his patent GB543606. 
Should the inventor want to keep the patent in force, he was asked to pay the renewal 
fee directly. Both letters were returned and the Department never managed to contact 
Martinez.165 
The last section of Chapter 4 introduces the research work of Karl Schinzel, having 
provided some scientific milestones to Eastman Kodak in the development of the 
Kodacolor system through the establishment of patents. It is important to introduce 
the scientific collaboration between Schinzel and Eastman Kodak at the end of this 
chapter because it complements the history of colour research undertaken by Eastman 
Kodak following the launch of three colour Kodachrome. The nature of the relationship 
between the inventor and Kodak was also different due to Schinzel’s Czech roots and 
his restless character, far from Martinez's personality. 
 
                                                     
164 This is the equivalent of the American patent US 2,252,718 already studied in this chapter, in which 
Wilder described his first improvement of the Kodachrome process as disclosed to Phillips during his 
stay in Rochester in 1938. 
165 The second letter sent to the Martinez’s address at Los Angeles was returned on 18 July 1955 with 
the mention “moved, left no address.” It appears that this is the last track of the Italian inventor in the 
Kodak archive at the British Library. Martinez’s dates of birth and death are unknown. Through the 
European Patent Office, I found his probable last patents. The British patent 770,959 was filed with the 
complete name “Michele Pasquale Luigi Martinez”. It entitled “Improvements in a photographic iron-
silver color process” and the patent was granted on 27 March 1957. The last patent of the same M. P.L. 
Martinez is the American patent US 2,886,435 about the similar iron-silver color process. It was granted 
on 12 May 1959 and it was noted that Martinez was the assignor to the Panacolor, Inc. Company. For 
more information about Panacolor, see Roderick T. Ryan, A History of Motion Picture Color Technology 




4.2.3. Scientific collaboration with Karl Schinzel and the Kodak 
Research Laboratory project in Switzerland  
 
The scientific collaboration between Schinzel and Eastman Kodak is a rich, lengthy and 
complex story, involving the project of creating an additional research laboratory in 
Europe. It goes beyond the preceding collaboration between Martinez and Eastman 
Kodak to better clarify the nature of innovation performed by the film manufacturer 
through its industrial research structure in Europe at the end of the 1930s. It confirms 
that some practices were similar to those used within the scope of “Open Innovation”, 
a concept that was defined in the introduction in section 1.2.5.3. It also complements 
our understanding of colour research undertaken by Kodak following the launch of 
three colour Kodachrome. For Eastman Kodak, Schinzel was alternately an 
independent photochemist like Martinez, an employed researcher at Rochester like 
Mannes or Godowsky and even the director of a new Kodak Research Laboratory 
project like Clark or Abribat. The large quantity of archive materials relating to 
Schinzel’s research work over a long period in the Kodak Collection archive confirms 
that the photochemist worked on the further improvement of colour photography 
from the release of the three-colour Kodachrome in 1935 onwards. 
It makes it all the more difficult to understand why Schinzel has been so absent in the 
history of Kodak research up to now. During his lifetime, Schinzel was granted 4 entries 
in Wall’s History of Color Photography in 1925 and 18 entries in Friedman’s book about 
the same topic in 1944. The two historians and photochemists pointed out that 
Schinzel was the first to suggest the technology of the monopack for the reproduction 
of colour in 1905.166 But this was only one aspect of Schinzel’s work in photochemistry. 
Before collaborating with Eastman Kodak he undertook independent research for 
instance about colour development, chemical toning, three-colour printing or mixed 
type emulsion with silver chloride and silver bromide. Friedman specified that in 1936 
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and 1937, Karl and his brother Ludwig Schinzel published a series of papers in the 
German journal Das Lichtbild in which they discussed the chemistry of primary colour 
development. The innovative technology provided by the papers was secured by 
Schinzel in a series of patent applications and assigned to Eastman Kodak.167 Recently, 
Rogers clarified that through one of these publications Schinzel was even the first to 
disclose the concept and mechanism of instant photography, which led to the 
innovative products of Polaroid Corporation.168 In the older literature, Douglas A. 
Spencer was one of the few Kodak managers to recognize Schinzel’s scientific 
contribution. In the Maxwell Centenary Discourse Spencer gave in 1961, the author 
provided a concise list of pioneers of colour photography. Schinzel was in this list for 
his theory of integral tripacks disclosed in 1905 beside Young, Maxwell, Ducos du 
Hauron, Traube, Fischer and Mannes and Godowsky. 
Schinzel was a sort of Austrian counterpart to the Frenchman, Du Hauron. In over 
50 patents he described in outline the various pathways along which this form of 
colour photography could be developed, but could do little more with the facilities 
available to him : colour photography had become a problem for chemists and 
engineers rather than physicists.169 
Spencer, who joined the Research Laboratory of Kodak Limited in 1939 and became 
managing director of the company in 1957, was the first professional scientist to hold 
this position and was therefore acutely aware of photographic research matters. He 
had worked before as a chemist at Colour Photographs Limited to improve the printing 
process of the company and knew the corresponding patents of Martinez, as has 
already been mentioned.170 Therefore it was no surprise that Spencer was perfectly 
aware of Schinzel’s research work in colour photography. However, the information 
                                                     
167 Friedman, History of Color Photography, 366. 
168 David Rogers, The Chemistry of Photography. From Classical to Digital Technologies (Cambridge: 
Royal Society of Chemistry, 2007), 202. The reference mentioned by Rogers was Karl Schinzel and 
Ludwig Schinzel, Photographische Industrie 34 (1936): 942. 
169 Douglas A. Spencer, “The first hundred years of colour photography,” The Photographic Journal 101 
(September 1961): 269, 272. 





about Karl Schinzel and his brother has only come from the patent literature and the 
analysis of periodicals up to now. Very little is known about Schinzel’s biography and 
above all about the period of collaboration with Eastman Kodak. It is worth further 
study to clarify the research work on colour photography through the prism of 
Schinzel’s life in the 1930s and around the Second World War, because it will ascertain 
the real contribution of Schinzel to Kodak Research from archival materials. 
They are only two fragmented but recent biographies of Karl Schinzel.171 The most 
complete one was published in the Czech magazine The Heart of Europe in 2006 on the 
occasion of the 120th anniversary of Schinzel’s birth. 172 Due to his Czechoslovakian 
roots, Schinzel was cited as having the first name Karel.173 When he patented his 
monopack process of Katachromie in 1905 he was only 19. Transferred to the Vienna 
branch of Hell & Co., a German chemical group, Schinzel was able to attend lectures on 
chemistry at the University of Technology and some evening courses. In 1912 he finally 
gained the title of engineer. He served in the Army during the First World War and 
resumed his education at the end of the conflict by working on a doctoral dissertation. 
In 1919, he received a doctorate in technical sciences about the manufacture of 
explosives at the University of Technology of Vienna. It is very likely that Schinzel 
attended some lectures of Joseph Maria Eder at the Research Institute of Graphic Art 
in Vienna.174 However, the author of the biography clarified that in 1922 Schinzel was 
                                                     
171 The first biography is from Gert Koshofer, “Schinzel, Karl,” Neue Deutsche Biographie 23 (2007): 1, 
accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/ppn139578617.html. See also Gert 
Koshofer, Farbfotografie 2 (München: Laterna magica, 1981), 11-15. 
172 Ludek Wünsch, “Karel Schinzel, An Inventor Crossed by Fate,” The Heart of Europe, no. 4 (2006): 16-
19.  
173 Born in 1886 at Edrovice in the actual Czech Republic in a modest family, the young Schinzel moved 
ten years later for the bigger city of Opava, in the heart of Czech Silesia. He started a two-year business 
school as he was supposed to take over the small family business. However, when he discovered the 
photographic medium in the beginning of the twentieth century, he developed a passion not only for 
the visual art but also for the photochemical mechanisms of the photographic process. He then worked 
as an accountant at Hell & Co., a chemical and drug manufacturer in Troppau. At this time he could not 
access a scientific education at the university but devoted most of his free time to the self-learning study 
of photographic processes, analysing the French, German and English literature on the topic. 





unsuccessful in a scientific proposal to a committee of experts for improving his 
monopack process. After this failure, Schinzel returned to Opava and began to work 
independently on colour photography with the help of his brother Ludwig, who 
assisted him for his photographic experiments. He worked for more than a decade on 
theoretical and experimental work on colour photography in a personal laboratory, 
without any link to academic circles or photographic film manufacturers.175 
The Schinzel brothers suddenly became renowned and respected photochemists in 
1936 after Ludwig convinced his brother to publish most of his many findings in 14 
papers in the German journal Das Lichbild.176 Coote briefly mentioned Schinzel’s 
contribution to colour photography and cited an article published in the British Journal 
of Photography in November 1939. In this article a list of forty patent specifications 
equivalent to around 200 printed pages was mentioned and for the author, “the 
specifications as a whole form an encyclopedia of information on materials for colour 
photography”.177 Unsurprisingly Schinzel’s research work attracted the attention of 
Eastman Kodak as well as its German competitor Agfa. Mees and his research team 
needed to react promptly to prevent the loss of Schinzel’s technology to Germany. It is 
unclear whether Schinzel was contacted first by Kodak Limited or directly by 
Rochester. Crowther and Branch stated later that they had known Schinzel since the 
autumn of 1936.178 According to Wünsch, Schinzel was finally invited at Kodak Park in 
Rochester in December 1936 and later to London.179 There is some evidence of 
Schinzel’s visit to Eastman Kodak at this date in some administrative files of the Kodak 
Collection archive. A retainer agreement between Schinzel and Eastman Kodak 
                                                     
175 Wünsch, “Karel Schinzel, An Inventor Crossed by Fate,” 16-17. I contacted by electronic message the 
author who is apparently the curator of the photographic collection at the Silesian Museum in Opava to 
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mentioned the employment agreement offered to the inventor and was signed on 23 
December 1936. Schinzel committed to begin work at the Kodak Research Laboratory 
from 1 July 1937. In return the manufacturer agreed to pay him the sum of £9164 
“with interest thereon at the rate of five percentum (5%) per annum from the date 
hereof to the date of payment […].”180 It is likely however that Schinzel came to work 
with the Kodak researchers only at the end of 1937, as his salary suggests.181 Before 
this close collaboration in the laboratories at Kodak Park, Schinzel had secured his 
findings by means of preliminary patent work.182 In the first part of 1937, Kodak 
researchers at Rochester studied the many applications that Schinzel had filed in 
Austria in May and July 1936. Schinzel’s work, although promising, was highly 
theoretical and it had to be integrated into the scientific and technological knowledge 
of the Kodak laboratories. Perrins reported this work of patent analysis from the 
Patent Department at Rochester in a letter to his counterpart Crowther from Kodak 
Limited. He also clarified the future strained relationship between Mannes, Godowsky 
and Schinzel at Kodak Park. As the inventors of Kodachrome were mentioned in the 
first article of Schinzel in Das Lichtbild as “zwei eingewanderten polnischen 
Musikanten”, Perrins noticed that the terminology was rather pejorative and the 
biographical data wrong.183 In September 1937, Branch visited his counterparts at 
Rochester. He reported that he was still working on Schinzel patent cases together 
with Vittum, Petersen and Wilder.184 
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not giving the best of their advice and opinions in order to obtain the best protection we can on what 
Dr. Schinzel has disclosed, they are not at all enthusiastic about his work from a practical standpoint.” 
The German mention “zwei eingewanderten polnischen Musikanten” means two immigrant Polish 
musicians but with a pejorative sense. Perrins to Crowther, “Off the record”, April 20, 1937, ref. A1251, 
box 89, KCA-BL. 




The research work of Schinzel done at Rochester is unfortunately not well documented 
in the Kodak Collection archive. In his later correspondence and scientific notes one 
can find some evidence of Schinzel’s mutual work with Kodak researchers such as 
Vittum, Petersen, Mannes and Godowsky.185 Finally, it seems adapting to teamwork 
was difficult for the temperamental Schinzel. Therefore a new kind of collaboration 
was progressively conceived and eventually proposed to Schinzel. The idea was to send 
the photochemist to pilot a new Research Laboratory in Europe. Apparently Schinzel 
was keen on this innovative concept and accepted the proposal. An agreement was 
made between him and Eastman Kodak, stating that he was “retained by Kodak not as 
an employee but as an independent researcher and consultant.” The contract specified 
Schinzel’s professional duties. 
D. Schinzel agrees that he will at once establish and will […] maintain and operate 
a laboratory in a European country satisfactory to Kodak and that he will in such 
laboratory faithfully and diligently devote his best efforts during said research 
period to such research and experimental work on color photography and 
chemical and photographic processes related thereto as he may be instructed by 
Kodak in writing to perform, and that he will devote thereto weekly the number 
of hours customary with research workers employed in industrial laboratories in 
such countries.186 
The researcher committed to preparing some samples and to providing some data, 
evidence or advice to the patent agents preparing the patent applications. Schinzel 
also committed to report “fully in writing to Dr. C.E.K. Mees, Director of Research from 
Kodak” about all experimental work, research, discoveries and inventions relating to 
colour photography carried on or made by him, his brother or any person employed by 
either of them.187 At the same time, Schinzel was supposed to grant to Kodak a non-
exclusive right and license relating to any potential invention and discovery for which 
he would have filed some patent applications or already received a patent. His brother 
Ludwig or potentially the employees of the laboratory would also be required to 
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comply with these rules. Finally, Schinzel committed to never disclosed an invention or 
discovery “to any third party” without Kodak’s permission. He also agreed that “he will 
not publish any articles about photographic subjects or chemical subjects related in 
any way to photography without first obtaining Kodak’s consent and approval in 
writing, signed by Dr. C.E.K. Mees […].”188 These structural constraints point out the 
strategic role of confidentiality in photographic invention as well as the protection 
gained from the patent system. A letter from Perrins the same year provided the 
financing agreed by Kodak to establish the new Research Laboratory. Schinzel was 
granted an annual salary of $6000 plus the expenses of his laboratory up to $4000. 
This rate was agreed for a period of five years but could be extended up to ten years. 
After this period of five or ten years Schinzel would be employed as a consultant at an 
annual salary of $2500. For any invention made during the period of agreement, 
Schinzel was granted a royalty of 2,5%.189 Perrins did not provide a complete 
explanation about this agreement but this rate was comparable to the rate obtained 
by Mannes and Godowsky in 1930, the value being equal and it is possible that it 
concerned 2.5% of the net selling price of motion picture films as well. The content of 
the agreement proves first that Eastman Kodak considered the collaboration with 
Schinzel in the very long-term, possibly over more than 10 years, anticipating all the 
potential of his theoretical inventions. Secondly, it points out that Eastman Kodak 
treated Schinzel on a level with Mannes and Godowsky. Therefore it is not only due to 
personal difficulties between him and the scientific staff of the Kodak Research 
Laboratory that Schinzel returned to Europe, as suggested by Koshofer in 2007.190 
Schinzel left Rochester on 29 November 1938 for Zürich in Switzerland where he had 
planned to open the Research Laboratory. Time passed, and the organisation of the 
new structure was not well advanced the following months. During the first semester 
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of 1939 Schinzel was working in close collaboration with Branch of Kodak Limited on 
patent applications and this additional scientific work may have diverted the 
independent researcher from his new supervisory function. First Branch and L.E. Jones, 
a chartered Patent agent in Liverpool working with Kodak Limited, met Schinzel in 
Zürich for three days in January 1939. From February to April Branch and Schinzel 
maintained an exhaustive correspondence about the patent applications. The 
correspondence between Schinzel and Branch in the first months of 1939 shows 
practically how an independent inventor transferred his knowledge of chemistry to the 
Kodak Patents and Trade Marks Department and to the Kodak Research Laboratory at 
Rochester. The letters also clarify the rationale and the strategy of the patent drafting 
process and the research activities required for that purpose.  
The Kodak Collection archive holds 14 letters written by Schinzel and sent to Branch 
from 4 February to 4 April 1939.191  Branch’s letters to Schinzel are not included in the 
file and it is unclear whether the set of Schinzel’s letters are complete or not. Schinzel 
was still in Switzerland, residing at the Hotel Plattenhof in the center of Zürich. The 
main topic of the letters was the filing of some patent applications for which Schinzel 
was the inventor, and at least two discussions about application work have been 
identified from the corpus of letter. The first one relates to one patent application in 
German and concerns more than the half of the corpus. According to my analysis of 
Schinzel’s patents, this German specification corresponds to the invention disclosed in 
British patent 498,663 on the development of multilayer photographic colour films. 
After the original British patent, a decision was taken to patent the technology in the 
United States of America and in Belgium, France and in the Netherlands.192  Due to the 
disruption of World War II, the German specification was probably not accepted as no 
                                                     
191 Karl Schinzel’s correspondence to Leslie E.T. Branch, 4 February to 4 April 1939, ref. A1726, box 152, 
KCA-BL. Some letters were labelled as “44/LETB/ IS” possibly by Schinzel himself. The last letter was 
labelled as “Schinzel letters RE503752” most probably by an archivist at Kodak Limited at an unknown 
date. 
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corresponding patent was found in my research. The second discussion identified was 
about the request from Eastman Kodak for the signature from Schinzel of an American 
application. The request would finally lead to the American patent 2,249,542 about 
phenolic and naphtolic couplers, which represent the last patent granted and 
identified from the collaboration between Eastman Kodak and Schinzel.193  
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Illustration 10. Schinzel’s letter to Branch on March 5, 1939, concerning the filing of 
an application.194 
                                                     




In his letters, Schinzel mentioned that he was not sure whether the filing of the 
application was necessary or not (see Illustration 10). 
It is designed as a “continuation in part” of Serial No. 151.811 filed July 3rd 1937 
in USA. Do I not risk a false oath, which would hinder me to return to U.S.A. ? The 
special properties of the couplers described in this new application has surely 
recognized somebody else, perhaps Dr. Petersen, or Mr. Lin[…], or Dr. Vittum or 
Mr. Mannes or Godowsky etc.195 
 Indeed all the patent work related to Schinzel’s letters was still issued from the initial 
Austrian applications that the inventor had filed in 1936, before leaving for Rochester. 
In 1939, even if most of Schinzel’s inventions were already patented through the 
collaboration with Eastman Kodak, the Austrian applications were still the “working 
document” from which Branch and Schinzel were frequently referring. Thus the first 
application 151.811 mentioned by Schinzel above was filed in July 1937, from the 
Austrian application filed in July 1936, and resulted in the patent US2249542 in July 
1941. Finally, Schinzel carefully inspected his Austrian application from 1936 and 
changed his mind: “I have found, that practically all the contents of the intended USA 
application is already contained in the mentioned Austrian application, so that I can 
sign with good conscience before the U.S.A. Consul (…) and I return you this 
application.”196 
Schinzel’s correspondence not only provides evidence of administrative patent work 
however. Through the letters, one also better understands how the inventor conceived 
his applications and what his practical constraints were during this period of intense 
political tension. In Zürich, he had no access to a photographic laboratory to work on 
the behaviour of certain chemical compounds through experimentation. But he was 
able to confirm the theory of his inventions by studying at the library and he 
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sometimes worked there before answering Branch’s request about chemical 
elements.197  The first letter is instructive because Schinzel, while discussing the 
methods of developing reversal colour films, made reference to his collaborative work 
at Rochester. He was for instance aware at the time of writing that the researcher Dr. 
Petersen was experimenting with some colour couplers at Kodak Park at the same 
period, in particular high molecular coupling components. As to the filter dyestuffs 
used in each layer, he reported that Vittum had advised him against using titanic 
ferrocyanide because it was not intense enough and Schinzel mentioned that uranyl 
ferrocyanide may be a better compound for this process. Apparently, the chemical 
fogging of layers had not been studied enough at Rochester according to Schinzel. 
All the fogging methods were denied by M[ess]rs. M[annes]. & God[owsky]., and 
they had already worked out a complicated process with intense green blue 
illumination from behind for the middle image. I must come to demonstrate within 
some weeks, that pure fogging is the best method […].198 
Three days later, Schinzel got in touch with Branch again about the fogging with 
ferrocyanide. Again, the letter contains evidence of Schinzel’s scientific collaboration 
at Rochester and proves the intense exchange of chemical knowledge between the 
most prominent actors of the American Kodak Research Laboratory and the 
independent photochemist.199 In the letters Schinzel also discussed the subtle strategy 
of the patent system. The inventor, despite his extensive experience with patent work, 
feared the possible risk created by the time gap between the filing of the provisional 
specification and the filing of the complete one. 
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I have remarked in the London Patent Library, there is a huge literature and 
uncertainty as to the “legal development” if in the meantime, before filing the 
complete specification, another is filing an application, comprising the new 
material contained in the complete specification.200 
In fact, some of his inventions were similar to the technology disclosed in two German 
patents that Agfa gained in May and June 1937. To avoid an infringement of the Agfa 
patents and the possible refusal of his application in Germany, he proposed to Branch 
to add a disclaimer to exclude the substances already described in the Agfa patents. 
Schinzel’s strategy was also to study the claims published in the Agfa patents to 
provide some additional innovation in his own claims. “Agfa has forgotten in claim 1 
line 16 : …stage an insoluble or almost or totally non-diffusing dyestuff component… I 
believe, my claim 3 in Austrian 7.7.36 is much more distinct !”201  Finally Schinzel 
suggested to Branch to start an opposition procedure against the Agfa patents due to 
its remarks about chemical elements. He also justified the possibility of opposition 
because he had published some of his findings in Das Lichbild before than Agfa sent its 
complete specification to the British patent office. Thus Agfa could have theoretically 
used Schinzel’s findings for its own British patent 468,946. This striking example of 
time management applied to patent strategy illustrates well the difficulties for an 
inventor or a research organisation to control the legal and official property of its own 
inventions. Apparently, as it has been previously discussed, all the patent work 
provided in the letters regarding the Schinzel patent application in Germany was 
unfruitful and no corresponding German patent was gained. 
During the summer 1939 Schinzel came to London to work with Branch and L.E. Jones. 
The inventor went back to Switzerland in August 1939. As Branch testified later, he 
“last saw Karl Schinzel during August 1939 when [he] left London to go to France”.202 
But on 16 September 1939, Schinzel sent a letter to Eastman Kodak from Germany 
indicating that he had been surprised there by the outbreak of the war and that he 
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might be obliged to perform military service.203 As a consequence, the Eastman Kodak 
managers finally decided to use an article of the retainer agreement signed with 
Schinzel to reduce his annual salary from $6000 to $2500.204 The probable failure of 
the creation of the Research Laboratory was not the only problem. The European 
Kodak network was unable to locate Schinzel, and the signature of the Schinzel 
brothers was still necessary to file nearly 22 divisional patent applications in Great 
Britain.205 
After Schinzel’s disappearance at the end of the year 1939, Perrins expressed his 
discouragement and suggested to stop “writing up these applications which could not 
be filed”, as it seemed impossible to have them signed by the inventor.206 On the other 
hand, the request to file the 22 divisional applications from the many claims of the 
original patent was a way for Eastman Kodak to secure the specific unclaimed 
inventions. As this patent work was postponed, the risk was that the original patent 
would be granted while the unclaimed inventions could be disclosed in applications 
filed by other researchers or companies. For his part, Branch suggested getting the 
signature of Ludwig, the brother of Karl Schinzel, through the German and 
Czechoslovakian subsidiaries of Eastman Kodak.207 However Schinzel reappeared in 
March 1940, by sending an application signed in a simple letter to the Dutch 
correspondents of the patent agent L.E. Jones in Liverpool. The form was dated the 
first March 1940 in Karl Schinzel’s handwriting and dispatched from Holland on 26th 
March.208 In April 1940, L.E. Jones was also informed that Schinzel sent a letter to their 
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German correspondents M. Breitung & Marsch in Berlin including an assignment 
signed and a new postal address in Vienna.209 A few weeks later, the Dutch 
correspondents L.E. Jones provided the 22 application forms signed by Schinzel, 
received in Holland from M. Breitung & Marsch.210 There was renewed hope at 
Eastman Kodak then and Branch planned to have other pending documents signed by 
Schinzel despite the procedural difficulties. This optimism was short-lived however. In 
the summer 1940, Mr. Sutherland of Kodak S.A. in Lausanne forwarded a letter from 
Schinzel clarifying the possibilities of communication with foreign countries. 
I beg to inform Kodak Limited in London that it is useless to send me anything to 
sign, because I should not be able to return it, all communications, also the indirect 
ones through neutral country being prohibited under the most severe penalties.211 
Perrins from the Patent Department at Rochester had also sent many papers for 
Schinzel to sign and, in the same letter, the inventor confirmed he had sent in May 
1940 nine American applications signed to Eastman Kodak. This exchange was still 
allowed as the United States of America had not yet entered the war.212 Branch 
reacted quickly to Schinzel’s remark, arguing it could be theoretically possible for an 
inventor in enemy territories to communicate through the British Patent Office to get 
documents signed. But he also suggested a second option to Perrins, that is to “get a 
Power of Attorney from Schinzel to sign on his behalf all patent applications in 
countries outside the United States”. With this subterfuge they could stop chasing the 
Schinzel brothers throughout most of Europe.213 Some days later Perrins confirmed 
that Rochester had received one power of attorney signed by Karl and Ludwig Schinzel 
in favour of a colleague of the chartered Patent agent L.E. Jones in Liverpool. Further 
paper work was thus made easier. From this point on, Schinzel’s correspondence with 
the Eastman Kodak agents during the Second World War discontinued, and the fate of 
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all Kodak correspondents becomes almost impossible to clarify from an analysis of the 
archive. Schinzel’s own fate will be revealed at the end of the section but most 
important, a clarification of his scientific contribution to colour photography has to be 
done through the analysis of his numerous patents. Doing so not only complements 
the prior research work of Mannes, Godowsky, Wilder or Martinez studied before but 
also stresses the crucial fact of gathering scientific knowledge through the making of 
patents. 
The complete study of the full patent work of Karl Schinzel has never been done 
before. The rare references citing Schinzel and his research work give only a partial list 













Title (complete) Eq. US Patent 
GB498663 Karl Schinzel 
09/05/1936 10/05/1937 
10/01/1939 
Improvements in Processes for the 
Production of dye images from 
photographic silver salt images 
US2295013 
US2172262 
GB498869 Karl Schinzel 
Process of Colour Photographic 
Development 
- 
GB498870 Karl Schinzel 
Process of Colour Photographic 
Development 
- 
GB498871 Karl Schinzel 
Process of Colour Photographic 
Development 
- 
GB498874 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Colour Photographic 
Elements 
- 
GB498875 Karl Schinzel Process of Colour Photography - 
GB499185 Karl Schinzel - 09/05/1936 
Process of and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB500716 Karl Schinzel 
09/05/1936 10/05/1937 10/02/1939 
Method of Colour Processing a Colour 
Photographic Element 
- 
GB500717 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Colour Photographic 
Elements and Processing thereof 
- 
GB500718 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Colour Photographic 
Elements 
- 
GB500719 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in the Production of multi-
layer Colour Photographs by Reversal 
- 
GB500720 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Processes for the 
Production of dye images from 
photographic silver salt images 
- 
GB500721 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in and relating to Three-
Colour Photography 
- 
GB500793 Karl Schinzel 
Process of and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB500794 Karl Schinzel 
Method for the Production of Colour 
Photographs 
- 
GB500795 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Colour Photographic 
Elements 
- 
GB500796 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in and relating to Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB500826 Karl Schinzel 






GB501000 Karl Schinzel Process of Colour Photography - 
GB501001 Karl Schinzel Process for Colour Photography - 
GB501002 Karl Schinzel 
Process of and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB501003 Karl Schinzel Process of Colour Photography - 
GB501040 Karl Schinzel 
not 
accepted 
Improvements in Colour Photographic 
Development 
- 
GB503752 Karl Schinzel 
07/07/1936 07/07/1937 11/04/1939 
Process of Colour Photography 
US2249542 
GB503814 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Three-Colour 
Photographic Materials 
GB503815 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in the Production of Natural 
Colour Photographs by Colour Development 
- 
GB503816 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Sensitive Material for 
Three-colour Photography 
- 
GB503817 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Sensitive Material for 
Three-colour Photography 
- 
GB503818 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Sensitive Material for 
Three-colour Photography 
- 
GB503819 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Sensitive Material for 
Three-colour Photography 
- 
GB503820 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Sensitive Material for 
Three-colour Photography 
- 
GB503821 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Sensitive Material for 
Three-colour Photography 
- 
GB503822 Karl Schinzel Process of Colour Photography - 
GB503823 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB503824 Karl Schinzel Process of Colour Photography - 
GB503825 Karl Schinzel 
Process and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB503826 Karl Schinzel 
Process and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB503827 Karl Schinzel 
Process and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB503939 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in Three-Colour 
Photographic Materials 
- 
GB503940 Karl Schinzel 
Improvements in the Production of Colour 






Process and Materials for Colour 
Photography 
- 
GB512559 Karl Schinzel 
03/12/1936 03/12/1937 
20/09/1939 
Improvements in and relating to Colour 
Photography 
US2249541 
GB512752 Karl Schinzel 25/09/1939 




K. and L. 
Schinzel214 
10/04/1937 09/04/1938 10/01/1940 




K. and L. 
Schinzel 
25/06/1937 27/06/1938 04/01/1940 
Photographic Films especially Colour Films 
bearing Sound tracks 
US2246013 
GB520173 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
- 27/06/1938 16/04/1940 
Photographic Films especially Colour Films 
bearing Sound tracks 
 
GB523296 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
- 06/09/1938 11/07/1940 




K. and L. 
Schinzel 
22/10/1937 22/10/1938 
30/05/1940 Production of Coloured Pictures US2227981 
GB521833 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
31/05/1940 
Production of Coloured Pictures  
GB521834 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
Production of Coloured Pictures - 
GB521835 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
Production of Coloured Pictures - 
GB521836 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
Production of Coloured Pictures - 
                                                     





K. and L. 
Schinzel 
Production of Coloured Pictures - 
GB521888 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
03/06/1940 Production of Coloured Pictures - 
GB524552 








K. and L. 
Schinzel 




K. and L. 
Schinzel 
04/09/1940 




K. and L. 
Schinzel 
Process of Making Natural Colour 
Photographs 
- 
GB533568 Karl Schinzel - 16/06/1939 17/02/1941 




















US2295013 Karl Schinzel 
09/05/1936 29/04/1937 
08/09/1942 
Method of Developing Multilayer 
Photographic Color Films GB498663 
US2172262 Karl Schinzel 05/09/1939 Ultraviolet Filter in multilayer Film 
US2249542 Karl Schinzel 07/07/1936 03/07/1937 
15/07/1941 




US2249541 Karl Schinzel 03/12/1936 02/12/1937 
Production of natural Color Photographs by 




K. and L. 
Schinzel 
10/04/1937 07/04/1938 16/12/1941 Color Print by multiple Color Development GB516719 
US2246013 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
25/06/1937 18/06/1938 17/06/1941 Color Sound Film 
GB516536 
GB520173 
US2227981 Karl Schinzel 22/10/1937 21/10/1938 07/01/1941 




US2276254 Karl Schinzel - 14/06/1940 10/03/1942 Color Photography GB533568 
US2193011 Karl Schinzel 
09/05/1936 
30/12/1938 21/03/1940 Colored Photographic Image - 
US2206126 Karl Schinzel 29/04/1937 02/07/1940 Photographic Color Developer - 
US2226639 Karl Schinzel 29/04/1937 31/12/1940 Color Photography - 
US2231684 Karl Schinzel - 29/04/1937 11/02/1941 
Monopack Film sensitized with layers 
containing different silver halides 
- 
US2306410 Karl Schinzel 07/07/1936 03/07/1937 29/12/1942 Color Development - 
US2263012 Karl Schinzel 23/12/1937 17/12/1938 18/11/1941 
Process for making Natural Color 
Photographs 
- 
US2266443 Karl Schinzel 09/05/1936 08/12/1938 16/12/1941 Semipermeable Layer for multi-layer Film - 
US2213745 
K. and L. 
Schinzel 
06/09/1937 19/08/1938 03/09/1940 Making Silver-free Three-Color Prints - 
US2356475 Karl Schinzel 07/07/1936 24/03/1939 22/08/1944 
Phenolic and Naphtholic Couplers 
containing Sulphonamide Groups 
- 
 





Apart from the secondary sources already cited, the recent Timeline of Historical Film 
Colors published online by Barbara Flueckiger was helpful as a start for an incomplete 
set of Schinzel’s patents. Some of the patents were listed in a publication by Adrian 
Cornwell-Clyne in 1951. For the rest of the patents attributed to Karl Schinzel alone or 
with his brother Ludwig, I analysed the database of the European Patent Office also 
available online. I performed a double search for which Schinzel was either the 
applicant of the patent, or the official inventor. In this manner the list of Schinzel’s 
patents was completed and the inventions for which a British patent as well as an 
American patent were granted were also identified.215 
In almost all Karl and Ludwig Schinzel’s patent literature, some mention was made of a 
“convention date” in Austria, which always pre-dates the specification application (see 
Tables 9 and 10). In the patent system, this “convention date” makes reference to the 
Paris Convention priority right of the inventor.216 This procedure allows the claimant to 
file an application in a contracting State of the Paris Convention so that the filing date 
will be recognised by all the other member countries. Then the inventor has to file a 
subsequent application within a specific period from the first filing in the countries 
where he wants to request a patent. Practically, Schinzel used this method in Austria 
when he started to publish the description of his research work in Das Lichtbild in 1936. 
This way his inventions were secured, provided that he kept on working on the writing 
of the patent applications. As Schinzel’s Austrian applications were filed before the 
inventor was invited by Eastman Kodak to Rochester, and due to the large amount of 
scientific findings, Schinzel’s strategy was highly risky. It is unlikely that Schinzel, 
operating alone without the collaboration of the staff of the Eastman Kodak Patents and 
Trade Marks Departments, would have been able to produce this extensive patent 
                                                     
215 Barbara Flueckiger, “Kodachrome Reversal,” Timeline of Historical Film Colors, University of Zurich, 
accessed September 20, 2015, http://zauberklang.ch/filmcolors/timeline-entry/1277/#; Adrian 
Cornwell-Clyne, Colour Cinematography (London: Chapman & Hall, 1951), 427-451; European Patent 
Office, “Espacenet Patent Search,” http://worldwide.espacenet.com/advancedSearch?locale=en_EP.  
216 The treaty of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was signed in Paris on 20 
March 1883. The contracting member countries constitute the Union for the protection of industrial 
property. The United Kingdom became a member in 1884, the Austria in 1909 and the United States of 




literature. In an ontological sense, the teamwork with Eastman Kodak acted as a 
collaboration revealing Schinzel’s research work and inventions. It is peculiar that 
despite this mutual development of scientific facts and inventions in the field of colour 
photography, Schinzel’s contribution to photographic science has not emerged and has 
remained confined within the paragraphs of patents. 
Admittedly, Schinzel’s theoretical work that could be found in his Austrian applications 
was not within the reach of midrange photochemists dealing with standard black and 
white photography. In fact the inventor synthesised years of photographic research by 
compiling specialised literature, photographic patents and his own chemical 
experimentation in the laboratory. Schinzel represents a turning point in understanding 
the activities of the Kodak Research Laboratories. From his contribution to colour 
photography the understanding of his research work becomes more difficult and the 
degree of expertise rises significantly. The patents and work of Mannes, Godowsky, 
Wilder or Martinez for instance were more intelligible in comparison for the 
interactional expert, whereas Schinzel’s work requires an analysis from a contributory 
expert, according to the definition of Collins and Evans.217 My interactional expertise 
was enough as well to analyse the many Harrow Research reports and to sort them out 
into several categories in chapter 3. But the Schinzel literature, principally made of pure 
scientific knowledge, exceeded the limits of my own expertise to be able to state 
whether or not an innovation that can be found in a patent is significant to colour 
photography. Thus this in-depth analysis from a contributory expertise will not be 
undertaken within the framework of my research and I will rather clarify some scientific 
and technological processes involved in Schinzel’s patents that echo the methods and 
processes used at that time by the Kodak Research Laboratories. 
A tally of the British patents resulting from the Austrian applications filed on 9 May and 
7 July 1936 proved that Coote’s reference in 1993 was right218 : 41 patent documents 
                                                     
217 Collins and Evans, The third wave of science studies, 254. Interactional and contributory expertise 
have been studied in sections 1.2.4. and 3.2.1. 




were found, one patent receiving the British number 501,040 but with the mention 
“application void” and the specification refused. From this batch of British patents, only 
three resulted in American patents. It does not necessarily mean that only these later 
American patents would have been used for the production of colour film. Indeed the 
existence of the patent is not always linked with the immediate need of its embedded 
invention for production, but also to protect innovative technology from use by an 
industrial competitor. In the first British patent 498,863, Schinzel disclosed a method of 
removing the metallic silver during the colour development without removing the dye 
associated with it. The dye was rendered insoluble and was prevented from diffusing 
through the adjacent layers by treating the image with a precipitant for the dye before 
removal of the silver.219 In the related American patent 2,172,262 Schinzel studied in 
particular the selective development of a colour photographic element with three 
gelatino-silver halide emulsion layers and additional filter layers absorbing ultra-violet, 
within the framework of a three-colour reversal development. The purpose was to be 
able to expose the element to ultra-violet light to develop a particular layer with no 
incidence in the other ones. The yellow and ultra-violet filters were used to divide of the 
spectrum in the intermediate layers. Schinzel also provided some examples of re-
exposures with lights of different nature (red, blue, yellow, ultra-violet, X rays etc.). The 
invention was used to improve the colour rendering of the colour monopack. 
                                                     






Illustration 11. Drawings of Schinzel’s American patent US 2,295,013, on the cover. 
 
In the related American patent 2,295,013 the technology of selective re-exposure within 
the same context of reversal development is defined even better.220 However in all 
                                                     
220 “The steps of re-exposing one of the exterior layers to light of a color absorbed by the filter between 
the re-exposed layer and the middle layer, developing an image in color in such re-exposed layer, re-
exposing the other of the exterior layers to light of a color absorbed by the filter between such other 
layer and the middle layer, developing an image in a second color in such re-exposed layer, rendering 




claims the middle layer was always rendered chemically developable and Schinzel did 
not disclose a similar technique with particular light exposure (see Illustration 11). In this 
latest of Schinzel’s inventions there is a similarity with the selective reversal process 
studied and worked out by Wilder, Phillips and other Kodak researchers in 1938. 
Therefore it is necessary to point out that Wilder’s research work on the new colour 
processing of Kodachrome in 1938 was influenced by Schinzel’s technology of selective 
re-exposure in particular.221 This remark confirms the significant role of the patent 
system in the transfer of scientific knowledge. It also stresses that the development of 
an innovation can be enriched by preceding innovations. 
In the British patents that also resulted from the first batch of Austrian applications, 
Schinzel disclosed some data about the chemical nature of the developing agents 
applied to colour development (498,869, 498,871) and discussed the principle of colour 
development itself, which consists in converting a colour component silver salt image 
into a dye image with a developing solution (498,870). In the British patent 498,874 
Schinzel provided a new development of the selective re-exposure process of either 
reverse silver halide images or silver salt images obtained by reconversion of silver 
images.222 With this innovation, the other emulsions were unaffected during the re-
exposure of the specific emulsion. To this end Schinzel insisted on the use of an infra-
red sensitiser. Concerning the nature of the dyes, the inventor also disclosed his findings 
about a special developer consisting of an alkaline solution or suspension of a leuco vat 
dye. This developer, as explained in the British patent 498,875, was used to convert a 
colour component silver salt image into a dye image. The leuco form of the dye was 
colorless and water-soluble but became coloured and insoluble after oxidation. Thus 
                                                     
layer.” Karl Schinzel, “Method of developing multilayer photographic color films,” American patent US 
2,295,013, filed April 29, 1937, and issued September 8, 1942, 11. 
221 It is a pity that the Kodak Collection Archive did not reveal some evidence of teamwork between 
Wilder and Schinzel, during Schinzel’s stay at Rochester. 
222 “This is done by giving one of the emulsions a sensitivity to light outside the region it is destined to 
record and to which it is sensitized, such as to infra-red light, by means of another sensitizer which is 
stable to developing or developing and oxidizing baths.” Karl Schinzel, “Improvements in colour 
photographic elements,” British patent 498,874, filed May 10, 1937 (in United Kingdom), and issued 




after the residual silver was removed the dye remained in the layer. The British patent 
500,716 disclosed the use of organic mercaptans and coloured mercaptides, some 
innovative chemical components of the period that proved useful for the production of 
coloured images.223 The mercaptides produced were orange-coloured and Schinzel 
stressed that the invention did not require the exposure of the silver halide to light in 
the middle layer, which was particularly convenient for a monopack made of three 
differentially coloured sensitised silver halide emulsions coated on a single support. This 
patent was followed by 14 other British patents all granted the same day on 10 February 
1939. 
The subsequent set of 18 patents provided from the second set of Austrian applications 
filed on 7 July 1936. The first British patent 503,752 is remarkable as it clarified partially 
the Schinzel‘s research method. The inventor disclosed chemical formulas of developers 
and coupling components necessary for the colour development of double or triple 
layers monopacks. The patent document contains no less than 42 pages including some 
tables that “give examples of compounds indicated”, and references to publications in 
which the specific compound was studied.224 These endless lists of examples, issued 
from years of literature review, were also a way of submerging the reader with chemical 
formulas and to make a convenient selection of chemical compounds almost impossible 
to a competitive researcher. It is sometimes difficult to understand the relationship 
between British and American patents, since for instance the situation of the British 
patent 503,752 above was linked by the European Patent Office to the American patent 
2,249,542. It involved a method of multilayer monopack colour development rather 
than a list of developers and couplers. The author provided some information only about 
the coupling developers and also some examples about the chemical nature of the 
                                                     
223 “It has now been found that the coloured mercaptides formed by reaction between metallic salts, 
especially silver salts, and organic mercaptans or their alkali metal or ammonium salts are suitable for 
the production of coloured images useful in the colour processing of a multi-layer colour photographic 
element […].” Karl Schinzel, “Method of colour processing a colour photographic element,” British 
patent 500,716, filed May 10, 1937 (in United Kingdom), and issued February 10, 1939, 1. 





couplers. For this process the couplers were integrated in the photographic layers and 
not added during the development. It was made of insoluble or non-diffusing 
compounds that formed “a colored image by coupling with the oxidation product of a 
primary aromatic amino coupling developing agent”.225 Schinzel hid from the reader that 
it was necessary for the process that the couplers did not diffuse during the coating of 
the emulsions or during the development. This information points out the theoretical 
character of this invention. 
Sixteen other British patents issued from the Austrian applications of July 1936 follow. 
All relate to Schinzel’s research work before his collaboration with Eastman Kodak. It is 
more interesting to go over to the set of British and American patents from the 
Rochester period in 1937-1938, because it is directly linked with Schinzel’s period of 
scientific collaboration on-site. It represents 17 British patents and 4 American patents 
and for the majority of them, Ludwig Schinzel is also mentioned with his brother as the 
co-author of the invention.226 In the American patent 2,249,541 Schinzel disclosed new 
information about the colour development of a monopack film including the couplers 
in the layers. In 17 pages the inventor illustrated all the possibilities of chemical 
reactions with the detail of the chemical compounds used. The couplers were in fact 
coupling derivatives of a dye compound and for Schinzel the definition of these critical 
elements in the colour process was important for the comprehension of the 
invention.227 Another patent clarified the nature of some of these couplers and 
pointed out the difficulty of adding those made of insoluble salts into the emulsion as 
                                                     
225 Karl Schinzel, “Rehalogenation process of color photography,” American patent US 2,249,542, filed 
July 3, 1937, and issued July 15, 1941, 1. 
226 Although Ludwig Schinzel probably assisted his brother Karl during the Interwar period for laboratory 
work and or publications in journals, his faithful contribution did not interfere with Karl Schinzel’s pure 
research work. All indications lead to believe that Ludwig was not with Karl at Rochester between 1937 
and 1938 and it is therefore peculiar to find his name in the patents of that period. One reason of this 
co-authoring could be the direct receipt of sums relating to patent rights in a European bank through 
Ludwig Schinzel. 
227 Schinzel described couplers as “dyes or dye derivatives such as the reduced form of anthraquinone 
which are combined with, or contain, a group which couples with the oxidation product of an aromatic 
amino photographic developer.” In several claims, the photographic developer was the paraphenylene 
diamine. Karl Schinzel, “Production of natural color photographs by intermediate dye coupling,” 




they can crystallize.228 Furthermore Schinzel did not neglect to undertake research on 
the sound track and its development in a colour monopack. In the American patent 
2,246,013, the strategy was to control the diffusion of the developing solutions 
through the nature of the gelatin. Two general layers were used. In the first one made 
of soft gelatin and containing silver chloride the picture image was printed and 
developed in a weak developer. In the second one made of harder gelatin containing 
sensitive silver bromide the sound track image was printed and developed in a strong 
developer. One understands from these descriptions of Schinzel’s technologies that at 
that time the photochemist had to deal with several recurring characteristics of the 
chemical compounds. First of all their nature which implies their selection or rejection 
according to the advance of organic and colloidal chemistry. Secondly their solubility in 
pure water or other aqueous substances, and the ability to fix a compound in a layer or 
remove it during the development. But also the physical nature of the compound was 
important to control, that is to say its colour: beyond its intrinsic spectral sensitivity, a 
chemical compound also performed in some processes as a colour filter, for instance 
blocking some of the visible spectrum to remove any lighting effect on the adjacent 
layers. All this, including the presence or absence of coupling compounds into the 
layers, generated a new science of colour photography that very few scientists were 
able to master and develop. 
From the set of patents above, Branch mentioned at the end of 1939 four British 
patent applications that would result in four of these patents. At this time, the Kodak 
staff had no news from Schinzel and in his statutory declaration, Branch testified to 
Schinzel’s faithfulness towards Eastman Kodak.229 In the Schinzel patents inventory, 
the last identified British patent specification was signed by Schinzel in June 1939 and 
                                                     
228 In the American patent 2,266,442, Schinzel disclosed the nature of some couplers: an aryl hydrazide 
including its chemical structure, an aryl hydrazide of aceto-acetic acid, an aryl hydrazide of α-naphtol 
carboxylic acid or some insoluble salts of varied compounds. 
229 “He often had informed me that he wishes to continue to work for the E.K.Co. Karl Schinzel made it 
clear to me beyond all doubt that he wished W.P. Thompson & Company to file application 31061/39 
(Case 5).” Statutory declaration of Leslie E.T. Branch, n. d., ref. A1251, box 89, KCA-BL. Leonard E. Jones, 
the chartered Patent agent of Kodak Ltd., was working at W.P. Thompson & Company. The British 




the equivalent patent 533,568 was granted in February 1941. The related American 
patent 2,276,254 was granted in June 1942 and its specification filed in June 1940. In a 
brief letter, Perrins informed one Kodak Limited chartered patent agent that he had 
received from Kodak Lausanne the corresponding US patent application signed by 
Schinzel on 22 May 1940.230 Although the patent work seemed to continue from the 
Schinzel specifications during the Second World War, no additional Schinzel patent was 
identified as later than the American patent 2,276,254. Branch, Perrins and the rest of 
the Kodak staff did not know if Schinzel would survive the war. But after all, work on 
his specifications was not wasted time according to Crowther. 
I feel our appeal (…) would be considerably strengthened if we could put before 
Schinzel, at the appropriate time, the evidence of our acts of goodwill in piloting 
his Patents through in his absence and of doing everything we could to keep them 
alive.231 
Of course this work was not done unselfishly and the objective was the gaining of 
exclusive licenses under Schinzel’s patents. But paradoxically the terrible constraints of 
the war and the arm-wrestling contest about intellectual property of Schinzel’s 
inventions allowed a successful conclusion to the inventor’s patent work. 
Karl Schinzel survived the Second World War. Some letters in the Kodak Collection 
Archive clarify the fate and role of the photochemist during the war, from his point of 
view. In the summer 1939, he left London for Rotterdam with a Dutch steamer to 
better comprehend “the development of the political situation”. Suspected as a 
German spy by the Dutch harbour police, he was deported to Germany with two 
German professors of the University of Oxford and London. After this he remained 
under the control of the German authorities.232 According to Wünsch, he worked for 
the manufacturer Zeiss-Ikon in Berlin in 1942 but, as the city was regularly bombed by 
the Allies, he was allowed to go back to Vienna in 1943.233 As soon as the war came to 
                                                     
230 Perrins to Thompson, June 7, 1940, ref. A1251, box 89, KCA-BL. 
231 Crowther and Branch to Perrins, January 29, 1940, ref. A1251, box 89, KCA-BL, 5. 
232 Schinzel to Branch, August 28, 1947, ref. A1251, box 89, KCA-BL. 




an end, Schinzel contacted Kodak Limited again and sent a first letter to the deputy 
chairman William Webb in July 1945. He never gave up the idea of the new Research 
Laboratory and wanted to express his complete loyalty towards the pre-war project.234 
However, the situation had dramatically changed after the war. Schinzel was informed 
that Webb suddenly died in April 1943 and his many requests in July 1945 were sent to 
Hargrave, the new president of Eastman Kodak from 1941.235 Cash reserves of 
industries like Kodak and its subsidiaries were much reduced and it seems that the 
Swiss Research Laboratory project was progressively abandoned, and no definite 
answer was sent to Schinzel. Even worse for the inventor, his personal laboratory and 
his specialised library in the family house in Baden near Vienna were vandalised and 
partially destroyed by the Russian army in April 1945. Schinzel lost years of data 
collection in the field of photography. As he remained in contact with Kodak Limited up 
to his death, he regularly requested some photographic journals or patents from 
Branch. In 1949, Schinzel was still working on a new process. In a letter to the inventor, 
Branch indicated that he had studied the corresponding applications with the Dutch 
Patent agents of Kodak Limited for what he named the elimination coupling process. As 
Schinzel had suggested to Branch some experiments about the process, the Kodak 
manager confessed his helplessness in this matter.  
We are not allowed to do colour research at Harrow without first asking Rochester, 
because this work is centralised in the laboratories in Rochester, which is the only 
place having the proper facilities. However, I wrote to Rochester last week 
explaining in full our difficulties and I think that they will help us to solve them 
[…].236 
This last research was apparently never fulfilled. Karl Schinzel died suddenly on 23 
November 1951 and over the following years his brother Ludwig corresponded from 
                                                     
234 “Please to make yourself a petition to the Swiss Government in Bern, that your House has a great 
interest that a Research Laboratory should be established for the inventor of the modern Kodachrom 
film, which was planned already before the war, and the respecting petition was filed be me 1. May 
1939.” Schinzel to Webb, July 26, 1945, ref. A1251, box 89, KCA-BL, 1. 
235 Page to Schinzel, September 17, 1945, Page to Hargrave, September 17, 1945, ref. A1251, box 89, 
KCA-BL. 




time to time with Branch, requesting some copies of Karl’s letters to his Kodak Limited 
quasi-colleagues. This was the end of a long-term scientific collaboration. 
 
4.3. Conclusion of Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 opened with a chronological and technological narrative about the all-round 
research of a subtractive tripack during the Interwar years. I argued that Kodak 
research was not limited to the in-house work of the Kodak Research Laboratories 
scientists. Unlike traditional views concerning not only the history but the business and 
industrial research of Kodak, the development of new products came frequently within 
the scope of external technologies often theorised but not applied to the production 
side.237 To this end, photographic research was increasingly correlated with the patent 
system and its subsequent protection of intellectual property and innovation from 
1920. Scientific discoveries and inventions were hidden in patent jargon and in its 
claims. Thus the patent played an increasingly active part in the process of innovation 
and invention. Sometimes the research period was disconnected from the date of the 
patent’s award due to the strict control process of the patent application, such as the 
Troland’s case and the patent reissue 18680.238 For the photochemists Mannes and 
                                                     
237 Jenkins described in detail how Kodak Research was organised from 1912 on, using George Eastman 
correspondence and Kenneth Mees most significant publications. But he did not investigate other 
archival materials to understand how Kodak Research really worked in the first years of the Research 
Laboratory. See Jenkins, Images and Enterprise, chapter 14, section “Eastman Kodak. Research and 
Development,” 300-318. For his conference paper Sturchio also used Mees’s publications and academic 
literature about business and industrial research as well, but did not consider the administrative 
production of the Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester. See Sturchio, “Experimenting with Research: 
Kenneth Mees, Eastman Kodak, and the Challenges of Diversification,” 7-19. However, one could think 
that Sturchio and Thackray might have been able to consult the Rochester research reports, when they 
worked in close collaboration with the Kodak researchers at the end of the 1980s for the publication of 
Journey: 75 Years of Kodak Research in 1989. 
238 Troland’s reissued patent 18,680 is a good example of the use of a specific jargon in patent literature. 
For instance, the claim 232 mentioned “a photographic film for making color pictures comprising a base 
having on the same side a plurality of coatings including one coating which is sensitive to a color to 
which a second coating on the entrant side of said first coating is substantially insensitive and the 
second coating being sufficiently absorptive of other colors substantially to restrict the exposure of said 




Godowsky, who undertook long-term research of a subtractive bi-pack and tri-pack in 
collaboration with Eastman Kodak, the patent was a bureaucratic tool to announce 
their many innovations to the competition as much as a major constraint embedded in 
the research process and with which they had to deal.239 Some of the best evidence for 
the importance of the patent system in the photographic industry is the History of 
Color Photography published by the photochemist Joseph Friedman. The author was 
able to write his long narrative of technological systems of photographic reproduction 
in natural colour mostly from the expert analysis of hundreds of patents, frequently 
quoting various descriptions and formulas. As Friedman never worked for Eastman 
Kodak, the analysis of the patent literature was critical in ascertaining the state of the 
fundamental and industrial research for some Kodak processes such as the new 
Kodachrome or the wash-off relief process.240 Indeed, Eastman Kodak strengthened its 
use of the patent system as a strategic tool concerning fundamental research in colour 
photography during the Interwar years. 
Another section of chapter 4 dealt with the period that followed the release of the tri-
colour Kodachrome in 1935. Unlike official histories of photography, this product’s 
launch was far from an accomplishment. On the contrary, it represented a new 
beginning in colour research because the technology used was highly complex and 
ultimately required a simplification of its developing process. The research and 
development work at Kodak Park and the collaboration of the Harrow Research 
Laboratory was fundamental in improving the general characteristics of the 
Kodachrome process as well as protecting the innovation produced by the use of 
                                                     
239 Collins placed great emphasis on Mannes and Godowsky and their scientific collaboration with 
Eastman Kodak, but did not mention that they were affected by constraints of already patented 
technologies related to photochemical compounds. See Collins, The Story of Kodak, 205-215. 
240 The only biography of Friedman can be found in the second edition of the History of Color 
Photography published in 1968. The author of the introduction was the photographic consultant and 
expert Lloyd E. Varden, who was one of Friedman’s friends. Friedman gained his PhD in chemistry at the 
University of Chicago in 1926. Between 1928 and 1929 he assisted Edwin H. Land to develop his 
polarizer sheet and obtained his first patent together with the later founder of Polaroid. In 1929 
Friedman joined the research laboratories of the Technicolor Corporation and worked there several 
years before to leave for different positions in the photographic industry. In 1943, he took a position in 
the Ansco research laboratories. Such as Wall, he always remained out of the Eastman Kodak “silver 




patents. The scientific contribution of certain researchers at the Research Laboratory 
in Rochester had been underestimated as well, such as the colour research work of 
Wilder, Vittum or Jelley. Through analysis of the British archive and from his corpus of 
patents, the scientist Lot Wilder progressively emerged as a central figure of the in-
house research about colour photography at Rochester up to the end of the Second 
World War. He invented a new developing process for Kodachrome in 1938 and 
reduced the many steps from 28 to 18. He also patented an innovative process by 
which colour couplers were incorporated into the monopack film, unlike the 
Kodachrome process. There were some major technological constraints, however. The 
most important challenge for the Kodak researchers at that time was the development 
of a new solution to prevent the couplers from wandering into the adjacent layers of 
the monopack films. It was necessary that this innovation refrain from infringing on 
the German technology of long-chain molecules, which was protected by dozens of 
patents. 
Although Wilder suggested an approximate solution as seen above, it was the 
independent inventor Michele Martinez who authored a decisive invention secured by 
Kodak Limited and used later for the new Kodacolor negative film. The description of 
the scientific collaboration with Martinez, including the joint elaboration of a patent, 
clarified this fundamental innovation method used several times by Eastman Kodak. 
This unpublished account of such collaboration demonstrated that independent 
inventors were not always hired by the American manufacturer, like Mannes and 
Godowsky in 1930. When Eastman Kodak decided to collaborate with the Italian 
inventor, the Patents and Trade Marks Department of Kodak Limited was on the 
frontline, becoming the only interface between him and the Kodak Patent Offices. 
During this collaboration the Department outshone the Kodak Research Laboratories 
that were still used however as a task force necessary to support and validate the 
inventor’s assumptions. Thus, Martinez’ story ascertains the crucial role of Kodak 
Limited in the development of colour technologies in the 1930s and during the Second 
World War. This is particularly meaningful in the new understanding of how Kodak 




and collaborated with independent inventors on a temporary basis without recruiting 
them, in the style of “Open Innovation”. 
Kodak Limited started to collaborate with Martinez as early as 1924, through a non-
disclosure agreement referring to a colour photographic process. During the drafting 
of his first significant patent from 1937 onwards, Martinez not only approached Kodak 
Limited but also the British competitor Elliott & Sons from Barnet near London. Kodak 
Limited managed to strike a deal with Martinez and acquired the rights to his British 
patent 505,834. In this patent, the Italian inventor disclosed a physical solution to 
prevent the transfer of colour couplers into the adjacent layers during the chemical 
development of a monopack. His strategy was to localise the action of the colour 
former with a natural or artificial resin. This material would unite with the colour 
former “in a purely physical way” and not through a chemical combination. From the 
outbreak of the Second World War, Martinez continued to work on the improvement 
of his technology of localisation but also on new colour and printing processes. His 
work led to the British patent 543,606 that was obtained with the collaboration of 
Kodak Limited. For this new photographic process, the resin binders not only 
contained the colour former but also the silver halide that had been precipitated in 
close physical association with it. The resin binder, acting as an insulator for the silver 
salts and the colour couplers, itself spread into the gelatin of the emulsion. 
The rest of chapter 4 analysed the lengthy development work necessary for the British 
patent 543,606, which took place in 1941 and 1942. This scientific collaboration 
between Martinez and the team of the Patents and Trade Marks Department of Kodak 
Limited faced a major constraint. The Italian photochemist was arrested in January 
1941 and sent to one of the internment camps on the Isle of Man. Despite Martinez’s 
internment, he corresponded regularly with Branch and Crowther of Kodak Limited 
and they worked jointly on the specifications corresponding to the future British 
patent 543,606. The narrative of their scientific collaboration demonstrated that 
despite exceptional circumstances both the inventor and his correspondents at Kodak 




obtain the required patent. It also stressed that both Branch, Crowther and the Kodak 
Research Laboratories underestimated the potential of the many other inventions 
proposed by the prolific Italian inventor.   
I introduced in the last section of chapter 4 the research work of Karl Schinzel, another 
prolific photochemist, and his contribution to Kodak Research. Schinzel provided some 
scientific milestones to Eastman Kodak in the development of the Kodacolor system 
through the establishment of patents. As with Martinez, a crucial scientific 
collaboration took place between Schinzel and Eastman Kodak. The structure of this 
collaboration was important because it took several forms, from the first relationship 
with the independent inventor and the purchase of his patent rights, through the 
scientist employed and incorporated in the research structure at Rochester to the 
external consultant commissioned to spread industrial research in Europe via the 
creation of a new Research Laboratory. From the analysis of the legal agreements 
between Schinzel and Eastman Kodak it has been possible to ascertain the use of the 
modern concept of “Open Innovation” to develop new processes and inventions 
through Schinzel’s consultancy. The identification, classification and analysis of 
Schinzel’s complete patent work demonstrated that his scientific contribution was 
fundamental to Eastman Kodak within the framework of industrial research 
surrounding colour photography. By collating the specific jargon of the patent 
literature, the photochemical expressions used with Schinzel’s correspondence and 
archival materials issued from the Eastman Kodak Patent departments, it was possible 
to follow the creation of an invention from the technical discussions and brainstorming 
of the participants up to the final acceptance by a national Patent Office. 
The narrative of Schinzel’s scientific collaboration with Eastman Kodak was also the 
first account ever written about one of the major but neglected researchers of 
twentieth century photography. Schinzel briefly worked with Mannes and Godowsky 
at Rochester in 1937 and his patent work is at least as important as theirs. At the 
beginning of Schinzel’s collaboration with Eastman Kodak, the researchers from 




had to sort out, validate and possibly use. Like Martinez, Schinzel suffered during the 
Second World War and was forced to drastically reduce his laboratory and research 
work. Schinzel’s exhaustive correspondence and his legal agreements with Eastman 
Kodak revealed that without the outbreak of the War, the planned Research 
Laboratory in Switzerland would have played a major role together with the British and 
French Kodak Research Laboratories in innovation at Eastman Kodak. From Schinzel’s 
return from Rochester to Europe in 1938, the staff of the Patents and Trade Marks 
Department of Kodak Limited became the privileged interlocutors of the independent 
inventor. Through the scientific expertise of Branch and Crowther, some of Schinzel’s 
innovations and inventions resulted in invaluable patents.  
It is challenging to understand why the Eastman Kodak press machine neglected 
talented scientists like Wilder, Martinez and Schinzel. At the end of the 1980s, Kodak 
decided to put forward Mannes and Godowsky’s success story in its own history of 
photography and innovation and to ignore the three photochemists studied above. 
Kodak communicators simplified the narrative about colour photography, by claiming 
Mannes and Godowsky as co-geniuses and the only inventors of the three-colour 
Kodachrome, in the great tradition of the history of science. The fact that they had 
benefitted from external innovations developed by Martinez and Schinzel was also 
contrary to the corporate discourse claiming Kodak research as an in-house source of 
inventions per se. However, we have missed much by listening only to Kodak’s own 
history of innovation and neglecting corporate archives of prime importance such as 
research reports, notebooks and patent literature. By contrast, the present thesis that 
has used such archival materials clarified that the release of Kodachrome in 1935 was 
only one step along the way to improve fundamental and applied research in colour 
photography for the next decades. This research was governed by international 
teamwork and knowledge sharing implying key contributions from Mannes and 
Godowsky of course but also from Wilder, Martinez and Schinzel, as well as from a 




In the final conclusive chapter, I will undertake a general analysis of all the findings 
made during my research on the industrial and scientific research at Eastman Kodak 
and the contribution of the European Kodak Research Laboratories from 1928 to the 
end of the Second World War. In the core chapters I identified and clarified the 
structures used to develop industrial research, the methods of innovation selected to 
this end and the professional and social relationships between the managers, 
researchers and technicians that led to the development of a new science of 
photography within private laboratories or through independent photochemists. 
Several questions were solved through these chapters. I discussed and clarified the 
reasons for the creation of two additional Kodak Research Laboratories in Europe 
during the 1920s. The routine work performed in these laboratories was identified, as 
well as the nature of innovation favoured for these structures. I pointed out the 
methods used by the researchers to communicate and to share scientific knowledge 
together, in-house or through scientific communication. I unveiled the unknown 
involvement of Kodak Limited members of the Patents and Trade Marks department 
and their fruitful collaboration with independent inventors in the development of 
colour photography. I also stressed the importance of the patent system in the 
innovation methods of the photographic industry and the development of this growing 
constraint during the Interwar period. The final chapter will be an opportunity to 
compare the initial research questions and speculations with these results and to 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
So far, chapter 2 has proven that there was industrial research going on at Eastman 
Kodak before the opening of the first Research Laboratory in 1912. As early as the end 
of the nineteenth century, activity in fundamental and applied research was taking 
place at the Harrow Works while training trips and steady correspondence allowed the 
exchange of technological and scientific knowledge with the principal Works at 
Rochester. Chapter 2 also clarified that from 1912, the American Research Laboratory 
provided a better structure than the previous industrial laboratory to perform 
fundamental research and extend the knowledge of the photographic process. This 
initial period of the new research structure was largely characterised by a model of 
“Closed Innovation” in which researchers made scientific discoveries and produced 
knowledge within the laboratory. In chapter 3, we have also seen through the analysis 
of the research reports that the European Research Laboratories made an important 
contribution to innovation at Eastman Kodak during the 1927-1945 period. This 
analysis stressed in particular that the Harrow Research Laboratory favoured using 
“Closed” and “Open Innovations” together. In chapter 4, the study of unpublished 
correspondence folders from the Kodak Collection archive pointed out how the mutual 
work of the Patents and Trade Marks Department and Kodak Limited’s Research 
Laboratory was fundamental to scientific collaboration with independent 
photochemists for the drafting of key patents. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 offer some conclusions regarding the nature of the constraints 
faced by Kodak Research, the production and transfer of knowledge in the European 
Kodak Research Laboratories, the principles of scientific collaborations and the 
“models of innovation” used by Kodak in Europe during the twentieth century. 
Consequently, these chapters clarify that the French and British Research Laboratories 
played an important role in the R&D activities of the firm, at least from their opening 
to the end of the Second World War, contrary to the official discourse of the company, 
which has always emphasised the predominance of the Research Laboratory of 




journey of the European Kodak Research and by extension of the whole photographic 
research during the twentieth century has been neglected by scholarly studies. Until 
recently, the principal reason for this was the lack of existing industrial archives. In this 
final chapter, I will bring these different strands together by comparing first the 
findings provided by this study with the initial research questions. Furthermore, I will 
briefly mention the activities of Kodak European Research in the first years of the 
twentieth-first century to compare them to the situation of the interwar period, 
extensively studied in this thesis. I will also reflect on the nature of the research 
presented here and offer some suggestions for further work. 
 
5.1. Answers to the introductory questions 
 
In the central chapters I identified and clarified the organisations set up by the 
photographic industry to develop fundamental and applied research, the methods of 
innovation used to this end and the professional and social interactions between the 
managers, researchers and engineers that led to the development of a new science of 
photography within private laboratories or through the collaboration with 
independent photochemists. In this section I return to my original research questions 
and discuss the conclusions reached as a result of this research. The original questions 
were: 
1. To what extent did the practice of industrial secrecy in the process of film 
making restrain the sharing of photographic knowledge? 
2. Is there any evidence of basic and industrial research at Kodak Limited before 
the creation of the first Kodak Research Laboratory in Rochester in 1912? 
3. What was the strategy behind Eastman Kodak’s opening of two additional 




4. What do the contents of the French and British research reports tell us about 
the daily work of the researchers, the organisation and methods of industrial 
research and international scientific collaboration? 
5. Is it possible to uncover the nature of Kodak technological research and 
practices for the transfer of photographic knowledge through the analysis of 
the notebooks of some researchers? 
6. Is it possible to clarify in practical terms the scientific collaboration between 
independent inventors and Eastman Kodak through the analysis of legal 
agreements and other corporate documents? 
7. How important was the patent system to the innovation process at Eastman 
Kodak, and how was the patent literature designed from a purely practical 
point of view? 
8. Finally, considering the complete set of data gathered from the archives about 
the industrial research activities at Eastman Kodak, is it possible to qualify the 
type of innovation favoured by the company during the interwar years, and to 
confront it with recent “innovation models”? 
I will now revisit each of these questions in turn. 
1. To what extent did the practice of industrial secrecy in the process of film making 
restrain the sharing of photographic knowledge? 
The analysis of the archival and primary sources consulted clearly demonstrated in 
Chapter 2 the negative influence of the industrial secrecy on the sharing of 
photographic knowledge. The rare specialists of photographic emulsion working 
outside the main film manufacturing companies could not benefit from their scientific 
discoveries and practical innovations. During the interwar period, the possible transfer 
of photographic knowledge was only one-sided, from public research organisations to 
the research structures of Eastman Kodak, Ilford or Agfa among others. Practices of 
secrecy also spread among the Departments of the Kodak Research Laboratories and 
the production facilities thereby delaying the laboratory work and to some extent 




2. Is there any evidence of basic and industrial research at Kodak Limited before the 
creation of the first Kodak Research Laboratory in Rochester in 1912? 
Archival sources studied in Chapter 2 also provide answers to question 2. Small-scale 
fundamental research took place at Kodak Limited involving several modern 
organisational methods such as the transfer of technological knowledge with Kodak 
Park at Rochester and scientific collaboration with independent photochemists to 
develop and adapt the “science of photography” to mass production. In this context, 
the creation of the first Kodak Research Laboratory at Rochester in 1912 principally 
represented the deployment of a new organisation of industrial research rather than a 
serious break from the traditional structure of the industrial laboratory. Staff and 
budget progressively increased, while the Research Laboratory was used in parallel as 
a symbol of prestige against the competitors. 
 
3. What was the strategy behind Eastman Kodak’s opening of two additional Research 
Laboratories in Europe in the 1928? 
The in-depth historical narrative of the internationalisation of Eastman Kodak Research 
in 1928 (Chapter 3) provides a clear view of Eastman Kodak’s strategy. The creation of 
the British and French Research Laboratories does not constitute a single strategy, but 
was instead a result of multiple factors and originated from different causes. For Kodak 
Limited, the creation of the Research Laboratory took place first of all within the 
context of the modernisation of the Harrow Works. Secondly, the new structure was 
designed to improve the transfer of technological knowledge between the Research 
Laboratory at Rochester and Harrow. Thirdly, it was also intended to compete with the 
Ilford Research Laboratory by developing basic research on the chemistry of cyanine 
dyes, used as optical sensitizers. Finally, the new Research Laboratory was organised 
around the new European Kodak organisation, including the new Kodak-Pathé 
subsidiary in France and the new Kodak film plant at Cöpenick in Germany. 
For Kodak-Pathé, George Eastman had known the capacities for fundamental and 




making of a nonflammable film. French photochemists produced a corpus of scientific 
knowledge during two decades and it was seen as a valuable company asset when 
Eastman Kodak merged with Pathé in 1927. The decision was made to continue the 
development of photographic research at Vincennes and most of the researchers of 
the former French company were incorporated to this end. Ultimately, Mees’s will to 
establish teamwork between British and French researchers was another reason to 
develop scientific research in France. 
 
4. What do the contents of the French and British research reports tell us about the 
daily work of the researchers, the organisation and methods of industrial research and 
international scientific collaboration? 
An analysis of the French and British research reports and their teachings in Chapter 3 
provided an intimate look at the daily work of researchers as well as clarifying some 
aspects of the organisation of industrial research and international scientific 
collaboration. While a qualitative data analysis in the form of tag clouds applied to the 
title of 350 research reports did not provide significant results, the expert content 
analysis of this same corpus covering the period 1929-1935 provided a remarkable 
source of information about the activities of the Harrow Research Laboratory. Three 
main categories finally emerged from the global activities of the Harrow Research 
Laboratory. Standard fundamental research represented 13% of studied reports, 
standard industrial research and development represented 56% while the 
collaboration-oriented activities concerned 31% of the corpus of reports. These reports 
proved to be invaluable archival material for the historical social researcher by 
revealing the multifaceted nature of Kodak research in Europe. We knew from Kodak 
marketing discourse that Kodak scientists were partially conducting fundamental 
research activities, but the analysis of the French and British reports also teaches us 
that they solved multi-site manufacturing issues as well, conducted technology watch 
or reverse engineering and used the model of “Open Innovation” by benefitting from 





5. Is it possible to uncover the nature of Kodak technological research and practices for 
the transfer of photographic knowledge through the analysis of the notebooks of some 
researchers? 
As to question 5, using the notebooks of a number of researchers, it was found that 
content analysis of the selected notebooks provided an invaluable insight into the 
professional practices of the photochemists, production managers and researchers. 
Some paragraphs within the notebooks showed that the technological knowledge and 
the company’s know-how was kept, assessed and shared through a restricted 
community of people who were allowed to consult these collaborative tools. Some 
limitations of this study appeared as well, such as the rather small sampling of 
notebooks studied compared with the complete collection of notebooks available at 
the British Library or the lack of information about the supposed use of these 





Illustration 12. Eastman Kodak advertisement in Life magazine in 1943.1 
 
6. Is it possible to clarify in practical terms the scientific collaboration between 
independent inventors and Eastman Kodak through the analysis of legal agreements 
and other corporate documents? 
                                                     
1 “Kodak Research Has Made Color Photography a Part of Everyone’s Life,” Life, August 2, 1943, 39. This 
advertisement points out the Kodak Research path as an exciting adventure punctuated with 




The section of Chapter 2 about the agreement between the photochemist Krohn and 
Kodak Limited, and above all the sections of Chapter 4 about the terms of the 
agreements between Mannes, Godowsky or Schinzel and Eastman Kodak, answered 
question 6 by shedding light on the terms of scientific collaboration between 
independent inventors, employees and the American film manufacturer. Beyond the 
legal jargon incorporated in these formal documents, study of them demonstrated 
that they were extremely precise about the rights and duties of each party. This kind of 
archival source represents invaluable evidence for the study of intellectual property 
and innovation in the movie and photographic industry. 
 
7. How important was the patent system to the innovation process at Eastman Kodak, 
and how was the patent literature designed from a purely practical point of view? 
In Chapter 4 I clearly demonstrated how the patent system controlled the mechanisms 
of innovation within the specific framework of basic and industrial research 
undertaken for the development of a colour photographic process. As in other 
industries, the patent acted as a major constraint to innovation, which the researchers 
had to deal with. Furthermore, unpublished documents and correspondence provided 
a description of the time-consuming negotiating and drafting of several patent 
documents. These narratives of the whole process up to the final delivery of the patent 
showed that this procedure was an integral part of the scientific research process. 
 
8. Finally, considering the complete set of data gathered from the archives about the 
industrial research activities at Eastman Kodak, is it possible to qualify the type of 
innovation favoured by the company during the interwar years, and to confront it with 
recent “innovation models”? 
Pertaining to question 8, the many case studies processed in my thesis point out that 
the nature of innovation at Eastman Kodak was heterogeneous during the interwar 
years. On one side, the creation and activities of the Research Laboratories promoted a 




the research capabilities of the company and its subsidiaries. On the other hand, the 
Harrow Research Laboratory partially used a model of “Open Innovation” by 
investigating third party innovative technologies locally or in Europe, by partnering 
with local actors in testing some new materials or by developing scientific 
collaborations in-house and with independent inventors. The analysis of the structure 
of the Research Laboratory of Kodak Limited during its first years also revealed its 
small-scale size in terms of research and development. In this context, I argue that this 
reduced size forced the company to use the global model of “Hybrid Innovation”, as 
discussed in section 5.1, by mixing “Closed Innovation” and investigations of external 
sources of technological knowledge. This method of innovation is surprisingly modern 
and it appears that it led to successful collaborations between in-house researchers or 
technical experts and independent inventors. The intellectual property of some 
theoretical inventions was secured this way and new products were eventually 
launched afterwards. It is worth noting that the findings of this thesis shed a new light 
on the actual nature of Kodak Research during the twentieth century. Previously 
unknown activities of Kodak researchers in Europe point out the modern nature of 
Kodak Research organisation in those days. These findings fill a gap between the 
official discourse of Eastman Kodak about its history, as seen for instance in Illustration 
12, and what really happened in the laboratories. 
 
5.2. The significance of “Open Innovation” to Kodak 1927-
1945 
 
From the findings of Chapters 3 and 4, I argue that Kodak European Research was a 
prototypical modern organisation, partially using the recently developed concept of 
“Open Innovation”. This section clarifies the relationship between Kodak Limited’s 
recent activities and Kodak European Research during the interwar years, in the 




In the Eastman Kodak publication about the 75 years of Kodak Research mentioned in 
Chapter 2, it has already been pointed out that the Kodak Research Laboratories in the 
United States of America were drastically re-organised between 1985 and 1986, to 
better “fit the new company-wide structure.”2 In fact, the structure of the company 
had moved to a business-oriented one in November 1984, initially made up of 17 
business units. In 1990, the number of business units reached 27 and they were sorted 
into 5 groups. The Research Laboratories were also affected. “A large central research 
lab was replaced by several organisationally dispersed research laboratories.”3 The 
consequences of this reorganisation on the European Kodak Research Laboratories at 
the end of the twentieth century go beyond the framework of my research. However, 
one can assume that the business-oriented structure also reshaped the organisation of 
European research. 
More recently, a striking case study about Kodak Research in the United Kingdom 
created the opportunity to connect the model of “Open Innovation” to my historical 
research findings about this company. Kodak European Research (KER), an Open 
Innovation Centre, was opened in January 2006 in a regional cluster at Cambridge. This 
R&D unit was a result of the replacement of research facilities in Harrow, Paris and 
Chalon-sur-Saône in France.4 KER was supposed to identify potential partners and to 
develop scientific collaboration, locally and in the European, African, and Middle 
Eastern Region (EAMER). In these areas KER established global pipelines to access 
relevant information by identifying knowledge intermediaries. According to Eastman 
Kodak, KER was closed in 2009 due to the financial crisis. Despite the failure of this 
innovative outpost three years after its opening, the fact that Eastman Kodak judged 
                                                     
2 Journey: 75 years of Kodak Research, 152. 
3 Rzasa, Philip V., Terrence W. Faulkner, and Nancy L. Sousa, “Analyzing R & D Portfolios at Eastman 
Kodak,” Research Technology Management 33, no. 1 (1990): 27. 
4 “In the Picture. Kodak's New European Research Centre on Cambridge Science Park,” Catalyst. 
Cambridge Science Park Newsletter (Spring, 2006): 4-5. The article is derived from the interview of the 




the model of “Open Innovation”, as theorised by Chesbrough in 2003, relevant and 
useful must be pointed out.5 
In fact, Eastman Kodak decided to open the KER unit at Cambridge Science Park due to 
its many potential connections with industries, spin-off companies, universities and 
research institutes. In such a regional network, spatial proximity increased the transfer 
of tacit knowledge and the informal exchange of new ideas. The concept of “Open 
Innovation” was used to supplement the Kodak activities of Technology Intelligence, in 
order to identify possible threats or opportunities through the regional cluster. In 
practice, the mission of the rather small staff of 25 technical experts at KER was to 
identify the local buzz created from continuous exchanges and updates of information 
by companies embedded in the cluster. This information was used to facilitate access 
to knowledge, to capture the relevant new technological information and to speed up 
technological advancement.6 Figure 10 shows how this research work was undertaken 
practically, from the identification of new technologies and intermediaries to the 
development of technological collaborations. 
                                                     
5 Concerning the dismantling of KER in 2009, see Elisabeth Goodman, “Deep Visuals Ltd – how Kodak’s 
knowledge assets did not quite ‘walk out of the door’,” Cambridge Network webpage, 13/10/2009, 
http://www.cambridgenetwork.co.uk/news/deep-visuals-ltd-how-kodak-s-knowledge-assets-did-not-
quite, accessed April 14, 2015. 
6 Rani J. Dang, Letizia Mortara, Ruth Thomson and Tim Minshall, “Developing a Technology Intelligence 
Strategy to Access Knowledge of Innovation Clusters,” in Strategies and Communications for 
Innovations. An Integrative Management View for Companies and Networks, ed. Michael Hülsmann and 
Nicole Pfeffermann (Berlin; Heidelberg; New York: Springer, 2011), 51-71; see also Letizia Mortara, Ruth 
Thomson, Chris Moore, Kallopi Armara, Clive Kerr, Robert Phaal, and David Probert, “Developing a 
Technology Intelligence Strategy at Kodak European Research: Scan & Target,” Research Technology 





Figure 10. Design methodology of Technology intelligence at KER, moving from 
Scan to Target.7 
 
One of the conclusions given by Dang et al. about the KER experience at Cambridge 
echoes the situation of the Harrow and Vincennes Research Laboratories for the 
studied period of my research. 
By interacting with the Cambridge cluster, Kodak became more integrated within 
the local network as it could directly access relevant local knowledge that was not 
easily reachable from the headquarters in America.8 
                                                     
7 Mortara et al., “Developing a Technology Intelligence Strategy at Kodak European Research: Scan & 
Target,” 30. Both modes of Scan and Target were used in the Technology intelligence process to source 
new technologies outside of the organization. The result of the Scan mode was the identification of 
partners or technologies with high relevance to Kodak while the final Target mode was used to increase 
knowledge pertaining to these innovative entities, up to the forming of possible collaborations. 
8 Dang et al., “Developing a Technology Intelligence Strategy to Access Knowledge of Innovation 




For its collaboration-oriented activities, the Harrow Research Laboratory typically 
demonstrated a similar role of interface between Rochester and local actors and 
networks in Europe. The researchers investigated new technologies developed by local 
companies and travelled in Europe to find partners and promising technologies, 
whereas the staff of the Patents and Trade Marks Department at Harrow established 
scientific collaborations with Martinez and Schinzel. As to the Research Laboratory at 
Vincennes, its role as interface was lower because it already represented a unique 
source of science and technology and a network of contacts including intermediaries 
and suppliers. In addition, the French Laboratory, like the British Laboratory, 
exchanged scientific knowledge directly with Rochester. 
So, following my in-depth research into the activities of the Kodak Research 
Laboratories principally during the Interwar period, I can argue that the Harrow 
Research Laboratory, and to a lesser extent its French counterpart, partially used a 
similar strategy of “Open Innovation” for their collaboration-oriented activities.9 Each 
was acting not only as a “listening post” but also as a regional cluster which supplied 
the Eastman Kodak headquarters in Rochester with possible innovative technologies, 
new partners and scientific collaborations with independent photochemists. Just like 
the KER outpost and its networking activities with the Cambridge cluster, the European 
Research Laboratories and the other local actors in photochemistry constituted a 
scientific community during the interwar period that can be assimilated to an 
innovation network. With the benefit of hindsight, it is therefore possible to define the 
Kodak European Research structure during the years 1927-1945 as a prototypically 
modern organisation in terms of the ideas about innovation that were theorised only 
in the twenty-first century. 
Again, this research and its findings, such as the real nature of Kodak European 
Research, matter as they provide a rare glimpse into the Kodak “black box”, relevant to 
the methods of industrial research used by this international company. From this 
                                                     
9 As seen in section 5.1, I already argued that the Harrow research Laboratory used a global strategy of 




study, we discovered an entire segment of knowledge about the way photographic 
processes were invented in the twentieth century by one of the largest photographic 
and cinematographic firms. Regarding the significance of Eastman Kodak to 
photography history, it strongly complements our understanding of the Kodak 
photographic and cinematographic products, because this research was conducted for 
the first time from the analysis of the scientific production of the researchers and not 
from the analysis of top management correspondence, or the study of Kodak 
marketing discourse and advertisements. 
But this thesis is also crucial as it complements the history of photography and its 
evolution in the twentieth century. Scholars in the field have already pointed out the 
development of the photographic industry, such as Coote, McCauley, or Pritchard.10 
Other academics have stressed the development of a new visual culture following the 
release of photographic colour processes, such as Bellone and Fellot, Boulouch and 
Roberts.11 However, a study of the nature of research and development activities in 
the photographic industry had never been done before, except Lavédrine and 
Gandolfo’s noteworthy publication about the development of the autochrome process 
and the history of the Lumière family enterprise.12 And yet, doing the history of 
photography in a comprehensive and holistic manner means studying the uses of 
photography since 1839, but also studying the long-term invention of photography. 
This last field of the history of photography was and is still active with key studies 
clarifying the invention and development of the first photographic processes before 
                                                     
10 Coote, The Illustrated History of Colour Photography; Elizabeth Anne McCauley, Industrial Madness: 
Commercial Photography in Paris, 1848-1871 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994; Michael 
Pritchard, “The Development and Growth of British Photographic Manufacturing and Retailing 1839-
1914” (PhD diss., De Montfort University, 2010). 
11 Roger Bellone and Luc Fellot, Histoire mondiale de la photographie en couleurs : des origines à nos 
jours (Paris: Hachette Réalités, 1981); Nathalie Boulouch, Le ciel est bleu : une histoire de la 
photographie couleur (Paris: Textuel, 2011); Pamela Glasson Roberts, The Genius of Color Photography: 
from the Autochrome to the Digital Age (London: Goodman, 2010). See also the more technological 
publication of Sylvie Pénichon, Twentieth-century color photographs: Identification and care (Los 
Angeles, California: Getty Conservation Institute, 2013). 
12 Bertrand Lavédrine and Jean-Paul Gandolfo, The Lumière Autochrome: History, Technology, and 




and after 1839, and up to the 1870s.  But a similar study was missing for the further 
inventions of photography in the twentieth century. However, the history of twentieth 
century photography does not only concern the study of the many uses of 
photography including his social context, and the analysis of photographic archives or 
photographers’ work. If we want to study photography “as a whole”, we need to 
consider that “doing photography” also means re-inventing the medium by 
progressively creating new processes in a highly socialised context. Researchers 
developing photographic processes independently or within the context of the 
industrial research laboratory in the twentieth century were often the first 
practitioners of their experimental films. Despite a body of technological, scientific and 
material constraints, they knew which technical characteristics to achieve and 
benefitted from a constant spirit of competition due to the consistently high volume of 
the transfer of scientific knowledge from the patent literature and from the specialised 
periodicals. Scientists and photochemists had the desire for photography, at least the 
desire to create new analogue photographic processes which would change the visual 
culture of the popular imagination, including memories in colour, from their release 
into the market. When Karl Schinzel theorized a subtractive monopack process he 
called Katachromie in 1905, he was unable to develop this first concept of a multi-
layered photographic process, which was only a brilliant idea at the time. But he had 
the desire to produce it one day. When Mannes and Godowsky experienced the poor 
colours of a movie using a four-colour additive process in 1917, they also wished for a 
new cinematographic film to be able to provide a better reproduction of natural 
colours. These situations were similar to Talbot’s disappointment, while drawing the 
panorama of Lake Como in 1833, wishing to create a process able to mechanically 
reproduce and fix the image displayed by the camera lucida.13 The present thesis 
stressed this notion of social desire regarding the further inventions of twentieth 
century photography. 
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This research also points out that photography and cinematography historians have 
many topics of common interest and should therefore share their research and 
findings, since most big film manufacturing companies worked for both markets in the 
twentieth century. This remark was particularly relevant with regard to the conference 
I attended in December 2015, at the Fondation Jérôme Seydoux-Pathé in Paris, about 
the studies made so far from the Kodak-Pathé research notebooks.14  
This thesis contributed to the field of history of technology as well, having clarified 
Eastman Kodak’s contribution to the development of industrial research 
internationally, the company’s use of industrial secrecy and its parallel use of patent 
strategy. Regarding Kodak’s industrial research, the thesis complements the existing 
studies of large-scaled organisations mentioned in section 1.2.3. such as General 
Electric, AT&T, Du Pont and Philips. In particular, it clarified the management of multi-
site industrial research, split into three main research laboratories and the related 
circulation of scientific knowledge. This research went beyond previously existing 
studies about patented technologies of the photographic industry, such as Corcy and 
Schimmelman on inventories of patents.15 It not only inventoried patents in a specific 
photographic technology, but also clarified the drafting of several patents and the 
production and transfer of related scientific knowledge. This unique narrative of the 
patent “in the making” helped to understand the specific moment of the creation of an 
invention and scientists’ rationale. 
This research also addressed the field of business history, as there was always a 
connecting lead between Kodak industrial research and the marketplace. It showed 
how the industrial research structure was progressively set up, how Mees conceived its 
organisation and how and why two additional research laboratories were opened at 
                                                     
14 See Stéphanie Salmon, ed., Les Cahiers De Recherche Pathé (1904-1930) (Paris: Fondation Jérôme 
Seydoux-Pathé, forthcoming). 
15 Marie-Sophie Corcy, Inventaire des brevets du relief optique : dépôts français 1852-1998 (Paris: 
Prodiex, 2001); Janice G. Schimmelman, American Photographic Patents 1840-1880: The Daguerreotype 
and Wet Plate Era (Nevada city: Carl Mautz-Publishing, 2002); see also Franz Schmitt, Dictionnaire des 




the end of the 1920s. Furthermore, the thesis clarified how Eastman Kodak innovated 
practically. From the very first invention to the release of a final product, Kodak mixed 
in-house fundamental and applied research and the use of external sources of 
knowledge. This is particularly relevant for the recent field of innovation studies and a 
source of instruction for existing large companies. 
Finally, the study was made “from the inside” in this thesis, while answering Latour’s 
call, as seen in section 1.2.4., also echoed the epistemological concerns of Science and 
Technology Studies scholars, when they address the nature of scientific knowledge and 
of scientific practice. My analytical method used for the study of the Harrow Research 
reports could benefit academic laboratory studies in other industrial sectors, by 
investigating scientific archives with a similar combination of Grounded Theory with 
the concept of interactional expertise, as introduced in section 3.2.1., to make it 
possible to identify the origins of industrial research strategies, the organisation of the 
work and its social dimension. 
 
5.3. Limitations of this study 
 
It is worth remembering that this thesis constitutes one of the first academic studies 
using Kodak corporate and scientific archives only recently available to scholars. The 
understanding of the Kodak Collection Archive and of the Kodak-Pathé Archive as a 
whole still remains. Therefore, further research on these archives might provide 
findings which could complement some of the conclusions of the present thesis. 
In particular, it was not possible to study in the thesis the impact of the German defeat 
in 1945 and the subsequent transfer of Agfa technologies to Eastman Kodak and other 
film manufacturers. This was due not only to the lack of documentation in the British 
and French Kodak archives, but also to the large amount of time spent on the analysis 




not study the American activities of Kodak during the Manhattan Project and the 
possible contribution of Kodak Limited.  
As regards methodology, some initial tracks studied during the literature review 
process were not used in the thesis, such as the concept of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) conceptualised by Norman Fairclough or the method of corpus linguistics.16 
However, CDA or corpus linguistics techniques could be of benefit to the analysis of 
the Harrow research reports or the Vincennes research notebooks, as these large 
bodies of literature follow a homogeneous editorial standard. Such analysis techniques 
could be used once all or part of the corpora have been digitised and deciphered with 
optical character recognition software. For my research, I did not pursue this option 
finally, notably because of the strict regulations at the British Library pertaining to the 
reproduction of special collections materials. 
Furthermore, I decided to study only the first part of the Harrow research reports 
corpus due to the large amount of documents available. Thus, the findings about the 
activities of the Harrow Research Laboratory cover only the years 1929 to 1935. 
 
5.4. Further research 
 
As a consequence of the final limitation outlined above, it would be logical to extend 
the data collection and analysis of the Harrow Research Laboratory up to 1940 and 
beyond, to study the impact of the Second World War on Kodak industrial research in 
England, in particular. 
It would also be necessary to inventory and study the complete corpus of the personal 
notebooks available in the Kodak Collection archive, as it was not entirely identified so 
                                                     
16 See Norman Fairclough, Media Discourse (London; New York: E. Arnold, 1995); Tony McEnery and 
Andrew Hardie, Corpus Linguistics: Method, Theory and Practice (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 




far. This would allow a further comparison with the Marcel Mayer notebook held at 
the Fondation Jérôme Seydoux-Pathé already studied in section 3.3.1. 
Of course, it would also be necessary to investigate other Kodak archives in the United 
States of America. In particular, it would be fundamental to ascertain whether the 
equivalent Rochester research reports survived at the George Eastman Museum or at 
the University of Rochester, to complement the study about the transfer of knowledge 
between the three Kodak Research Laboratories carried out in chapter 3.17 The 
analysis of the Rochester research reports might also unveil the many activities of the 
first Kodak Research Laboratory and help to open this initial “black box” to define the 
nature of innovation used at Rochester from 1912. More specifically, it would be worth 
identifying and analysing the American researcher Lot Wilder's familial archive, if one 
exists, to better clarify his research work at the Kodak Research Laboratory in 
Rochester and his contribution to Kodak Research. 
Lastly, this thesis has highlighted the activities of a community of Kodak researchers 
and independent photochemists and a part of their destiny. It would be worth 
undertaking an iconographic analysis of the two Kodak archives to complement our 
knowledge about the research laboratories, the manufacturing plants and about these 
women and men who invented, for the most part anonymously, twentieth-century 
photography. The visual material itself contained in the Harrow research reports would 
greatly benefit from further academic research. 
                                                     
17 For example, the Kodak Historical Collection #003 held by the Rush Rhees Library at the University of 






acetylation process. A chemical reaction producing cellulose acetate material and as 
well as acetic acid. 
backing. A photographic or cine film is usually backed, incorporating an additional anti-
halation layer to prevent any rays of incident light from being reflected again 
through the emulsion. The anti-halation backing is also used to improve the anti-
static behaviour of the film. 
collodion. A dissolution of cellulose nitrate (nitrocellulose) gelled in a mixture of 
alcohol and ether. 
colloidal chemistry. A branch of chemistry involving the study of colloids and their 
physico-chemical behaviour. A colloid is the suspension of at least two substances, 
the first being made of minute particles and dispersed into the second. In 
photography, the photographic emulsion can be described as a colloidal suspension 
made of a solid light-sensitive material (silver halide crystals) dispersed in gelatin, 
which is coated on a film support. 
coupler. A coupler is a chemical component necessary for colour development. It is 
either present in the layers of a tripack film, or in the specific developer for each 
layer. During the film development, after the exposure, the developer first reacts 
with the silver halide grains present in the emulsion to form silver and oxidised 
developing agent. Then the coupler reacts with this oxidised developing agent to 
produce an insoluble dye. This chemical reaction is called a coupling reaction. The 
coupler's action forms a dye, the expression yellow-forming coupler, magenta-
forming coupler and cyan-forming coupler being frequently used. 
diazotype. A reproduction process by contact printing using the diazo chemical 
process. Diazo paper can be produced by combining a diazonium salt with an azo 
dye. Diazotype processes create blue-line reproductions on a white background 
without continuous tones. 
diffraction spectroscope. An instrument used to identify chemical materials by 
spectroscopic analysis, from a light source diffracted by the spectroscope. 
dye-transfer process. A color photographic printing process involving the successive 
transfer of cyan, magenta, and yellow dyes onto a sheet of gelatin-coated paper. It 
was also used by Technicolor Corporation in the imbibition dye transfer process 
from the three black and white printing matrix films to produce the final colour film. 
See imbibition. 
fogged. An emulsion is fogged when unwanted density, made of silver crystals, can be 
found locally on the developed film. In the case of emulsion research, this issue 
mostly comes from chemical fogging. 
gamma. In a photographic film, the slope of its characteristic curve is called gamma. It 
is used in sensitometry to characterise its contrast, to study the influence of 




graininess. A perceptual concept referring to the visual appearance of the granular 
structure in a photographic image. It is different from the physical property of the 
photographic structures that produce graininess, which is called granularity. 
horizontal integration. A business practice used to increase the production capability 
of the company via acquisition or merger. The use of horizontal integration 
particularly allows the reduction of commercial impact from the competition and 
the increase in market share. 
hypersensitisation. When an emulsion is exposed to light, it enters a temporary phase 
that is called latent image. This phase is not chemically stable and can degrade if the 
exposed emulsion is not developed. The use of hypersensitisation techniques 
before the exposition provides an increase of the latent image lifetime, up to the 
development of the photographic material. It is often used in astrophotography for 
long exposures. 
imbibition. A particular type of diffusion involving the absorption of water by solids-
colloids and an increase in volume. Imbibition was particularly used by Technicolor 
Corporation for the dye-transfer technique necessary to produce final colour film. 
See dye-transfer process. 
Latent image. An invisible image produced when a photosensitive material is exposed 
to light. This image becomes visible when the photographic film is developed. 
lenticular. A film made to reproduce natural colours is said to be lenticular if one side 
of its base is embossed with minute lenticulated elements. These optical elements 
are similar to minute lenses, directing rays of coloured light to the relevant area of 
the black and white emulsion at the back of the film base. The first Kodacolor 
lenticular process used 22 lenticulated elements per millimeter. 
maturation. The maturation or ripening is the action of letting the recently mixed 
emulsion stand for a specific time and at a specific temperature, before it is coating 
on a photographic support. During the process of maturation the emulsion speed 
increases because the size of the silver grains also progressively increases. 
monopack. A synonym of the term integral tripack. Monopack derives from the 
product of Technicolor Corp., Monopack, a single-strip colour reversal film 
introduced in 1941. See tripack. 
orthochromatic emulsion. An early black and white photographic emulsion that is 
sensitive only to the blue and green spectrum. Most photographic emulsions 
manufactured by the industry between the 1880s and the 1910s were 
orthochromatic. 
panchromatic emulsion. A black and white photographic emulsion that is sensitive to 
the full visible light, from the blue to the red spectrum. The first panchromatic 
photographic plates were introduced in 1906 by the British company Wratten & 
Wainwright, following Mees' research work to expand the sensitivity of the 
emulsion to all wavelengths of the visible light. 
photometer. An instrument used to measure the densities of exposed areas of 
processed photographic materials, in the context of a sensitometric survey. 
Radiographic film. A photographic film, used for general radiography and medical 
purposes, able to record X-rays, an electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths 




reverse engineering. In the industry, a technique used to analyse the components of a 
product to understand their nature and ascertain how the final product was made. 
The final goal of the process is the ability to manufacture a similar product from this 
analysis. 
sensitising dyes. In a photographic emulsion, chemical dyes used to increase the 
sensitivity of silver halide crystals to other areas of the visible light. Their discovery 
led to the production of panchromatic emulsions. 
sensitometer. An instrument used to conduct sensitometric tests, in which the 
photographic material is exposed to a specific amount of light using a standard 
artificial light source. 
sensitometry. The measurement of the sensitivity of photographic materials. 
Sensitometry is conducted practically by exposing, processing and analysing 
photographic films. The analysis involves the use of densitometry, the 
measurement of the density of processed photographic materials. 
solarisation. An exposure to light of a photographic element creating the partial or 
entire reversal of the image tones, by physical overexposure. 
tripack. A tripack, or integral tripack, is a photographic color film coated with at least 
three layers one on top of the other. Each layer is made of an emulsion sensitive to 
a specific area of the visible spectrum. The complete design of such a multilayered 
film including the film base and possible additional layers is known as an integral 
tripack. Tripack films use the subtractive method of colour reproduction, that 
involves the selective analysis and absorption by the three layers of the red, green 
and blue components of the photographed subject. See also monopack. 
wedge spectrograph. An instrument providing the relative photosensitivity of a 
photographic material. It produces its spectrogram, i.e. its spectral response to an 
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Montréal: Presses Universitaires, 1958.  
Didiée, Louis. Le Film Vierge Pathe ́: Manuel De dev́eloppement Et De Tirage. Paris: Les 
Et́ablissements Pathé-Cinéma, 1926.  
Eggert, John and Arpad von Biehler. »Bericht über Den VIII. Internationalen Kongress 
für Wissenschaftliche Und Angewandte Photographie, Dresden, 1931.« Dresden: 
Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1932.  
Friedman, Joseph Solomon. History of Color Photography. Boston: American 
Photographic Publishing Company, 1944.  
Gallafent, Victor. “The Direction of Photographic Research.” The Photographic Journal 
94, (April, 1954): 104-118.  
Gauntlett, Margaret D. “A History of Kodak Limited to 1977.” Unpublished report, 
1978, Harrow Research Division, Kodak Limited, Harrow.  
Hale, George E. “Industrial Research and National Welfare.” Science 48, no. 1247 
(1918): 505-507.  
Hamor, William Allen. “The Research Couplet: Research in Pure Science and Industrial 
Research.” The Scientific Monthly 6, no. 4 (1918): 319-330.  
Harrison, G. B. “The Laboratories of Ilford Limited.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences 220, no. 1143 (December 
22, 1953): 9-20.  
Hurter, Ferdinand and Vero Charles Driffield. “Photochemical Investigations and a New 
Method of Determination of the Sensitiveness of Photographic Plates.” Journal of 
the Society of Chemical Industry 9, no. 5 (1890): 455-469.  
———. The Photographic Researches of Ferdinand Hurter and Vero C. Driffield, edited 
by Ferguson, William Bates. London: Royal Photographic Society of Great Britain, 
1920.  
James, Thomas H. A Biography-Autobiography of Charles Edward Kenneth Mees, 
Pioneer of Industrial Research. Rochester, N.Y.: Photographic Research 
Laboratories, Eastman Kodak Co., 1990.  
Krohn, F. W. Thomas. “Early Kodak Days”. Unpublished report, 1932, Kodak Limited, 
Harrow. 
Little, Arthur D. “Industrial Research in America.” Science 38, no. 984 (1913): 643-656.  
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List of the 62 Harrow research reports (1929-1935) used in section 3.2.1 for the 
analysis of the Harrow Research Laboratory activities (2/2). 
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